DESIGNING STABLE MECHANISMS FOR ECONOMIC
... Chen and Gazzale, 2004; Healy, 2006). Thus, mechanisms that induce dynamically stable games will drive play to equilibrium, while mechanisms that induce unstable games will not. These ‘wind tunnel’ tests suggest that theorists should add dynamic stability to the constraints of the mechanism design p ...
... Chen and Gazzale, 2004; Healy, 2006). Thus, mechanisms that induce dynamically stable games will drive play to equilibrium, while mechanisms that induce unstable games will not. These ‘wind tunnel’ tests suggest that theorists should add dynamic stability to the constraints of the mechanism design p ...
Context$Dependent Forward Induction Reasoning
... transparent that Bob believes she would play Up and, given this, a rational Bob should have played Out. Thus, conditional upon her information set being reached, Ann must forgo the hypothesis that Bob is rational and so may very well think that Bob is playing In-Right. In this case, she may make the ...
... transparent that Bob believes she would play Up and, given this, a rational Bob should have played Out. Thus, conditional upon her information set being reached, Ann must forgo the hypothesis that Bob is rational and so may very well think that Bob is playing In-Right. In this case, she may make the ...
The One-Third Law of Evolutionary Dynamics The Harvard
... other extreme, w = 1, fitness equals payoff. In the replicator dynamics of infinite populations, the selection intensity cancels out so that it has no effect on the evolutionary outcome. However, it is known that it crucially matters in finite populations (Traulsen et al. 2007b). To address evolution i ...
... other extreme, w = 1, fitness equals payoff. In the replicator dynamics of infinite populations, the selection intensity cancels out so that it has no effect on the evolutionary outcome. However, it is known that it crucially matters in finite populations (Traulsen et al. 2007b). To address evolution i ...
Kanniainen 01 ee08 6538261 en
... move production to the Netherlands caused a consumer boycott. A person who joins a consumer boycott is typically willing to pay a higher price for a good produced by a …rm not boycotted. Moreover, those organizing the boycott often want to see other consumers join.1 The internet and other modern mea ...
... move production to the Netherlands caused a consumer boycott. A person who joins a consumer boycott is typically willing to pay a higher price for a good produced by a …rm not boycotted. Moreover, those organizing the boycott often want to see other consumers join.1 The internet and other modern mea ...
Modeling infinitely many agents
... shortcoming of the Lebesgue unit interval, especially for the three problems as discussed above. To resolve the same or related problems with the Lebesgue unit interval, various approaches have been proposed, such as distributional equilibria, standard representations, hyperfinite agent spaces, satu ...
... shortcoming of the Lebesgue unit interval, especially for the three problems as discussed above. To resolve the same or related problems with the Lebesgue unit interval, various approaches have been proposed, such as distributional equilibria, standard representations, hyperfinite agent spaces, satu ...
Class Project (Project 2) - University of Arizona Math
... • This is the real world of business, where we expect our competitors to be well-managed companies • other 18 companies are sitting in their offices and boardrooms making the same calculations that we have just performed. Given the results, other companies will also elect to subtract less than 31.38 ...
... • This is the real world of business, where we expect our competitors to be well-managed companies • other 18 companies are sitting in their offices and boardrooms making the same calculations that we have just performed. Given the results, other companies will also elect to subtract less than 31.38 ...
Evolutionary game theory
... This is because all individuals are doing the best for themselves, and this is not necessarily the best for the population as a whole. To illustrate this point consider the Hawk–Dove game. In this game the same resources are available per pair regardless of the strategies employed by population memb ...
... This is because all individuals are doing the best for themselves, and this is not necessarily the best for the population as a whole. To illustrate this point consider the Hawk–Dove game. In this game the same resources are available per pair regardless of the strategies employed by population memb ...
An Introduction to Game Theory
... uncertainty is another individual, namely Beril. If Ali believes that Beril is going to invest in the venture, then his optimal choice is the venture as well, whereas, if he thinks Beril is going to invest in bonds, his optimal choice is to invest in bonds. Furthermore, Beril is in a similar situati ...
... uncertainty is another individual, namely Beril. If Ali believes that Beril is going to invest in the venture, then his optimal choice is the venture as well, whereas, if he thinks Beril is going to invest in bonds, his optimal choice is to invest in bonds. Furthermore, Beril is in a similar situati ...
Chapter 6 Games - Cornell Computer Science
... social, natural, or technological system really means two things: first, an underlying structure of interconnecting links; and second, an interdependence in the behaviors of the individuals who inhabit the system, so that the outcome for any one depends at least implicitly on the combined behaviors ...
... social, natural, or technological system really means two things: first, an underlying structure of interconnecting links; and second, an interdependence in the behaviors of the individuals who inhabit the system, so that the outcome for any one depends at least implicitly on the combined behaviors ...