Deliberation as Coordination through Cheap Talk ∗ Randall Calvert Washington University, St. Louis

... achieve preferred outcomes for most or all individuals through coordinated actions. The present paper portrays this problem as a multi-player version of a battle-of-thesexes (BoS) game, and deliberation is represented as a sequence of pre-play proposals for various coordinated action patterns. Failu ...

... achieve preferred outcomes for most or all individuals through coordinated actions. The present paper portrays this problem as a multi-player version of a battle-of-thesexes (BoS) game, and deliberation is represented as a sequence of pre-play proposals for various coordinated action patterns. Failu ...

Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite

... we introduce a parameter w, which determines the contribution of the game’s payoff to fitness. This parameter, quantifying the intensity of selection, cancels out in deterministic replicator dynamics of infinite populations, but plays a crucial role in finite populations, as we shall see. We can cal ...

... we introduce a parameter w, which determines the contribution of the game’s payoff to fitness. This parameter, quantifying the intensity of selection, cancels out in deterministic replicator dynamics of infinite populations, but plays a crucial role in finite populations, as we shall see. We can cal ...

The Distribution of Optimal Strategies in Symmetric Zero-sum

... The main result is obtained in Corollary 1 and states the following: if games are drawn from a symmetric, regular probability distribution then, for every set of actions S, the probability that a symmetric zero-sum game admits an optimal strategy with support S is 2−(n−1) if S has odd cardinality an ...

... The main result is obtained in Corollary 1 and states the following: if games are drawn from a symmetric, regular probability distribution then, for every set of actions S, the probability that a symmetric zero-sum game admits an optimal strategy with support S is 2−(n−1) if S has odd cardinality an ...

EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN THE NASH DEMAND GAME AN

... is because, with positive probability, the individuals (i or j) that are not choosing a best reply will switch their demands, choosing a best reply. The previous claim implies that if a state is absorbing it must belong to the set NE. It is easy to check that eﬃcient conventions are absorbing. Now ...

... is because, with positive probability, the individuals (i or j) that are not choosing a best reply will switch their demands, choosing a best reply. The previous claim implies that if a state is absorbing it must belong to the set NE. It is easy to check that eﬃcient conventions are absorbing. Now ...

Evolutionary Game Theory and Population Dynamics

... The behaviour of systems of interacting individuals can be often described within game-theoretic models [48, 24, 25, 103, 100, 79, 36, 106, 27, 14, 37, 66, 67, 68]. In such models, players have at their disposal certain strategies and their payoffs in a game depend on strategies chosen both by them ...

... The behaviour of systems of interacting individuals can be often described within game-theoretic models [48, 24, 25, 103, 100, 79, 36, 106, 27, 14, 37, 66, 67, 68]. In such models, players have at their disposal certain strategies and their payoffs in a game depend on strategies chosen both by them ...

Subsidization to induce tipping

... primary result of this paper is that asymmetric subsidy programs will eliminate the inferior equilibrium at less expense to the government agency than a uniform subsidy program, whether or not all agents are identical and even if private values are anonymous. The asymmetric subsidy scheme which we d ...

... primary result of this paper is that asymmetric subsidy programs will eliminate the inferior equilibrium at less expense to the government agency than a uniform subsidy program, whether or not all agents are identical and even if private values are anonymous. The asymmetric subsidy scheme which we d ...

Hannu Salonen Bonacich Measures as Equilibria in Network

... We investigate the cases when the Bonacich measures of strongly connected directed bipartite networks can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. One such case is a two-person game such that the utility functions are bilinear, the matrices of these bilinear forms represent th ...

... We investigate the cases when the Bonacich measures of strongly connected directed bipartite networks can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. One such case is a two-person game such that the utility functions are bilinear, the matrices of these bilinear forms represent th ...