CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONALISM
... there is not one but an infinite number of infinite regresses that seem to threaten our ability to justifiably believe anything, on the supposition that all justification is inferential. Peter Klein has recently argued in an unpublished paper for a view he calls infinitism. He accepts the first clau ...
... there is not one but an infinite number of infinite regresses that seem to threaten our ability to justifiably believe anything, on the supposition that all justification is inferential. Peter Klein has recently argued in an unpublished paper for a view he calls infinitism. He accepts the first clau ...
Study Guide: René Descartes
... Deduction: Beginning only with facts one knows with complete certainty, reasoning to reach further facts that are known with certainty. o Any belief of which one is not completely certain cannot qualify as knowledge. Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy are intended to show that we can be a ...
... Deduction: Beginning only with facts one knows with complete certainty, reasoning to reach further facts that are known with certainty. o Any belief of which one is not completely certain cannot qualify as knowledge. Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy are intended to show that we can be a ...
The Essentials of Pragmatism
... capable of determinate scientific investigation; 2) it conforms to our common sense understanding of things; 3) it offers an alternative to traditional metaphysics, extracting whatever was worthwhile in the old doctrines. -through an imaginary dialogue, P further elaborates this doctrine... ...
... capable of determinate scientific investigation; 2) it conforms to our common sense understanding of things; 3) it offers an alternative to traditional metaphysics, extracting whatever was worthwhile in the old doctrines. -through an imaginary dialogue, P further elaborates this doctrine... ...
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Peirce What Pragmatism Is [DOC]
... 10. The reader does not doubt that he can exert self-control over his future actions, that selfpreparation will impart to action one character i.e. absence of self-reproach. a. As action is repeated it tends toward the perfection of that fixed character. b. Where no self-control is possible there wi ...
... 10. The reader does not doubt that he can exert self-control over his future actions, that selfpreparation will impart to action one character i.e. absence of self-reproach. a. As action is repeated it tends toward the perfection of that fixed character. b. Where no self-control is possible there wi ...
Why Should We Believe Moral Claims?
... the idea that we can start from certain moral principles, without having to justify them by argument, implies that those moral principles must be infallible, incorrigible, etc. But I have never been able to get anyone to tell me why this would be so.12 Why may we not hold our starting points open to ...
... the idea that we can start from certain moral principles, without having to justify them by argument, implies that those moral principles must be infallible, incorrigible, etc. But I have never been able to get anyone to tell me why this would be so.12 Why may we not hold our starting points open to ...
1 Empiricism, Rationalism, and Plato`s Innatism Intro to Philosophy
... be known a posteriori as well—as when a young child learns by counting that two apples bunched together with two other apples equals four apples—and how this affects the status of one’s apparent knowledge of such truths. For rationalists, statements which can be known both a posteriori and a priori ...
... be known a posteriori as well—as when a young child learns by counting that two apples bunched together with two other apples equals four apples—and how this affects the status of one’s apparent knowledge of such truths. For rationalists, statements which can be known both a posteriori and a priori ...
1 “A Counter-Example to Contextualism about Justificatory
... evidence at t1, they would know that p, the plane will stop in Chicago, based on his evidence? Clearly, since he knows in this reversed scenario about Mary and John’s skeptical doubts, and not having gotten the calls from his airline and travel agents yet at this point, he wouldn’t. What about at t2 ...
... evidence at t1, they would know that p, the plane will stop in Chicago, based on his evidence? Clearly, since he knows in this reversed scenario about Mary and John’s skeptical doubts, and not having gotten the calls from his airline and travel agents yet at this point, he wouldn’t. What about at t2 ...
Knowledge
... Questioning Is it possible that we have any knowledge at the level of certitude? one of the most difficult subject in epistemology ...
... Questioning Is it possible that we have any knowledge at the level of certitude? one of the most difficult subject in epistemology ...
Plato, knowledge and virtue
... both beautiful and not beautiful. • Therefore, we can have knowledge of the Forms, though not through our senses. • The highest knowledge is knowledge of the Form of the Good: it is from the good that ‘things that are just and so on derive their usefulness and value… Is there any point in having the ...
... both beautiful and not beautiful. • Therefore, we can have knowledge of the Forms, though not through our senses. • The highest knowledge is knowledge of the Form of the Good: it is from the good that ‘things that are just and so on derive their usefulness and value… Is there any point in having the ...
Philosophy 165: Epistemology
... because you saw them get married. But unknown to you, they actually got married before the stage wedding and therefore you have a false belief that they were married in front of you when they were not. So you still know that they are married but it is based on a false believe. And it proved to be to ...
... because you saw them get married. But unknown to you, they actually got married before the stage wedding and therefore you have a false belief that they were married in front of you when they were not. So you still know that they are married but it is based on a false believe. And it proved to be to ...
Some basic terminology
... some point, we may want to gives reasons, justifications, for these beliefs. Empiricists say that justification of a belief must always end in some kind of appeal to sense experience. (For example, “I know that P is true because I saw Q.”) Rationalists deny this, and say that, at least sometimes (ma ...
... some point, we may want to gives reasons, justifications, for these beliefs. Empiricists say that justification of a belief must always end in some kind of appeal to sense experience. (For example, “I know that P is true because I saw Q.”) Rationalists deny this, and say that, at least sometimes (ma ...
1 “Our cabaret is a gesture. Every word that is spoken and sung here
... the anthropologist’s macrocosm is this: co-presence. At least the presence of persons is not, thankfully, reducible to the anthropologist’s relationships with them. In this realization, anthropology might find a purpose for the displacement of knowledge.” And: “I like to think that anthropologists c ...
... the anthropologist’s macrocosm is this: co-presence. At least the presence of persons is not, thankfully, reducible to the anthropologist’s relationships with them. In this realization, anthropology might find a purpose for the displacement of knowledge.” And: “I like to think that anthropologists c ...
THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
... laws. But such backing is not always strong enough for knowledge. Whether it is so or not depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. If I were asked how I knew that a physical object of a certain sort was in such and such a place, it would, in general, be a sufficient answer for me to sa ...
... laws. But such backing is not always strong enough for knowledge. Whether it is so or not depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. If I were asked how I knew that a physical object of a certain sort was in such and such a place, it would, in general, be a sufficient answer for me to sa ...
Can We Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? The James/Clifford
... belief is properly basic? Plantinga alleges that the condition of foundationalism for a properly basic belief is the following: (F) A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and only if p is selfevident, incorrigible, or ‘evident to the senses’ for S. This is classical foundationalism, bas ...
... belief is properly basic? Plantinga alleges that the condition of foundationalism for a properly basic belief is the following: (F) A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and only if p is selfevident, incorrigible, or ‘evident to the senses’ for S. This is classical foundationalism, bas ...
Rationalism
... experienced “disillusionment” because of the turbulent times in which he lived (Protestant Revolution, Church beliefs cast into doubt, Copernicus & Galileo challenged religious/scientific truths ...
... experienced “disillusionment” because of the turbulent times in which he lived (Protestant Revolution, Church beliefs cast into doubt, Copernicus & Galileo challenged religious/scientific truths ...
here - News @ Wesleyan
... find this reasoning to be fully convincing on its own terms, yet I have also come to realize that “belief ” is not a central analytic category to the philosophical and theological texts with which I tend to work. In fact, many of these texts explicitly reject belief as inimical to thinking itself. So ...
... find this reasoning to be fully convincing on its own terms, yet I have also come to realize that “belief ” is not a central analytic category to the philosophical and theological texts with which I tend to work. In fact, many of these texts explicitly reject belief as inimical to thinking itself. So ...
Correspondence, Coherence, and Pragmatic Theories of Truth
... theory of truth. That theory holds that judgements we make about the world are true or false depending on whether they correspond to facts. ANY theory of truth must satisfy three requisites by displying the following features: Features of the Theory: Theory of truth must contain an account of fal ...
... theory of truth. That theory holds that judgements we make about the world are true or false depending on whether they correspond to facts. ANY theory of truth must satisfy three requisites by displying the following features: Features of the Theory: Theory of truth must contain an account of fal ...
Notes to Introduce Epistemology
... He would build his knowledge upon this one undoubtable thing. The one undoubtable thing: He was a thinking substance. “I doubt; therefore I think.” “I think; therefore I am.” ...
... He would build his knowledge upon this one undoubtable thing. The one undoubtable thing: He was a thinking substance. “I doubt; therefore I think.” “I think; therefore I am.” ...
Plato
... There is also intelligent ignorance, as when someone does not know X and acknowledges forthrightly that he does not know it, etc. More thought is needed on this matter…. However, Plato’s view of ignorance as having non-being (nothingness) as its object does not seem correct (or at least not ...
... There is also intelligent ignorance, as when someone does not know X and acknowledges forthrightly that he does not know it, etc. More thought is needed on this matter…. However, Plato’s view of ignorance as having non-being (nothingness) as its object does not seem correct (or at least not ...
Plato
... There is also intelligent ignorance, as when someone does not know X and acknowledges forthrightly that he does not know it, etc. More thought is needed on this matter…. However, Plato's view of ignorance as having non-being (nothingness) as its object does not seem correct (or at least not ...
... There is also intelligent ignorance, as when someone does not know X and acknowledges forthrightly that he does not know it, etc. More thought is needed on this matter…. However, Plato's view of ignorance as having non-being (nothingness) as its object does not seem correct (or at least not ...
Rationalism - George Belic Philosophy
... had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing a ...
... had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing a ...
Philosophy Years 5 - The da Vinci Decathlon
... Strawman – Misrepresenting someone’s argument to make it easier to attack Middle ground - Claiming that a compromise or middle point between two arguments is the truth False Cause -Presuming that a real or perceived relationship between things means that one is the cause of the other. Appeal to natu ...
... Strawman – Misrepresenting someone’s argument to make it easier to attack Middle ground - Claiming that a compromise or middle point between two arguments is the truth False Cause -Presuming that a real or perceived relationship between things means that one is the cause of the other. Appeal to natu ...
This dissertation is a critique of three strands of recent
... problem is with the naturalists’ use of the concept of “belief.” I argue that naturalistic philosophy of mind, while perhaps acceptable for other purposes, does not deliver a concept of “belief” consistent with the constraints and needs of naturalized epistemology. I achieve this by offering a taxon ...
... problem is with the naturalists’ use of the concept of “belief.” I argue that naturalistic philosophy of mind, while perhaps acceptable for other purposes, does not deliver a concept of “belief” consistent with the constraints and needs of naturalized epistemology. I achieve this by offering a taxon ...
HERE - A Universal Basic Income
... whether deductive or inductive, are usually less obvious than many of their instances. Towards the end of our inquiry I shall return to the definition of “knowledge,” and shall then attempt to give more precision and articulation to the above suggestions. Meanwhile let us remember that the question ...
... whether deductive or inductive, are usually less obvious than many of their instances. Towards the end of our inquiry I shall return to the definition of “knowledge,” and shall then attempt to give more precision and articulation to the above suggestions. Meanwhile let us remember that the question ...