Russell, Bertrand - The Problems of Philosophy
... as they appear. Here we have already the beginning of one of the distinctions that cause most trouble in philosophy -- the distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality', between what things seem to be and what they are. The painter wants to know what things seem to be, the practical man and the phi ...
... as they appear. Here we have already the beginning of one of the distinctions that cause most trouble in philosophy -- the distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality', between what things seem to be and what they are. The painter wants to know what things seem to be, the practical man and the phi ...
MODELS OF POSSIBILISM AND TRIVIALISM
... a general view of logical consequence might not be neat enough. Something similar happens with the case of the internal logic of degenerate toposes. Logical notions, from truth values to zero-, first- and higherorder connectives can be defined in toposes. However, in degenerate toposes (categories i ...
... a general view of logical consequence might not be neat enough. Something similar happens with the case of the internal logic of degenerate toposes. Logical notions, from truth values to zero-, first- and higherorder connectives can be defined in toposes. However, in degenerate toposes (categories i ...
Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1996. HOW TO
... I. What is Non-cognitivism? Non-cognitivism about a particular family of terms presupposes a more general distinction: that between cognitive and non-cognitive discourse in general. In effect, the standard literature offers two possible answers to the question as to how this distinction is to be ch ...
... I. What is Non-cognitivism? Non-cognitivism about a particular family of terms presupposes a more general distinction: that between cognitive and non-cognitive discourse in general. In effect, the standard literature offers two possible answers to the question as to how this distinction is to be ch ...
AN OBVIOUS-BASED ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY
... Concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs) are statements of the form: ‘I know that p, but possibly q’, where q obviously entails not-p. ‘Possibly’ here expresses epistemic possibility. But what is epistemic possibility? There are different accounts, and these different accounts deliver different verd ...
... Concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs) are statements of the form: ‘I know that p, but possibly q’, where q obviously entails not-p. ‘Possibly’ here expresses epistemic possibility. But what is epistemic possibility? There are different accounts, and these different accounts deliver different verd ...
Dialogue Games for Inconsistent and Biased Information
... that is, the agent is not complete certain, but biased to believe the former. A belief state is called biased when more evidence exists to believe than to disbelieve something or vice versa. A special case of a biased belief state is when an agent is not convinced either to believe a statement or to ...
... that is, the agent is not complete certain, but biased to believe the former. A belief state is called biased when more evidence exists to believe than to disbelieve something or vice versa. A special case of a biased belief state is when an agent is not convinced either to believe a statement or to ...
Basic Concepts and Distinctions - The University of Texas at Arlington
... life-saving medicine, but that I, a physician, have only enough medicine for one of them. Obviously, I would like to save all the needy people, and would do so if I could, but the situation constrains me. I must make a tragic choice. 9 In what is called a “many-valued logic,” there are more than two ...
... life-saving medicine, but that I, a physician, have only enough medicine for one of them. Obviously, I would like to save all the needy people, and would do so if I could, but the situation constrains me. I must make a tragic choice. 9 In what is called a “many-valued logic,” there are more than two ...
Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping
... its sleeve. As a result, there is little of semantic or philosophical importance that rides on the back of assertion. From a sentence’s making a genuine assertion, it doesn’t follow that the sentence describes anything. The minimalist theme sounded here derives largely from the work of Crispin Wrigh ...
... its sleeve. As a result, there is little of semantic or philosophical importance that rides on the back of assertion. From a sentence’s making a genuine assertion, it doesn’t follow that the sentence describes anything. The minimalist theme sounded here derives largely from the work of Crispin Wrigh ...
What if all truth is context-dependent?
... – something can be defined as absolutely true if it is true in all contexts containing the one it is posited in. Such a quantification is, of course, an absolute notion – standing above a never-ending progression of ever wider contexts. Quite apart from this being a utterly impractical process (how ...
... – something can be defined as absolutely true if it is true in all contexts containing the one it is posited in. Such a quantification is, of course, an absolute notion – standing above a never-ending progression of ever wider contexts. Quite apart from this being a utterly impractical process (how ...
Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi
... whether or not a statement, envisaged as uttered on a particular occasion, would express a truth is a function only of the content it would have on that occasion and the state of the world in relevant respects. The more basic kind of realism involves, I suggest, the assumption of a sort of mechanica ...
... whether or not a statement, envisaged as uttered on a particular occasion, would express a truth is a function only of the content it would have on that occasion and the state of the world in relevant respects. The more basic kind of realism involves, I suggest, the assumption of a sort of mechanica ...
1 What is Scientific Progress? Lessons from Scientific Practice Moti
... the receiver of a blood transfusion has antibodies against the donor blood cells. He grouped blood types into three groups, which he designated as A, B, and C (which later became O and the AB blood group was subsequently added by others). Thanks to Landsteiner’s work, the first successful blood tran ...
... the receiver of a blood transfusion has antibodies against the donor blood cells. He grouped blood types into three groups, which he designated as A, B, and C (which later became O and the AB blood group was subsequently added by others). Thanks to Landsteiner’s work, the first successful blood tran ...
Deductive Reasoning
... This is not a skeptical worry about whether justification is preserved but rather an explanatory question about why deductive inference has this positive normative status. There are several different theories of why deductive reasoning preserves justification. On one view, the explanation is that co ...
... This is not a skeptical worry about whether justification is preserved but rather an explanatory question about why deductive inference has this positive normative status. There are several different theories of why deductive reasoning preserves justification. On one view, the explanation is that co ...
The Objectivity of the Past
... Pragmatism is not synonymous with Rorty, however, and Huw Price has developed an alternative pragmatism to that of Rorty’s – one that does not slight any notion of representation but gives ‘one cheer’ to representationalism on “a spectrum ranging from complete rejection of representationalism, on th ...
... Pragmatism is not synonymous with Rorty, however, and Huw Price has developed an alternative pragmatism to that of Rorty’s – one that does not slight any notion of representation but gives ‘one cheer’ to representationalism on “a spectrum ranging from complete rejection of representationalism, on th ...
1 "Plato on Akrasia and Knowing Your Own Mind" Section 1
... about what the lines of thought that we have explored may suggest about Plato's conception of rationality. Section 2: Issues Raised by Recent Work on Self-Knowledge So now let us turn to the worries to which our lack of awareness of our own minds might give rise. To begin, we are creatures that have ...
... about what the lines of thought that we have explored may suggest about Plato's conception of rationality. Section 2: Issues Raised by Recent Work on Self-Knowledge So now let us turn to the worries to which our lack of awareness of our own minds might give rise. To begin, we are creatures that have ...
SI Hayakawa, Charles Sanders Peirce and the Scientific Method
... tutional means. This method, Peirce explains, “has… been one of the chief means of upholding correct theological and political doctrines.” These kinds of beliefs are enforced through the “will of the state,” a ruling aristocracy, an organized guild, or a professional priesthood (CP, vol.5, par.379). ...
... tutional means. This method, Peirce explains, “has… been one of the chief means of upholding correct theological and political doctrines.” These kinds of beliefs are enforced through the “will of the state,” a ruling aristocracy, an organized guild, or a professional priesthood (CP, vol.5, par.379). ...
A problem for expressivism
... would automatically be true or false. They would be true just when the beliefs they expressed were true, just when the attitudes they reported obtained. The reason, according to expressivists, that ethical sentences lack truth conditions is precisely that they express attitudes without reporting the ...
... would automatically be true or false. They would be true just when the beliefs they expressed were true, just when the attitudes they reported obtained. The reason, according to expressivists, that ethical sentences lack truth conditions is precisely that they express attitudes without reporting the ...
EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTUAL BELIEF
... The foregoing only establishes that perceptual experiences cannot be logical reasons for the contents of perceptual beliefs. It does not establish that experiences cannot be reasons, as well as causes, for perceptual belief-acts. Why cannot a tree-experience both cause and be a reason for the act of ...
... The foregoing only establishes that perceptual experiences cannot be logical reasons for the contents of perceptual beliefs. It does not establish that experiences cannot be reasons, as well as causes, for perceptual belief-acts. Why cannot a tree-experience both cause and be a reason for the act of ...
introphil_Week 4 – Morality: Objective, Relative or
... of things that can be true or false, and what makes them true or false are facts that are generally independent of who we are or what cultural groups we belong to – they are objective moral facts. ...
... of things that can be true or false, and what makes them true or false are facts that are generally independent of who we are or what cultural groups we belong to – they are objective moral facts. ...
What is an Anthropology of the Contemporary?
... ‘wonderful fact’ that our thoughts in their multiple differences can still be of ‘the same’. And with this fact dismisses the question of whether that ‘same’ be a single thing, a whole class of things, an abstract quality and so on. He suggests, “our meanings are of singulars, particulars, indefinit ...
... ‘wonderful fact’ that our thoughts in their multiple differences can still be of ‘the same’. And with this fact dismisses the question of whether that ‘same’ be a single thing, a whole class of things, an abstract quality and so on. He suggests, “our meanings are of singulars, particulars, indefinit ...
Chapter 9 Not Knowing Mar. `10 “Ignorance is the necessary
... honoured, inputs to our reasoning devices are free from the taint of ignorance (or in a softer version, lack of reason to believe). There are two interesting kinds of case which give the lie to thinking so. In each, ignorance plays a crucial and cognitively virtuous role. In the one, it is a conditi ...
... honoured, inputs to our reasoning devices are free from the taint of ignorance (or in a softer version, lack of reason to believe). There are two interesting kinds of case which give the lie to thinking so. In each, ignorance plays a crucial and cognitively virtuous role. In the one, it is a conditi ...
The Implications for the Principle of Bivalence of Accepting Truth as
... pseudo-scientific. For some reason, unfathomable to certain theorists, metaphysics, in philosophy, lost this objective of truth being established by way of verification- or knowability. It is, of course, true that philosophy does its work differently to science, and it may therefore be argued that m ...
... pseudo-scientific. For some reason, unfathomable to certain theorists, metaphysics, in philosophy, lost this objective of truth being established by way of verification- or knowability. It is, of course, true that philosophy does its work differently to science, and it may therefore be argued that m ...
Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws
... such—nor therefore any knowledge about it—with the ability to learn by reasoning, to the suggestion that the message of Lewis Carroll's famous 1995 note in Mind is that it leads to vicious regress, or circularity, to suppose that acquiring knowledge by inference must presuppose knowledge of the good ...
... such—nor therefore any knowledge about it—with the ability to learn by reasoning, to the suggestion that the message of Lewis Carroll's famous 1995 note in Mind is that it leads to vicious regress, or circularity, to suppose that acquiring knowledge by inference must presuppose knowledge of the good ...
Rene Descartes
... seated by the fire right now, writing in his notebook. The second argument undercuts even this sort of everyday belief: one might be dreaming that one sees what one sees. Dreams, at the time of dreaming anyway, can seem just like waking life. If we have no criterion by means of which to distinguish ...
... seated by the fire right now, writing in his notebook. The second argument undercuts even this sort of everyday belief: one might be dreaming that one sees what one sees. Dreams, at the time of dreaming anyway, can seem just like waking life. If we have no criterion by means of which to distinguish ...
The Semantic Paradoxes Continued
... what caused Frege to stop doing mathematics and do philosophy of language instead. ...
... what caused Frege to stop doing mathematics and do philosophy of language instead. ...
Hilary Kornblith, On Reflection
... Though few may sing reflection’s praises aloud, it occupies a central and, some think, indispensable role in much of our theorizing across philosophy. It is a familiar, almost commonsensical, thought that what distinguishes us from the earth’s “lesser” creatures is our ability to reflect. While cats ...
... Though few may sing reflection’s praises aloud, it occupies a central and, some think, indispensable role in much of our theorizing across philosophy. It is a familiar, almost commonsensical, thought that what distinguishes us from the earth’s “lesser” creatures is our ability to reflect. While cats ...