A rtificial-intelligence research is undergoing a revolution
... In response Maxwell might bite the bullet and claim, quite correctly, that the room really is bathed in luminance, albeit a grade or quality too feeble to appreciate. (Given the low frequency with which the man can oscillate the magnet, the wavelength of the electromagnetic waves produced is far too ...
... In response Maxwell might bite the bullet and claim, quite correctly, that the room really is bathed in luminance, albeit a grade or quality too feeble to appreciate. (Given the low frequency with which the man can oscillate the magnet, the wavelength of the electromagnetic waves produced is far too ...
Strong AI – can machines really think
... Functionalist – consciousness remains Biological naturalist – consciousness vanishes. Brain computer interface (BCI) ...
... Functionalist – consciousness remains Biological naturalist – consciousness vanishes. Brain computer interface (BCI) ...
Searle`s Chinese Room Argument and its Replies
... Mariano de Dompablo Cordio Philosophy University of Wisconsin, La Crosse __________________________________________________________________ Abstract This paper treats the philosophy of John R. Searle in his article "Minds, Brains, and Programs". It shows, using Searle's Chinese room argument (CR), t ...
... Mariano de Dompablo Cordio Philosophy University of Wisconsin, La Crosse __________________________________________________________________ Abstract This paper treats the philosophy of John R. Searle in his article "Minds, Brains, and Programs". It shows, using Searle's Chinese room argument (CR), t ...
here
... famous in the field of AI, and why it is important (historical context). 3) A list of at least two references. Each reference should contain enough information to let someone else actually find and consult your source without any detective work. ...
... famous in the field of AI, and why it is important (historical context). 3) A list of at least two references. Each reference should contain enough information to let someone else actually find and consult your source without any detective work. ...
Minds, brains, and programs - human
... i , he viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and *"* ThiSIcC Xu^iraTut;of theS I assume this b an empirical fact about the actua. causal relations between --*£«— do^ls) ^ a product of causa ^ .^.^^ (2) Instantiating a computer progr ...
... i , he viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and *"* ThiSIcC Xu^iraTut;of theS I assume this b an empirical fact about the actua. causal relations between --*£«— do^ls) ^ a product of causa ^ .^.^^ (2) Instantiating a computer progr ...
Richard W. Hamming - Learning to Learn
... B says we can, in principle, make a Von Neuman machine pass a Turing test, but it would not be conscious. C is still materialist, but suggests we couldn’t make a Von Neuman machine pass a Turing test. But we might with some other, man-made mechanism, such as neural nets or biological computers. D is ...
... B says we can, in principle, make a Von Neuman machine pass a Turing test, but it would not be conscious. C is still materialist, but suggests we couldn’t make a Von Neuman machine pass a Turing test. But we might with some other, man-made mechanism, such as neural nets or biological computers. D is ...
Philosophy 4610
... considering the functions of the mind or brain we find certain operations which we can explain in purely mechanical terms. This we say does not correspond to the real mind: it is a sort of skin which we must strip off to find the real mind. But then in what remains we find a further skin to be strip ...
... considering the functions of the mind or brain we find certain operations which we can explain in purely mechanical terms. This we say does not correspond to the real mind: it is a sort of skin which we must strip off to find the real mind. But then in what remains we find a further skin to be strip ...
Artificial Intelligence: Computers do not think
... political cause the state of being characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, and thought : MIND the totality of conscious states of an individual the normal state of conscious life the upper level of mental life of which the person is aware as contrasted with unconscious processes ...
... political cause the state of being characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, and thought : MIND the totality of conscious states of an individual the normal state of conscious life the upper level of mental life of which the person is aware as contrasted with unconscious processes ...
3 churchlands could a machine think?
... conversational questions and remarks typed into a console by you or me, and the outputs are typewritten responses from the SM machine. The machine passes this test for conscious intelligence if its responses cannot be discriminated from the typewritten responses of a real, intelligent person Of cour ...
... conversational questions and remarks typed into a console by you or me, and the outputs are typewritten responses from the SM machine. The machine passes this test for conscious intelligence if its responses cannot be discriminated from the typewritten responses of a real, intelligent person Of cour ...
01A
... o Passing presumably requires knowledge base, natural language processing, context understanding • “Eliza” o Computer program written in 1966 (Weizenbaum) o Trivial program (~200 lines of code), simply bounces back human input with minor modifications o Many people thought it was a human o Challenge ...
... o Passing presumably requires knowledge base, natural language processing, context understanding • “Eliza” o Computer program written in 1966 (Weizenbaum) o Trivial program (~200 lines of code), simply bounces back human input with minor modifications o Many people thought it was a human o Challenge ...
Comment on John Searle's "What Your Computer Can’t Know" Bill Hibbard
... behavior enough? Of course for many purposes it is enough. If the computer can fly airplanes, drive cars, and win at chess, who cares if it is totally nonconscious? But if we are worried about a maliciously motivated superintelligence destroying us, then it is important that the malicious motivation ...
... behavior enough? Of course for many purposes it is enough. If the computer can fly airplanes, drive cars, and win at chess, who cares if it is totally nonconscious? But if we are worried about a maliciously motivated superintelligence destroying us, then it is important that the malicious motivation ...
Turing Test and Natural Language Processing
... Each team will pick randomly and independent to act either as a HUMAN or a CHATBOT For 5 minutes, the class will ask each team arbitrary questions Each time a different team member will answer the question As HUMAN, a team will come up with an answer by typing on their computer As CHATBOT, a team wi ...
... Each team will pick randomly and independent to act either as a HUMAN or a CHATBOT For 5 minutes, the class will ask each team arbitrary questions Each time a different team member will answer the question As HUMAN, a team will come up with an answer by typing on their computer As CHATBOT, a team wi ...
File - Mr. Warner`s US History
... period of time, cannot tell which is which. Turing claims that any computer that passed such a test would have to be able to think. ...
... period of time, cannot tell which is which. Turing claims that any computer that passed such a test would have to be able to think. ...
epiphenomenal
... Without "understanding" we cannot describe what the machine is doing as "thinking". Because it does not think, it does not have a "mind" in anything like the normal sense of the word. Therefore "strong AI" is mistaken (Searle). ...
... Without "understanding" we cannot describe what the machine is doing as "thinking". Because it does not think, it does not have a "mind" in anything like the normal sense of the word. Therefore "strong AI" is mistaken (Searle). ...
CSE 5290 Artificial Intelligence
... Suppose we ask the Chinese Room to prove that John Searle is not a conscious being. After a while, it comes up with a learned paper that looks remarkably like Searle’s paper, but switches “computer” and “human” throughout, along with all the corresponding terms. The claim would be that if Searle’s a ...
... Suppose we ask the Chinese Room to prove that John Searle is not a conscious being. After a while, it comes up with a learned paper that looks remarkably like Searle’s paper, but switches “computer” and “human” throughout, along with all the corresponding terms. The claim would be that if Searle’s a ...
Philosophical Arguments Against AI.
... knowably sound, saying to assume otherwise: ...seems to be totally at variance with what mathematicians seem actually to be doing when they express their arguments in terms that can (at least in principle) be broken down into assertions that are ‘obvious’ and agreed by all. I would regard it as far- ...
... knowably sound, saying to assume otherwise: ...seems to be totally at variance with what mathematicians seem actually to be doing when they express their arguments in terms that can (at least in principle) be broken down into assertions that are ‘obvious’ and agreed by all. I would regard it as far- ...
Artificial Intelligence
... 1. “Although it is established that there are limitations to the powers of any particular machine, it has only been stated without any sort of proof, that no such limitations apply to the human intellect” I.e. are we sure humans can prove all true theorems? ...
... 1. “Although it is established that there are limitations to the powers of any particular machine, it has only been stated without any sort of proof, that no such limitations apply to the human intellect” I.e. are we sure humans can prove all true theorems? ...
2101INT – Principles of Intelligence Systems
... caused by low-level neurological processes inside the neurons It is the unspecified properties of the neurons that matter – and equivalent mental states are not produced by something else with the same functional behaviour Of course, this theory doesn’t define why neurons have this power but the con ...
... caused by low-level neurological processes inside the neurons It is the unspecified properties of the neurons that matter – and equivalent mental states are not produced by something else with the same functional behaviour Of course, this theory doesn’t define why neurons have this power but the con ...
Homework 6: Can a computer think
... played with a male and a female?” Turing believed this would be possible within 50 years of writing his article. Turing’s work suggested that intelligence in general, including human intelligence, should be characterized in terms of the carrying out of a computation over uninterpreted symbols accord ...
... played with a male and a female?” Turing believed this would be possible within 50 years of writing his article. Turing’s work suggested that intelligence in general, including human intelligence, should be characterized in terms of the carrying out of a computation over uninterpreted symbols accord ...
Chinese room
The Chinese room is a thought experiment presented by the philosopher John Searle to challenge the claim that it is possible for a computer running a program to have a ""mind"" and ""consciousness"" in the same sense that people do, simply by virtue of running the right program. The experiment is intended to help refute a philosophical position that Searle named ""strong AI"":""The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds.""To contest this view, Searle writes in his first description of the argument: ""Suppose that I'm locked in a room and ... that I know no Chinese, either written or spoken"". He further supposes that he has a set of rules in English that ""enable me to correlate one set of formal symbols with another set of formal symbols"", that is, the Chinese characters. These rules allow him to respond, in written Chinese, to questions, also written in Chinese, in such a way that the posers of the questions – who do understand Chinese – are convinced that Searle can actually understand the Chinese conversation too, even though he cannot. Similarly, he argues that if there is a computer program that allows a computer to carry on an intelligent conversation in a written language, the computer executing the program would not understand the conversation either.The experiment is the centerpiece of Searle's Chinese room argument which holds that a program cannot give a computer a ""mind"", ""understanding"" or ""consciousness"", regardless of how intelligently it may make it behave. The argument is directed against the philosophical positions of functionalism and computationalism, which hold that the mind may be viewed as an information processing system operating on formal symbols. Although it was originally presented in reaction to the statements of artificial intelligence (AI) researchers, it is not an argument against the goals of AI research, because it does not limit the amount of intelligence a machine can display. The argument applies only to digital computers and does not apply to machines in general. This kind of argument against AI was described by John Haugeland as the ""hollow shell"" argument.Searle's argument first appeared in his paper ""Minds, Brains, and Programs"", published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 1980. It has been widely discussed in the years since.