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ADJUSTING ROMANIAN VALUES TO EUROPEAN STANDARDS Values define Europe, not borders. José Manuel Barroso Abstract: the main assertion of this paper is that a proper integration into EU structures requires a process of adjusting national values to European standards, that is ideal-type (in the weberian sense) European values. Unfortunately, recent surveys have showed that Romania is characterized by value incompatibilities in vital fields such as democracy, rule of law or tolerance. After identifying the deep causes of this phenomenon as due to axiological uncertainty, a common feature both for the communist regime and the post-communist transition, the writer suggests that a suitable solution would be to increase the levels of social capital in the Romanian society by fighting corruption and promoting voluntary action. Key terms: values, democracy, rule of law, tolerance, axiological uncertainty, communism, post-communist transition, social capital, corruption, voluntary action. Introduction. The European Union is sometimes mistakenly identified as only a geographic entity or a common market, established to spur intra-European economic integration. While the EU is certainly both of these, it is in reality much more, since its inception in the 1950s on through today the EU has been a community based on the shared values that guide Member States and their citizens as they live, work and interact with each other, with their neighbours and with the wider world. It is because of this state of facts that countries who wish to join the club not only have to meet political, economic or social criteria as imposed from above, but they also have to realize that the most salient priority is to internalize these shared values which underpin the European project. Detangling the value concept. Defining the concept of value has always been controversial. One of the causes responsible for this difficulty is made up of the different meanings the term holds in various disciplines. In aesthetics or philosophy for example, the concept has a normative connotation, values thus representing the basis on which the distinction between good and wrong or beautiful and ugly is made. In the field of social sciences, which deal with the study of values as one of their main preoccupation, a consensus on how to define them has not been reached yet. Still, both psychologists and sociologists agree upon the fact that values are elusive to define and therefore difficult to operate with. Despite this initial agreement though, there is a lack of consensus between the two categories, as psychologists tend to see values as a way of Ioana Lung-Adjusting Romanian Values to European Standards selective orientation in connection with individual motivations, needs and attitudes, whereas sociologists tend to link values with social norms, habits and ideologies. Generally speaking and from a normative perspective, values can be identified as general criteria that make us orientate, lines between what is and is not socially permitted or desirable. One of the definitions which enjoy a large acceptance among sociologists belongs to Kluckhohn, who sees values as an explicit or implicit concept, distinctive for an individual or characteristic for a group, regarding what is desirable and influencing the selection between available ways and means of action (Voicu, Voicu, 2002). In connection with this definition, the author also defines the term of value orientation, as a generalised and wellorganized outlook regarding the environment and the place of the individual inside of it, but also the relations of the individual with the others members of the society and the social rules it encompasses. Among the most important characteristics attached to the value concept is the fact that they cannot be observed directly, but rather as included in behaviour, decisions and attitudes. To put it differently, they are not ways or means of action, but principles that underlie and guide actions, and thus the difficulty to quantify them. One step further, Rokeach considers that values do not exist independently, but organised in what he calls a system of values, a dynamic hierarchy influenced by culture, society or personal experience (Voicu, Voicu, 2002). European standards. Besides the field of psychology or sociology, it has become obvious that values are highly topical in the context of European integration too. The beginning of the new century has seen the Union submerged in an omnipresent debate of unprecedented intensity on its underlying values and the need for the Member States and accession countries to internalize these values both at societal and individual level. At least four factors can be cited for bringing discussion of values to a head: the drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, the so-called Austrian crisis of the same year, the general turmoil in international politics following September 11 and, finally, the European Convention’s drafting of the European Union’s new constitutional treaty. Truth is that in order to speak about a European identity or its legal dimension, the European citizenship, one cannot resort to concepts like race, language or religion, but to more latent realities such as guiding principles, attitudes or beliefs. It has been emphasized that Member States will not be able to find a common ground on a functional level as long as they do not agree on their ideas about Europe. Back in the 1950’s, Monnet used to say that building the European project meant not only forming a coalition of states, but uniting people. Half a decade later, more and more EU high-officials emphasize in their speeches the fact that the European Union must be seen as a community based on shared values (see, for example, dr. Joe Borg’s speech, European Values, delivered at the SDM International Conference “The Common Heritage of Europe”, Malta, 14 May 2005). All in all, values are the noblest mean we posses to tackling the non-material issue of community belonging. Despite this however, the notion of European values remains foggy, as it is used with different meanings in different contexts. Toggenburg argues that the discussion circulating around this issue is usually based on one of the three different preconceptions of what constitutes European values (Toggenburg, 2004:7-11). Firstly, European values are often referred to as political principles underlying the European Communities (founding values). Secondly, the term arises regularly in the debate on “European identity” and, in this context, one refers to various ideological stances as European values (European ideas). These European ideas try to sketch a hidden ideological agenda or a common cultural Ioana Lung-Adjusting Romanian Values to European Standards backbone for Europe and its integration process. Thirdly, the term labels the legal acquis communautaire surrounding concepts such as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, liberty, democracy or rule of law. Since Maastricht, these common principles have been enshrined in the treaties, namely in Article 6 EU. The latter circle of values is nowadays the most prominent reference to values in the treaty. However, in this internal dimension, the treaty does not speak of values, but of principles, the notion of values being so far reserved to the realm of the Union’s external relations. It must be mentioned here that it is to the values attached to this category that I am going to make references further on. All of these values shall be considered as ideal-type ones, in the weberian understanding of the term, as it is not this article’s aim to make empirical comparisons (qualitative or quantitative) between the different levels of adherence to these values in different European countries. Romanian realities. As an acceding country, Romania has undertaken the task to comply with economic, political and social EU criteria. It is a well known fact, and the 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report shows it, that our country has made important progress in edifying a suitable legal and institutional framework for EU integration: Romania, it is said in the Report, continues to fulfill the political criteria for membership. Overall, it has reached a satisfactory level of compliance with EU requirements. In addition, it has taken significant steps to address some of the issues within the political criteria which were highlighted in the 2004 report as requiring further improvements, such as the reform and independence of the judiciary, ensuring greater media freedom, new legislation on property restitution, an overall improvement of the situation of minorities and child protection. Nevertheless, in the field of latent realities, the Romanian population seems to be one step behind regarding the process of adjusting national values to European standards. In its 2005 Communication Strategy, the Delegation of the European Commission in Romania emphasizes that its main mission is to promote the European values through different instruments and to different target groups. One of its most recent activities has consisted of conducting a survey entitled “Romanian and European values: the same or not?” The survey has showed important discrepancies between national and European values in three fundamental fields: democracy, rule of law and tolerance. These aspects are crucial both for the Copenhagen criteria and the implementation of the acquis communautaire. In the field of democratic achievements, an overwhelming majority (83%) believes that the common people cannot by any means influence political decisions; furthermore, more then a half (55%) see no advantage in having a multitude of political parties and a worrying third (34%) considers that a strong leader is far more efficient than laws and reforms. Overall, there is a lack of trust in the participation process, weak valorization for political pluralism and a tendency towards strong leaders. Moving to justice and the rule of law, 85% percent of the Romanians believe there is no chance of fair treatment in the judicial system unless one has connections, 62% agree that in order to get a promotion one needs to commit illegalities, and 58% subscribe to the pessimist sentence that it is impossible to eliminate bribery and the influence of politics over justice. What these results show is a perception of a highly eroded system, mainly by corruption, both at a high and grass-root level. Last, but not least, the picture also looks dim in the tolerance field, where there have been encountered strong negative feelings towards ethnic groups and even xenophobia. Almost two thirds (62%) of the ones interviewed Ioana Lung-Adjusting Romanian Values to European Standards strongly suggest that ethnic minorities should be forced to learn the Romanian language. 42% say that there are more gypsies committing illegalities than Romanians and that the Hungarians from Romania are more attached to Hungary than Romania (68%). Addressing the root causes. The legitimate question after looking at these rather discouraging results would be: where do these incompatibilities with Western values come from? A vast number of sociologists have linked this issue to the legacies of the communist regimes and post-communist transition, both features of Central and Eastern European regimes. Communism did teach its citizens lessons in the decade of its rule. It did not create the model “socialist men” it set out to create, nor did it create the homogeneity that was its goal. It did create a population that was highly educated and mobilized with a sense of “rightful power”. In doing this, it created citizens with values, expectations and behavior patterns quite different from those of their Western neighbors and even other states (for example states in Latin America and South-Europe) that have gone from being authoritarian to being democratic. The answer to the above question therefore lies in the remains of communist-era institutions, in the problematic economic transformation process with which these societies are dealing, but also in the characteristics of the population that communism crafted, that is the less quantifiable and more subjective realm of social attitudes, learned behavior and patterns of interaction and expectation. None of these are the same as those that underlay and underlie the birth and survival of democracies elsewhere. Their significance and impact not only color the nature of political reconstruction in present-day Eastern Europe, but will also have a long-term effect on the nature of the region’s polities and societies. Starting with the educational legacies, it must be mentioned that all of the population of Eastern Europe, Romania included, is highly educated, with literacy virtually universal, and also higher and technical education more widespread that in most Western European countries. At the very least, Western theories of development and political participation would indicate that highly educated populations are likely to be more politically conscious and participatory than those with lower educational levels. Education in communist regimes carried out messages more politically pregnant than the standard messages of Western-based education. What was conveyed, deliberately or inadvertently, in this education was far different from the messages in standard educational programs elsewhere. Rather than focusing primarily on literacy and technical education, communist societies tried to use their educational societies to remake their people. It created a mobilized, if disillusioned population divided into groups with special skills and interests. Moving to industrialization legacies, the populations of Eastern Europe are highly industrialized populations that shifted from a rural social base to an industrial one in the great industrialization drive of the 1950s. A statecontrolled economy that employed virtually every working person brought with it a heightened sense of the relationship between politics and economics: economic difficulties were not seen as the fault of a firm or its management, but as the fault of state. In this light, too, individuals lost the sense of personal responsibility that industrialization usually creates. Instead of individual gains or losses being seen as a result of individuals’ work or failures, such gains or losses came to be seen as the product of the government’s bad policy or poor management. Further on, the critical distinction that communism taught people was the distinction between “them” and “us”, a distinction that is played out on all levels. On the most personal level, the use of secret police created a situation Ioana Lung-Adjusting Romanian Values to European Standards in which individuals’ initial reaction to each other was distrust. On a national level, the split between “them” and “us” took on far greater significance. The political elite was perceived as imposed by the outside. The relative secretiveness and insularity of the leaders’ lives, and the revelations of their privileged positions, set them apart from the population. From the perspective of those at the bottom of the hierarchy, it seemed that the power wielded by “them” made it impossible for the “us” to be responsible or to act. This perception was magnified by the sense that “they” were not just an untouchable elite but a system imposed from the outside, by the Soviet Union. This perception also allowed people to avoid taking responsibility for their society and its problems by using “them” as a scapegoat. Accompanying this “them-versus-us” dichotomy has been a learned cynicism about politics. For all the claims that East Europeans states were workers’ states in which the working class built their countries, the citizenry learned early on that its voice mattered little. Voting was something to be done because it was required, not something done to affect politics. With this cynicism came disrespect for the law. Fear bred obedience, not support or respect. Survival as a successful factory manager, a citizen with a well-stocked larder, or someone who had to make things happen, required working around and bending the law. To sum up, the decision-taking process has been characterized by opacity, the decisions being taken by a hand of people and behind closed doors, or even imposed from the outside (the Soviet Union); this discouraged civic participation, mainly by decreasing the levels of individual responsibility. On the other hand, for the Communist rulers, the law was not something that regulated them and so working around and bending the law soon became common practice. Coupled with economic shortages, the disrespect for the law led to the edification of a parallel society, governed by informal ties, corruption and illegalities. Last, but not least the freedom of expression was buried under broken feedback mediated by ideology and restrained by censorship. Due to these communist developments, the Romanian society has become characterized by axiological uncertainty (Voicu, 2001:43), a low level of prediction regarding the social environment. A low level of axiological uncertainty (which is equivalent to a high axiological certainty) presupposes the capacity of individuals to correctly forecast the actions of the other individuals from a society due to the knowledge of the decision-taking process and the way of acting. This kind of knowledge is only possible when the individuals are similar as regards their value orientations and/or way of action. An increased level of axiological uncertainty eventually leads to value uncertainty and hampers the process of dynamic value change. Unfortunately, some of the practices from the Communist regime have been perpetrated during the period of post-communist transition. This period of time added economic insecurity to the communist legacy, insecurity that has led to changes in value hierarchy, giving priority to the satisfaction of basic needs. This was added to the malfunction of institutions and corruption, which created a lack of trust of the population, thus endangering the strength of the democracy and creating a vicious circle almost impossible to break (Zamfir, 2003). Tackling the issue. If we put axiological uncertainty at the heart of the Romanian value deficit, then reducing it would definitely help increasing convergence in values with the EU, and one mean to achieve this would be by addressing the concept of social capital. A highly popular concept which has emerged in the social sciences during the last ten years, social capital has become a synonym for positive influence of informal norms and institutions, the generator of development and political stability. In recent years, the importance of social capital has been empirically confirmed in the transitional Ioana Lung-Adjusting Romanian Values to European Standards context as well, both in terms of linking the trust in institutions and civic participation with economic growth and pointing out the deficit of civility and civic participation in the postcommunist societies. By social capital we define a cluster of specific characteristics of social life, norms and customs that support cooperation and solidarity in the society (Fukuyama, 2000). It is usually referred to as a three-dimensional notion, made of generalized trust (level of initial readiness to cooperate with unknown individuals), civic participation and trust in institutions (Putnam, 1993). Studies have shown that increasing the levels of social capital is the generator of economic development and political stability, processes that reduce axiological uncertainty and foster dynamic values changes (Marginean, Precupetu, Precupetu: 2001). My main suggestion that follows this line of reasoning as regards policy recommendations is that two of the most popular measures of increasing the levels of social capital consist of fighting corruption and promoting voluntary action. The perception of corruption is the strongest predictor in the case of trust in institutions, in other words those who believe in the omnipresence of corruption are less likely to have confidence in important societal institutions (Badescu, 2003). The logic behind this is obvious: how to maintain trust where norms can be breached regularly and without sanctions? Therefore, the first policy recommendation is to halt the spread of cynicism and opportunism, particularly among youth. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to step up the work of the existing institutions and to increase their actions’ visibility in the media (Rimac, Stulhofer, 2005:322). Adding to this, anti-corruption campaign must be systematic, in that it should start in one sector and then move to others (spillover effect) in order to attain the highly sought rule of law. The second policy recommendation is to encourage voluntary action, as this has a direct and positive impact on the levels of generalized trust and civic participation, coupled with the improvement of tolerance and democracy. On one hand, voluntary associations are a mean of expressing civic participation and assure a better representation of the citizens, thus being beneficial for democratic developments. On the other hand, the range of activities developed under the framework of voluntary associations increase cooperation skills and a high sense of responsibility, teaching people win-win solutions, which breeds generalized trust and therefore reduces intolerance towards the other. Conclusion. As showed above, Romania still suffers form a value deficit in connection with EU values, a deficit that is in connection with the communist legacy, be it educational, social or political, and this deficit has been further perpetrated during the transition period. The European Union, through its Delegation of the European Commission in Romania as its main spokesperson, has underlined numerous times the salient need of reducing this deficit in order to speak about a healthy and complete integration of Romania into EU structures. However, it should be strongly emphasized that the desire for value change must not be motivated by political correctness, or the need to present ourselves more favorably to those whose club we want to enter, but by efforts to improve Romanian reality by subscribing to the universal values that the European Union stands for. Ioana Lung-Adjusting Romanian Values to European Standards References: 1. Badescu, Gabriel, (2003), “Incredere si democratie in tarile in tranzitie”, in Sociologie Romaneasca, vol. I, no. 1-2 2. Fukuyama, Francis, Social Capital and Civil Society, IMF Working Paper 213/2000, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htm 3. Marginean, Ioan, Precupetu, Iuliana, Precupetu, Marius, (2001), “Romania in cadrul celui de-al treilea val al democratizarii”, in Sociologie Romaneasca, no. 1-4 4. Rimac, Stulhofer, (2005), Socio-cultural values, economic development and political stability as correlates of trust in the European Union 5. Putnam, Robert D. (1993), Making Democracy Work, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 6. Toggenburg, Gabriel N., (2004), The Debate on European Values and the Case of Cultural Diversity”, European Diversity and Autonomy Papers, EDAP 1 7. Voicu, Bogdan, Voicu, Malina, (2002) “Proiectul de cercetare internationala privind studiul valorilor europene”, in Calitatea Vietii, XIII, no. 1-4, 2002 8. Voicu, Bogdan, (2001), “Romania pseudo-moderna”, in Sociologie Romaneasca, no. 1-4 9. Zamfir, Catalin, (2003), “Procesul politic din Romania: o explicatie structurala”, in Sociologie Romaneasca, vol. I, no. 1-2 Ioana Lung-Adjusting Romanian Values to European Standards