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Transcript
5-6 February, 2013
ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT MINISTERS MEETING
Photo: Bjorn Alfthan UNEP/GRID-Arendal
Arctic Environment Ministers meeting
Arctic Change – Global Effects
Discussion note
Content
1 Arctic development
2
2 Effects of Arctic climate change
4
3 Short-lived Climate Forcers
5
4
Arctic resilience
8
5
Contaminants in the Arctic
9
6
Biodiversity and ecosystem services
10
7
Ecosystem based management
12
The Arctic Environment Ministers will meet to
discuss Arctic environmental issues in Jukkasjärvi,
Sweden, 5-6 February, 2013. The theme for the
meeting is Arctic change - global effects.
This discussion note is developed by Sweden, as
chair for the Arctic Environment Ministers meeting
in Jukkasjärvi, for participants at the meeting. It is
not intended to reflect all the different views by
participants at the meeting, but is merely a note
aimed to stimulate discussions. For any questions
regarding this document, please contact Fredrik
Hannerz, Ministry of the Environment, Sweden, who
has been responsible for its content.
Contact: [email protected] or +46 8405 8025
Production: Ministry of the Environment
Print: Grafisk Service
Photo: UNEP/GRID-Arendal & AMAP
Article no: M2013_02
Vessels and iceberg - lulissat harbour. Photo: Anders Skov Hansen/ARC-PIC.COM
Arctic development
The Arctic is undergoing unprecedented change for
reasons mainly linked to increased global resource use.
Global emissions of greenhouse gases have made climate change in the Arctic more rapid than anywhere
else on Earth with widespread effects for societies and
ecosystems.
Traditional Arctic products have, with a few exceptions, historically played a relatively marginal role in the
global economy, however, as global resource demand and
depletion increases resources in the Arctic will become
more globally significant and commercially viable. It is
estimated that the Arctic contains almost 15 percent of
the world’s undiscovered conventional oil resources and
about 30 percent of its undiscovered conventional natural
gas resources. A significant proportion of these reserves
lie offshore, in the Arctic’s shallow and biologically productive shelf seas. With climate change the resource-rich
environments are becoming more accessible. Therefore,
the economic and development potential in the Arctic
has been dramatically reassessed and the Arctic region
will likely be under increasing pressure from the economic development. Arctic mineral extraction, oil and
gas development and advancing new trade routes are
becoming viable as ice-free summers are predicted in
the near future.
The global development clearly has a major impact
on the Arctic, but the Arctic also affects the rest of
the world, not only through Arctic tradable resources.
2
DISCUSSION NOTE
Science indicates that the Arctic holds important feedback mechanisms and critical tipping points for the
earth system, meaning that rapid changes in the Arctic
may trigger global effects of unprecedented scale in
modern times. A collapse of the Arctic summer sea-ice,
accelerating melt of the Greenland ice sheet, releases of
methane from melting permafrost and slowdown of the
thermohaline circulation are examples of such potential
tipping points.
Therefore, climate change, global pollution, global
markets and socio-economic pressures are all key drivers
of change in the Arctic with significant consequences
for Arctic societies, Arctic nations and the global community. These increased pressures may in some cases
raise potential for conflicts between economic development and environmental conservation and protection
requiring informed policy decisions to reach resolution.
From an environmental perspective this development
presents many risks, but the potential for a positive
economic development for Arctic societies, nations and
business also offers opportunities. A key challenge is
to ensure that measures are put in place to ensure that
adverse environmental impacts and risks are effectively
mitigated and that capacities to address pressures and
on-going change are strengthened.
The Arctic Council has an important role in facilitating talks and agreements about sustainable development
in the Arctic. Since established in 1996 it has undertaken
numerous assessments, critical for the understanding of
the Arctic environment and for establishing a scientific
foundation for stewardship actions. Increasingly, the
Arctic Council has evolved from a discussion forum to
a forum where also agreements of legally binding nature
are negotiated, notably the recent Search and Rescue
agreement and the current negotiations between Arctic
countries on an agreement on cooperation to address marine oil pollution. While many of the topics on the Arctic
Council agenda are under the responsibility of environment ministers, they do not have a formal meeting space
within the Arctic Council. Environment ministers have
instead met to discuss Arctic environment issues on the
initiative of Arctic Council chairmanships. At their first
meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland, during Danish chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2010, the main focus
was the protection of the Arctic marine environment1.
The meeting of environment ministers in Jukkasjärvi
is the second such meeting and is arranged by Sweden.
Possible actions
It is essential to manage the environmental risks associated with Arctic development. Specific actions
are proposed in the different sections of this note.
Some more general actions to address these risks were
identified in a study on Arctic issues commissioned by
Lloyd’s insurance company2 in 2012, including e.g. the
following conclusions:
• It is essential to close knowledge gaps, reduce
uncertainties and manage risks and that Arctic
economic development can only proceed at a rate
that takes into account these factors. Further
research is required to ensure that future development takes place in a sustainable fashion and does
not cause irreparable damage to the environment.
• Major investment is required in infrastructure
and surveillance to enable safe economic activity.
Public/private co-operation is needed to provide
this infrastructure.
• The mosaic of regulations and governments in the
Arctic creates a multi-jurisdictional challenge.
• Working through the Arctic Council to promote
high and common regulations for Arctic economic
activity is key.
A Chair’s statement from the meeting can be found at: http://
www.mim.dk/NR/rdonlyres/475C3E16-A549-40EA-A8BFF723363EE7EE/0/ILULISSATchairstatement_final.pdf
2
Lloyds: Arctic opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North
1
Blue glacier ice, Northwest Greenland . Photo: Lars Witting/ARC-PIC.COM
ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT MINISTERS MEETING
3
Questions for discussion
How can we make sure that the opportunities
for Arctic economic development does not risk
irreparable damage to the Arctic and global environment? Which are the key issues for the Arctic
countries to jointly take forward?
How can Arctic states and the Arctic Council
exert influence beyond the region in the global
environmental arena? For example, how should it
interact with multilateral environmental agreements and influence policy decisions that affect
the Arctic?
What is the role for environment ministers in
Arctic cooperation on sustainable development?
Effects of Arctic climate change
Arctic climate change science
The Arctic Council’s report: Snow Water Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA), is the most comprehensive
compilation of scientific knowledge on the impacts
of climate change on the frozen parts of the Arctic.
Hundreds of scientists have worked to produce the assessment. It concludes that there is an unprecedented
rate of change in the Arctic. Some of the major SWIPA
findings are:
• The observed recent changes in sea ice and in the
mass of the Greenland ice sheet and Arctic ice caps
and glaciers are dramatic. Projections reported by
the IPCC in 2007 underestimated the rates of change
now observed.
• The warming of the Arctic, due to climate change,
has been twice as high as the world average since
1980. Arctic summer temperatures have been higher
in the past few decades than at any time in the past
2000 years.
• Virtually all parts of the Arctic frozen components
are affected by warming. Temperatures in the
permafrost have risen by up to 2 °C, and nearly all
glaciers and ice caps in most regions of the Arctic
have been declining faster since 2000 than in the
previous decade.
• Changes cause fundamental changes to the characteristics of Arctic ecosystems and in some cases loss
of entire habitats.
4
DISCUSSION NOTE
• Transport options and access to resources are radically changed. Arctic infrastructure faces increased
risks of damage due to changes.
The Arctic region continued to break records in 2012. A
few of the major findings include3 the minimum Arctic
sea ice extent in September 2012 that set a new record
low and the nearly ice sheet-wide melt event on the
Greenland ice sheet in July, covering about 97 percent
of the ice sheet on a single day.
Possible future developments are also described in the
SWIPA assessment. The average autumn-winter temperatures in the Arctic are projected to increase by between
3 °C and 7 °C by the late twenty-first century (2080).
Arctic rain and snow fall are projected to increase during
all seasons, but mostly in winter. Mountain glaciers and
ice caps are projected to lose between 10 percent and 30
percent of their total mass by 2100. The Arctic Ocean
is predicted to be nearly ice free in summer within this
century, likely within the next 30 to 40 years.
There is now evidence of a number of potential feedback mechanisms at play in the Arctic. One example
is the snow and sea ice interaction with the climate
system. As highly reflective snow and ice surfaces are
diminishing, darker surfaces absorb more of the sun’s
energy and increase warming. Clear evidence for this
effect has been observed in the Arctic. Studies now show
that eight of the feedback mechanisms expected to have
strong effects lead to further warming, while only one
leads to cooling.
In the future, SWIPA projects that global sea level will
rise by 0.9–1.6 m by 2100 and that the loss of ice from
Arctic glaciers, ice caps, and the Greenland ice sheet
will make a substantial contribution to this. Loss of ice
and snow in the Arctic enhances climate warming by
increasing absorption of the sun’s energy at the surface of
the planet. It could also dramatically increase emissions
of carbon dioxide and methane and change large-scale
ocean currents. The combined outcome of these effects
on global climate is not yet known.
Arctic ocean acidification
The increasing amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide
dissolves into surface waters, form carbonic acid and
cause ocean acidification. Other changes in the Arctic
(melting sea ice and the decay of terrestrial organic matter) contribute to amplify ocean acidification. As a result,
the magnitude of ocean acidification is more pronounced
in the Arctic than in other oceans. Expanding low oxygen areas, lower salinity, rising seawater temperatures are
together shifting environmental domains in the ocean
at a speed that may be unpresedented.
• Ocean acidification is a large-scale process that may
have far-reaching effects on marine life and further
work is needed to understand the full effects.
• The effects of these changes on marine species of the
Arctic are poorly understood, but based on studies
from other oceans, it is highly likely that significant
changes can occur in Arctic marine ecosystems.
• It is likely that some organisms will benefit from
ocean acidification, yet others will be disadvantaged,
possibly to the point of local extinction.
• Early life stages and life-stage transitions are, in general, more susceptible to ocean acidification.
A major study of the Arctic Ocean acidification is being
developed within the Arctic Council and will be presented for foreign ministers at the Kiruna meeting.
Possible actions
SWIPA resulted in a number of major recommendations
to Arctic states focused on mitigation, adaptation and
further observation and scientific work.
• On mitigation it was e.g. recommended that Arctic
states increase the leadership role in climate change
mitigation and contribute to step up efforts in the
international negotiations.
• Regarding adaptation the need for adaptation strategies and standards for environmental management
was underscored.
• Improved observing and prediction systems and
further assessments of cryospheric change were also
recommended.
A follow up on SWIPA recommendations should be
pursued. Arctic states could consider addressing these
recommendations both individually as well as jointly
through forum including the Arctic Council.
As a complement to other actions to address the effects
of climate change Arctic states should increase efforts
to decrease the occurrence of short lived climate forcers
(next section).
Actions to reduce ocean acidification include mainly
reducing carbon dioxide emissions at global scale as
well as regionally. However, further work is needed to
understand the full effects of acidification.
3
From the NOAA Arctic report card.
Questions for discussion
Rapid Arctic climate change may have global effects. Is there a special responsibility by Arctic
countries to show leadership in climate change
mitigation and adaptation in the Arctic and
globally? How should such leadership be manifested at national level, within the Arctic Council
and in other international forums, including
within the UNFCCC?
A projected Arctic temperature increase of between 3 °C and 7 °C by the late twenty-first century
(2080) would completely change the Arctic region.
The basic UNFCCC target is to avoid dangerous
interference with the climate system and we have
agreed to a global 2-degree target. Is there a need
to strengthen targets and actions to protect the
Arctic environment and societies?
How can Arctic Environment Ministers promote
further scientific work on Arctic Ocean acidification?
Short-lived Climate Forcers
Short-Lived Climate Forcers (SLCFs) are a set of air pollutants that have both significant climate impacts and
negative health and environmental effects. According to
UNEP, millions of premature deaths and the loss of tens
of millions of tonnes of crops would be avoided each year
by implementing selected measures. These actions can
further reduce global warming by between 0.4 and 0.5°C
and Arctic warming by 0.7°C in the coming decades.
Carbon dioxide is the dominant factor contributing
to observed and projected rates of global warming,
and carbon dioxide emission reductions should be the
backbone of any climate change mitigation strategy.
However, SLCFs contribute significantly to warming and
particularly so in the Arctic. Reductions of black carbon
emissions in the Arctic could play an important role for
the Arctic climate, for slowing the melt of ice and snow,
and would have positive health effects in the Arctic due
to reduced particulate matter concentrations in the air.
Preliminary black carbon inventories by Arctic states
and an emission data compilation by the Arctic Council’s
Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers have identified the approximate amount and the major sources
of black carbon emissions in the Arctic countries. The
largest emission sources are on-road and off-road diesel
ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT MINISTERS MEETING
5
Particles on the ice sheet surface. Photo: Henrik Egede Lassen/Alpha Film
vehicles, open biomass burning (agricultural burning and
forest fires) and residential heating. Total emissions from
Arctic Council nations are expected to decline, primarily
because of diesel engine particulate matter standards.
However, marine shipping in the Arctic constitutes a
potentially future significant source, especially in the
Arctic due to its projected increase over time due to the
retreating Arctic summer sea ice and its proximity to
snow and ice. Gas flaring is also a potential significant
source but the understanding of its contribution is currently uncertain. Sources within the Arctic states likely
have a greater climate impact per unit of emission of
black carbon due to their proximity to the Arctic, though
total black carbon effects from non-Arctic Council nations may be significant.
In May 2012 the Executive Body to the UN-ECE Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(CLRTAP), to which all Arctic states are Parties, adopted
a revised Gothenburg Protocol with new emission reduction commitments for PM2.5 of which black carbon is a
fraction. To reduce the negative effects on human health
and the environment, and to contribute to a regional
slowing down of global warming, Parties are encouraged
to target sources known to emit high amounts of black
carbon while meeting the reduction target for PM.
6
DISCUSSION NOTE
Most Arctic states are also partners to the Climate
and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate
Pollutants. The Coalition works to catalyse new actions
as well as to highlight and bolster existing efforts on
near-term climate change and related public health,
food and energy security, and environmental issues.
The Coalition is a partnership between developed and
developing countries.
The Arctic Council recognized in its Nuuk Declaration the rapidly changing climate in the Arctic and
emphasized the importance of strengthening the Arctic
Council’s efforts to address this change. The Arctic states
were encouraged to implement, as appropriate in their
national circumstances, relevant recommendations of the
Task Force on SLCFs on measures to reduce emissions of
black carbon. The Nuuk meeting furthermore decided
to establish a Short-Lived Climate Forcer Contaminants
project steering group to undertake circumpolar demonstration projects to reduce black carbon and other SLCF
emissions. Several projects to implement concrete actions
to reduce emissions of SLCFs, with an emphasis on black
carbon, have been developed to date.
Possible actions
Arctic states are in a position to take immediate action
and demonstrate leadership to the rest of the world by
implementing farsighted measures to reduce, and to avoid future increases in, emissions of black carbon. Such
action would also be in line with Arctic countries’ commitments under CLRTAP and its revised Gothenburg
Protocol. This would provide substantial health benefits
for the populations of Arctic nations, but also contribute
to protecting the Arctic from the environmental damage
that arises from rapid climate change.
Emission inventories are of critical importance to
identify emission trends and cost-effective mitigation
opportunities for black carbon. Preliminary emission inventories for the Arctic countries have been undertaken
but there is a need to base the analysis of further emission
reduction possibilities on more complete and accurate
emission inventories based on a common and transparent
methodology. The Arctic states could agree to produce
and submit to CLRTAP national emission inventories for
black carbon, and this information could be synthesized
for Arctic Council purposes. The inventories could be developed in line with the inventory guidelines that are to
be agreed upon under CLRTAP in order not to duplicate
efforts and to facilitate a more rapid development under
that convention. A timeline for inventory development
and submission could be established, for example submission to CLRTAP no later than February 15, 2015.
Arctic states could support the development of an
Arctic Council instrument on black carbon, or on SLCFs
more generally, to increase the transparency of emission
trends, enhance emission reductions and form a basis
for strengthened cooperation among Arctic nations for
efforts both internal and external to the Arctic Council. This could also encourage other countries, regions
and forums to initiate similar actions. At this time it
may be premature to define what legal status such an
instrument would have. This would be the outcome of
the negotiations leading up to a formal document that
can be accepted by all Arctic nations.
A high-level group could be established at the Kiruna Ministerial meeting and mandated to develop and
present a proposal for an Arctic Council instrument
to enhance efforts to reduce Black Carbon emissions,
potentially including the following:
• a new mechanism for cooperation requiring all
Arctic states to submit national-level emissions and
national action plans on black carbon to the Arctic
Council,
• a common vision for black carbon emission reductions,
• joint procedures for consultation on national mitigation action,
Dogs on sea ice, Greenland. Photo: Lawrence Hislop/UNEP-GRID/Arendal
ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT MINISTERS MEETING
7
• development and promotion of a compilation of best
mitigation practices and technologies available, both
within Arctic Council nations, but also for the polar
region where increased activities are expected,
• targets if desired (binding or non-binding).
Any process developed under the Arctic Council should
complement, facilitate and accelerate work on black
carbon taking place in other forum – not duplicate it.
Questions for discussion
Are the above outlined actions the most promising
for taking action over the medium term to reduce
emissions of black carbon in the Arctic?
How can an Arctic states’ instrument for black
carbon reductions best be developed over the
coming years?
Arctic resilience
Resilience in the Arctic can be conceived as the ability to
respond to the challenges created by rapid environmental
and social changes. These changes include the impacts of
climate change but also changes related to rapid economic development and social transformations. Assessing
resilience includes analysis both of the changes that are
taking place, including their potential impacts, and the
social and ecological capacities for adaptation and transformation, including how these may be changing due to
new pressures. Assessing resilience is about preparing for
change, where a key concern is to understand how governance institutions and policy decisions can strengthen
society’s capacity to protect valuable ecosystem services
in the Arctic.
The Arctic is already changing rapidly. While some
changes are slow and gradual, there is also increasing
evidence of threshold changes, which are generally relatively rapid and may be difficult to reverse because they
involve feedbacks that reinforce the changes. The rapid
decline of Arctic sea ice is an example where large new
expanses of open water have created a situation that has
primed the Arctic for further warming. The Arctic pack
ice has been identified as a tipping element in the world
climate systems, making this change significant not
only in the Arctic but on a global scale. Another Arctic
8
DISCUSSION NOTE
tipping element of global significance is permafrost,
where thawing permafrost leads to release of greenhouse
gases that accelerate the warming. Moreover, collapsing
permafrost can change the landscape in ways that affect
heat transfer and the flow of water. Declining sea ice and
thawing permafrost also have large impacts regionally in
the Arctic, not least along coasts that are prone to erosion.
Some parts of the Arctic feature extremely high erosion
rates that threaten community and industrial infrastructure. Permafrost loss is also linked to some very rapid
changes in the terrestrial landscape, including draining
of lakes over the course of only a few years and shifts
in vegetation that have immediate negative impacts on
reindeer grazing. Other observed ecosystem changes that
have threshold characteristics are linked to warmer air
temperatures and longer growing seasons. One example
is shrub encroachment across the lower Arctic, where a
canopy that reached above the snow speeds up the warming. Another is a shift from coniferous to deciduous
forest in Alaska, which was directly triggered by increasing wildfires. Within one to two decades such a shift
can turn the forest from a carbon sink to a carbon source.
Whether society can respond to the challenges related
to rapid changes in Arctic landscapes and seascapes without losing important ecosystem services depend on our
collective ability for action, which in turn is influenced
by rapid social changes in the Arctic. The more and sooner we mitigate emissions, the less we will have to adapt,
and the higher the probability for successful adaptation
will be. Without effective mitigation, there is a very high
risk that our capacity for adaptation will be exhausted.
Questions for discussion
What are the next steps to introduce considerations of resilience in national management policies
and practices?
How can Arctic countries increase Arctic capacity
to adequately address rapid change and resilience,
and what is the Arctic Council role in doing so?
Contaminants in the Arctic
Addressing contamination of the Arctic environment,
biota and communities calls for actions in and outside
the Arctic territory. Many pollutants end up in the
Arctic irrespective of where they are released into the
environment, leading in many cases to accumulation
of toxic substances in the food chain. In addition to the
present sources of contamination, depositions of previous
decades are released into the ocean as the ice and permafrost melt. Work on identifying sources of pollution in
the Arctic territories continues to be a significant area
of engagement for Arctic nations.
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) accumulate and
persist for long periods of time and adversely affect
health including by acting upon the immune, reproductive, nervous and endocrine systems. Although international actions have effectively reduced the levels of old
POPs (mainly pesticides and industrial chemicals) in the
Arctic, levels of many new substances used in consumer
products are rising. These include brominated flame
retardants in electronics, upholstery and construction
products, and perfluorinated compounds in detergents,
textiles and upholstery.
Among the heavy metals, mercury, lead and cadmium
are of major concern because of their presence in animals consumed by people. These metals have multiple
toxicological effects, including effects on development
and the functioning of the nervous system.
Mercury continues to present risks to Arctic wildlife
and human populations. The assessment made by the
Arctic Council (AMAP 2011) confirms the need for concerted international action if mercury levels in the Arctic
(and in the rest of the world) are to be reduced. It is of
particular concern that mercury levels are continuing to
rise in some Arctic species in large areas of the Arctic,
despite reductions in emissions from human activities
over the past 30 years in some parts of the world.
POPs and heavy metals bioaccumulate in the food
web, with the highest concentration of toxins found
in top predators, including humans. Particular risks of
contaminants to the Arctic ecosystems and indigenous
communities have been acknowledged in the Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, in which
the Arctic Countries have played an active part.
Radionuclides persist in soil and plants, leading to
potentially high exposure levels in humans and can be
damaging to health. As radionuclides are at higher levels
on land than in the marine food web they are a relatively
lesser concern for people eating marine species.
Possible actions
While the Arctic Council states have been actively contributing to the international activities, attention should
still be paid to the Arctic territories. Action will be
needed to address e.g. the thousands of tonnes hazardous
waste, including obsolete pesticides and PCBs as well as
mercury-containing waste stored in the catchment area
of the Arctic ocean.
Inventories and improved storage conditions have
already been developed for obsolete pesticides stocks in
the Arctic territories of the Russian Federation. In the
project more than 7 000 tonnes of old pesticides unfit
for use were located, taken account and repackaged as
necessary. Challenges, however, remain: in the absence of
environmentally sound destruction capacity, inappropriate disposal of waste in landfills or dumping take place.
The Arctic countries should ensure that only the
highest environmental standards are used in hazardous
waste management in the vulnerable Arctic territory and
regions directly impacting it. These could include banning sub-standard incineration, inappropriate disposal
practices for hazardous waste and providing sufficient
technical and financial resources to ultimately destroy
the existing stockpiles. Resource extraction and energy
production are also potentially polluting activities that
should be based on highest possible environmental
standards.
A comprehensive, legally-binding global instrument
that will significantly reduce global mercury use and
releases will be of large importance for the Arctic.
Questions for discussion
How could the Arctic states (e.g. through the Arctic Council) play a more active role in relation to
Arctic and global governance of contaminants?
How can Arctic states better collaborate to improve
environmentally sound management of hazardous
wastes in the Northern regions directly impacting
the Arctic?
ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT MINISTERS MEETING
9
Polar Poppy and tourists, Georgeland, Franz Josef Land/Russian Arctic National Park. Photo: Peter Prokosch/UNEP-GRID/Arendal
Biodiversity and ecosystem services
Arctic biodiversity is an irreplaceable cultural, scientific,
ecological, economic and spiritual asset and holds values
of global importance. The Arctic Biodiversity Assessment
was initiated in with the purpose of synthesizing and assessing the status and trends of biological diversity in the
Arctic. It provides a first ever and much needed description of the state of the Arctic’s biodiversity. It provides
up-to-date knowledge, identifies gaps in the data record,
describes key mechanisms driving change and presents
science-based suggestions for actions on how to address
major environmental and anthropogenic pressures.
The first product released from the ABA process – the
Arctic Biodiversity Trends 2010: selected indicators of
change report - includes the following key findings:
1. Unique Arctic habitats for flora and fauna, including
sea ice, tundra, thermokarst ponds and lakes, and
permafrost peatlands have been disappearing over
recent decades.
2. Although the majority of Arctic species examined
are currently stable or increasing, some species of
importance to Arctic people or species of global
significance are declining.
3. Climate change is emerging as the most far reaching
and significant stressor on Arctic biodiversity. Howe-
10
DISCUSSION NOTE
4.
5.
6.
7.
ver contaminants, habitat fragmentation, industrial
development, and unsustainable harvest levels continue to have impacts. Complex interactions between
climate change and other factors have the potential
to magnify impacts on biodiversity.
Since 1991, the extent of protected areas in the Arctic
has increased, although marine areas remain poorly
represented.
Changes in Arctic biodiversity are creating both
challenges and opportunities for Arctic peoples.
Long-term observations based on the best available
traditional and scientific knowledge are required to
identify changes in biodiversity, assess the implications of observed changes, and develop adaptation
strategies.
Changes in Arctic biodiversity have global repercussions.
Possible actions
The full Arctic Biodiversity Assessment is to be completed in 2013 and presented to the Arctic Council meeting
in Kiruna. Based on its draft scientific findings, key
actions can be identified including:
• strengthen efforts to reduce climate change;
• implement Ecosystem Based Management;
• make agreed biodiversity objectives effective in
Arctic;
• identify biologically, ecologically and culturally
significant areas;
• advance the protection and management of a network of areas of importance for marine, terrestrial
and freshwater species and habitats;
• protect the Arctic environment from pollutants by
international efforts, clean-up activities and best
available technologies;
• manage the Arctic living resource in a sustainable
way, through e.g. improved data gathering, integration of traditional ecological knowledge, development of management plans for exploited species and
reducing by-catch;
• improve public awareness and understanding of the
importance of Arctic biodiversity and the challenges
it faces;
• address the threats to migratory species, not least
through improved international cooperation among
and beyond the Arctic.
A comprehensive and integrated approach will be needed
to address the interconnected and complex challenges
facing biodiversity and to ensure informed policy decisions in a changing Arctic. The lack of standardized, long
term data presents a critical impediment to our ability to
understand and predict what is happening with Arctic
biodiversity.
Discussions at the Conference of the Parties to the
CBD in Hyderabad resulted in a strong recognition of the
importance of Arctic biodiversity and of Arctic Council
work, in particular the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment,
and further highlighted the need for international
cooperation in conservation and sustainable use within
the Arctic. The conference underlined the importance
of identification of ecologically and biologically significant areas in the Arctic and areas of high ecological
and cultural significance as well as work to promote the
implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity
2011-2020 in relation to the Arctic environment.
Fishing boats in the harbour in Lofoten, Norway.Photo: Lawrence Hislop/UNEP-GRID/Arendal
ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT MINISTERS MEETING
11
Questions for discussion
What are the most important steps to make biodiversity objectives effective in Arctic?
How should we advance the protection of areas of
important marine, terrestrial and freshwater habitats?
What actions/activities are of high priority to follow up on in the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment?
Possible actions
Some of the recommendations by the EBM group strongly related to the ambit of responsibility of ministries of
environment are highlighted here:
• make a political committment to EBM in the Arctic,
• develop an overarching Arctic EBM goal and provide
guidance on how to develop and operationalize
objectives supporting this goal (one might explore
the potential of articulating a conservation objective for the Arctic supported by Ecological Quality
Objectives);
• institute periodic Arctic Council reviews of EBM in
the Arctic to exchange information on integrated
assessment and management experiences, including
highlighting examples from Arctic states.
Ecosystem based management
Ecosystem based management (EBM) refers to an integrated, science-based approach to environmental management that aims to sustain the health, resilience, culture
and diversity of ecosystems while supporting sustainable
and equitable use by humans of the services they provide.
At a general level, EBM facilitates efficient and sciencebased decisions by providing a way of assessing and
managing the effects of multiple stressors affecting the
same ecosystem. Locally, through the design of inclusive
stakeholder processes that reflect a broad range of scientific as well as traditional and local knowledge, EBM
can help ensure that policy outcomes advance ecological,
social and economic goals, and help Arctic peoples adapt
to changing ecological and socio-economic conditions.
Already at the last Arctic Environment Ministers
meeting in Ilulissat, ministers highlighted the need for
an EBM approach. Within the Arctic Council an expert
group on EBM is now preparing to deliver results to the
Arctic Council meeting in Kiruna. In its draft report the
group makes recommendations to the Arctic Council to
advance EBM and proposes that the Arctic Council adopt
a policy commitment to EBM in the coastal, marine and
terrestrial environments.
12
DISCUSSION NOTE
Questions for discussion
Should an overarching conservation objective for
the Arctic be formulated?
How can the Arctic states best advance EBM implementation in the Arctic? Who is responsible for
this process and the cross-sectoral collaboration it
requires?
103 33 Stockholm • Phone 08-405 10 00
www.government.se/environment