Download I. Sociologists* Views of the Scientific Knowledge

03’秋 社會研究方法
社會系 關秉寅老師
一些科學哲學上的思考
 科學知識是什麼？幾種不同的觀點
1. Wallace (1979: 18): Elements in the Scientific Process
“There are at least four ways of generating, and testing the truth of, empirical
statement: ‘authoritarian,’ ‘mythical,’ ‘logico-rational’ and ‘scientific.’ A principal
distinction among these is the manner in which each vests confidence in the producer of
the statement that is alleged to be true (that is, one asks, Who says so?); in the procedure
by which the statement was produced (that is, one asks, How do you know?); and in the
effect of the statement (that is, one asks, What difference does it makes?).” (Wallace,
1979: 11)
“….. [A]mong these four modes of generating and testing empirical statements, the
scientific mode combines a primary reliance on the observational effects of the
statements in question, with a secondary reliance on the procedures (methods) used to
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generate them. Relatively little weight is placed on characteristics of the producer per se;
but when they are involved, achieved rather than ascribed characteristics are stressed not for their own sakes, but as prima facie certifications of effect and procedure claims.”
(Wallace, 1979: 13)
2. Collins (1979): Why is Sociology not a Science?
“My contention is that sociology can be a successful science and that it is well on
the way to becoming so. The problem is to understand just what is involved in this.
There are a number of different goals that have been set for sociology (and for the social
sciences generally); ..... As things stand now, we have badly confused the explanatory,
practical, ideological, and aesthetic aspects of the social sciences.” (Collins, 1979:1)
“The scientific ideal is to explain everything, and to do it by making causal
statements which are ultimately based upon experience. The most powerful scientific
theory is the one that can get the most explanatory mileage out of the most concise body
of principles. Science is a way of extrapolating from things we know to things we do not,
a way of seeing the novel as another arrangement of the familiar.” “This aim is no
different when applied to sociology than to physics, however different the empirical
materials may be.”(Collins, 1979: 2)
“The basic method of explanatory science is that of controlled comparison. The
essence of methodological empiricism - and that is what science is - is to explain a
phenomenon not by looking at it in isolation but by comparison and contrast to other
things. To understand a thing, we must compare where it occurs with where it does not
occur, and note the difference of in the accompanying conditions.” (Collins, 1979: 4)
3. Turner (1991: 2) : Types of Knowledge
Is knowledge to be empirical?
Yes
Is knowledge to
be evaluative?
No
Yes
Ideologies; or beliefs
that state the way the
world should be
No
Religions; or beliefs
that state the dictates
of supernatural forces
Science; or the belief
that all knowledge
is to reflect the
actual operation of
Logics; or the various
systems of reasoning
that employ rules of
calculation
the empirical world
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“….. [T]here are different ways to look at, interpret, and develop knowledge about
the world. Science is only one way. Science is based upon the presumption that
knowledge can be value free, that it can explain the actual working of the empirical
world, and that it can be revised on the basis of careful observations of empirical
events...... However, even this portrayal of science is questioned by many who regard it
as rather idealized. For these critics, values always figure into what we study. The
empirical world is not ‘just there’; rather, it is filtered through concepts and
presuppositions. And rarely are facts dispassionately collected to test theories; indeed,
there are always organizational politics, revolving around vested interests and resources,
that influence what ‘facts’ we collect and how we interpret them.” “Perhaps even more
fundamental than criticisms of science’s assertion of ‘neutrality’ and ‘objectivity’ is the
belief among many sociologists that the very nature of the social universe precludes
science as a useful mode of inquiry. Humans are creative and can change the nature of
their world; as a consequence, they can obviate and make obsolete or irrelevant theories
that purport to explain human interaction and organization. There are no timeless,
universal properties of human organization, and hence there can be no laws like that
those in natural sciences. Human constantly remake their universe in ways that render
scientific theories inappropriate.” (Turner, 1991: 3-4)
4. Alexander (1985: 632-633): Positivist and Post-Positivist Views of Science among
Social Scientists
A. The major postulates of the “positivist persuasion”:
(1) A radical break exists between empirical observations and non-empirical
statements.
(2) Because of this assumed break between general statements and observations, it is
widely believed that more general intellectual issues - philosophical or
metaphysical - are not fundamentally significant for the practice of an empirically
oriented discipline.
(3) Since such an elimination of the non-empirical (purely intellectual) reference is
taken to be the distinguishing feature of the natural sciences, it is believed that
any objective study of society must assume a natural ‘scientific’
self-consciousness.
(4) Questions which are of a theoretical or general nature can correctly be dealt with
only in relation to empirical observations. There are three important corollaries to
this fourth point: (a) Regarding the formulation of scientific theories, the
positivist persuasion argues that the process of theory formation should be one of
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construction through generalization, a construction consisting of inductions from
observation. (b) Regarding the problem of theoretical conflict, the positivist
persuasion argues that empirical tests must in every case be the final arbiter
between theoretical disputes. It is ‘crucial experiments’ rather than conceptual
dispute that determine the outcome of competition between theories. (c) If the
formulation of theories and the conflict between them can be entirely reduced to
empirical material, there can be no long-term basis for structured kinds of
scientific disagreement. Social-scientific development is viewed as a basically
progressive one, that is as linear and cumulative, and the segmentation or internal
differentiation of a scientific field is viewed as the product of specialization rather
than the result of generalized, non-empirical disagreement.
B. The fundamental postulates of the ‘post-positivist persuasion’, which all point to the
rehabilitation of the theoretical:
(1) First, all scientific data are theoretically informed. The fact/theory distinction is
not concrete, does not exist in nature, but is analytic. Calling statements
‘observational’ is a manner of speech. We use some theories to provide us with
the ‘hard facts’, while we allow others the privilege of ‘tentatively’ explaining
them.
(2) Empirical commitments are not based solely on empirical evidence. The
principled rejection of evidence is often the very bedrock upon which the
continuity of a theoretical science depends.
(3) The elaboration of general scientific theory is normally dogmatic rather than
skeptical. Theoretical formulation does not proceed, as Popper would have it,
according to the law of fiercest struggle for survival ....., when a general
theoretical position is confronted with contradictory empirical evidence which
cannot be simply ignored (which is often the first response), it proceeds to
develop ad hoc hypotheses and residual categories which allow these anomalous
phenomena to be ‘explained’ in a manner that does not surrender a theory’s more
general formulations.
(4) Fundamental shifts in scientific belief will occur only when empirical challenges
are matched by the availability of alternative theoretical commitments. ..... The
struggle between general theoretical positions is among the most powerful
energizers of empirical research, and it must be placed at the heart of major
changes in the natural sciences.
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5. Sayer (1992): A Realist Approach of Knowledge
A. Some important claims of the realist view of knowledge:
(1) The world exists independently of our knowledge of it.
(2) Our knowledge of that world is fallible and theory-laden. Concepts of truth and
falsity fail to provide a coherent view of the relationship between knowledge and
its object. Nevertheless, knowledge is not immune to empirical check, and its
effectiveness in informing and explaining successful material practice is not mere
accident.
(3) Knowledge develops neither wholly continuously, as the steady accumulation of
facts within a stable conceptual framework, nor wholly discontinuously, through
simultaneous and universal changes in concepts.
(4) There is necessity in the world; objects - whether natural or social - necessarily
have particular causal power or ways of acting and particular susceptibilities.
(5) The world is differentiated and stratified, consisting not only of events, but objects,
including structures, which have power and liabilities capable of generating
events. These structures may be present even where, as in the social world and
much of the natural world, they do not generate regular patterns of events.
(6) Social phenomena such as actions, texts and institutions are concept-dependent.
We therefore have not only to explain their production and material effects but to
understand, read or interpret what they mean. Although they have to be
interpreted by starting from the researcher’s own frames of meaning, by and large
they exist regardless of researchers’ interpretations of them. In view of 4-6, the
methods of social science and natural science have both differences and
similarities.
(7) Science or the production of any other kind of knowledge is a social practice.
For better or worse (not just worse) the conditions and social relations of the
production of knowledge influence its content. Knowledge is also largely - though
not exclusively - linguistic, and the nature of language and the way we
communicate are not incidental to what is known and communicated.
Awareness of these relationships is vital in evaluating knowledge.
(8) Social science must be critical of its object. In order to be able to explain and
understand social phenomena we have to evaluate them critically (Sayer, 1992:
5-6).
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B. Knowledge in context:
“..... I shall argue that knowledge is primarily gained through activity both in
attempting to change our environment (through labour and work) and through
interaction with other people, using shared resources, in particular a common language.
Although the development of knowledge may be furthered through passive
contemplation of the world, it always presupposes the existence of these two contexts,
which provide a kind of feedback or test for our ideas and a language in which and with
which to think.” (Sayer, 1992: 15)
“To develop ‘knowledge’ we need raw materials and tools on which and with
which we can work, These are linguistic, conceptual and cultural as well as material. .....
Science is not a thing but a social activity.” (Sayer, 1992: 16)
“I shall argue that different types of knowledge are appropriate to different
functions and contexts; for example, engineering for the task of making nature move to
our designs, ethics to the harmonization of the conduct of people in society. But these
contexts are not mutually exclusive but overlapping. Scientific practice embraces
several types of knowledge, including some which are generally excluded as
non-science or even anti-science by scientism. For example, many philosophers who
have adopted this stance of ‘scientism’ have treated ethical decisions as a-rational,
purely with matters of fact, with rational and objective questions of ‘what is the case’.
Yet science is also a specialized type of social activity and as such it requires rules
governing what is proper and improper conduct; without ethical principles such as those
concerning honesty of reporting and refusal of illogical argument, science could not
exist.” (Sayer, 1992: 17)
“Knowledge is developed and used in two main types of context - work (or
‘labour’) and communicative interaction.” (Sayer, 1992: 17)
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03’秋 社會研究方法
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“Understanding social phenomena is by no means just a question of understanding
concepts in society and the meanings of practices. ..... Social phenomena have crucial
material dimension and are closely associated everywhere to relationships with nature,
both in its virgin and its artificially transformed states.” (Sayer, 1992: 28)
“..... the situation in social science is more complex for two reasons: 1 the
unavailability of experiments makes it more difficult to use such material interventions
for scientific purposes; 2 social phenomena can be changed intrinsically by learning and
adjusting to the subject‘s understanding.” (Sayer, 1992: 27-28)

自然、生命與社會科學之比較
一、自然科學是研究物質的現象，生物科學是研究由物質構成之生命的現象，而
社會科學是研究生存在物質世界之人類這種生命體所建構成之社會文化
世界。因此不論是何種科學都與物質世界之各種不同面向有關聯。
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二、生命及社會雖有物質基礎，但生命與社會都有 emergent phenomena，不是物
質之現象與知識所能完全解釋的。而生命及社會科學之重點應即是在了
解這種 emergent 現象。譬如說，人類語言之複雜繁多，即為一種 emergent
現象。
三、從社會學的角度來看，科學的活動的另一個重要的基礎就是社會。科學的活
動是一種社會的活動。例如，科學知識的根源，傳播及科學家的教育及
互動，都是在社會文化之環境中發生，並受其影響。某種程度來說，一
種知識或活動是靠科學家的社群來認定是否屬於科學、合乎科學的要
求。
四、不論是自然或社會科學其知識之核心是理論及觀察，亦即理性及經驗的結
合。正如 Turner et al. (1995:10)所說“Through concepts, speculation, and
logic, the facts of the empirical world would be understood; and through the
accumulation of facts, reason could be disciplined and kept from fanciful
flights of speculation.” 依此觀點看邏輯學及數學就不一定是科學。但若理
性是可經驗的（此不只是個人主觀的經驗，也是一種 intersubjective 的經
驗，如在交談過程中就可體會出理性之經驗），則以此理性經驗為對象之
學問，如推理之形式，亦可為科學。但這種科學之研究對象經常並不涉
及感官可經驗到之 referents，故可稱之為理論科學 (theoretical science)，
而不同於前述之實証科學 (empirical science)。
五、科學的理論主要是解釋現象之變化。其解釋主要是以抽象之命題或陳述來說
明現象間之因果或內在必然的關係。由於是抽象的，故有其普遍性。但
往往也因為是抽象的，只顧及現象的某一面，而有其片面性。具體的事
物及事件往往是需要顧及不同層面之理論綜合來解釋。
六、根據理論，科學家往往是在問自己知識體系內所引發之問題(questions)，而
非和生命有直接關聯之問題(problems)。大學之自主及與社會某種程度之
隔離亦和此種傾向有關。為追求對科學問題之瞭解，科學家所依尋之專
業倫理或原則可能會與一般人所依尋之倫理或原則相違背。
七、社會科學所研究的對象是能夠從事有意義與有意圖（intentional）的行動者，
因此其所構成的現象是因為行動者與研究者均有指涉此現象或行動的概
念而產生的（concept-dependent）。因此，社會科學對現象的瞭解是要用
詮釋方法或因果解釋的方式有不同的看法。詮釋方法強調的是瞭解特定
行動者的意圖、動機，行動的規則與發生的歷史、社會和文化的脈絡，
以及它們之間的關係。但是社會科學也關心為何有些人有不同的理念或
價值觀、行動；為何會有相當穩定的，不太因成員（行動者）更替而受到
影響的社會結構（一種 emergent 的現象）等。要瞭解這方面的現象，就必
須用因果解釋的方式。因此，這兩種研究方式在社會科學中都有其必要
性。
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
參考書目
Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1985. “Positivism.” Pp. 631-633 in The Social Science
Encyclopedia, edited by A. Kuper and J. Kuper. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Collins, Randall. 1975. Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science. New York:
Academic Press.
Sayer, Andrew. 1993. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. London:
Routledge.
Turner, Jonathan H. 1991. The Structure of Sociological Theory. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Turner, H. J., L. Beeghely, and C. H. Powers
1995 The Emergence of Sociological Theory. Belmont: Wadsworth.
Wallace, Walter L. 1979. The Logic of Science in Sociology. 台北:儒林.
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