Download SS Okinawa Case neg - ddi 2010

BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
Okinawa Policy Affirmative Case Negatives
BQ and MO Case Negative – Okinawa Policy Affirmative........................................................................................................................... 1
READ ME Notes ................................................................................................................................................................. 3
U.S. Japan Alliance Advantages
East Asia War ADV F/L (1/5) ................................................................................................................................................................. 4
East Asia War ADV F/L (2/5) ................................................................................................................................................................. 5
East Asia War ADV F/L (3/5) ................................................................................................................................................................. 6
East Asia War ADV F/L (4/5) ................................................................................................................................................................. 7
East Asia War ADV F/L (5/5) ................................................................................................................................................................. 8
EXT 1NC #1 – Alliance will not Break................................................................................................................................................... 9
EXT 1NC #6 – Okinawa Marine Presence Solves – Deterrence ........................................................................................................ 10
EXT 1NC #7 – Proliferation Turn O/V ................................................................................................................................................ 11
EXT 1NC #7 – Nuclear Terrorism Impact Scenario........................................................................................................................... 12
EXT 1NC #7 – Nuclear Terrorism Impact Scenario........................................................................................................................... 13
Ext 1NC #7 – Nuclear Terrorism Impact Scenario ............................................................................................................................. 14
EXT 1NC #7 – East Asia War Impact Scenario .................................................................................................................................. 15
EXT 1NC #7 – Rearmament Link ........................................................................................................................................................ 16
A2 – Tech Barriers Prevent Japan Rearm .......................................................................................................................................... 17
Global Warming ADV F/L – (1/4) ........................................................................................................................................................ 18
Global Warming ADV F/L – (2/4) ........................................................................................................................................................ 19
Global Warming ADV F/L – (3/4) ........................................................................................................................................................ 20
Global Warming ADV F/L – (4/4) ........................................................................................................................................................ 21
Ext 1nc #3 – Warming not too bad ....................................................................................................................................................... 22
AT Patrick Michaels has no quals ........................................................................................................................................................ 23
Ext 1nc #7 – Warming not too bad ....................................................................................................................................................... 24
Japan Nuclearization ADV F/L – (1/3)................................................................................................................................................. 25
Japan Nuclearization ADV F/L – (2/3)................................................................................................................................................. 26
Japan Nuclearization ADV F/L – (3/3)................................................................................................................................................. 28
EXT – Japan Won’t Nuclearize ............................................................................................................................................................ 29
EXT 1NC #2 – China Turn and A2 rearmament destabilizes East Asia........................................................................................... 31
EXT 1NC #3 – deters Chinese aggression ............................................................................................................................................ 32
Bio-diversity ADV F/L ........................................................................................................................................................................... 34
Bio-diversity ADV F/L ........................................................................................................................................................................... 35
Bio-diversity ADV F/L ........................................................................................................................................................................... 36
EXT 1NC #1 – Futenma is here to stay ................................................................................................................................................ 37
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
McCormick - SS - Lab
DDI 2010
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EXT 1NC #5 – Impact Inevitable: Global Warming .......................................................................................................................... 38
A2 Forest Fires ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 39
A2 Oceans ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 40
Democracy ADV F/L (1/3) ..................................................................................................................................................................... 41
Democracy ADV F/L (2/3) ..................................................................................................................................................................... 42
Democracy ADV F/L (3/3) ..................................................................................................................................................................... 43
Middle East War/Terrorism ADV F/L – (1/1) ..................................................................................................................................... 44
Japanese Politics ADV F/L – (1/3) ........................................................................................................................................................ 45
Japanese Politics ADV F/L – (2/3) ........................................................................................................................................................ 46
Japanese Politics ADV F/L – (3/3) ........................................................................................................................................................ 47
EXT 1NC #3 No Win ............................................................................................................................................................................. 48
EXT 1NC #4 – Tax Reform Bad ........................................................................................................................................................... 49
EXT 1NC #5 – Tax Reform Bad ........................................................................................................................................................... 50
CP
1NC CP – (1/1)........................................................................................................................................................................................ 51
***2NC CP O/V*** ............................................................................................................................................................................... 52
2NC CP Solvency – Generic .................................................................................................................................................................. 53
***2NC AT Perm Do Both *** ............................................................................................................................................................. 54
A2 CP = Reverse Island Hop – (1/3) ..................................................................................................................................................... 55
A2 CP = Reverse Island Hop – (2/3) ..................................................................................................................................................... 56
A2 CP = Reverse Island Hop – (3/3) ..................................................................................................................................................... 57
D.A
1NC Hegemony Good D.A. (1/1) ........................................................................................................................................................... 58
1NC Hegemony Good D.A. (2/2) ........................................................................................................................................................... 59
Hegemony Good - Democracy .............................................................................................................................................................. 60
Hegemony Good - Democracy .............................................................................................................................................................. 61
Rearmament Link - Okinawa ............................................................................................................................................................... 62
Compensation Link - Okinawa ............................................................................................................................................................. 63
Resolve Links – Okinawa ...................................................................................................................................................................... 64
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
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McCormick - SS - Lab
Notes
1. Make use of the allied proliferation D.A., Japan rearmament D.A., and the Hegemony Good D.A.
for additional links
2. ******The East Asia F/L is a frontline that should be read against ALL policy Okinawa
affirmatives because it has generic reasons why alliance is strong/generic reasons why Okinawa
marine presence is good. **********
3. Be Careful – the Proliferation Turn on the East Asia F/L is a double turn if read with some of the
reasons why Japanese Rearmament is good on Japan Nuclearization F/L
4. The Reverse Island Hop D.A. and the U.S. Japan Alliance ADV should be read
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
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McCormick - SS - Lab
East Asia War ADV F/L (1/5)
1. U.S.-Japan Alliance is set in stone, 50 years of experience and multilateral organizations prove
IIPSI, Institute for International Policy Studies, is a policy research organization founded on June 28, 1988 for the purpose of closely studying
important topics facing the international community from an independent perspective, and issuing creative and constructive recommendations, in
both domestic and international spheres, 2009 “A New Phase in the Japan-U.S. Alliance,” September, accessed on 7-6-10) SM
In comparison with the twentieth century, present-day Japan and the USA enjoy a number of advantages. On the other
hand, however, they are facing challenges of a greater magnitude. One advantage is that Japan and the USA are able to
tackle this crisis from the firm foundation of an alliance with a history of over fifty years that dates back to the end of
World War Two. This represents an enormous asset. Over the course of half a century’s historical experience with their
alliance, Japan and the USA have cultivated bilateral systems and conventions for smoothing over differences in views and
interests, and reconciling policy in various fields, including economics, finance, politics, diplomacy, and military affairs.
Moreover, this bilateral Japan–US relationship is also embedded in various larger-scale multilateral organizations.
Naturally, the United Nations and its associated organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), are flawed in many respects and in need of reform, but compared to how they were in the last century, they
are making progress. The role of the G8 (based on Japan, the USA, and Europe) can no longer be ignored—notwithstanding
the rise of the emerging nations. In the security domain, NATO and the Japan–US alliance, which were established during
the Cold War period, still continue to function in solid fashion. It could be said that these alliance relationships are in need
of reform to bring them into line with the conditions of the post-Cold War era. However, we are in a far better position than
our ancestors were in the period between the two world wars (the 1920s and 1930s), which was wracked by tremendous
upheaval—and which was devoid of any comparable stable and sustainable institutional framework.
2. No reason Okinawa protests can fracture a 50 year long alliance – politicians would never force the
U.S. out and the U.S. would never leave Okinawa, it has no incentive to due so
3. Okinawa not key to the alliance – Japanese politics and demographic challenges will threaten the
alliance
Prashanth Parameswaran, is a research assistant at the Project 2049 Institute, a Washington D.C.-based think tank covering Asian
security issues, July 7, 2010 “The Future of the U.S. Japan-Alliance,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5975/the-futureof-the-u-s-japan-alliance,
Yet several trends in Japanese politics have also added strains to the alliance. These tensions became evident in the months
after the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) historic election victory last year, which ended the five-decade long hegemony
of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The problem is not that the DPJ's victory illustrates uncertainty in Japan about the
validity of the U.S.-Japan alliance, or about the value of Japan's broader relationship with the United States. As Michael
Green pointed out (.pdf), the 2009 election was primarily about domestic political and economic reform, rather than foreign
or defense policy: Public opinion polls and surveys in Japan show historically high support for the alliance, and continued
uneasiness about China and North Korea. The issue is simply that political changes in Japan may make it much more
difficult for Washington and Tokyo to make necessary adjustments in the relationship, which has been periodically
redefined in the interest of both parties since the 1960s. But with four prime ministers in the past five years, Japan has had a
recent shortage of strong leaders able to reshape the alliance in the way that Ryutaro Hashimoto did in the 1990s or
Junichiro Koizumi did in the early 21st century. Other developing trends in Japan, such as the increasing power of local
governments over the central government or the DPJ's proposed plan to put politicians -- instead of experienced bureaucrats
-- in charge of foreign policy issues, can also complicate decision-making, as was seen with the Futenma base issue. Japan
also faces daunting demographic challenges (.pdf) in the upcoming decades that could further undermine its economic
growth, leading some to now wonder whether the country might turn inward in response.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
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McCormick - SS - Lab
East Asia War ADV F/L (2/5)
4. No impact – the dispute over Okinawa has underlined the importance of the Alliance – an aggressive
North Korea prove
John Bray, “China Calling”, 2010 The World Today. London: Aug/Sep 2010. Vol. 66, Iss. 8/9; pg. 10, 3 pgs
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=07-30-2015&FMT=7&DID=2093493611&RQT=309&cfc=1) SM
Before coming to power, Hatoyama promised to review a 2006 agreement with the US over moving the Futenma air base
from a crowded residential site to a new, but ecologically sensitive, area of reclaimed land in northern Okinawa. This
promise was consistent both with his plans for a wider review of Japanese policy and with local aspirations in Okinawa: it
raised hopes that the base could be removed altogether.
However, it seems that he had no game plan beyond a reconsideration of the issue. His ultimate submission to US pressure
to stick to the original scheme raised doubts on his political judgement in highlighting the issue. It is scarcely surprising it
proved politically fatal.Kan has likewise promised to stick to the 2006 plan to keep the base in Okinawa. Recent
developments in the wider Asian region, notably the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan inMarch, have no doubt
underlined the importance of the US alliance.Okinawa will remain a running sore both in Japan's internal politics and its
relationship with the US, but the basic calculation behind the alliance remains. The two sides need each other all themore in
an era of rising geopolitical uncertainty.Meanwhile, no one should underestimate the extent to which American influence
has been incorporated into the fabric of Japanese society, the sight of ten-year old boys in neatly laundered uniforms
cycling off to Saturday morning baseball practice is reminder enough.
5. New agreement and new Japanese leadership solves – the Alliance is back on safe footing
Abraham M. Denmark is a Fellow at CNAS. Dr. Daniel M. Kliman is a Visiting Fellow at CNAS. “
Cornerstone: A Future Agenda for the U.S.-Japan Alliance” Center for New American Security June) SM
The election of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) on August 30, 2009 inaugurated a new phase in the U.S.-Japan
alliance. After coming to power, the DPJ embarked on a foreign policy emphasizing Japan’s relations with East Asia and
calling for a “more equal” alliance with the United States. Although this rhetoric unnerved some in Washington, what most
troubled the alliance was the DPJ’s attempt to fulfill a campaign pledge by renegotiating a 2006 agreement with the United
States that called for closing Futenma, a U.S. Marine base in Okinawa, and building a new runway in the waters off Camp
Schwab – another U.S. Marine base on the island. The U.S. government initially resisted the DPJ’s bid to reopen
negotiations over Futenma, arguing that an agreement was already in place and revisions would jeopardize the entire effort
to transfer U.S. forces out of Japan to reduce the basing footprint there.1 Frustration mounted in Washington and Tokyo,
and some observers voiced concerns about an alliance adrift.2 The United States and Japan remained at odds over Futenma
for nine months until a combination of intensive U.S. diplomacy and growing disenchantment in Japan with then Prime
Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s handling of the alliance finally broke the impasse. The new agreement, issued in May 2010 via
a joint statement that reaffirmed the 2006 accord, clearly weakened Hatoyama. With his support in freefall, his governing
coalition in revolt, and elections for Japan’s Upper House scheduled in July 2010, Hatoyama resigned shortly thereafter.
Although the new agreement will likely face consid- erable resistance from vocal opposition groups in Okinawa, it
nonetheless removes a major roadblock to advancing the alliance on other fronts. The agreement on Futenma coupled with
Hatoyama’s resignation heralded the end of a tur- bulent period. An alliance agenda once consumed by Futenma is now
open to more productive pur- suits. And in newly chosen Prime Minister Naoto Kan, Washington has a new partner in
Tokyo who does not carry the baggage of Hatoyama’s approach to Futenma, is more experienced, and, by many accounts,
operates more pragmatically than his predecessor.3 Thus, the 50th anniversary of the alliance’s founding, until recently
considered a squandered opportunity, can still serve as a spring- board for adapting the alliance for the political and
strategic challenges of the 21st century.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
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McCormick - SS - Lab
East Asia War ADV F/L (3/5)
6. Forward deployment in Okinawa key to deter Chinese and North Korean aggression, U.S. marine
presence can ensure Asian stability
Richard C. Bush, director at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, March 10, 2 010, Brookings Institute, “Okinawa and
Security in East Asia,” http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2010/0310_japan_politics_bush.aspx, ) SM
The threat environment in Northeast Asia is not benign. North Korea’s WMD capabilities are a matter of concern but will
hopefully be a medium-term problem. More attention, however, is focused on China which has gradually developed a full
spectrum of capabilities, including nuclear weapons. Their current emphasis is on power projection and their immediate
goal is to create a strategic buffer in at least the first island chain. Although Taiwan is the driver for these efforts, they affect
Japan. Of course, capabilities are not intentions. However, how will Japan feel as the conventional U.S.-China balance
deteriorates and a new equilibrium is reached, especially knowing that China has nuclear weapons? There are also specific
points of friction within Northeast Asia such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the East China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan,
some of which involve and concern more than one government. Although we can hope that China will not seek to dominate
East Asia at the U.S. and Japan’s expense, we can’t be sure of their intentions either. Hope is not a policy.
The most sensible strategy—for both the U.S. and Japan—is to try to shape China’s intentions over time so that they move in a benign
direction; so that it has more to gain from cooperation than a challenge. This has been the U.S. and Japan’s strategy since the early 1970s.
The strategy has a good foundation in economic interdependence. However, it is easier said than done and is one of the biggest
challenges of this century. The strategy requires at least two elements: engaging and incorporating China as much as possible, and
maintaining the strength and willingness to define limits. This combination of elements is important because engagement without
strength would lead China to exploit our good will while strength without engagement would lead China to suspect that our intentions are
not benign. If engagement-plus-strength is the proper strategy for the U.S. and Japan each to cope with a rising China, it only makes
sense that Japan and the United States will be more effective if they work together, complementing each other’s respective abilities. The
strength side of this equation almost requires Japan to rely on the alliance since history suggests that it will not build up
sufficiently on its own. An important part of strength is positioning your power in the right places. That is why forward
deployment of U.S. forces in Japan has always been important. That is why our presence on Okinawa is important.
Lieutenant General Keith Stalder, commanding general of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, recently spoke in Japan about
the importance of Okinawa for the mission of the Marines. Among other things, he said that the U.S. Marine Corps is the
emergency response force in East Asia. He explained that “The fundamental Marine Corps organizational structure is the
Marine Air Ground Task Force, in which war fighting elements of aviation forces, ground combat forces, and logistics
forces all operate under a single commander.” The Marine ground forces must train consistently with the helicopters that
support them. Lieutenant General Stalder illustrated his point by saying that the “Marine Air Ground Task Force is a lot
like a baseball team. It does not do you any good to have the outfielders practicing in one town, the catcher in another, and
the third baseman somewhere else. They need to practice together, as a unit.” He went on to say that Okinawa is very
important because it is relatively close to mainland Japan, to Korea, to the South China Sea, and to the Strait of Malacca.
This geographic location is why, he said, “There is probably nowhere better in the world from which to dispatch Marines to
natural disasters” than Okinawa. This importance of Okinawa is another reason why finding a solution to the realignment
issue is essential. Any solution to the Okinawa problem should meet four conditions: efficiency of operations, safety, local
interests, and permanence. Resolving the situation is also important because, as Lieutenant General Stalder pointed out,
other nations are “watching to see whether the United States-Japan Alliance is strong enough to find a solution to the
current issues.”[1] Of course, our two countries and China are not the only ones concerned with the alliance. South Korea
has important stakes involved in the presence of U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. In the event of a conventional attack by
North Korea, South Korea has a very strong military, but it also depends on the ability of the United States to move forces
quickly to the Korean peninsula. It depends on those U.S. forces, including Marines, to dissuade and deter North Korea
from even considering an attack. South Korea is comfortable with the relocation of 8,000 marines to Guam, in part because
there are already other U.S. troops on the peninsula and in Japan, and also because moving Marines from Guam by air
doesn’t take long. However, South Korea would likely be concerned by signs that the U.S.-Japan alliance was slowly
dissolving. If U.S. troops were to be removed from, first, Okinawa and, then, the home islands, it would likely weaken
deterrence. Taiwan also has concerns. The Marines on Okinawa, plus the U.S. air force, serve to strengthen deterrence in
the event of aggression by China against Taiwan. China will be less likely to mount an attack because the U.S. has both
ground troops and an air base on Okinawa. If China attacked U.S. installations on Okinawa, that almost ensures a serious
conflict. The bases act as a tripwire.demands. As previously mentioned, the public supports the alliance, but it has
increasing doubts about DPJ leadership, in part because of Futenma.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
East Asia War ADV F/L (4/5)
7. U.S. military presence in Okinawa prevents Japanese rearmament and arms races
Eric, Vogel, Prof. @ Harvard U, 2003 Asian Studies Newsletter http://www.aasianst.org/Viewpoints/Vogel.htm) SM
Why is the Tokyo government ready to pay the support for the housing of U.S. troops in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan?
Because Japan’s alternatives to a security pact with the United States, developing an independent military capacity to
defend themselves or engaging in unarmed neutrality, are less attractive. An independent Japanese military capacity is
likely to unnerve the Chinese and Koreans, and the prospects of an arms race between Japan on the one hand and China or
Korea on the other, would be high; most Japanese would prefer to have better relations with China and Korea. Unarmed
neutrality would leave Japan open to the intimidation of neighbors, including North Korea, something the Japanese public
is not likely to tolerate in the long run. Given the alternatives, thoughtful people in the Diet and elsewhere in Japanese
policy circles prefer an alliance with the United States. Japanese political leaders who need cooperation from other parties
in Japan take a low posture and tone down their proclamations on controversial issues, but when the crunch comes they
vote to keep the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. And that is why so many Japanese politicians support the Guidelines worked
out between defense specialists in Japan and the United States to specify what Japan could do to respond in case of
emergencies. What is the new role of the U.S.-Japan Security alliance after the end of the cold War? It is to be ready to
respond in case of emergencies and to help keep a stable environment so that Japan, China, and Korea do not feel the need
to start an arms race in order for each to achieve security. Regional stability is sufficiently important that the United States,
having learned the cost of isolationism in 1914 and 1941, is willing to play a considerable role in guaranteeing regional
security. Chalmers Johnson wants U.S. troops to pull out of Okinawa but he wants Japan and the United States to keep their
treaty alliance. Unfortunately it is not possible to do both. If the United States is to respond quickly to emergencies in
places like the Korean peninsula it needs to have troops and supplies readily on hand. The North and South Koreans both
know that U.S. troops would defend South Korea if the North attacks because U.S. troops are in Korea and would be
affected. Most Japanese believe that U.S. troops would fight to defend Japan. But if U.S. troops were not in Japan, many
more Japanese would doubt the U.S. willingness to defend them, and the temptations to develop their own military capacity
would be very real; Korea and China would be unlikely to stand idly by. The United States does not negotiate with
Okinawa; it negotiates with the government of Japan, in Tokyo, and the Japanese government has chosen to keep bases in
Okinawa. U.S. military officials in Okinawa have worked hard and continue to work hard to keep good relations with
civilians in Okinawa and to keep incidents to a minimum. We do not live in an ideal dream world where everyone would be
perfectly happy. But preserving security in Asia and avoiding a new arms race and regional conflict is too important to the
lives of all Asians to be cavalier about advocating U.S. troop withdrawal from Japan without carefully considering the
consequences.
B. Proliferation leads to extinction
Victor, Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, 2002 of Institute for Defense Analysis (Victor A.,
Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90 Victor A Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for
Defense Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90)
In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs
will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless
nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s.
With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear “six shooters” on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it
is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole
nations.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
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McCormick - SS - Lab
East Asia War ADV F/L (5/5)
8. Turn – U.S./Japanese alliance destroys successful transition to independent Asia and risk Chinese
conflict
Richard J. Samuels, Ford International Professor of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Insititue of
Technology, 2007“Securing Japan,” http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/samuels/Samuels%20JJS%20article.pdf
Some neo-Asianists value the U.S. contribution to regional security less than others. Terashima Jitsuro¯ maintains that a
strengthened Japan-U.S. alliance has already led to the dissipation of Japanese influence in the Middle East and risks future
conflict with China. He insists that Japan be explicit about not intervening in a Taiwan crisis and not supporting the United
States if it does.91 He would not fully decouple Japan from the United States but does argue for a reduced U.S. military
footprint and revised SOFA.92 Japan, after all, must be prepared for a time when U.S. affections will shift from Japan
toward a triangular model of equidistance among Japan, China, and the United States — a model invoked by Ozawa during
his June 2006 trip to Bei- jing. Sounding more like a descendant of prewar pan-Asianists and a kissing cousin of
contemporary neoautonomists than like a liberal internationalist, Terashima suggests that “before long the Japanese will
have to extricate themselves from the self-satisfied embrace as the only advanced nation of ‘honorary Caucasians’” and
insists that America is a “worn-out superpower” (tsukareta cho¯ taikoku).93 Japan must abandon its identity as a country
near the United States (Beikokushu¯ henkoku) and establish true independence and self-respect (shin no jiritsu jison).94 He
calls for progress toward construction of an East Asian Community (Higashi Ajia Kyo¯ do¯ tai) as the only way to stabilize the explosive growth of the region.95 Asia is not a place to rediscover when things go bad with the United States; it is
a regional identity that Japan must vigorously take the lead in constructing.96 This view is shared in other, less vituperative,
analyses. Shiraishi Takashi reminds us that the reconstruction of East Asia after 1945 was an American project, one guided
by Washington’s desire to contain communist expansion and to get Japan back on its feet. U.S. power defined the region’s
borders and the U.S. dollar defined much of what went on within its con- stituent parts. But the once-overwhelming United
States has reached the “limits to empire,” and a region that was shaped under its values is now gen- erating values of its
own. A “pan-Asian cultural sphere” is emerging, which, while it may result in a distinctive Asian identity, has been driven
by market forces. A burgeoning, well-educated middle class that once made only things increasingly produces, consumes,
and shares culture as well. Japan, for its part, has been constrained by U.S. power but retains “great freedom of action” in
the region (o¯ kina ko¯ do¯ no jiyu¯ )— freedom built upon informal networks of economic relationships that could be
expanded.97
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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McCormick - SS - Lab
EXT 1NC #1 – Alliance will not Break
Extend 1nc #1 – The alliance truly is indestructible – the U.S. and Japan have had 50 years of experience
and have used their bilateral relationship to tackle domestic, foreign policy, and military issues, and even
if relations deteriorate, they would never collapse, their alliance is embedded in multi-national
organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and NATO – that’s our IIPSI evidence
And,
No risk of a broken alliance – U.S. and Japan share too many common objectives
Prashanth Parameswaran, is a research assistant at the Project 2049 Institute, a Washington D.C.-based think tank covering Asian
security issues, July 7, 2010 “The Future of the U.S. Japan-Alliance,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5975/the-futureof-the-u-s-japan-alliance, ) SM
The United States and Japan commemorated the 50th anniversary of their security alliance last month with an uneasy sense
of ambivalence. On the one hand, the sheer fact that the alliance, firmly rooted in the common interests and shared values
of both countries, has persisted for so long is reason enough to celebrate. The U.S. and Japan, in addition to being
democracies, are the world's top two economies and two of the largest funders of multilateral institutions. They share a long
list of common objectives, from ensuring that China's rise is peaceful and deterring a nuclear North Korea to policing
global sea lanes and addressing issues like climate change and human rights.
The alliance is also vital for both countries, albeit for different reasons. For Japan, the alliance has been essential to its
security posture, since no other Japanese ally is committed to defending the island country in the event of an armed attack.
For the United States, it has provided a means to maintain U.S. forward bases in Japan, both to deter wider regional crises
and for operational use in the event that one does arise. The alliance has also allowed the U.S. to maintain a close
relationship with a country not only at the heart of Asian security issues, but one that has also made significant
contributions to global security, from reconstruction in Afghanistan to aid during the 2004 Asian tsunami to anti-piracy
operations in the Gulf of Aden.
The Alliance is fine – the Okinawa dispute has shown how important the U.S.-Alliance is
Washington Post, July 28, 2010 Japan, America's top Asian ally, seems adrift. But it's not time to panic
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/27/AR2010072705314.html
All of this has left many Japanese, and some of Japan's overseas friends, wondering if Japan's problems are simply too big
for its politics. Such pessimism is understandable but wrong, or at least premature. Japan remains a wealthy, productive,
stable society with the world's second-largest economy. The instability of its politics reflects a healthy debate on what is,
after all, a daunting problem, and one humans have never had to face in this way: how to maintain economic prosperity
while declining birthrates and increasing longevity produce an older and older population. If Japanese voters are unsure
about whether it's better to raise taxes or cut spending, well, join the club. The challenge for U.S. officials is to manage dayto-day relations while safeguarding what remains a hugely important alliance in the shadow of China's growth. The bad
news is that the issue that bedeviled the relationship throughout the past year, a realignment of U.S. forces in Okinawa, is
likely to get kicked down the road yet again. The more important good news is that the past year's turmoil has only
reaffirmed the importance of the alliance for most Japanese. Mr. Hatoyama, who came into office flirting with a more
China-centric foreign policy, found little appetite for that among his compatriots. Americans should keep that in mind as
the U.S.-Japan alliance bumps along in the coming months.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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EXT 1NC #6 – Okinawa Marine Presence Solves – Deterrence
Extend 1nC #4 – turns case – Okinawa troop presence is vital –
A. The presence would be vital if a war erupted in the Korean peninsula, because forward
deployment would be critical to invade the area
B. The presence would be key to deterring North Korea from even considering an attack
C. It acts as a deterrent against China and stops her from invading Taiwan or attacking Japan, which
would be very likely because China would perceive a U.S. drawdown of troops as a weakening of the
alliance and an opportune time to strike
Marine presence in Okinawa acts as a key deterrent against enemy attacks and maintains Japan security,
this independently turns the case
Bruce, Klingner, a Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
May 28, 2010, The Heritage Foundation, “With Re-Acceptance of Marines on Okinawa, Time to Look
Ahead,”http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/05/With-Re-Acceptance-of-Marines-on-Okinawa-Time-to-Look-Ahead) SM
The DPJ policy reversal is the result of senior Japanese officials having a belated epiphany on geostrategic realities. They
now realize that the Marines on Okinawa are an indispensable and irreplaceable element of any U.S. response to an Asian
crisis. Foreign Minister Okada affirmed that “the presence of U.S. Marines on Okinawa is necessary for Japan’s national
security [since they] are a powerful deterrent against possible enemy attacks and should be stationed in Japan.”
Prime Minister Hatoyama now admits that after coming to power he came to better understand the importance of the U.S.–
Japan alliance in light of the northeast Asian security environment. He commented, “As I learned more about the situation,
I’ve come to realize that [the Marines] are all linked up as a package to maintain deterrence.” Japanese officials also
remarked that rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula—triggered by North Korea’s sinking of a South Korean naval
ship[1]—made clear to Japan that it lives in a dangerous neighborhood and should not undermine U.S. deterrence and
defense capabilities.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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EXT 1NC #7 – Proliferation Turn O/V
Prolif turns the case
1. The aff cannot have their cake and eat it too – the aff cannot withdraw from Okinawa and
maintain the Japan-U.S. Security alliance, removing troops sends the signal to Japan we are tired
of being their protector and are leaving them to fend for themselves in the Pacific – proves they
can’t access ANY ADV impact because the AFF erodes the alliance removing a main source of
military security that Japan values
2. This signal gives Japan no choice but to rearm in order to deter potential rivals such as South
Korea and China and accommodate for the lack of U.S. presence – that’s Vogel evidence, and
proliferation
3. And theirs no such thing as a small nuclear war, proliferation will escalate Nuclear wars can’t be contained
Colin Gray, Professor of International Politics at the University of Hull, “To Confuse Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies,” Alternative
Nuclear Futures, ed. Baylis and O’Neil, 2000, p. 17
A small nuclear war is an oxymoron. While most probably it is true that a nuclear war between regional powers would have
the effect of encouraging extra-regional actors to keep their heads down, it is not likely that a ‘small’ nuclear war between
regional rivals would have negligible, or world-system supporting, consequences. Scholar-theorists like Kenneth N. Waltz
probably are correct when they point to the readily conlinable domain of a regional nuclear conflict. In Waltz’s brutally
realistic words: ‘[i]f such [relatively weak] states use nuclear weapons, the world will not end. The use of nuclear weapons
by lesser powers would hardly trigger them elsewhere’.“ No one wants to be a player (target) in other people’s nuclear
wars. But to argue that a small regional nuclear war is going to remain small and regional is to risk missing the point. The
historical event of a nuclear war, no matter how small and tactically contained, must demonstrate the nonsense in the
assumption that nuclear non-use is the ‘rule of the road’ in world politics.
4. Proliferation will be fast – risk high
(Pat Coyne, 1995, New Statesman & Society, “The coming nuclear war”, Vol:8-4, p. 29, AP)
But does more always mean worse, or rather, more dangerous? Some, like the American Kenneth Waltz, professor of
international relations at Berkeley, in a recent book, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, argue exactly the opposite. Waltz
looks sanguinely on a gradual expansion of the number of nuclear states, asserting that this will bring to any conflict the
same stability of deterrence that it brought to the cold war. Nuclear weapons are cheaper than the conventional alternative,
and possession of even a modest number is likely to deter an aggressor, however large and well armed. The logic is
dangerously persuasive. True, proliferation has been much slower than was once feared, but it has happened and the odds
must be that one or two states will join the nuclear club every decade or so. The combination of the end of the cold war and
the new Non-Proliferation Treaty may slow things down for a while. However, against that must be set the availability of
plutonium (smuggled or not) from commercial nuclear plant, the wider dispersion of uranium separation technologies and
the possibility of new cheaper separation techniques using lasers. Even if a complete test ban is successfully implemented
in 1996—and recent French and Chinese tests, coupled with moves by some of the existing nuclear powers to allow tests
below a yield threshold of 100-200 tons of TNT, make the prospect of a total ban problematic—the fact that Israel, Pakistan
and South Africa, have built bombs without needing to test them, because they used proven designs, will encourage others.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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EXT 1NC #7 – Nuclear Terrorism Impact Scenario
A. Proliferation increases risk for nuclear terrorism
National Security Network, a broad network of experts to identify, develop and communicate progressive national security
policy solutions, 5/4/09 “Addressing the Proliferation Challenge” http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1298
The emergence of new nuclear weapons states destabilizes entire regions. Moreover, their lack of experience in securing
the weapons and maintaining command and control systems, make them most likely sites of an accidental nuclear exchange
or theft. As the WMD Commission writes, “As additional countries acquire nuclear facilities—particularly if they build
uranium enrichment facilities or reprocessing facilities, ostensibly to provide fuel for their power plants and reduce the
waste associated with the spent nuclear fuel—the number of states possessing the knowledge and capability to “breakout”
and produce nuclear weapons will increase significantly. This also increases the risk that such materials could be diverted
to, or stolen by, terrorist groups.” Another concern is that as the number of states that have nuclear material and expertise
increases, so do the chances that nuclear material will fall into the hands of non-state actors. This nightmare scenario has
already occurred. We know of at least one attempt to create a nuclear black market: “The father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb,
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, was revealed in 2004 to have led an international network that traded nuclear material and
expertise to North Korean, Iran, and Libya.” The Atlantic expands, saying “Libya, in subsequently renouncing its nuclear
ambitions, had named Pakistan, and particularly the Khan Research Laboratories, as the supplier of what was to be a
complete store-bought nuclear-weapons program... the Pakistani-run network had provided information and nuclearweapons components to Iran and North Korea, and had begun negotiations with a fourth country, perhaps Syria or Saudi
Arabia.” And as we see today in Pakistan, countries with nuclear stockpiles can fall into political instability, leaving the
nuclear arsenal at a greater risk of theft. Pakistan and North Korea also give rise to concerns about new nuclear states’
desires to traffic in weapons technology for money or prestige. [Matt Bunn, 12/08. The Atlantic, 11/05. Center for
American Progress, 11/08. NY Times, 12/12/02.]
B. And nuclear terrorism is an existential threat—it escalates to nuclear war with Russia and China.
Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria
University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would
not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear
terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here
with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states
that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would
fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War
period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of
nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated
entirely by state possessors themselves.But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic
interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and
especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons
between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume
the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as
raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in
the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem.
It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear
terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the
United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least
because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They
would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten
them as well.Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if
it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40
and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material
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EXT 1NC #7 – Nuclear Terrorism Impact Scenario
continued
to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the
debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it
detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the
explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came
from.”41Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe
that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors.
Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in
Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and
possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear
Cluedo?In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s
relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would
officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem
to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if
they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present
time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of
heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that
might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?Washington’s
early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided)
confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the
terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear
arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality,
it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and
possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must
be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.As part of its initial response to the
act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear)
retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group.
Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as
being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their
sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of
the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what
Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that
part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from
Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.
There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of
that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia
and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in
the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less
automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to
retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China
deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the
group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some
connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if
Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions
might it then draw about their culpability?If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons,
the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They
might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response,
the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken
the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international
system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options
would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades,
the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation.
If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse
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Ext 1NC #7 – Nuclear Terrorism Impact Scenario
continued
the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most
important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its
nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against
the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to
support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which
seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure?
If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and
Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how
would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how
dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit
form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.
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EXT 1NC #7 – East Asia War Impact Scenario
Withdrawing military presence destroys the alliance and creates East Asian instability, creating multiple
flashpoints for nuclear war
Richard L. Armitage et al., 2000 Kurt M.Campbell, Michael J. Green, Joseph S. Nye et al. fmr. Dep. Secretary of State, CSIS,
CFR, JFK School of Government at Harvard (also contributed to by James A. Kelly, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and
International Studies; Edward J. Lincoln, Brookings Institution; Robert A. Manning, Council on Foreign Relations; Kevin G. Nealer,
Scowcroft Group; James J. Przystup, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; “The United States and
Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership”, Institute for National Strategic Studies Special Report, October,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SR_01/SR_Japan.htm)
Asia, in the throes of historic change, should carry major weight in the calculus of American political, security, economic,
and other interests. Accounting for 53 percent of the world’s population, 25 percent of the global economy, and nearly $600
billion annually in two-way trade with the United States, Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, from Japan and
Australia, to the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, countries across the region are demonstrating the
universal appeal of democratic values. China is facing momentous social and economic changes, the consequences of
which are not yet clear. Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia
are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers,
and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at
a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each
area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest
nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances
that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a well- equipped and
competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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EXT 1NC #7 – Rearmament Link
Okinawa withdrawal undermines US extended deterrence – causes Japan nuclearization
William Choong, Senior Writer at The Straits Times, January 26, 20 10, “US-Japan security pact not as solid as it seems; Battle to
move marines' air base in Okinawa shows fragility of long-standing alliance”, Lexis |
The last two are the most pertinent. There are two interconnected dynamics here: Japanese fears of a 'Group of 2', or
G-2, between Beijing and Washington, might compel it to abandon its 'three noes' nuclear position and adopt an
independent nuclear deterrent. For now, at least, there is nothing to suggest that Japan would do so. But calls for it to go
nuclear will grow as China and the US become increasingly tied in what one former US State Department official
has called a 'mutual death grip' of shared interests. Japan's problem can be boiled down to two words: extended
deterrence. For decades, Japan has depended on Washington's extended deterrence posture - a sophisticated
term for saying that the country's security is guaranteed by America's nuclear umbrella. The doubt is simple: In
a nuclear confrontation with a nuclear-armed state such as China, for example, would the US risk Los Angeles in order to
save Tokyo? If at some point Tokyo feels that the US guarantee is no longer ironclad, it might decide to mull over other
alternatives. In the battle for Okinawa in May 1945, the US and its allies fought tooth and nail to secure Okinawa
as a base for the conquest of Japan. Allied victory in that war and a long-standing US-Japan alliance has secured
dividends not only for Tokyo, but also the Asia-Pacific. Hopefully, the second 'battle' for Okinawa will not lead to the US
exiting Japan via that island.
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A2 – Tech Barriers Prevent Japan Rearm
No technical barriers to Japanese nuclearization—energy and space programs could quickly be
converted to weapons manufacturing
Joseph Circione, director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 20 00
“The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/118/asiannuclear.pdf]
Japan has powerful reasons for remaining a non-nuclear-weapon state, and it is unlikely to act precipitously. However, the
primary barriers to a Japanese nuclear-weapon program are political and psychological, not technical. If the political
dynamics in Asia continue to shift, Japan could move quickly. Japan's plutonium-based nuclear-energy infrastructure has
produced a large stockpile of plutonium that could be utilized in a rapid nuclear buildup. Through plutonium reprocessing
contracts with Great Britain and France, Japan had acquired approximately 24.1 metric tons of separated, reactor-grade
plutonium as of 1997. It has been estimated that 7 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium are necessary to build an
explosive device of about 20 kilotons (as a point of reference, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima exploded with the
force of about 15 kilotons). An advanced warhead design--well within reach of Japan's technical abilities--could reduce the
amount to 4 kilograms or less. Japan's sophisticated space-launch vehicles could quickly be converted into ballistic
missiles. Its M-5 rocket compares roughly in thrust and payload capacity with the intercontinental MX Peacekeeper of the
U.S. arsenal. Technical failures recently forced Japan to abandon its $4 billion H-2 space-launcher program, but it is now
proceeding with the H-2A, which has a more advanced engine and more power than its predecessors.
Japan already has tools for weapons production
Brad Roberts, Fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses, Aug 2001, East Asia’s Nuclear Future: A Long-Term View of
Threat Reduction, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2001/final.doc]
The lack of full consensus on Japan’s non-nuclear status may have been reflected in its tardiness in signing the NPT (it was
one of the last important states to do so when the treaty originally opened for signature), its delay of six years in ratifying
the treaty, and its original reluctance to embrace unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT in the lead-up to the
review and extension conference in 1995. To be sure, Japan’s attitude toward the NPT has a great deal to do with the
extensive commercial burdens it carries under IAEA safeguards (nearly one in four IAEA inspection hours is spent in
Japan). Moreover, Tokyo became a strong supporter of NPT extension well before the conference itself. But to a certain
extent, Japan’s hesitations on the NPT reflected concerns about the treaty’s efficacy in ensuring that the number and
identity of nuclear weapon states would remain unchanged—a strong Japanese desire. From a purely technical point of
view, Japan is today the preeminent model of a state with a virtual weapons production capability.8 It has a substantial
nuclear energy sector generating a growing stockpile of plutonium (under full safeguards).9 It also possesses the requisite
engineering and scientific expertise to quickly assemble a nuclear arsenal.10 And it has advanced missile systems and
satellites in production for commercial purposes.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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Global Warming ADV F/L – (1/4)
1. Status quo solves – their Calder evidence indicates the threat of warming will eventually force U.S. and
Japan to strengthen their security alliance and that this environmental cooperation will boost relations
2. Reject their impact - Tickell is a British journalist, he’s not qualified to write about the existential
threat of warming
3. No impact – the doom-gloom scenarios for warming does not exist
Patrick J. Michaels, is senior fellow in environmental studies and author of Climate of Extremes: Global Warming Science They
Don't Want You to Know, September 23, 2009, “The Dog Ate Global Warming,”) SM
Interpreting climate data can be hard enough. What if some key data have been fiddled?Imagine if there were no reliable
records of global surface temperature. Raucous policy debates such as cap-and-trade would have no scientific basis, Al
Gore would at this point be little more than a historical footnote, and President Obama would not be spending this U.N.
session talking up a (likely unattainable) international climate deal in Copenhagen in December.Steel yourself for the new
reality, because the data needed to verify the gloom-and-doom warming forecasts have disappeared.Or so it seems.
Apparently, they were either lost or purged from some discarded computer. Only a very few people know what really
happened, and they aren't talking much. And what little they are saying makes no sense.In the early 1980s, with funding
from the U.S. Department of Energy, scientists at the United Kingdom's University of East Anglia established the Climate
Research Unit (CRU) to produce the world's first comprehensive history of surface temperature. It's known in the trade as
the "Jones and Wigley" record for its authors, Phil Jones and Tom Wigley, and it served as the primary reference standard
for the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) until 2007. It was this record that prompted the IPCC to
claim a "discernible human influence on global climate."Putting together such a record isn't at all easy. Weather stations
weren't really designed to monitor global climate. Long-standing ones were usually established at points of commerce,
which tend to grow into cities that induce spurious warming trends in their records. Trees grow up around thermometers and
lower the afternoon temperature. Further, as documented by the University of Colorado's Roger Pielke Sr., many of the stations
themselves are placed in locations, such as in parking lots or near heat vents, where artificially high temperatures are bound to be
recorded.So the weather data that go into the historical climate records that are required to verify models of global warming
aren't the original records at all. Jones and Wigley, however, weren't specific about what was done to which station in order
to produce their record, which, according to the IPCC, showed a warming of 0.6° +/- 0.2°C in the 20th century.
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Global Warming ADV F/L – (2/4)
4. Plan can’t solve warming, without the U.S.’s full commitment; Japan’s attempt to solve warming will
be futile
Kishore Mahbubani, staff writer for Project Syndicate, 11/16 2009 “Asia’s Energy Future,” http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/mahbubani7/English, ) SM
The West industrialized rapidly without worrying about climate change, contributing mightily to the stock of greenhouse
gases that has led the world ever closer to the tipping point at which global warming can no longer be halted.If the West
now wants to hold Asian countries responsible for restraining new sources of greenhouse-gas emissions, it must first hold
itself accountable for its old stock and current emissions. This is why there is unanimous agreement in Asia, including
China and India, that any just solution for climate change demands greater sacrifice from rich Western countries.The good
news is that robust public policy, coupled with rapid advances in technology, could help humanity as a whole reduce its
energy consumption. Consistent policy and superior technology explain why Japan uses one-tenth the energy that China
uses to generate the same amount of economic output. Both China and India can learn a lot from Japan, and both
governments, fortunately, are firmly committed to increasing their energy efficiency and use of green technology. Zhenhua
Xie, Chinese President Hu Jintao’s special representative on climate change, has stated categorically that China has no
other choice than to pursue sustainable development.In 2007, China founded its National Leading Group on Climate
Change, headed by President Hu, and adopted its National Climate Change Program, the first by any developing country.
China aims to lower its energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20% relative to 2005 levels by 2010.As for India, at the G8 Summit in July 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, “Nothing could be farther from the truth than the notion that
the developing countries were complacent or were not interested in addressing the consequences of climate change.”
Indeed, in 2008 India unveiled an ambitious National Action Plan on Climate Change, which includes eight national
missions, including solar and enhanced energy efficiency missions.
Asia is also at the forefront of innovative energy technology and policy efforts. The nonprofit company Grameen Shakti
currently leads the world in the installation of solar panels for the rural poor. From 1996 to 2009, Grameen Shakti installed
750,000 solar home systems in Bangladesh to provide emissions-free electricity to more than two million people.
China doubled the efficiency of rural energy consumption between 1983 and 1998 by distributing safer and cleaner stoves
to 185 million households. In Singapore, regulators are developing an innovative Electricity Vending System to give 1.2
million consumers real-time price signals so that they can learn to conserve electricity during peak periods.
India, China, and a handful of other Asian countries are also witnessing remarkable growth in local alternative energy
companies and the use of renewable energy. India ranks fifth in the world in total production of wind power and third in
terms of wind power added in 2008. Suzlon Energy, an Indian company started in 1995 with just 20 people, has become
one of the world’s leading wind power companies, with offices in 21 countries.Moreover, China is the world leader in total
renewable energy capacity, small hydroelectric capacity, and the use of solar hot water heaters; second for wind power
added in 2008 (ahead of Germany and Spain); and third in total ethanol production. Suntech, a Chinese company founded
in 2001, is the third largest manufacturer of solar cells in the world. Japan and South Korea were third in the amount of
grid-connected solar photovoltaic panels added in 2008; the Philippines was second for total geothermal power and third
for total biomass power; Indonesia was third for total geothermal power. Yet neither policy nor technological
innovations in Asia will solve the world’s climate change problem. Only a major global bargain between the West
and the rest will suffice.In the eyes of most Asian policymakers, the proposed contribution by the West, especially
America, towards solving the problem is woefully inadequate. The American public is simply not being asked to make any
serious sacrifices. The G-8’s declaration that its members will reduce carbon emissions by 80% in 2050 contains no upfront
commitments. And the clock is ticking. Today, Earth’s atmosphere already contains 380 parts per million of CO2. The
“tipping point” could come when we reach 450 ppm.Developing countries, particularly those in Asia, will suffer the worst
consequences of global warming: storm damage, rising sea levels, and massive refugee flows. The Maldives will likely
disappear entirely.In these circumstances, Asians cannot afford to sit back and moralize. They must formulate and present
realistic solutions, and negotiate forcefully and realistically before and during the Copenhagen conference in December
2009 in order to produce a global agreement that is based on an equitable sharing of the global commons. The biggest
challenge Asians face is to use their intellectual and political leadership to save the world and themselves.
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Global Warming ADV F/L – (3/4)
5. No Link – the Security alliance has existed for 50 years, no reason that a stable alliance now would
force the U.S. to adopt stringent emission standards and alternative energy incentives as per the Calder
ev
6. Environmental cooperation is impossible – Obama has abandoned the climate bill and is focused on
jobs and the Afghanistan war, similarly, Kan has no political capital and is only focusing on tax reform
and deteriorating Japanese economy
7. Sqo solves – Japan and the U.S. are already cooperating on warming – our ev postdates
Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 27, 2010
U.S.-Japan Relations for the 21st Century,” http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/07/145191.htm
Japan is one of the United States’ closest partners as we confront the global challenge posed by climate change. Last fall,
the President endorsed the U.S.-Japan Clean Energy Action Plan, which will build on our extensive scientific cooperation
to help our economies transition to greater reliance on renewable forms of energy and ensure that transition creates
economic opportunities here at home. We are both committed to ensuring all countries do their part to address this global
threat, assisting those that can benefit from our technical expertise. Japan was a strong partner in developing the
Copenhagen Accord, and pledged in Copenhagen to provide as much as $15 billion in financing to assist developing
countries in combating climate change, premised on the development of a fair and effective global framework. We continue
to coordinate closely as we look to the next Conference of the Parties in Mexico this winter.
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Global Warming ADV F/L – (4/4)
8. And even if the U.S. commits to warming it will fail – the workforce lacks education and skilled
workers
Teryn Norris, Director of Americans for Energy Leadership, Senior Advisor at the Breakthrough Institute, and a Public Policy
student at Stanford University, March 18, 2010 “Racing for Clean-Tech Jobs:WhyAmerica Needs an Energy
Education Strategy,”http://itsgettinghotinhere.org/2010/03/18/racing-for-clean-tech-jobs-why-america-needs-an-energy-educationstrategy/)
A growing consensus suggests that clean tech will be one of our generation’s largest growth sectors. The global clean-tech
market is expected to surpass $1 trillion in value within the next few years, and a perfect storm of factors – from the
inevitability of a carbon-constrained world, to skyrocketing global energy demand, to long-term oil price hikes – will drive
global demand for clean-energy technologies.That is why the national debate about global clean-tech competitiveness is so
important, sparked by the rapid entry of China and other nations. My colleagues and I recently contributed to the discussion
with “Rising Tigers, Sleeping Giant,” a large report providing the first comprehensive analysis of competitive positions
among the U.S. and key Asian challengers. In order to compete, we found, “U.S. energy policy must include large, direct
and coordinated investments in clean-technology R&D, manufacturing, deployment, and infrastructure.”
But even if the United States adopts a real industrial policy for clean energy, there is little evidence that our workforce is
skilled enough to compete. Unfortunately, according to the Department of Energy, “The U.S. ranks behind other major
nations in making the transitions required to educate students for emerging energy trades, research efforts and other
professions to support the future energy technology mix.”A competitive energy workforce requires much more than
technicians and building retrofitters. Scientists, engineers, high-tech entrepreneurs, and advanced manufacturers will play a
critical role, just as they have in strategic sectors like infotech, aerospace, and biotech. The federal government has started
to address the need for green technician and efficiency retrofit training, such as with the Green Jobs Act, but it has not
implemented an education strategy to keep the U.S. at the leading edge of energy science, technology, and
entrepreneurship.Unfortunately, the majority of our colleges and universities lack degree programs focused on energy, and
the U.S. power engineering education system is on the decline. Over the next five years, 45 percent of electric utility
engineers will be eligible for retirement, along with 40 percent of key power engineering faculty at U.S. universities,
according to a report by IEEE. “Engineering workforce shortages are already occurring,” the report concludes. “We need
more electrical engineers to solve industry challenges, and to build the 21st century electric power grid… Meeting these
needs requires long-term investment now.”Meanwhile, other countries are producing a substantially larger portion of
scientists, engineers, and researchers that will benefit their clean-tech industries. Science and engineering make up only about
one-third of U.S. bachelor’s degrees, compared to 63 percent in Japan, 53 percent in China and 51 percent in Singapore, and the number
of Chinese researchers is now on par with the United States (though some have pointed out that the quality of these graduates and
researchers is not always comparable). “Over time,” stated a recent report by the National Science Board, “the United States
has fallen from one of the top countries in terms of its ratio of natural science and engineering degrees to the college-age
population to near the bottom of the 23 countries for which data are available.”The energy workforce deficit and STEM
education gap will substantially limit the nation’s ability to lead the clean-tech industry and accelerate clean energy
development. As Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman put it, “If you had to explain America’s economic success with one word,
that word would be ‘education.’” In order to succeed in the clean-tech industry, the U.S. must develop an energy education
strategy to develop tens of thousands of advanced energy scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs, as well as
technicians.Recognizing these trends, several experts have called for federal programs to develop our advanced energy
workforce. In April 2009, President Obama took up these recommendations by announcing the first nationwide initiative to inspire and
train young Americans “to tackle the single most important challenge of their generation — the need to develop cheap, abundant, clean
energy and accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy.” The proposal, called RE-ENERGYSE (Regaining our Energy Science and
Engineering Edge), is part of the administration’s 2011 budget request, which will be considered by Congress in the months ahead. With
oversight from the Department of Energy and National Science Foundation, it would educate thousands of clean-energy scientists and
engineers, beginning with $74 million for energy-related programs at universities, community and technical colleges and K-12 schools,
with the largest component focusing on higher education.RE-ENERGYSE is an important step toward creating a competitive U.S. cleanenergy workforce – that is why thousands of students and dozens of professional associations want it to succeed, and that is why
Congress should fund it at the full budget request. Beyond RE-ENERGYSE, the federal government should work to expand these
programs into a clean-energy education strategy on par with the National Defense Education Act of 1958, which helped reposition the
U.S. in the space race and achieve revolutions in information technology.The global clean-energy race represents one of the
greatest challenges for American leadership in a generation, and now is a critical moment. If we do not immediately
implement a national strategy for energy leadership – including smart investments to educate the energy generation – we
will miss a historic economic opportunity. American students are willing to rise to this national challenge, and we need the
support of our government to succeed.
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Ext 1nc #3 – Warming not too bad
Global Warming is a guesstimate not a science – escalation is unlikely
Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, is a research fellow at the Cato Institute's Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity” july 14,
2010 “Climategate: Beyond Inquiry Panels”http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11987
Two British committees, one Dutch committee and a US Senate committee have investigated Climategate — the disclosure
from emails that scientists at the Climate Research Unit (CRU) of East Anglia University sought to withhold data from and
sabotage research publications of other scientists questioning the conventional wisdom on global warming.
The first three committees gave CRU scientists and collaborators — including Phil Jones, Michael Mann, Keith Briffa and
Kevin Trenberth — a slap on the wrist without calling them outright frauds. The Minority Staff Report of the US Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, however, has accused the scientists of (a) obstructing release of damaging
data and information, (b) manipulating data to reach preconceived conclusions, (c) colluding to pressure journal editors
who published work questioning the climate science 'consensus', and (d) assuming activist roles to influence the political
process.Critics have lambasted the supposedly-independent inquiry by Sir Muir Russell because he himself is a climate
change crusader. He interviewed the CRU scientists but not the climate sceptics whom the scientists were targeting. This
has been called "a trial with judge, jury, reporters, spectators and defendant, but no plaintiff. The plaintiff is locked outside
the courtroom sitting in the hall hollering and hoping the jury hears some of what he has to say."At the end of it all, two
things are clear. First, it is fantasy for crusaders to claim that catastrophic global warming is established science: the emails
reveal doubts and caveats even among true believers in CRU. Second, the International Panel on Climate Change must
disavow its claim made first in 2001 — based on the 'hockey stick' graph of Michael Mann using historical tree-ring data —
that the world is warmer today than ever before.Tree-ring data after 1961 indicate cooling, but actual temperatures show
warming. So, Jones resorted to the 'trick' of splicing tree-ring data up to 1961 with actual temperatures after 1961, thus
manufacturing a steadily-rising temperature trend in the 20th century. The splicing was dishonest and an insult to science.
Yet, the independent inquiry did not condemn it, showing how easily crusader-inquirers forgive transgressions that promote
their private agenda.The IPCC needs to revert to the earlier scientific consensus — maintained from its first report in 1990
to 2001 — that the medieval warm period of 800-1,300 AD — well before fossil fuels were extracted — was warmer than
it is today.This is inconvenient for climate crusaders who blame fossil fuels for all warming. But it will provide citizens
with basic information they need before deciding whether to spend trillions on combating a problem that may or may not be
real.To throw light on these two issues, it is worth citing some of the emails.Phil Jones (regarding queries from climate
sceptic S McIntyre). "I had some emails with him a few years ago when he wanted to get all the station temperature data we
use here in CRU. I hid behind the fact that some of the data had been received from individuals and not directly from Met
Services through the Global Telecommunications Service (GTS) or through GCOS."Phil Jones to Michael Mann. "And
don't leave stuff lying around on ftp [file transfer protocol] sites — you never know who is trawling them. The two MMs
have been after the CRU station data for years. If they ever hear there is a Freedom of Information Act now in the UK, I
think I'll delete the file rather than send it to anyone."KEITH Briffa. "I know there is pressure to present a nice tidy story as
regards apparent unprecedented warming in a thousand years or more in the proxy data, but in reality, the situation is not
quite so simple. We don't have a lot of proxies that come right up to date and those that do (at least a significant number of
tree proxies) show some unexpected changes in response that do not match the recent warming..."Phil Jones. "The scientific
community would come down on me in no uncertain terms if I said the world had cooled from 1998. OK, it has, but it is
only seven years of data and it isn't statistically significant ."On February 13 this year, Phil Jones told BBC that "there has
been no statistically significant warming over the last 15 years."Kevin Trenberth, UCAR, October 12, 2009, "We can't account for
the lack of warming at the moment and it is a travesty that we can't ."Professor Mojib Latif, an IPCC member, recently said, "For the time
being, global warming has paused, and there may well be some cooling." Breaking with climate-change orthodoxy, he said North Atlantic
Oscillation (NAO) cycles were probably responsible for some of the strong global warming seen in the past three decades. The NAO was
now moving into a colder phase (New Scientist, September 2009).The National Research Council appointed by US Congress concluded
that "the substantial uncertainties in the quantitative assessment of large-scale surface temperature changes prior to about AD 1600 lower
our confidence in this (hockey stick) conclusion compared to the high level of confidence we place in the Little Ice Age cooling and 20th
century warming. Even less confidence can be placed in the original conclusions by Mann et al(1999) that the 1990s are likely the
warmest decade, and 1998 the warmest year, in at least a millennium."Climategate fortifies my own convictions as a critical
agnostic on global warming. We know so little about the weather that we cannot predict it five days ahead, let alone one
century ahead. This also means we know too little to rule out guesstimates — like the six IPCC scenarios — about a
possible catastrophe.The case for combating global warming rests not on established proof of warming but on insuring
against a catastrophe that may not happen. If the public decides to spend a trillion dollars on such speculative insurance, so
be it. I doubt if this will happen once people learn that catastrophic global warming is a guesstimate, not proven science.
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AT Patrick Michaels has no quals
Cato Institute, No Date Given, “Patrick J. Michaels, Senior Fellow in Environmental Studies”
http://www.cato.org/people/patrick-michaels
Distinguished Senior Fellow in the School of Public Policy at George Mason University.
He is a past president of the American Association of State Climatologists and was program chair for the Committee on
Applied Climatology of the American Meteorological Society.
Michaels was also a research professor of Environmental Sciences at University of Virginia for thirty years.
Michaels is a contributing author and reviewer of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007.
His writing has been published in the major scientific journals, including Climate Research, Climatic Change, Geophysical
Research Letters, Journal of Climate, Nature, and Science, as well as in popular serials such as the Washington Post,
Washington Times, Los Angeles Times, USA Today, Houston Chronicle, and Journal of Commerce.
He was an author of the climate "paper of the year" awarded by the Association of American Geographers in 2004. He has
appeared on most of the worldwide major media.
Michaels holds A.B. and S.M. degrees in biological sciences and plant ecology from the University of Chicago, and he
received a Ph.D. in ecological climatology from the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1979
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Ext 1nc #7 – Warming not too bad
Squo solves – key countries are committed to solving for climate change
Scientific American, July 20, 2010, “Countries pledge global support for clean
energy,”http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=countries-pledge-global-support) SM
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States and dozens of other countries have pledged hundreds of millions of dollars
toward clean energy initiatives to help battle climate change, U.S. Energy Secretary Stephen Chu said on Tuesday.
Meeting in Washington, D.C., for a two-day conference, delegations from 24 countries representing 80 percent of global energy
consumption promised 11 initiatives that would mean building fewer power plants and using more clean energy.
"We know the clean energy challenge won't wait, and we won't wait either," Chu said.With the U.S. Senate virtually gridlocked on
passing an energy and climate change package this year, the Obama administration is under pressure to provide leadership in global
climate talks that are making little progress.The countries pledged to improve energy efficiency in appliances and buildings,
accelerate deployment of smart grid technology and electric vehicles, and help developing countries embrace low-carbon
technologies.These initiatives "will save enough energy in the next 20 years to equal the output of 500 medium-sized power
plants," Chu said.Eight companies, including Wal-Mart Stores Inc, Target Corp, Marriott International Inc and Nissan
Motor Co Ltd, along with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, backed a plan to create efficiency standards for
buildings and industrial facilities.Britain's Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Chris Huhne, said a group led
by his government and Australia will help advance carbon capture and storage (CCS), a technology its backers hope will
reduce fossil fuel emissions."CCS is going to play absolutely a vital role in tackling global climate change," Huhne said.The
group will reveal recommendations for accelerating the use of CCS technologies before 2020 at the next ministerial meeting in
2011.India, Italy and the United States agreed to work together to supply developing countries with solar projects not
connected to energy grids and other alternative power.The U.S. Energy Department said this initiative would help light the homes
of 10 million people within five years.The program was officially activated on Tuesday with Italy's $10 million contribution to the
International Finance Corporation, the first transfer of funds for the project."The main goal of this program is to create stable market
conditions in developing countries in order to make off-grid, high quality energy technologies commercially viable, and therefore
affordable to the local population," said Stefania Prestigiacomo, Italy's Minister for Environment, Land and Sea.The meeting in
Washington brought together delegations from the European Commission, Mexico, Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Sweden,
Russia, South Africa and other nations."What this is about is taking concrete action, concrete steps," Chu said. "This is not
about philosophical positioning. This is about really saying, 'We're going to do this.'"Chu said that the international talks
and agreements made during the meeting would help broker understanding at the global climate talks.
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Japan Nuclearization ADV F/L – (1/3)
1. Japan will never nuclearize – expert consensus, public opposition, and no political support
Gregory Kulacki, Senior Analyst, China Project Manager, Expert in Nuclear Weapons & Global Security-US-China Relations at
the Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security Program, March 2010, “Japan And America’s Nuclear Posture”,
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/japan-american-nuclear-posture.pdf |
In this report we examine the claim that the Japanese government opposes
the U.S. government declaring
that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter or respond to the use of nuclear weapons by
another country. We also examine the claim that in response to such a change in U.S. policy there is an increased risk
Japan’s leaders may decide to develop Japan’s own nuclear arsenal. We find that: • Some Japanese security experts and
officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense are concerned about the credibility of
U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. However, these concerns are not new nor a consequence of the potential changes in
U.S. nuclear policy the Obama administration is discussing. • There is a long-standing consensus among Japanese
security officials and experts, including those concerned about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, that there
is no imaginable scenario in which developing nuclear weapons would be advantageous to the defense of Japan. • Japanese
public opinion polls consistently register strong levels of support for nuclear disarmament and strong levels of opposition to
the development of nuclear weapons or the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan. • The prime
minister, the foreign minister, and more than 200 members of the Japanese Diet have expressed strong support for a change
in U.S. declaratory policy stating that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter or respond to the
use of nuclear weapons by another country. These findings imply that the United States could reduce the role
of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy without weakening the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Moreover,
there is no evidence that these changes will increase the risk that Japan will withdraw from the NPT and develop its own
nuclear weapons. To the contrary, it appears that both the Japanese public and the Japanese government would welcome
these changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
2. Turn – North Korea
A. Japanese nuclear deterrent key to stop North Korean War
Clifton Sherrill, Professor at FSU, 2001, Comparitive Strategy Vol 20 Num 3 Pg 259-270) SM
To take the particular case of South Korea, a nuclear-armed Japan would aid Korean security far more than it would
threaten it. South Korea is threatened by the tyrannical regime in North Korea. Pursuant to pressures from the United States,
South Korea has foregone development of a nuclear program, artically limited its own missile capabilities, and permitted a North Korean
military advantage to exist. In return, the United States has concluded a mutual defense treaty with South Korea, pledging American
military assistance in case of attack. The United States, in furtherance of its bilat eral security accord with South Korea, currently deploys
approximately 37,000 American troops in South Korea. North Korea counters with hundred s of thousand s of troops, many of which are
deployed directly across the demilitarized zone, within 40 mi les of Seoul. If the North Koreans launched a surprise attack, t he
deployed American contingent of forces would not be able to stop it. The United States of course would seek t o reinforce
these “trip- wire” troops . Accordingly, it most certainly would seek to transport both troops and equipment through nearby
American bases in Japan. If the North Koreans threatened Japan with a nuclear or perhaps even a chemical or biologic
attack in the event American forces moved through these bases, Japan would be forced to rely on the credibilty of the
American nuclear deterrent. Because North Korea likely has developed he ballistic missile capability to attack the United
States homeland directly, it would be question- able whether t he United States would risk an attack on Los Angeles by
responding to a North Korean missile attack on Japan. Japan could request that t he United States not use t he American bases i n Japan,
or overt ly refuse American access t o t he bases, in which case t he alliance would be shattered [10] . Absent U.S. throughpu t from t
hese bases, the North Koreans woul d be far more li kely to succeed in a sweep t hroug h Sout h Korea. To summarize, South
Korea n security is in part dependent on U.S. access to American bases in Japan. Japan is vulnerable to North Korea n blackmail,
depending on North Korea ’s assessment of U. S. willingness to respond to a North Korean attack on Japan, given t hat North Korea mi
ght t hen ret al iate wi th a mi ssi le att ack agai nst the conti nental Uni ted St at es. In the st at ed case, Sout h Korean existent ial securi
ty is at stake; both Japanese and American security are at st ake t hroug h ei ther mi ssile at tack or pot ent ial al li ance disi nte- grat ion.
If under the same scenario Japan possesses nucl ear weapons, however, the results could be far different. In this case, if
North Korea were to threaten Japan to not allow American through put, Japan would not be reliant on extended deterrence
but would have its own deterrent—one that i n the event of a North Korean attack undoubtedl y would be used. North
Korea could no longer hope t o divide the U.S.–Japan alliance and would be faced with certain retaliation from t he
Japanese if it launched against Japan. In this case, North Korea would have to prepare for t he rapid through put of
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American aid from t he bases in Japan that might deprive North Korea of t he quick decisive opera ion t hat would
constitute its only chance to succeed in an attack on South Korea . Thus, Japanese possession of nuclear weapons could
deter North Korea from choosing to engage i n such an operat ion and aid South Korea n security far more than threaten it.
Japan Nuclearization ADV F/L – (2/3)
B. Korean War leads to economic collapse and extinction
Kim Myong, Executive Director of the Centre for Korean-American Peace and Unofficial Spokesman for the DPRK,1999, U.S.—
DPRK will end up in a shotgun marriage”, http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forumsonline/security/9907G_Kim.html) SM
Kim Jong Il, often called North Korea's David, did not flinch from standing up to the military muscle of the world's superGoliath, the United States. Kim Jong Il had already built up a lethal war machine capable of wreaking unprecedented havoc
on the American mainland at a minute's notice. Kim Jong Il is sure of the huge capability of his military. It would take the
Korean People's Army as few as several minutes to wipe out off the world map the whole of South Korea and the entire
Japanese archipelago. Significantly absent from the Perry report is a mention of the real threat of any new war in Korea
instantly expanding into nuclear war, with 12 operating nuclear reactors in the ROK, 51 reactors in Japan and 102 in the
United States singled out as prime targets. However, the Perry report noted that a new war would be fought on the world's
most densely populated and industrialized areas, unlike the Gulf War and the Yugoslavia war.
Resumption of hostilities in Korea would spell an abrupt end to the present unprecedented economic prosperity the
Americans are enjoying. It would leave South Korea and Japan smoking in Stone-Age ruins. Forward military bases,
AEGIS ships, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, submarines and cruise missiles would be of little operational value in
safeguarding the American mainland from nuclear holocaust. Moreover, dozens, hundreds of Chernobyls will inevitably
break out in South Korea, Japan and the United States.
3. Turn – Chinese Expansionism
A. Japanese nukes key to check Chinese expansionism
Clifton Sherrill, Professor at FSU, 2001, Comparitive Strategy Vol 20 Num 3 Pg 259-270) SM
Chinese military adventurism in the South China Sea would likely continue to some degree despite the creation of a
Japanese nuclear deterrent; however, a nuclear armed Japan would be better equipped to prevent China from becoming a
regional hegemon. The incremental approach employed by China in displaying power in the region is limi ted inherently
when it reaches the point of confrontation with a force backed by a credible nuclear deterrent. Rat her than acquiescing to
Chinese dominance in areas of vital interest to Japan, a nuclear-backed SDF could const rain Chinese expansion.
B. Chinese expansion causes global war
Arthur Waldron, professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College, 19 97, Ebsco Host, Commentary March) SM
MAKING THESE flash-points all the more volatile has been a dramatic increase m the quantity and quality of China's
weapons acquisitions. An Asian arms race of sorts was already gathering steam in the post-cold-war era, driven by national
rivalries and the understandable desire of newly rich nation-states to upgrade their capacities; but the Chinese build-up has
intensified it. In part a payoff to the military for its role at Tiananmen Square in 1989, China's current build-up is part and
parcel of the regime's major shift since that time away from domestic liberalization and international openness toward
repression and irredentism. Today China buys weapons from European states and Israel, but most importantly from Russia.
The latest multibillion-dollar deal includes two Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with the much-feared SS-N-22
cruise missile, capable of defeating the Aegis anti-missile defenses of the U.S. Navy and thus sinking American aircraft
carriers. This is in addition to the Su-27 fighter aircraft, quiet Kilo-class submarines, and other force-projection and
deterrent technologies. In turn, the Asian states are buying or developing their own advanced aircraft, missiles, and
submarines--and considering nuclear options. The sort of unintended escalation which started two world wars could arise
from any of the conflicts around China's periphery. It nearly did so in March 1996, when China, in a blatant act of
intimidation, fired ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Straits. It could arise from a Chinese-Vietnamese confrontation,
particularly if the Vietnamese should score some unexpected military successes against the Chinese, as they did in 1979,
and if the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which they are now a member, should tip in the direction
of Hanoi. It could flare up from the smoldering insurgencies among Tibetans, Muslims, or Mongolians living inside China.
Chains of alliance or interest, perhaps not clearly understood until the moment of crisis itself, could easily draw in
neighboring states--Russia, or India, or Japan--or the United States. Such potentially catastrophic conflict is hardly
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predestined, and political evolution in China may reduce the danger. But right now there is little sign of such evolution.
Quite the opposite: the words and deeds of today's China manifest a strengthening sense that resort to force will be
necessary to achieve its goals, and a growing confidence that force can be used successfully.
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Japan Nuclearization ADV F/L – (3/3)
4. Rearm is inevitable but ineffective
Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, July 07, 2007, “A New Era in Asia: Japan Rising”,
http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/07/06/a-new-era-in-asia-japan-rising/ | Suo
An equally dramatic, if perhaps not quite so problematic, shift is taking place in Japan. Tokyo’s forceful bid for
regional domination collapsed as its warships sank and cities burned in 1945. During the Cold War Japan produced
an economic miracle but remained a geopolitical pygmy. Washington fumed, but both Japan’s rulers and neighbors
preferred U.S. dominance. Tokyo now is changing direction , however. Japanese politicians and leaders alike seem ready
to turn Japan into a normal country, undertaking diplomatic responsibilities and creating military capabilities commensurate
with its size and wealth. Although even a reenergized and rearmed Tokyo would be unable to impose its will on its
neighbors, a more active Japan could temper the ambitions of North Korea and, more important, the
PRC. Beijing may come to enjoy an “unipolar” moment in East Asia, but Japan’s new direction makes that prospect less
likely, or at least more distant.
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EXT – Japan Won’t Nuclearize
Nuclearization is impossible – overwhelming opposition from all corners
Gregory Kulacki, Senior Analyst, China Project Manager, Expert in Nuclear Weapons & Global Security-US-China Relations at
the Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security Program, March 2010, “Japan And America’s Nuclear Posture”,
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/japan-american-nuclear-posture.pdf | Suo
Public opinion polling consistently confirms very high levels of Japanese opposition to the introduction of U.S.
nuclear weapons into Japan and to the development of Japanese nuclear weapons. This opposition is not diminishing
over time. Recent polls show that the large popular majorities in favor of Japan remaining a non-nuclear weapon state are
the same or higher than polls taken in the late 1960s at the height of the anti-nuclear movement.xi Even after the North
Korean nuclear test of 2006, 80 percent of Japanese polled said Japan should continue to prevent the introduction of
U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan.xii Some U.S. defense experts discount the Japanese public’s opposition to nuclear
weapons and place greater weight in the opinions of the Japanese ruling elite. But even the Japanese elite shows very high
rates of disapproval. NIRA, a respected semi-governmental Japanese research organization, conducted a poll shortly after
the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998. NIRA found that 86 percent of the “informed” Japanese elite, compared
with 93 percent of the general public, would still not choose to develop nuclear weapons even if the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty were dissolved.xiii In this regard popular and elite opinion is consistent with the military
judgment of the conservative Japanese defense officials who authored the 1995 JDA study on Japan’s nuclear
options. Japanese attitudes toward nuclear weapons developed in reaction to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. The bombings made the enormous destructive power and costly long-term effects of nuclear
weapons clear to the Japanese public. Each year, Japanese political leaders travel to ground zero to remember the
bombings. The annual memorials, as well as constant public debates related to proper care and compensation for the
survivors and their descendants, force Japanese government officials to reiterate and reaffirm Japan’s
anti-nuclear commitments. The annual ritual denunciation of nuclear weapons is a defining feature of contemporary
Japan’s national identity, much like the annual celebration of Thanksgiving is a defining feature of the national
identity of the United States. The political influence of the Japanese antinuclear lobby was first demonstrated in the
massive Japanese public protests against U.S. nuclear testing that sickened and killed a group of Japanese
fishermen in March 1954. Concerned about the safety of their seafood—a staple of the Japanese diet—
a group of homemakers launched an appeal to ban nuclear weapons that garnered the signatures of 32 million Japanese
people—a third of the population. Shortly afterward, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke indicated he supported the use of
nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Public pressure compelled Kishi , a conservative, to make public promises to both houses
of the legislature that Japan would not possess, manufacture, or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons
into Japan. These came to be known as Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” and in 1971 were
codified in a resolution of the Japanese Diet.
US policy won’t affect nuclearization – domestic concerns outweigh, proven by broad empirical analysis
Llewelyn Hughes, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Spring
2007, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet); International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan”, International
Security, Lexis | Suo
These findings are in line with research demonstrating that although security incentives are important, they are
rarely determinative. n10 Numerous scholars have noted the role of domestic organizational and other variables in
influencing states' decisions to develop (or reverse) their nuclear weapons programs, although the causal weight
assigned to systemic versus domestic explanations typically varies. In the case of Pakistan, Samina Ahmed
argues that although the perceived security threat from India was a necessary condition in Pakistan's
drive to develop and test a nuclear device, the marginalization of the political leadership and dominance of the
military in Pakistan's security policy architecture played a decisive role in nuclear decisionmaking across time. n11
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David Karl notes that in the case of India, the military leadership was reticent about developing a nuclear
weapons program because of fears it would enable greater civilian intervention in military decisionmaking. n12 The
French decision to develop an independent nuclear deterrent has similarly been argued to be driven by national
prestige as well as systemic variables. n13 Finally, Ariel Levite writes that domestic factors have been important
causes of "nuclear reversal," that is, when states choose to abandon their nascent nuclear weapons programs . n14 The
evidence presented here adds to this record, demonstrating the importance of including domestic organizational
preferences into calculations of future nuclear choices, a point underscored by the repeated failure of predictions
that Japan will introduce a nuclear deterrent.
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1
EXT 1NC #2 – China Turn and A2 rearmament destabilizes East Asia
Japanese nuclearization won’t destabilize East Asia – its critical to deterring nuclear North Korea
Ted Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,” 20 06
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6772) SM
Faced with a dangerous, nuclear-capable neighbor and a more limited U.S. military commitment to the region, Japan or
South Korea (or both) might well decide to build a nuclear deterrent. Although the Japanese public seems reluctant to go
down that path, the attitude in South Korea is different. A public opinion poll taken shortly after Pyongyang's nuclear test
showed that a majority of respondents believed South Korea should develop a deterrent of its own.
The prospect of additional nuclear weapons proliferation in northeast Asia obviously is not an ideal outcome. But offsetting
the North's looming illicit advantage may be the best of a bad set of options. Moreover, the real danger arising from
proliferation is when repulsive rogue states such as North Korea get such weapons, not when stable, democratic countries
such as Japan and South Korea do so in self-defense.If the North had to deal with nuclear neighbors, whom it could not so
easily intimidate, it might have to abandon its current provocative course. Indeed, Pyongyang might face the prospect of
confronting more prosperous adversaries that could easily build larger and more sophisticated nuclear arsenals than it could
hope to do. Kim's regime might then conclude that keeping the region non-nuclear would be more productive. Even if it
does not do so, a nuclear balance of power in the region would likely emerge instead of a North Korean nuclear monopoly.
The prospect of a nuclear-armed Japan is also the one factor that might galvanize the Chinese to put serious diplomatic and
economic pressure on Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions. Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer
expresses that thesis starkly: "We should go to the Chinese and tell them plainly that if they do not join us in squeezing
North Korea and thus stopping its march to go nuclear, we will endorse any Japanese attempt to create a nuclear deterrent
of its own. . . . If our nightmare is a nuclear North Korea, China's is a nuclear Japan. It's time to share the nightmares."
Even if one does not embrace Krauthammer's approach, the reality is that if the United States blocks the possible
emergence of a northeast Asian nuclear balance, it will be stuck with the responsibility of shielding non-nuclear allies from
a volatile, nuclear-armed North Korea. More proliferation may be a troubling outcome, but it beats that scenario.
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EXT 1NC #3 – deters Chinese aggression
Japan rearm stabilizes East Asia and deters Chinese aggression
Richard Lowry, editor of National Review, a conservative American news magazine, and a syndicated columnist, July 4, 200 5,
“Time for the Sun to Rise”, Lexis | Suo
Pacifism has never been so silly. In an East Asia featuring both one of the world's most irrational states and a rising
dictatorial power bent on changing the region's strategic balance, it is a crucial ally of the United States that labors under a
constitution that could have been written by Quakers. Of course, it was an American team put together by
Douglas MacArthur after World War II that wrote the Japanese constitution imposing pacifism as state
policy. That was understandable 50 years ago. Now, the constraints of the Japanese constitution -- and the
Japanese attitudes that preserved them all these years -- are senseless anachronisms. Japan has slowly been
emerging from its shell over the last decade, and it is one of the diplomatic triumphs of the Bush
administration that it has helped accelerate this process, strengthening the U.S.-Japanese bond and
enhancing its usefulness. The Japanese will proceed at their own pace, but our response to every step they take toward
becoming a more "normal" country should be nothing but encouragement: "More, please." The goal , although it will
never be fully achievable given historic, cultural, and other differences, should be to make Japan as reliable a
partner of the U.S. in Asia as Britain is in Europe. "There is no fear of Japan. The old cork-in-the-bottle theory
is dead," says an administration official, referring to the former fear in the U.S. government that any
Japanese step toward rearmament would mean an inevitable slide toward aggressive militarism. "The
old saw is that Japan is just an aircraft carrier, a jumping-off point for American forces. Well, we want to make it a
jumping-off point for both U.S. and Japanese forces." The alliance is a natural. Japan broadly shares our values. The U.S. is
the world's number-one economy and Japan is number two, a powerful combination. We want to check China, and
Japan feels threatened by China. Japan provides the basing the U.S. needs at a time when we have lost our bases in
the Philippines and our relationship with South Korea looks shaky. We want to stay in East Asia, and the
Japanese want to keep us there, in a dangerous neighborhood. Japan is surrounded by three nuclear countries that would
make anyone nervous: North Korea, China, and Russia. After the Cold War, the alliance seemed headed for a
breakdown. Japan provided only financial support for the first Gulf War and refused to give the U.S.
intelligence and logistical aid during the 1993-1994 showdown with North Korea. The Clintonites,
meanwhile, were obsessed with banging on the Japanese on trade issues, to the exclusion of nationalsecurity considerations. They talked up a "strategic partnership" with China. But nothing concentrates the
mind like a few missile launches. In 1996, China tested ballistic missiles off Taiwan, with a few landing
near Japanese shipping lanes. This led to a joint U.S.-Japanese statement pledging Japanese logistical
support to the U.S. during "regional contingencies" and stipulating that the U.S.-Japanese alliance
includes "situations in the areas surrounding Japan." The Chinese screamed -- accurately -- that
"situations" was meant to cover a potential conflict over Taiwan. Two years later, the North Koreans
launched a missile over northern Japan, spurring Japanese interest in cooperation with the United
States on a missile-defense system. Politically, Japan has become more conservative. Its Left has
effectively collapsed. The Socialist party was never serious about governing, but existed as an
obstructionist force in parliament (sound familiar?). After electoral reform in the early 1990s, it all but
evaporated. Japanese politics has become more populist, and Japanese society more open and less riskaverse. A new generation of politicians both in the ruling Liberal Democratic party and in the
opposition Democratic party is not so wedded to the old pieties. "Japan is tired of constantly apologizing, and
it wants a place in the sun more than in a pure economic sense," says former State Department official Jim Kelly.
North Korea is enough to shake anyone's pacifism. Besides its nuclear adventurism, it abducted Japanese citizens in the
1970s and 1980s, outraging ordinary Japanese. The Japanese realize that the North Koreans just might be
telling the truth when they say they would never attack other Koreans; similar assurances are never made about Japan .
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Meanwhile, the Chinese have stupidly provoked Japan at every turn. China scholar Arthur Waldron calls
Beijing's alienation of Japan one of its great post-war blunders. "Japan was a pacifist country, with a
sentimental view of China," says Waldron. "It was ideal for the Chinese."
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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Bio-diversity ADV F/L
1. No internal link – their biodiversity impact is predicated off of the relocation of Futenma being bad
because it will destroy the environment, squo solves, Futenma isn’t going anywhere
The Daily Yomiuri, July 24, 2010, “U.S. marines' Guam move seen delayed / Futenma plan also could be jeopardized ,
“http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T100723005957.htm,) SM
WASHINGTON--The U.S. government has effectively given up on completing the transfer of about 8,000 U.S. marines
stationed in Okinawa Prefecture to Guam in 2014, sources have said, a decision that also could scuttle the planned
relocation of a U.S. base in the prefecture.The U.S. Pacific island territory's infrastructure cannot handle such a hasty
construction schedule, according to the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO) of the U.S. Navy.The United States told the
Guam government Thursday of its unofficial decision, according to the sources. It had already informed the Japanese
government of the possibility, they said. Moving about 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel and their
approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa Prefecture to Guam is one pillar of the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for
Realignment Implementation, agreed upon between the two countries in May 2006. Another focus is the relocation of
Futenma Air Station in the prefecture. Relocating Futenma and transferring the marines have been considered as a set,
according to the U.S. Defense Department.With the marines' transfer expected to be delayed, some observers believe it
highly likely that Futenma Air Station will not be relocated from its current location of Ginowan.The possible delay in
completing the marines' relocation to Guam was revealed in a preliminary meeting held Thursday on the environmental
impact assessment by the JGPO.Although the bilateral agreement governing the transfer of the U.S. Marine Corps
personnel from Okinawa Prefecture to Guam calls for a target completion date of 2014, the JGPO's statement says it
"recognized that Guam's infrastructure may not be able to handle such a rapid construction pace.""In response, the DEIS
[draft environmental impact statement] will identify a mitigation measure called 'adaptive program management,' in which
the pace and sequencing of construction will be adjusted to stay within the limitations of Guam's utilities, port, roadways
and other systems. This will result in a more stretched-out, manageable construction timeline," the statement says.The
statement took into consideration the Guam government's assertions that the territory's civil infrastructure, including
utilities, must be improved to cope with the rapid population growth that will result from the marines' relocation.As the
U.S. government is prioritizing the improvement of civil infrastructure over construction of the marines' base, it became
inevitable that construction would take longer and cost more than originally planned.This position will be officially
announced in the final environmental impact statement to be compiled within the month, the sources said. Meanwhile, a
Japanese government source said this country's officials had been already briefed by the United States on the matter."It will
take several years to improve the infrastructure," the source said, indicating that, objectively speaking, it would be
impossible to complete the base's construction by the end of 2014.Some observers have said the postponement of the
marines' relocation to Guam is partly the result of the lack of progress in Japan on the relocation of Futenma." This may
suggest that interest within the U.S. government toward promoting the overall realignment of U.S. forces has been
diminishing," a Foreign Ministry source said.The Japanese and U.S. governments have agreed that Japan will shoulder 6.09
billion dollars, or 59 percent, of the total budget of 10.27 billion dollars for moving the marines from Okinawa Prefecture to
Guam. The Japanese portion includes fiscal spending of 2.8 billion dollars.Guam's strong resistanceThe de facto
postponement of completing the U.S. marines' relocation to Guam was prompted by strong resistance from the Guam
government.Guam Gov. Felix Camacho argued strongly for improvements in civil infrastructure when the Defense
Department announced the draft environmental impact statement in November. As such improvements will require a
certain amount of time and a larger budget, many within the U.S. government and Congress are now increasingly uncertain
about when the relocation will be finished. As a result, the budget for fiscal 2011 saw major cuts in funding for the
construction of military facilities connected with the relocation to Guam.
2. No impact – Even if their ev is talking about the current location of Futenma being bad, its been their
for 50 years, proves impact is empirically denied
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Bio-diversity ADV F/L
3. Multiple alternate causalities to biodiversity loss
Michael Rosenzweig, Department of Ecology & Evolutionary Biology, 01, PNAS, Volume 98, No. 10, May 8, p. 5404)
Human pressure may greatly accelerate the relaxation process by increasing accidental extinction rates. Various human
activities suggest this. We increasingly commingle evolutionarily separate provincial biotas, creating the New Pangaea and
introducing native species to predatory and competitive threats from exotics (47). We rapidly transport novel diseases and
parasites around the world. We simplify biotic temporal regimes (for example by limiting disturbances such as fire). And
we are warming the globe. The National Research Council (44) implicates exotic species or lack of adequate disturbance as
the root cause in endangering a significant proportion of threatened U.S. species. But global warming may constitute the
worst threat of all: by altering the basic abiotic conditions of reserves, it can destroy their ability to do much of their job.
When the earth was covered with contiguous tracts of natural habitat, species could track such changes, moving to keep up
with the shifts in location of their favored habitats and so avoiding extinction (48-50). But today, with natural habitats
restricted to patches of reserves, this is not possible. Meanwhile, we show little sign of abandoning the destruction of
habitat that brings deterministic extinction to species.
4. Ecosystems are sufficiently resilient; one species cannot lead to extinction, even if it is the Dugong
Roger Sedjo A Sedjo, Sr. Fellow, Resources for the Future, 2000, Conserving Nature’s Biodiversity: insights from biology, ethics
and economics, eds. Van Kooten, Bulte and Sinclair, p. 114, 2000
As a critical input into the existence of humans and of life on earth, biodiversity obviously has a very high value (at least to
humans). But, as with other resource questions, including public goods, biodiversity is not an either/or question, but rather
a question of “how much.” Thus, we may argue as to how much biodiversity is desirable or is required for human life
(threshold) and how much is desirable (insurance) and at what price, just as societies argue over the appropriate amount and
cost of national defense. As discussed by Simpson, the value of water is small even though it is essential to human life,
while diamonds are inessential but valuable to humans. The reason has to do with relative abundance and scarcity, with
market value pertaining to the marginal unit. This water-diamond paradox can be applied to biodiversity. Although
biological diversity is essential, a single species has only limited value, since the global system will continue to function
without that species. Similarly, the value of a piece of biodiversity (e.g., 10 ha of tropical forest) is small to negligible
since its contribution to the functioning of the global biodiversity is negligible. The global ecosystem can function with
“somewhat more” or “somewhat less” biodiversity, since there have been larger amounts in times past and some losses in
recent times. Therefore, in the absence of evidence to indicate that small habitat losses threaten the functioning of the
global life support system, the value of these marginal habitats is negligible. The “value question” is that of how valuable to
the life support function are species at the margin. While this, in principle, is an empirical question, in practice it is
probably unknowable. However, thus far, biodiversity losses appear to have had little or no effect on the functioning of the
earth’s life support system, presumably due to the resiliency of the system, which perhaps is due to the redundancy found in
the system. Through most of its existence, earth has had far less biological diversity. Thus, as in the water-diamond
paradox, the value of the marginal unit of biodiversity appears to be very small.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
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5. Impact inevitable – global warming
Jeanne Neath, Published writer in feminist and ecofeminist philosophy, PhD in Social Psychology from Kansas Univ ., 2010
“My Fair Share”, The Cedar Hill Report, January 24 th, 2010, available online at http://www.ecofeminismblog.org/?p=455,
accessed July 7, 2010//Thur)
But, wait! There’s a problem. At current levels of world income humanity is producing such a large quantity of greenhouse
gases that we are threatening the continuation of human civilization and much of life on earth. The Global Humanitarian
Forum, a think tank directed by former United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan, estimates that global warming is
already causing 300,000 human deaths per year. To reduce greenhouse gases either income and related production must be
reduced from the current world average (meaning I’d get less than $6500), world population must drop significantly, or
every dollar spent must result in much less carbon entering the stratosphere. Damage to the environment is commonly
calculated by multiplying these three factors (i.e. Impact=Population x Affluence x Technology). Both population (.7% per
year) and income (1.4% per year) are growing. The most palatable option for the world’s rich is the third option, commonly
known as reducing carbon intensity. Carbon intensity can be decreased by increasing efficiency (producing goods and
services with less energy) and by using non-carbon energy sources like solar power. Over the past 25 years carbon intensity
has improved by almost 23% worldwide. But, this downward trend has not been
consistent over the years. Since the year 2000 carbon intensity has worsened worldwide. With worsening carbon intensity,
increasing income, and increasing population the total amount of carbon going into the atmosphere has increased by 3.5%
per year since 2000 (up from under 1% in the 1990s). This rate of increase is far higher than the rates assumed in any of the
models used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in making its predictions of future global warming. Even
with the Kyoto Protocol, no part of the world has succeeded in diminishing its carbon emissions. Prosperity Without
Growth, a recent report from the United Kingdom’s Sustainable Development Commission, has calculated the
improvements in carbon intensity that would be necessary to offset projected growth in population and income between
now and 2050 and still reduce carbon in the atmosphere down to 450 ppm. While in 2007 carbon intensity was at 768
grams of carbon dioxide per dollar we would need to get down to 36 grams per dollar by 2050. In other words carbon
intensity would need to improve by 21 times! Remember that 25 years of technological improvements between 1980 and
2005 were only able to improve emissions 1.3 times (from 1000 to 768 grams carbon dioxide per dollar). This projection
allows for slow income growth, but no equalization of income between rich and poor countries. If world income were to
equalize at current European Union levels by 2050, allowing no income increases in the developed world, carbon intensity
would need to diminish to 14 grams carbon dioxide per dollar, 55 times better than today. This last scenario presumes no
income growth in the European Union, a loss in income for the U.S., and large gains in income throughout the developing
world. Prosperity Without Growth concludes that these levels of improvement in carbon intensity are not feasible and that
economic growth cannot safely continue. Worldwatch attempted to put similar figures into perspective by pointing out that
for everyone on the Earth to live at the EU levels expected in 2050 if “normal” growth continues we would need cars
capable of getting 700 or 800 miles per gallon! It looks like even my fair share of $6500 is too much unless a revolution in
technology dropped carbon intensity down to nearly nothing. Since new technologies take decades to come into common
usage, the hope for such a revolution is just a fantasy, albeit a popular and dangerous one. The only other alternative – and
this is just a personal solution – would be for me to find a way to spend my dollars on products and services that emit
almost no carbon.
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EXT 1NC #1 – Futenma is here to stay
The resignation of Hatoyama has squandered any current communication or opportunities regarding the
Okinawa issue, Kan is focusing on the economy and giving lip-service to the Okinawans, delaying any
progress
The International Herald Tribune, June 11, 2010, Lexis Nexis, “The Okinawa Question,” accessed on 7-20-10) SM
Whatever his reasons, it was a promise heavy in historical and emotional significance, which is why Hatoyama's failure
to deliver on it had so much political impact. Was Hatoyama doomed to fail from the beginning? Maybe. The Futenma
base issue is only the most visible tip of a much larger configuration of issues relating to the foundations of the postwar
Japanese state and U.S.-Japan relations. It was naïve to think that Hatoyama could singlehandedly undo a situation that
has been more than 60 years in the making.But there are many ways to fail, and Hatoyama failed particularly badly. He
reached an agreement with the United States on May 28 about Futenma's relocation despite the strong, vocal and
frequent expressions of opposition from Okinawans.The anger at Hatoyama's betrayal shut down channels of
communication between Okinawa and the central government and aggravated local mistrust of the center. It has also
exacerbated the sense among Okinawans that ''mainland Japan'' is perfectly willing to continue its discriminatory
treatment of Okinawa by leaving the island to carry the burden of the U.S.-Japan security relationship from which all
Japan benefits.But this is not only about Okinawa. Any serious attempt to address the question of bases on Okinawa
cannot avoid the inextricably linked question of the entire U.S.-Japan security arrangement.In mishandling the Futenma
issue, Hatoyama squandered the opportunity to start a frank discussion - and perhaps even a rethinking - of what Japan's
role in that relationship is, and what it wants from it.This is crucial for Japan as a whole because a conversation about
the country's future direction (including its existing security relationships) within a rapidly changing East Asia is
becoming increasingly necessary.Hatoyama cast his resignation as taking responsibility for failure on the Futenma
issue, but this too, looks likely to hurt the situation. Since his resignation, Japanese media and popular attention to the
Futenma issue has collapsed, and Okinawa's base issue faces the very real risk of getting lost in the transition to the new
government. Indeed, the new prime minister, Naoto Kan, has made the Japanese economy his primary focus. Regarding
Futenma, he reaffirmed the government's commitment to the May 28 agreement with the U.S. while promising
(vaguely) to give attention to reducing Okinawa's base burdens.
The final re-negotiations of the Futenma Air Station have been delayed until after the gubernatorial
elections in Okinawa, signaling the uncertain fate of the base issue
Associated Press, July 20, 2010, Japan May delay Finalizing U.S. base relocation”
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9H2KREO0&show_article=1 , ) SM
Japan may delay finalizing details of the planned relocation of a key U.S. military base within Okinawa Prefecture, Defense
Minister Toshimi Kitazawa suggested Tuesday in reference to the original deadline of August.
Kitazawa, speaking to reporters after a Cabinet meeting, said the government must pay attention to the result of a
gubernatorial election in Okinawa slated for November.
"We must place importance" on the election to choose the governor "who has the heaviest responsibility for Okinawa," he
said. The Japanese and U.S. governments agreed in May to move the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station within the
island prefecture despite strong opposition from locals. The two countries then decided to work out such details of the
relocation plan as a specific location and construction methods for the replacement facility by late August after a series of
talks. Kitazawa said the government hopes it could avoid forcing people in Okinawa to accept finalized details without any
argument, adding, "I think it is likely that we cannot tell anything for sure until after the election."
His comments signal that the government may not aim to reach a conclusion during the ongoing talks between Japanese
and U.S. officials and experts, and will instead only narrow the possible options they could take.
Tokyo's position of delaying the relocation may cause U.S. backlash. But Kitazawa said, "I believe the U.S. side
understands the political situation in Okinawa well." The Japan-U.S. agreement in May said more of the U.S. military drills
in Okinawa will be transferred out of the prefecture, naming Tokunoshima Island of Kagoshima Prefecture, Self-Defense
Force bases in mainland Japan and the U.S. territory of Guam as possible hosts. The government is now more likely to
abandon the Tokunoshima option as it is considering giving up earmarking in the budget for next fiscal year the cost of
research in connection with a possible transfer of some U.S. military drills there, government sources said. Cabinet
members denied anything has been finalized. Kitazawa said the government is not yet at a stage where it can decide
"whether or not we should give up."
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EXT 1NC #5 – Impact Inevitable: Global Warming
Warming destroys ecological resilience—it increases water, agricultural, and biodiversity stress.
J.R., Pegg, 2008 (2/1, Environmental News Service, "U.S. Lawmakers Urged to Lead Global Warming Battle", http://www.ensnewswire.com/ens/feb2008/2008-02-01-10.asp, WEA)
It is the world's poor who are "most vulnerable" to the adverse impacts of climate change, Pachauri said, noting that the
IPCC estimates some 1.5 billion people in the developing world are likely to be exposed to increased water stress due to
climate change by 2020.
The panel also estimates agricultural yields will drop by some 50 percent in some African countries, by 30 percent by 2050
in Asia and by 30 percent in Latin America before 2080.
"This clearly has major implications for food security worldwide," said Pachauri.
Furthermore, climate change could wreck havoc with ecosystems, he added, and threatens 20 to 30 percent of the planet's
plant and animal species.
"Once this kind of damage takes place, we really have no way of turning back," Pachauri said, noting that humans will be
impacted by the loss of biodiversity.
Continued warming causing feedbacks—this amplifies warming beyond control.
Science Daily, 2006 - based on research by the DOE's Climate Change Resarch Division and the National Science Foundation
(5/22, "Feedback Loops In Global Climate Change Point To A Very Hot 21st Century",
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/05/060522151248.htm, WEA)
Studies have shown that global climate change can set-off positive feedback loops in nature which amplify warming and
cooling trends. Now, researchers with the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Berkeley Lab) and the University of
California at Berkeley have been able to quantify the feedback implied by past increases in natural carbon dioxide and
methane gas levels. Their results point to global temperatures at the end of this century that may be significantly higher
than current climate models are predicting.Using as a source the Vostok ice core, which provides information about glacialinterglacial cycles over hundreds of thousands of years, the researchers were able to estimate the amounts of carbon dioxide
and methane, two of the principal greenhouse gases, that were released into the atmosphere in response to past global
warming trends. Combining their estimates with standard climate model assumptions, they calculated how much these
rising concentration levels caused global temperatures to climb, further increasing carbon dioxide and methane emissions,
and so on.“The results indicate a future that is going to be hotter than we think,” said Margaret Torn, who heads the
Climate Change and Carbon Management program for Berkeley Lab’s Earth Sciences Division, and is an Associate
Adjunct Professor in UC Berkeley’s Energy and Resources Group. She and John Harte, a UC Berkeley professor in the
Energy and Resources Group and in the Ecosystem Sciences Division of the College of Natural Resources, have coauthored a paper entitled: Missing feedbacks, asymmetric uncertainties, and the underestimation of future warming, which
appears in the May, 2006 issue of the journal Geophysical Research Letters (GRL).
In their GRL paper, Torn and Harte make the case that the current climate change models, which are predicting a global
temperature increase of as much as 5.8 degrees Celsius by the end of the century, may be off by nearly 2.0 degrees Celsius
because they only take into consideration the increased greenhouse gas concentrations that result from anthropogenic
(human) activities.“If the past is any guide, then when our anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions cause global warming,
it will alter earth system processes, resulting in additional atmospheric greenhouse gas loading and additional warming,”
said Torn.Torn is an authority on carbon and nutrient cycling in terrestrial ecosystems, and on the impacts of anthropogenic
activities on terrestrial ecosystem processes. Harte has been a leading figure for the past two decades on climate-ecosystem
interactions, and has authored or co-authored numerous books on environmental sciences, including the highly praised
Consider a Spherical Cow: A Course in Environmental Problem Solving.
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A2 Forest Fires
1. No, STOP – this evidence is talking about forest fires in the U.S. in 1987, no reason this evidence is
applicable to Japan
2. Your evidence concludes forest fires would not be global
NYT,87(10-20, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE4DE133EF933A15753C1A961948260)
The dark pall of smoke hovering above giant forest fires recently in the West has yielded a scientific bonanza for
researchers studying whether nuclear warfare would plunge the earth into a freezing ''nuclear winter.'' ''The conditions that
existed in southern Oregon and Northern California were as close as one is likely to see to conditions one might expect
after the use of nuclear weapons,'' said Bernard Zak, atmospheric program coordinator at Sandia National Laboratories in
Albuquerque, N.M. The fires yielded ''at least 10 times as much data'' as the controlled brushfire last year in the San Dimas
Experimental Forest northeast of Los Angeles, said Mr. Zak, a physicist whose work is financed by the Defense Nuclear
Agency. Smoke on Regional Scale ''Fire and smoke began to approach the regional scale we expect to see after a nuclear
war, although certainly they didn't come anywhere close to the global scale,'' said Richard Turco,
a Marina del Rey atmospheric scientist.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
39
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
A2 Oceans
1. Warming causes sea level rises – seawater expansion and glacial melting
Tolman 2009 (4/30, League of Women Voters, LVW climate change taskforce, "POSITIVE FEEDBACKS AND CLIMATE
RUNAWAY THE NEED TO ACT WITHOUT DELAY",
http://www.lwv.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=13409, WEA)
Of all the threats posed by global warming—more severe droughts and floods, crop yield losses, more intense hurricanes,
the spread of diseases, increased forest fires, species extinction, and sea level rise—the last poses perhaps the most obvious
threat to modern industrial societies, with their major cities on coasts and their dependence on ports for international
trade.32 As GHG concentrations and temperatures rise, sea levels also rise for two reasons: (1) Seawater expands as it
warms, and (2) water runs into the oceans from glaciers melting on land. Global mean temperature three million years ago
was only 2-3ºC higher than it is today while sea level was 25±10 m (80±30 ft) higher. When the atmosphere last had a concentration of
560 ppm, twice what it was in 1750, about 7 million years ago, there was no Greenland ice sheet and considerably less ice in Antarctica.34 If just the
Greenland and the West Antarctic ice sheets melt, this would raise sea levels by 15 m (50 ft), submerging large parts of the Delmarva Peninsula,35
Florida, much of Bangladesh, several small island states (e.g., the Maldives and the Marshall Islands),36 and other low lying areas. A 50-ft
rise would drown many large coastal cities and can aptly be called “catastrophic”. A recent paper using data on land
elevation and population in coastal areas reports that a sea level rise of just 6 m (20 ft) would inundate over The
relationship between global average temperature and sea level, based on earth’s behavior for the past 40 million years, is
shown in Figure 2. Note that the solid points represent equilibrium conditions—with enough time for the oceans, ice, and
vegetation to fully respond. The open point, labeled Projection for 2100, which shows a projected temperature of about
18ºC and a sea level rise of 1 m in 2100, is based on the fact that the ice will not have had nearly enough time by then to
fully respond to the temperature change. The best straight line drawn through the solid points has a slope of 20 m/°C (37
ft/°F). This means that we can expect an equilibrium sea level rise of 20 meters (67 ft) for each 1°C rise in global average
temperature. A critical question is: How rapidly will the ice melt? If we are lucky and the melting is slow enough, we may
be able to manage a staged retreat from the coasts.
2. Warming causes massive droughts
Washington Post 7 (Doug Struck, “Warming Will Exacerbate Global Water Conflicts”, 8-20, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/08/19/AR2007081900967.html)
As global warming heats the planet, there will be more desperate measures. The climate will be wetter in some places, drier
in others. Changing weather patterns will leave millions of people without dependable supplies of water for drinking,
irrigation and power, a growing stack of studies conclude . At Stanford University, 170 miles away, Stephen Schneider, editor of the journal Climatic Change and a
lead author for the authoritative Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), pours himself a cup of tea and says the future is clear. "As the air gets warmer, there will be
more water in the atmosphere. That's settled science," he said. But where, and when, it comes down is the big uncertainty.
"You are going to intensify the hydrologic cycle. Where the atmosphere is configured to have high pressure and droughts,
global warming will mean long, dry periods. Where the atmosphere is configured to be wet, you will get more rain, more gully washers. "Global warming will intensify
drought," he says. "And it will intensify floods." According to the IPCC, that means a drying out of areas such as southern Europe, the Mideast, North Africa, South Australia, Patagonia and the U.S.
Southwest. These will not be small droughts. Richard Seager, a senior researcher at Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia University, looked at 19 computer models of the future under current
global warming trends. He found remarkable consistency: Sometime before 2050, the models predicted, the Southwest will be gripped in a dry spell akin to the Great Dust Bowl drought that lasted through
most of the 1930s. The spacing of tree rings suggests there have been numerous periods of drought going back to A.D. 800, he said. But, "mechanistically, this is different. These projections clearly come
from a warming forced by rising greenhouse gases."
Farmers in the Central Valley, where a quilt of lush, green orchards on brown hills displays the alchemy of irrigation, want to believe this is a passing
dry spell. They thought a wet 2006 ended a seven-year drought, but this year is one of the driest on record. For the first time, state water authorities shut off irrigation pumps to large parts of the valley,
forcing farmers to dig wells. Farther south and east, the once-mighty Colorado River is looking sickly, siphoned by seven states before dribbling into Mexico. Its reservoirs, Lake Mead and Lake Powell,
are drying, leaving accusatory rings on the shorelines and imperiling river-rafting companies. Seager predicts that drought will prompt dislocations similar to those of the Dust Bowl. "It will certainly cause
movements of people. For example, as Mexico dries out, there will be migration from rural areas to cities and then the U.S.," he said. "There is an emerging situation of climate refugees." Global warming
Much of the world's fresh water is in glaciers atop mountains. They act as mammoth storehouses. In
wet or cold seasons, the glaciers grow with snow. In dry and hot seasons, the edges slowly melt, gently feeding streams and
rivers. Farms below are dependent on that meltwater; huge cities have grown up on the belief the mountains will always
give them drinking water; hydroelectric dams rely on the flow to generate power. But the atmosphere's temperature is
rising fastest at high altitudes. The glaciers are melting, initially increasing the runoff, but gradually getting smaller and
smaller. Soon, many will disappear. At the edge of the Quelccaya Glacier, the largest ice cap in the Peruvian Andes, Ohio State University researcher Lonnie Thompson sat in a
threatens water supplies in other ways.
cold tent at a rarified 17,000 feet. He has spent more time in the oxygen-thin "death zone" atop mountains than any other scientist, drilling ice cores and measuring glaciers. He has watched the Quelccaya
Glacier shrink by 30 percent in 33 years. Down the mountain, a multitude of rivulets seep from the edge of Quelccaya to irrigate crops of maize, the water flowing through irrigation canals built by the
"What do you think is going to happen when this stops?"
Thompson mused of the water. "Do you think all the people below will just sit there? No. It's crazy to think they won't go
anywhere. And what do you think will happen when they go to places where people already live?" The potential for
conflict is more than theoretical. Turkey, Syria and Iraq bristle over the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Sudan, Ethiopia and
Egypt trade threats over the Nile. The United Nations has said water scarcity is behind the bloody wars in Sudan's Darfur
region. In Somalia, drought has spawned warlords and armies. Already, the World Health Organization says, 1 billion people lack access to potable water. In northern China, retreating glaciers and
Incas. Even farther downstream, the runoff helps feed the giant capital, Lima, another city built in a desert.
shrinking wetlands that feed the Yangtze River prompted researchers to warn that water supplies for hundreds of millions of people may be at risk.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
40
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
Democracy ADV F/L (1/3)
1. This advantage makes no sense – Japan has been squelching democracy through the courts by ignoring
the Okinawa people for 50 years, no reason now is the key time
2. No Solvency – no reason Japan is key to promote democracy, squo solves, U.S. current democracy
promotion solves back any risk of a terminal impact
3. No impact- their Shaw evidence is predicated off of multiple international actors cooperating to ensure
democracy, plan does not solve
4. Turn - Democratic peace theory is wrong – status quo proves democracies go to war
James Ostrawski, a trial and appellate lawyer and libertarian author from Buffalo, New York. He graduated from St. Joseph’s Collegiate Institute in 1975 and obtained a
degree in philosophy from the State University of New York at Buffalo in 1980. His articles have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Buffalo News, Cleveland Plain Dealer and
Legislative Gazette. His policy studies have been published by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the Ludwig von Mises Institute at Auburn University, and the Cato
Institute in Washington, D.C. His articles have been used as course materials at numerous colleges including Brown, Rutgers and Stanford, 2002 “The Myth of Democratic
Peace: Why Democracy Cannot Deliver Peace in the 21st Century,” Lewell Rock, http://www.lewrockwell.com/ostrowski/ostrowski72.html)
Spencer R. Weart alleges that democracies rarely if ever go to war with each other. Even if this is true, it distorts reality and
makes people far too sanguine about democracy’s ability to deliver the world’s greatest need today – peace. In reality, the
main threat to world peace today is not war between two nation-states, but (1) nuclear arms proliferation; (2) terrorism; and
(3) ethnic and religious conflict within states. As this paper was being written, India, the world’s largest democracy,
appeared to be itching to start a war with Pakistan, bringing the world closer to nuclear war than it has been for many years.
The United States, the world’s leading democracy, is waging war in Afghanistan, which war relates to the second and third
threats noted above – terrorism and ethnic/religious conflict. If the terrorists are to be believed – and why would they
lie?─they struck at the United States on September 11th because of its democratically-induced interventions into
ethnic/religious disputes in their parts of the world. As I shall argue below, democracy is implicated in all three major
threats to world peace and others as well. The vaunted political machinery of democracy has failed to deliver on its
promises. The United States, the quintessential democracy, was directly or indirectly involved in most of the major wars in
the 20th Century.
B. Democratic governments exploit and manipulate individuals—peace is unconceivable in this system
Ostrawski ‘2, (James, a trial and appellate lawyer and libertarian author from Buffalo, New York. He graduated from St. Joseph’s Collegiate Institute in 1975 and
obtained a degree in philosophy from the State University of New York at Buffalo in 1980. His articles have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Buffalo News, Cleveland Plain
Dealer and Legislative Gazette. His policy studies have been published by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the Ludwig von Mises Institute at Auburn University, and
the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. His articles have been used as course materials at numerous colleges including Brown, Rutgers and Stanford, “The Myth of Democratic
Peace: Why Democracy Cannot Deliver Peace in the 21st Century,” Lewell Rock, http://www.lewrockwell.com/ostrowski/ostrowski72.html)
It is apparent from a consideration of the definitions of the concepts peace and democracy that democracy does not promote
peace. Peace is the absence of violence or the palpable threat of violence against persons and their property. Democracy is a
form of government which, by and large, places persons and their property at the mercy of the vagaries of majoritarian
politics over which, as individuals, they have essentially no control, and to which, therefore, they cannot be deemed, under
any view but the fantastic, to have consented. In truth, democracy is nothing more than the numerous and their
manipulators bullying the less numerous. It is an elaborate and deceptive rationalization for the strong in numbers to
impose their will on the electorally weak by means of centralized state coercion. It takes as its premise the right of each
person to control his destiny, and, by shifting this right from the individual, to the collective, destroys it. Advocates of
democracy emphasize the self-government rights of an abstraction called "the people," but ironically recoil in horror at the
prospect of real persons governing their own selves. Democracy is not a formula for peace, domestic or foreign. If
democratic states can impose their will on their own minority populations, why can’t they impose their will on other
countries, states, and peoples, particularly if they are not democratic?
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
41
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
Democracy ADV F/L (2/3)
5. No modeling—worldviews of American democracy ruined
Andrew Kohut, 2009“Obama Unlikely to Find a Quick Fix for U.S. Global Image,” President, Pew Research Center March 31,
2009)
As Barack Obama travels through Europe on his first overseas trip as president, keep your expectations modest that this is
the beginning of a major revival of America's global image. No question that Barack Obama has a great personal following
around the world, especially in comparison with President Bush. But to restore the global image of the nation he now leads,
the new president must overcome a number of fundamental criticisms. And issues arising from the global economic crisis
and other world problems on Obama's agenda seem likely to resonate with key criticisms about America's leadership in the
Bush years. Judging from Pew Research's interviews with 177,000 people in 55 nations between 2002 and 2008, topping
the list of carryover complaints is the charge that America too often acts unilaterally: that it doesn't take into account the
interests of other nations in formulating policy. Closely linked to this critique is the view that the United States relies too
much on military force to deal with international conflicts. Another consistent and prevalent criticism has been that the U.S.
does too little to address world problems, and what it does do has widened the global gulf between rich and poor. On
matters ranging from promotion of democracy to globalization to international security, the rest of the world became openly
skeptical of America's word and intentions over most of this decade. Although a good deal of this global hardening of
attitudes was aimed directly at President Bush and his policies, the animus amounted to something larger than a thumbs
down on the-then-occupant of the White House. Simply put, much of the world came to fear and resent the unrivaled power
of that worrisome colossus, the United States. While President Obama has been extremely popular personally, his
international agenda may not be, given the global mindset about the U.S. Take for example his desire to gain more
European support for the war in Afghanistan. In 2008 most Europeans surveyed by Pew Research, save the British, favored
withdrawing NATO troops from that country. An American president urging reluctant Europeans to use force is hardly
likely to allay concerns about U.S. militarism. Then there is Obama's economic stimulus plan encouraging consumer
spending and entailing greatly increased budget deficits. This apparently strikes at least some European leaders as reckless.
The new president's efforts to sell this policy approach may well feed into the prevailing notion of the U.S. going its own
way in dealing with mega international problems. Even more importantly, blaming the U.S. for the global recession may
well resonate with the broader complaint about America's power and influence.
6. Democratic transitions lead to civil wars
Henderson, 2002 (Errol, assistant professor, department of political science at the University of Florida, “Democracy and War the end of an Illusion?” pg. 147-148)
Are Democracies in the Postcolonial World Less Likely to Experience Civil Wars? The results fail to support the
democratic peace for civil wars in post-colonial states since democracy is not significantly associated with a decreased
probability of intrastate war in postcolonial states. Instead, the result corroborate previous findings that semi-democracy is
associated with an increased likelihood of civil war. Therefore, although coherent democracy does not appear to reduce the
likelihood of postcolonial civil wars, partial democracy exacerbates the tensions that result in civil war. Given the findings
from Chapter 6, these results suggest that democratic enlargement as a strategy for peace is not likely to succeed for those
states that need it most—the postcolonial, or third world, states. Further, even if full-fledged democracy were to engender
peace within these states—which is not indicated by the findings reported here—it would likely generate conflict,
internationally, since democracies are more prone to initiate and become involved in interstate wars and militarize disputes.
As noted earlier, the promise of egalitarianism, which is the true appeal of democracy seems to involve a Hobson’s choice
for citizens of postcolonial states: equality with an increased likelihood of domestic instability or inequality with a
decreased likelihood of international stability.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
42
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
Democracy ADV F/L (3/3)
7. Authoritarian regimes solve conflict – they are comparitvely more cooperative
F. Gregory Gause, 2005 – University of Vermont political science Professor & Director of the University's Middle East Studies
Program [F. Gregory Gause III. “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?,” Foreign Affairs. New York: Sep/Oct 2005. Vol. 84, Iss. 5; pg.
62//Metapress, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61021/f-gregory-gause-iii/can-democracy-stop-terrorism]
It is highly unlikely that democratically elected Arab governments would be as cooperative with the United States as the
current authoritarian regimes. To the extent that public opinion can be measured in these countries, research shows that
Arabs strongly support democracy. When they have a chance to vote in real elections, they generally turn out in percentages
far greater than Americans do in their elections. But many Arabs hold negative views of the United States. If Arab
governments were democratically elected and more representative of public opinion, they would thus be more antiAmerican. Further democratization in the Middle East would, for the foreseeable future, most likely generate Islamist
governments less inclined to cooperate with the United States on important U.S. policy goals, including military basing
rights in the region, peace with Israel, and the war on terrorism.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
43
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
Middle East War/Terrorism ADV F/L – (1/1)
1. First— Zero risk of terror
GSN ‘9
(Global Security Newswire, “Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism,” http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090113_7105.php)
In even the most likely scenario of nuclear terrorism, there are 20 barriers between extremists and a successful nuclear
strike on a major city, said John Mueller, a political science professor at Ohio State University / The process itself is
seemingly straightforward but exceedingly difficult -- buy or steal highly enriched uranium, manufacture a weapon, take
the bomb to the target site and blow it up. Meanwhile, variables strewn across the path to an attack would increase the
complexity of the effort, Mueller argued / Terrorists would have to bribe officials in a state nuclear program to acquire the
material, while avoiding a sting by authorities or a scam by the sellers. The material itself could also turn out to be bad /
"Once the purloined material is purloined, [police are] going to be chasing after you. They are also going to put on a high
reward, extremely high reward, on getting the weapon back or getting the fissile material back," Mueller said during a panel
discussion at a two-day Cato Institute conference on counterterrorism issues facing the incoming Obama administration /
Smuggling the material out of a country would mean relying on criminals who "are very good at extortion" and might have
to be killed to avoid a double-cross, Mueller said. The terrorists would then have to find scientists and engineers willing to
give up their normal lives to manufacture a bomb, which would require an expensive and sophisticated machine shop /
Finally, further technological expertise would be needed to sneak the weapon across national borders to its destination point
and conduct a successful detonation, Mueller said / Every obstacle is "difficult but not impossible" to overcome, Mueller
said, putting the chance of success at no less than one in three for each. The likelihood of successfully passing through each
obstacle, in sequence, would be roughly one in 3 1/2 billion, he said, but for argument's sake dropped it to 3 1/2 million /
"It's a total gamble. This is a very expensive and difficult thing to do," said Mueller, who addresses the issue at greater
length in an upcoming book, Atomic Obsession. "So unlike buying a ticket to the lottery ... you're basically putting
everything, including your life, at stake for a gamble that's maybe one in 3 1/2 million or 3 1/2 billion." / Other scenarios
are even less probable, Mueller said / A nuclear-armed state is "exceedingly unlikely" to hand a weapon to a terrorist group,
he argued: "States just simply won't give it to somebody they can't control ." / Terrorists are also not likely to be able to steal
a whole weapon, Mueller asserted, dismissing the idea of "loose nukes." Even Pakistan, which today is perhaps the nation
of greatest concern regarding nuclear security, keeps its bombs in two segments that are stored at different locations, he said
(see GSN, Jan. 12) / Fear of an "extremely improbable event" such as nuclear terrorism produces support for a wide range
of homeland security activities, Mueller said. He argued that there has been a major and costly overreaction to the terrorism
threat -- noting that the Sept. 11 attacks helped to precipitate the invasion of Iraq, which has led to far more deaths than the
original event / Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and
governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about
terrorists' ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply
what is possible, he said.
2. Second— No terrorist threat – no reason to attack and too weak; their predictions are flawed
John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, 6
“Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?”, September/October 2006, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61911/john-mueller/is-there-stilla-terrorist-threat-the-myth-of-the-omnipresent-en
For the past five years, Americans have been regularly regaled with dire predictions of another major al Qaeda attack in the
United States. In 2003, a group of 200 senior government officials and business executives, many of them specialists in
security and terrorism, pronounced it likely that a terrorist strike more devastating than 9/11 -- possibly involving weapons
of mass destruction -- would occur before the end of 2004. In May 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft warned that al
Qaeda could "hit hard" in the next few months and said that 90 percent of the arrangements for an attack on U.S. soil were
complete. That fall, Newsweek reported that it was "practically an article of faith among counterterrorism officials" that al Qaeda
would strike in the run-up to the November 2004 election. When that "October surprise" failed to materialize, the focus shifted: a taped
encyclical from Osama bin Laden, it was said, demonstrated that he was too weak to attack before the election but was
marshalling his resources to do so months after it. On the first page of its founding manifesto, the massively funded Department of Homeland
Security intones, "Today's terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any weapon." But if it is so easy to pull off an attack
and if terrorists are so demonically competent, why have they not done it? Why have they not been sniping at people in
shopping centers, collapsing tunnels, poisoning the food supply, cutting electrical lines, derailing trains, blowing up oil
pipelines, causing massive traffic jams, or exploiting the countless other vulnerabilities that, according to security experts,
could so easily be exploited? One reasonable explanation is that almost no terrorists exist in the United States and few have
the means or the inclination to strike from abroad . But this explanation is rarely offered.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
44
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
Japanese Politics ADV F/L – (1/3)
1. Impact is non-unique - continued Japanese economic slowdown is already devastating – its reached the
tipping point
Rafferty, former managing director at the World Bank, editor in chief of PlainWords Media, a group of journalists specializing in
economic development issues, 6-10-10
(“Can Kan Revive Japan?” Special Report for the Japan Times http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100610a1.html)
Similar unreality is shown about economic growth. The Japanese media reported that the ruling Democratic Party of Japan
draft manifesto "calls for achieving an average nominal economic growth of 3 percent and real growth of 2 percent in the
years through fiscal 2020." On the other hand, "The LDP hopes for nominal growth of 4 percent and real growth of 2
percent, LDP lawmakers said." How nice if the real world were as simple and real growth for 10 years ahead worked neatly
according to politicians wishful formulas.Some economists, including foreign ones, say that Japan can relax even with
higher ratios than Greece. One reason is that the published figures are gross debts and the net figures are much lower, closer
to half the gross ones. More importantly, Japanese debts, unlike those of Greece, or the U.S. or Britain, are predominantly
owed to Japanese, not foreigners.This has allowed Japan to get away with low interest rates on its debts as well as not to
worry about a selloff. The benchmark 10-year government bond yield is steady around 1.3 percent because of brisk demand
from domestic life insurance companies and banks. According to the Bank of Japan, domestic investors held 94.8 percent
of Japanese government bonds at the end of 2009. Cynics say that the old boy network of the Japanese elite means that the
institutional investors have no real choice except to swallow the bonds, and no foreign investor would look at such low
yields.But even with these factors in Japan's favor, Kan is correct to worry. The rise in numbers is scary. The ministry of
finance forecasts that Japan's central government debt could reach ¥973 trillion by the end of the current fiscal year.
Apart from conventional concerns such as government borrowing crowding out the private sector and the fear of reaching a
tipping point when markets will declare they have had enough even of the Japanese government, the country is running up
a heavy burden that future generations will not be able to bear.Damaging effects are already being seen, in household
savings rates that have fallen below those of the U.S., and in huge unfunded pensions at big companies because of the low
yields of government bonds and the falling stock market, less than 24 percent of its 1989 peak. Unfunded liabilities at
Hitachi are ¥1.1 trillion and those at NTT are ¥576 billion, huge gaps and potential disappointments for workers expecting
a comfortable retirement, who will then find that the state has no money to pay for their medical and pension bills.What
should worry Kan most of all is the lack of any realistic debate on the wide socioeconomic implications of heavy debts,
economic stagnation and an aging society. Indeed, Japan Inc. seems to be sleepwalking toward its inevitable doom.
Economic reform, restructuring and deregulation are dirty words in the political lexicon. In terms of ideas, from schools to
the big companies and the media, South Korea, India, and even China within strict political limits, are livelier than Japan
2. Kan’s potential coalition partners don’t oppose the US presence – it’s not key to his agenda.
Daisuke Wakabayashi and Yuka Hayashi, WSJ (Wall Street Journal), 7/12/2010, “Weakened Kan Faces
Deadlines on Okinawa”
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703580104575360660021162180.htmlw
The tensions revolve around a 2006 agreement between the two countries to shuffle U.S. troops in Okinawa to make them
more politically acceptable to the local population. The agreement calls for the U.S. to move 8,000 Marines to Guam by
2014 and to shift part of an existing Okinawa helicopter facility to a rural part of the island from a densely populated area.
The aim is to diminish local hostility to the Marine presence, which has been stoked by a rape case and a helicopter crash.
While the deal reduces the number of Marines on Okinawa, it leaves thousands there, and it doesn't go far enough for many
Okinawans, who want the base moved off the island entirely. The ruling Democratic Party of Japan had endorsed that view
last year and promised base opponents it would support their cause. But Mr. Hatoyama changed his position under pressure
from the U.S. The issue didn't get much attention in a campaign dominated by domestic issues, such as Mr. Kan's pledge to
raise the national sales tax to help cut the national debt. The parties that Mr. Kan is likely to invite into a new ruling
coalition have either endorsed the U.S. plan or haven't vocally opposed it. In that sense, Mr. Kan may be freer than Mr.
Hatoyama to move forward in implementing the U.S. agreement. Mr. Hatoyama's coalition included the left-leaning Social
Democratic Party of Japan, which strongly opposes the U.S. military presence in Okinawa—and which left the coalition
when Mr. Hatoyama reversed course.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
45
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
Japanese Politics ADV F/L – (2/3)
3. No Win - Japan opposes a total withdrawal of the US presence.
William Breer, Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5/2010, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/05_east_asia_breer.aspx
Despite periodic outbursts of opposition to nuclear ship home-porting or other aspects of the U.S. deployment in Japan,
support among the Japanese people for the security relationship has remained at a remarkably high level. As a result the
U.S. has had a relatively free hand in the use of our facilities and in the deployment of forces there. Generations of Japanese
leaders have cooperated with U.S. security needs. These include a contribution of $13 billion in support of the first Gulf
War, the dispatch of ground forces in support of our operations against Saddam Hussein, and generous foreign assistance to
many places in which we have a strategic interest, including Afghanistan. Japan has also for the past 25 years made major
contributions - $4-5 billion per year - to the support of U.S. forces in Japan. Who would have imagined 60 years ago that
there would be significant U.S. military facilities in Japan in 2010?
4. Tax reform causes a Japanese economic recession – history proves.
Paul J. Scalise, research fellow at Temple University Japan, guest columnist at Newsweek, 6/12/2010;
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/12/kan-s-megaproblem.html
Japan’s former finance minister, Naoto Kan, has become the nation’s fifth prime minister in just four years—and the
predictable cycle of high expectations followed by mild cynicism has begun anew. How long he will remain in office is
anyone’s guess, but one thing is certain: trying to solve government finances could be for this premier the same kind of
career killer that the Futenma base-relocation issue was for the last one. The inescapable math of an aging society that has
been promised huge retirement and welfare benefits, which are not fully covered by taxes, could make Kan’s tenure a true
test of government and party leadership. Japan’s gross debt-to-GDP ratio is second only to Zimbabwe, at almost 200
percent. Even if double counting the debt (what government agencies owe each other) were deducted, net debt is still 113
percent of GDP. That’s about the same ratio as Greece, which ignited a continent-wide financial meltdown earlier this year.
No one can predict if or when the Japanese bond market will collapse, of course, but rating agencies, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, and the International Monetary Fund have all publicly expressed concern. Aging
populations exacerbate pension costs and pay fewer taxes. In Greece, the 65-and-over population is projected to increase
from 18 percent of the total in 2005 to 25 percent in 2030. For Japan, the swell is worse, from 19.9 percent to 30 percent.
Until recently, Japan’s debt—the total of all annual budget deficits—was allowed to build thanks to the country’s unique
market conditions. With 95 percent of the national debt held by Japanese, increased government borrowing from its own
citizens was arguably nothing more than a domestic transfer—a shift of funds from the right hand (taxes to pay off the debt)
to the left hand (interest income for bond holders). As long as interest rates remained artificially low and competing
investment opportunities in the private sector limited, the government could manage the bond market without depending on
the kindness of foreign lenders. It could tap into the country’s savings surplus until the economy recovered. Except for one
unforeseen glitch: the economy never recovered. Throughout two “lost decades,” Japan applied small Band-Aids to
festering fiscal wounds that drained the country of its dynamism and prolonged the recession. In lieu of major tax cuts or
aggressive spending that could have stimulated economic growth, the Japanese government and the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) opted for incremental tax hikes, increases on insurance premiums on social welfare, and minor cuts in benefits.
Today, the government has maneuvered itself into a cul-de-sac. The three largest expenditures—social security, debt
servicing, and tax transfers to local governments—have grown from 30 percent of the national budget and 1 percent of
GDP in 1960, to staggering heights: 70 percent of the national budget, and 13 percent of GDP. Any attempt now to cut
welfare benefits drastically, raise taxes sharply, or reduce its legal obligations to financially strained local economies like
Osaka and Akita would, at least in the short term, throw the economy deeper into recession. Ironically, that would make
delivering these promised benefits all the more difficult.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
46
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
Japanese Politics ADV F/L – (3/3)
5. Tax reform causes deflation without increasing tax revenue, jacking Japan’s economic recovery.
Yuka Hayashi, 3/1/2010, Wall Street Journal, “Japan takes hard look at massive debt”,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/news/japan-takes-hard-look-at-massive-debt/story-e6frg90x1225835451996
Raising the tax could hurt Mr Hatoyama's party in future elections, including elections for the upper house of parliament set
for July. The idea is unpopular with voters, especially Japan's large bloc of senior citizens. But advocates say a tax increase
is probably the most effective way to reduce the deficit and secure funds to cover the nation's ballooning pension and
medical costs. Experts generally agree an increase in the sales tax is inevitable, but differ on how it should be implemented.
Some argue any increase should be phased in slowly and not started until it's clear it won't kill Japan's economic recovery.
Japan has gone down this road before. A 1997 sales-tax increase triggered a sharp drop in consumption and was blamed for
pushing the economy back into a slump and sparking a broad decline of prices for goods and services in the economy. The
tax idea faces opponents inside the government too. International Affairs Minister Kazuhiro Haraguchi, said: "I'd like to
point out boosting tax burdens when (Japan's) regions and economy are fatigued like this would only result in lower tax
revenues."
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
47
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
EXT 1NC #3 No Win
Japan wants to maintain U.S presence and a strong alliance with the US.
Michael Green, senior adviser and holds the Japan Chair at CSIS, associate professor of international relations
at Georgetown University, 8/7/2009, http://csis.org/publication/reluctant-realism-redux-us-japan-ties-under-dpj
They have mostly chosen the latter—for good reason. While the public has some specific complaints about the alliance,
overall support for the alliance is high, particularly in the wake of North Korean provocations and China’s rapidly growing
power. Mismanaging the alliance would undermine public confidence in the DPJ and open the party to fissures between
conservatives and liberals that the LDP could exploit. Japan remains a center-right nation. Ozawa and Hatoyama know that
the DPJ must shift to the center and demonstrate competence if it wants to deal a knockout blow to the LDP. As a result, in
the new election Manifesto issued July 26, the DPJ expressed support for the US-Japan alliance (including a bilateral Free
Trade Agreement) and dropped opposition to MSDF refueling operations in the Indian Ocean until at least January when
the current law expires. On the other problematic issues of revising the SOFA, and base agreements, the Manifesto only
expressed a vague “desire to move towards revision.” Party leaders have told the press they will focus on building a
personal relationship with President Obama and his key cabinet officials before raising difficult bilateral issues.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
48
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
EXT 1NC #4 – Tax Reform Bad
Japan’s economy is stable – the consumption tax will crush growth.
(Andy Hoffman, Barrie McKenna, Globe and Mail, 7/12/10, " Setback at polls casts doubt on Japan's
economic reforms
", http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/setback-at-polls-castsdoubt-on-japans-economic-reforms/article1636586/)
Despite its debt issues and troubling inflation, Japan's economy has performed well lately, with GDP increasing 4.6 per cent
in the first quarter, the second-fastest among the Group of Eight countries behind Canada. As well, Japan's debt troubles are
less problematic than many countries because the vast majority of government debt is held by domestic investors. The
election losses will make it more difficult for Mr. Kan to push fiscal austerity. But Drummond Brodeur, vice-president and
portfolio manager at Signature Global Advisors in Toronto, noted that it was always going to be a hard sell for Mr. Kan
because there's no sense of urgency among the Japanese to put the country's fiscal house in order. “;Japan has been in a
deflationary, stagnant economy for two decades now. So there's no sense of crisis,” he said. Nor is there a sense of crisis in
financial markets: Interest rates are near zero and the yen is near its all-time high versus the U.S. dollar. Mr. Brodeur also
pointed out that Mr. Kan was facing dissent within his party on the consumption-tax hike, even before the Upper House
election. There's a legitimate concern that raising the consumption tax could hurt Japan's fragile consumer economy, just as
it did in the mid-1990s, the last time the rate was hiked, he said.
Kan’s tax reform proposal won’t generate additional revenue – there’s only a risk it hurts growth.
The Yomiuri Shimbun, 7/14/2010, Daily Yomiuri Online,
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/20100715TDY02T05.htm
During the election campaign, Kan suggested strengthening the progressive taxation system, under which high-income
earners and others bear heavier tax burdens. However, the maximum income tax rate already stands at 40 percent, which is
high by international standards. Because this rate is applied to only a few taxpayers, no visible tax revenue increase can be
expected from Kan's plan. Rather, the prime minister seemed to be trying to fend off public criticism that the proposed
consumption tax hike would hurt the pockets of the wider general public. Raising the maximum income tax rate will
discourage people from working hard and undermine efforts to energize the country's businesses.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
49
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
EXT 1NC #5 – Tax Reform Bad
Raising the consumption tax empirically derails Japanese growth.
Economist,
6/24/2010,
"Enter
the
prudent
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=16438735
Mr
Kan",
Promising higher taxes to deflation-coshed voters just ahead of an important election would be a strange calculation in any
country. In Japan it has additional political and economic poignancy. The consumption tax reaped devastating results for its
supporters in upper-house elections shortly after it was introduced in 1989. After it was raised to 5% in 1997, it once more
harmed its sponsors and helped derail Japan’s economic recovery, plunging the country into a second lost decade of
economic growth.
Raising taxes ends growth, causing deflation.
Robert Gavin, economics reporter-Boston Globe 7/21/2010, Eric Rosengren = president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/07/21/rosengren_says_keep_stimulus_rolling/
Rosengren pointed to Japan's experience, which he studied as an economic researcher. Japan experienced a similar real
estate bust and banking crisis in the 1990s, which policy makers battled by cutting interest rates and boosting government
spending. As the economy began to rebound and concerns about budget deficits grew, Japanese policy makers raised taxes
and cut spending too soon, stalling the recovery and setting off deflation: a debilitating cycle of falling prices. Deflation, a
mark of the Great Depression, occurs when weak demand drives businesses to slash prices to attract buyers, who remain on
the sidelines waiting for prices to fall further. Inventories build, businesses cut production, and more workers lose jobs.
Consumers cut spending, and the cycle repeats. Once deflation sets in, Rosengren said, it is very difficult for policy makers
to revive the economy. “In Japan,'' he said, “it's been a 15-year battle that they have yet to win.''
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
50
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
1NC CP – (1/1)
Counter Plan Text: The United States federal government should close down Futenma Air Station and
put a cap on future troop increase in Japan.
Contention 1 – The CP competes through the proliferation turn and Hegemony good d.a.
Contention 2 – Solvency
Continued resistance over Futenma could spillover through the rest of Japan in the form of grass-root
movements that could not only threaten the very existence of the bilateral security alliance and the
credibility and role of the U.S. in East Asia, but also isolate Japan in the Western Pacific through antibase resentments
Michael Auslin, Director of Japan Studies at The American Enterprise Institute, June 16, 20 10 “The Real Futenma Fallout,” Wall
Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704324304575307471399789704.html) SM
In particular, defense officials focused on Mr. Kan's promise to stick with a 2006 agreement with the U.S. to move a
Marine air wing from one part of Okinawa Island to another. But even so, there remain fissures in the U.S.-Japan
relationship that could erupt into further crises for the alliance. Senior Japanese military officials I've recently interviewed believe
former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama set back Tokyo's relations with its own citizens in Okinawa by at least a decade by waffling on
the 2006 deal, and that the opposition to U.S. bases in Japan, emboldened by the former prime minister's position, could
endanger much broader bilateral military relations between the two countries. This bigger story has received almost no
attention in domestic or foreign press, but needs to be understood by those dismissive of the recent spat's importance.The
2006 agreement to move the Marine air wing at Futenma to Camp Schwab in the northern part of the island, and 8,000
Marines to Guam from Okinawa, was just one part of a broader realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. In the view of senior
Japanese military leadership, however, the actual centerpiece of the 2006 agreement is the expansion of Marine Corps Air Station
(MCAS) Iwakuni, located in Yamaguchi Prefecture, in the west of Japan's main island, Honshu.MCAS Iwakuni already hosts several
Marine air squadrons, including the only American F/A-18 Hornet squadron permanently based abroad. Under the 2006 agreement, the
USS George Washington's fighters, which comprise the navy's only permanently forward-deployed air wing, will relocate to Iwakuni by
2014 from the more congested Naval Air Facility Atsugi, located close to Tokyo . In addition, a squadron of Marine Corps KC-130
tankers will also vacate Futenma for Iwakuni. In their stead, a squadron of Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces surveillance planes, P3s, will leave Iwakuni for Atsugi. All this might sound confusing, but the planned realignment will in essence reduce the
chances of catastrophic accidents happening in heavily populated areas at both Futenma and Atsugi, and will build up the
less-populated Iwakuni base. Here's the rub: The U.S. Department of Defense has made it clear that, unless the entire 2006
realignment plan goes forward, no individual pieces will be set in motion. And it all depends on moving the Marine
helicopters out of Futenma, which has long been a source of political contention between Tokyo and Washington. The
Japanese government, moreover, is committed to moving its surveillance planes to Atsugi, but that move probably won't happen if the
American carrier air wing stays put. Japanese military officials worry that this year's protests in Okinawa could have spillover
effects, inspiring protesters around Atsugi to demand a reduced American presence, and possibly even agitating against the
government plan to move Japanese planes there. Moreover, Iwakuni's mayor might reject the new burden of potentially
hosting the George Washington's air wing. That, in turn, would embolden antinuclear protesters in Yokosuka, the U.S.
Navy's main base, to step up their ongoing pressure to move the nuclear-powered George Washington, the Navy's only
permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, out of Japanese waters.This worst-case scenario would be a series of
simultaneous, grassroots movements against the U.S. military presence in Japan that could potentially put fatal stress on the
bilateral security alliance and effectively isolate Japan militarily in the western Pacific. Given Mr. Hatoyama's fate when he
botched this issue, politicians now are more likely to respond to public demands or they will be replaced by those who do.
The resulting political clash would either reaffirm tight ties with Washington or lead to endemic paralysis in Japan's
national security establishment. Given that the U.S. has permanently forward deployed ships and planes only in Japan, any
scenario like the one sketched out above could significantly weaken U.S. capability to operate in the western Pacific, and
thus call into question U.S. credibility as the underwriter of regional stability at a time when a crisis is brewing on the
Korean peninsula and China continues to flex its naval and air muscle. Anyone concerned about that scenario, even if
unlikely, realizes that the next half-decade of U.S.-Japan relations will have to go back to basics: rebuilding trust in the
relationship, agreeing on a common set of objectives in Japan's waters and throughout Northeast Asia, and strengthening a
commitment to upholding the alliance's military capabilities.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
51
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
***2NC CP O/V***
1. Zero risk of Solvency deficit – The Futenma Air Station and the debate over relocation has
created large public backlash within Okinawa that has the potential to spread into grass-root
movements against other U.S. military presence, like the protests against the George Washington
nuclear submarine in Atsugi, these grass-root movements could force Japanese politicians to
adhere to protesters and strain the very existence of the bilateral security alliance, leaving Japan
isolated in the Pacific and the U.S. presence in the region substantially weakened – that’s Auslin
2. Extend their 1ac Feffer evidence – it flows negative – Obama’s recalcitrance regarding the
relocation of FUTEMAN is creating hairline fractures in the alliance NOT Okinawa
3. There is absolutely no offense that can be garnered off of pulling out of Okinawa instead of just
Futenma – closing Futenma strengthens the U.S. Japan Alliance and solves their only ADV
And
The Futenma debate is an immediate threat to U.S. Japanese relations, causing Japan to be susceptible to
exorbitant U.S. base costs and Okinawan protests; only closing the base can ease tensions and derail
future protests
John Feffer, the co-director of foreign policy in Focus at the Institute for Foreign Policy Studies, March 6, 2010, Asia Times,
”Okinawa and the New Domino Effect,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh01.html, ) SM
The immediate source of tension in the US-Japanese relationship has been Tokyo's desire to renegotiate that 2006
agreement to close Futenma, transfer those 8,000 Marines to Guam, and build a new base in Nago, a less densely populated
area of the island. It's a deal that threatens to make an already strapped government pay big. Back in 2006, Tokyo promised
to shell out more than $6 billion just to help relocate the Marines to Guam. The political cost to the new government of
going along with the LDP's folly may be even higher. After all, the DPJ received a healthy chunk of voter support from
Okinawans, dissatisfied with the 2006 agreement and eager to see the American occupation of their island end. Over the
last several decades, with US bases built cheek-by-jowl in the most heavily populated parts of the island, Okinawans have
endured air, water, and noise pollution, accidents like a 2004 US helicopter crash at Okinawa International University, and
crimes that range from trivial speeding violations all the way up to the rape of a 12-year-old girl by three Marines in 1995.
According to a June 2009 opinion poll, 68% of Okinawans opposed relocating Futenma within the prefecture, while only
18% favored the plan. Meanwhile, the Social Democratic Party, a junior member of the ruling coalition, has threatened to
pull out if Hatoyama backs away from his campaign pledge not to build a new base in Okinawa. Then there's the dugong, a
sea mammal similar to the manatee that looks like a cross between a walrus and a dolphin and was the likely inspiration for
the mermaid myth. Only 50 specimens of this endangered species are still living in the marine waters threatened by the
proposed new base near less populated Nago. In a landmark case, Japanese lawyers and American environmentalists filed
suit in US federal court to block the base's construction and save the dugong. Realistically speaking, even if the Pentagon
were willing to appeal the case all the way up to the Supreme Court, lawyers and environmentalists could wrap the US
military in so much legal and bureaucratic red tape for so long that the new base might never leave the drawing board. For
environmental, political, and economic reasons, ditching the 2006 agreement is a no-brainer for Tokyo. Given
Washington's insistence on retaining a base of little strategic importance, however, the challenge for the DPJ has been to
find a site other than Nago. The Japanese government floated the idea of merging the Futenma facility with existing
facilities at Kadena, another US base on the island. But that plan - as well as possible relocation to other parts of Japan - has
met with stiff local resistance. A proposal to further expand facilities in Guam was nixed by the governor there. The
solution to all this is obvious: close down Futenma without opening another base. But so far, the US is refusing to make it
easy for the Japanese. In fact, Washington is doing all it can to box the new government in Tokyo into a corner.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
52
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
2NC CP Solvency – Generic
Despite Japanese resistance, Obama insists on keeping the Futenma base in Okinawa—continued
Japanese resistance could begin a domino effect of global resistance to the U.S. military
John Feffer, the co-director of foreign policy in Focus at the Institute for Foreign Policy Studies, March 6, 2 010, Asia Times,
”Okinawa and the New Domino Effect,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh01.html, ) SM
The current battle over the US Marine Corps air base at Futenma on Okinawa - an island prefecture almost 1,600 kilometers
south of Tokyo that hosts about three dozen US bases and 75% of American forces in Japan - is just revving up. In fact,
Washington seems ready to stake its reputation and its relationship with a new Japanese government on the fate of that base
alone, which reveals much about US anxieties in the age of President Barack Obama.
What makes this so strange, on the surface, is that Futenma is an obsolete base. Under an agreement the George W Bush
administration reached with the previous Japanese government, the US was already planning to move most of the Marines now at
Futenma to the island of Guam. Nonetheless, the Obama administration is insisting, over the protests of Okinawans and the
objections of Tokyo, on completing that agreement by building a new partial replacement base in a less heavily populated
part of Okinawa. The current row between Tokyo and Washington is no mere "Pacific squall", as Newsweek dismissively
described it. After six decades of saying yes to everything t he United States has demanded, Japan finally seems on the
verge of saying no to something that matters greatly to Washington, and the relationship that Dwight D Eisenhower once
called an "indestructible alliance" is displaying ever more hairline fractures. Worse yet, from the Pentagon's perspective,
Japan's resistance might prove infectious - one major reason why the United States is putting its alliance on the line over the
closing of a single antiquated military base and the building of another of dubious strategic value. During the Cold War, the
Pentagon worried that countries would fall like dominoes before a relentless communist advance. Today, the Pentagon
worries about a different kind of domino effect. In Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries are refusing to
throw their full support behind the US war in Afghanistan. In Africa, no country has stepped forward to host the
headquarters of the Pentagon's new Africa Command. In Latin America, little Ecuador has kicked the US out of its air base
in Manta. All of these are undoubtedly symptoms of the decline in respect for American power that the US military is
experiencing globally. But the current pushback in Japan is the surest sign yet that the American empire of overseas
military bases has reached its high-water mark and will soon recede.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
53
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
***2NC AT Perm Do Both ***
1. Perm doesn’t solve
A. The CP is textually and functionally competitive and competes by challenging the word “all” in
the plan text by ONLY withdrawing from Futenma
B. Links to Okinawa specific case turns and the hegemony good d.a., all links are predicated off of
removing ALL military presence in Okinawa
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
54
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
A2 CP = Reverse Island Hop – (1/3)
1. Non-Unique Link - Obama has already stated a commitment to withdrawing from Okinawa
The Mainichi Daily News, Japanese news source, 6/28/10, The Mainichi News,
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20100628p2a00m0na018000c.html
TORONTO -- Prime Minister Naoto Kan and U.S. President Barack Obama agreed on June 27 (June 28 Japanese time) to
make efforts to lighten Okinawa's burden in hosting U.S. military bases and to deepen the Japan-U.S. alliance. The leaders
reached the agreement in their first meeting since Kan became prime minister, on the sidelines of the Group of Twenty
Summit in Toronto. During the meeting, which lasted about 35 minutes, Kan told Obama that he wanted to make serious
efforts to materialize a joint Japan-U.S. statement in which it was agreed that U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma
would be relocated to the Henoko region of Okinawa. He also told Obama, "I want to ask for your cooperation in reducing
the burden on Okinawa." Obama reportedly agreed, saying he understood that the issue was not one that was easy for the
Japanese government to solve, and that he wanted to make efforts to make sure that the U.S. military would be accepted in
the region.
2. Impact is inevitable – Anti-base movements and grass-root movements will inevitably kick cause
Futenma to be closed down – that’s Auslin, the public protests and previous Prime Ministers resistance is
a sign American’s credibility and footprint in East Asia is declining – its only a question of whether we
pull out before the base derails the alliance
3. Turn – Futenma is the hotspot of anti-base movements – closing Futenma pulls the rug under grassroot movements an quells further resistance – that’s Auslin
4. No Link – the anti-base movement is confined to Futenma – – closing down Futenma shows Japan we
are willing to move-beyond Cold-War thinking and accept Japan’s new role in the alliance
J.E. Dyer, journalist and former intelligence analyst, who served internationally for US Naval intelligence from 1983 to 2004
March 11, 2010 “Past Time to Rethink Our Approach to Japan,” http://hotair.com/greenroom/archives/2010/03/11/past-time-torethink-our-approach-to-japan/” ) SM
“Smart power” from the Obama administration is looking downright differently-abled to basically everyone outside the
United States, where if most people think about Japan it’s because they own a Toyota or they love the Winter Olympics, or
just like ‘em some sushi or yakisoba.The Brits perceive us as having a tiff with Japan. Asia-based The Diplomat perceives
us as having a tiff with Japan. The Chinese perceive us as having a rift with Japan. Al Jazeera perceives us as having a tiff
with Japan. The New York Times perceives us as having a tiff with Japan. The Japanese perceive us as having a tiff with
Japan.Newsweek offers a rare contrasting view pointing out that in some key ways, even if we are, in fact, having a tiff with
Japan, our relations are still strong.But the current situation is troubling, because what it amounts to is the Obama
administration being dismissively recalcitrant about something that does, in fact, involve Japanese sovereignty and Japan’s
mastery of her own destiny. The situation is that we want to move a Marine Corps air base to Futenma on Okinawa – from
its previous location on Okinawa – and Okinawans don’t want the base at Futenma. (They want it gone altogether.)
There’s been resistance to it for some time, but a previous Japanese government concluded an agreement with the Bush
administration in 2006 to go ahead with the Futenma move. Since the new prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, formed his
government in September 2009, however, Japan has been rethinking the 2006 agreement. There were different ways to
handle this, but what the Obama administration has done is insist, with what is perceived as summary rudeness, that the
2006 agreement be honored. Hatoyama signaled in December that his government would not simply agree to that right
away, and announced that a final decision would be given no earlier than May. Hillary Clinton called in the Japanese
ambassador and gave him a talking to. Obama himself declined requests for a personal sidebar with Prime Minister
Hatoyama at the Copenhagen summit (although since he also declined such requests from Gordon Brown, Hatoyama might
not need to feel super-especially slighted. “Diss our best allies” seems to be one of the principles of Obamian Smart
Power).Now senior American officials are visiting Japan and being interviewed every other week uttering veiled threats
about the consequences, if Japan doesn’t stop with the domestic politics already, and just move forward with the Futenma
base.Have we lost our minds? For one thing, what happened to all that Obama business about shedding arrogance and
being solicitous of the rest of the world? If we went by his administration’s rhetoric and supposed aspirations, we’d think
that if the Okinawans don’t want a Marine air base, Obama would be the first one to listen and take their concerns to heart.
Farewell to the Shadow Shoguns
55
BQ Okinawa Policy Case Negative
DDI 2010
1
McCormick - SS - Lab
A2 CP = Reverse Island Hop – (2/3)
continued
Indeed, if Republican senators under a GOP administration were over in Japan telling the Japanese that Futenma is the
place we need to put the base, Obama would probably lead the charge against such “imperialism.”But there’s a more
fundamental issue here, and it makes the Obama administration’s weird inflexibility particularly ill-timed. The issue’s
origin is very simple: time has passed. The world has changed in some important ways since 1945. We haven’t given our
alliance with Japan a really fresh, critical look since Nixon handed Okinawa back in 1971, and it’s high time we did.The
UK Guardian article linked above comes, like most such treatments, from the perspective that the only alternative to a
divisive tiff between the US and Japan is the restoration (or at least reaffirmation) of the post-1971 status quo in our
relationship. But that status quo is losing support in Japan, and it’s not because the Japanese “don’t like us,” or because
they want to reemerge as an imperial power and start talking about Co-Prosperity Spheres again. It’s because the
justification for the features of Japan’s role in the alliance is starting to crumble.Most Americans aren’t aware that Japan
pays the cost of maintaining the military bases we use there. It costs the Japanese a lot of money to host our forces. That
feature of our relationship might not be called into question if there were no dispute over how many bases there should be,
and where they should go – but there is. If there were still a Soviet Union rattling a big saber short miles across the La
Perouse Strait from Hokkaido, such disputes might loom smaller in Japan’s domestic politics. But there isn’t. It’s
shortsighted to dismiss an emerging sense among Japanese voters that they’d be perfectly safe with fewer bases hosting
fewer US forces on their islands, and it’s downright obnoxious to demand that the national government behave as if that
sense didn’t exist, or wasn’t a real and serious factor in its internal obligations to its people.Japan has every right to her own
evolving perceptions about her security requirements. This is a voluntary alliance, not the Warsaw Pact. We may not like
all of those evolving perceptions, and they may present inconvenient decision points for us, but throwing diplomatic
tantrums is exactly, and I mean precisely, the wrong way to handle such developments. The truth is, our relationship with
Japan has to evolve. We can grunt angrily and resist, or we can get out ahead of the problem and do some rethinking
ourselves. That’s what we have State and Defense Departments for: to think ahead of current conditions to what will
position us for future ones.What we should want is to manage our way to a new, more sustainable relationship with Japan.
The day is going to come when we assume more of the cost of basing forces there, and probably have to keep fewer on the
Japanese islands anyway. This need only happen in alarming, confrontational jolts if we sit around twiddling our thumbs
and assuming nothing has to change. It’s not a bad thing to contemplate our alliance with Japan evolving to a different
basis. It’s a necessity, but it’s also a positive opportunity.I think we will always want to count Japan as an ally – an official
military ally, by treaty agreement – but our alliance in 2010 and beyond doesn’t have to have exactly the same features as
our alliance up to now. Getting on a new footing with Japan isn’t something to be feared, it’s something to be planned,
negotiated, and managed.The signals our moves send to China and Russia (as well as everyone from India to Australia) will
also matter tremendously. It’s not to our advantage at all for the US-Japan alliance to appear grudging, and maintained
mainly out of fear of China. (It’s not to Japan’s either; Japan is and will always be too big for China to intimidate militarily
anyway, without China rattling sabers that would bring retribution down on her from elsewhere.)
The US has a permanent interest in an East Asia that is not under the domination of a hostile hegemon, but is as
democratized as feasible and open to trade, travel, and cultural exchange. This interest is common up the scale of national
interests, from pure defense (we can’t let the other side of the Pacific become an armed imperium), to trading interests, to
our national interest in promoting liberalization and consensual self-government. This should be our starting point for
strategy – not the exact wording of today’s Status of Forces Agreement with Japan. The latter is something that can change
over time without compromising our security or interests. As Lord Palmerston famously said, it’s the interests that endure.
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A2 CP = Reverse Island Hop – (3/3)
5. Turn – not closing Futenma risks sparking ant-base movements against Kadina Naval Base, closing
Futenma is seen as an appeasement by Okinawa people and stops future protests
Mochizuki and O’Hanlon, , is Associate Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and holds the
Japan-US Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur. Michael O’Hanlon, Director of Research and a Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy at the Brookings
Institution, is author of The Science of War. “A proposed compromise on Futenma The unnecessary crisis , 2010 January Mike Mochizuki” THE
ORIENTAL ECONOMIST
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=32&ved=0CDUQFjABOB4&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gwu.edu%2F~elliott%2Fassets%2Fdocs%2Fn
ews%2Fmochizuki_futenma_orientalEconomist_0110.pdf&ei=tP8gTMnVCYaDnQfKjdVf&usg=AFQjCNFKUnjurrUisw0LtFv1LQ7PrX5cg&sig2=QHHKqwcaJTnvLAPzK0mP-Q
What then should be done to prevent an alliance crisis? US officials might hope that Washington’s toughness will
eventually cre- ate such domestic difficulties in Japan as to force Hatoyama to either embrace the origi- nal base
realignment plan or resign. But if current political trends in Okinawa continue, Hatoyama will find it increasingly difficult to accept the 2006
plan without major modi- fications. Even if Hatoyama were to resign, the DPJ would still be in power and the new prime
minister is likely to probe Washington for changes. This would hold true even if the DPJ wins a single-party majority in the Upper House
election and can dispense with its unruly coalition partners. DPJers are now brainstorming about alternatives to the existing plan. Ozawa has floated
Shimojijima and Iejima (both small islands in Okinawa with airfields) as possi- ble candidates. A private advisory group to Hatoyama has proposed
moving these func- tions to Japanese Self-Defense Force bases in Nagasaki Prefecture. Whether any of these ideas turn into an official proposal
remains to be seen. An honest evaluation of these alterna- tives demands examining the necessity of the Marines slated to
remain on Okinawa in order to provide “rapid crisis response capa- bilities.” Marines in Okinawa would have a
geographic advantage over their counter- parts in Guam by being closer to potential flash points like the Korean
peninsula and the Taiwan straits. If these different elements of the Marines are to be maintained in Okinawa, then it would
be desirable to have a dedicated air station on the main Okinawan island to facilitate the interaction among these units through regular training, exercises, and operations. But the desirability of such an air station needs to be weighed against the political risks to the alliance .
We two authors have long argued that the Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa is militarily more significant than Futenma
Marine base, given Kadena's likely role in possible conflicts in Korea, the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere, as well as its role as a
hub in the American global network. Preserving local political support for Kadena is, therefore, much more important than
holding onto Futenma or building a succes- sor. So, if further accommodating Okinawan interests on the Futenma issue
is necessary, it is a modest price to pay for shoring up the broader political health of the U.S. military presence on
Okinawa in general and at Kadena in particular. Just as the US makes pragmatic decisions in other parts of the world about force
relocation for the greater good of an alliance, it can factor local sensitivities into this issue. Provided the US could improve its contingency
access to other airfields on Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan for use in a possible crisis or war, our view is that the US
could make do without Futenma or a substitute. Losing the airfield altogether (with modest numbers of flights for the
residual Marine presence occurring from alternative facilities in Okinawa and other prefectures, perhaps) is not a preferred option but a
tolerable one—especially with the Marines in Guam. Using commercial or Japanese military airfields in a crisis or war is allowed
under the 1996 and 1997 agreements between Tokyo and Washington; prestationing of some supplies and engineering
equipment on these other airfields, while also purchasing extra Marine Corps ground combat equip- ment and placing it aboard maritime
prepo- sitioning ships based in one of Japan's har- bors, could go a long way toward mitigating the downside of any loss of a
permanent air station and even loss of the Marine Corps presence altogether. Japan is overdue for a more far-reach- ing
debate on its overall role in international security. Hatoyama and Ozawa have some- times hinted at a greater willingness to con- sider an
expanded global role for the Self- Defense Forces, and that is just part of the equation. It would be a shame for either cap- ital to let the
dispute over Futenma derail a broader positive US-Japan dialogue, particu- larly on the 50th anniversary of the USJapan Security Treaty.
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1NC Hegemony Good D.A. (1/1)
A. U.S. military primacy is high – an aggressive force posture makes it sustainable, and there are no
challengers
Stephen G. Brooks and William C Wohlforth 2008 [ Profs. Gov’t @ Dartmouth, World out of Balance, p. 28-9]
The United States spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are
its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over
many decades, make an effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting than the grit spending numbers imply.
Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investments that give United States a
dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were me than six
times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures
in the world are American.' And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has
harvested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D.'5These vast commitments have created a
preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While
other powers could contest US forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible,
the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity
arises from “command of the commons” –that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry
Posen puts it,“Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the US global power position. It allows the United
States to exploit more fully other sources of power including its own economic and military might as well as the economic
and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by
restricting their access to economic, military and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United
States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had.
B. Maintaining U.S. military dominance in East Asia is vital for U.S. hegemony – only through U.S.
presence in East Asia can it maintain its primacy and deter rivalries
Takashi Inoguchi - Japanese academic researcher of foreign affairs and international and global relationships of states . and Paul
Bacon - Associate Professor of International Politics, School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University, Japan. September
2005. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/2/117?rss=1&ssource=mfc)
After the cold war, the United States clearly sought to reinforce its hegemonic strategy in East Asia, seeking a special role
for itself as the principal guarantor of regional order. The United States could have withdrawn in order to let a local balance
of power emerge and undertaken the role of offshore balancer. It could also have promoted multilateral regional security
organizations, or sought to construct a regional balance of power that contained China . However, it did none of these things.
Mastanduno argues that the United States will retain its preponderant power status in the coming years but that the task of
maintaining and completing US regional hegemony will become more difficult. The two biggest challenges that the United
States faces are the global war on terror and the management of the rise of China, as a result of which the longer-term
prospects for East Asian order are uncertain and problematic. There are two key features of US hegemonic strategy in the
region. First, the United States has cultivated a set of bilateral relationships with other key states in the region, the most
important and enduring of which have been the ties with Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, the United States has reaffirmed
its close partnership with Australia and sought to engage rather than contain China. This preference for a primary set of bilateral
relationships is referred to as the ‘hub and spokes’ approach. The second institutional feature of US hegemony has been the US
forward presence in the region, and the US intention to maintain a substantial political and military commitment to the
region for an ‘indefinite duration’. US hegemonic strategy in the region has contributed to order in several ways. For China,
the US presence effectively ‘contains’ Japan, and, similarly, for Japan, the US presence deters China from a bid for regional
dominance. The US presence has helped to deter major powers from intensifying dangerous rivalries, and it has, in so
doing, reassured smaller states whose security and autonomy would otherwise be threatened by these large states. East Asia
is a dangerous neighborhood, in which smaller states must coexist with larger states that have geopolitical ambitions,
territorial claims, and a history of enmity. The United States has also worked hard to manage and stabilize regional conflicts
that have the potential to develop into local and possibly even systemic wars. In the 1990s, for example, the United States
took initiatives in security crises between China and Taiwan, in North Korea, and in the Kashmir conflict. Finally, the
United States has striven to discourage nationalist economic competition. It has pushed Japan over domestic economic
reform, sought to integrate China into a globalizing world economy, and maintained access to sources of global liquidity
and US markets in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. US hegemonic strategy has, therefore, made a substantial
contribution to regional order in East Asia, but it also has its limitations.
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1NC Hegemony Good D.A. (2/2)
C. Only US leadership can create international stability—less engagement guarantees regional wars in
Asia and the Middle East, and WMD terrorism against the US
Robert Lieber, prof of gov’t and int’l affairs at Georgetown, 2005
[,The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, 7-8]
This book presents arguments supporting these propositions in some detail. It also considers the circumstances in which
American primacy could be diminished by, for example, a grave economic crisis, a shattered domestic consensus,
involvement in a Vietnam-style quagmire, or a mass casualty on the continental United States involving nuclear weapons or
a viral biological agent. I also consider the implications for international order were the United States to play a far less
engaged world role. I suggest that this would bring heightened instability and more dangers competition and conflict among
regional powers, for example in East Asia (China, Japan, Korea) South Asia (India and Pakistan), and throughout the
Middle East. In sum, at a time when the threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are no longer remote
contingencies, and when the values of human rights, peace and stability cannot be reliably assured by institutions such as
the U.N. and the European Union, global activism on part of the United States becomes a necessity, not something about
which to be apologetic. In the urgent debate about America’s place in the world, this book insists that we grasp the
differences between the global arena as we might wish it to be and what it is, the ideals of the U.N. was created to serve and
why that institution so often falls dangerously short, the reasons why our European allies are often motivated to define their
identity in contrast to ours but in the end remain tied to us, the cultural and societal causes of admiration and resentment,
and the reasons why in the most dangerous regions of the world, the absence rather than presence of the United States is
more likely to cause harm. Ulitmately, it is the inevitable lack of global governance, the burdens of primacy, and the
lethality of external threats that shape the requirements of the American era.
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Hegemony Good - Democracy
US leadership key to vitality of liberal democratic structures—stops rise of authoritarian powers
Robert Lieber, prof of gov’t and int’l affairs at Georgetown, Sept 2, 2007 “Persistent Primacy and The Future of the American Era,
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/1/0/5/pages211058/p211058-1.php]
One more component of threat to the global liberal democratic order concerns what Azar Gat has termed the rise of
authoritarian capitalist powers. 16
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/1/0/5/pages211058/apsa07_proceeding_2110589.htmlIn his view, radical Islam, is actually a lesser threat in that it fails to offer a viable alterative to modernity, though he
does take seriously the potential use of WMD, especially by terrorist groups. However, Gat argues that the more dangerous
challenge stems from the rise of China and Russia, both of which represent an alternative path to modernity. He concludes,
that while either country could eventually evolve in a more democratic direction, United States continues to be the key
actor for the future of liberal democracy. In his words, “As it was during the twentieth century, the U.S. factor remains the
greatest guarantee that liberal democracy will not be thrown on the defensive and relegated to a vulnerable position on the
periphery of the international system.
The impact is extinction.
Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution senior fellow, co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, December 1995, A Report to the Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives,”
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist
aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates
that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly
endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or
absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war
with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic
governments do not ethnically “cleanse” their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to
threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable
climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who
organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and
because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil
liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be
built.
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Hegemony Good - Democracy
We control uniqueness—democracies increasing worldwide due to American leadership
Bradley Thayer, Associate Professor of Defense & Strategic Study, Southwestern Missouri State, 20 07
American Empire: A Debate, pg. 42-3]
The American Empire gives the United States the ability to spread its form of government, democracy, and other elements
of its ideology of liberalism. Using American power to spread democracy can be a source of much good for the countries
concerned as well as for the United States. This is because democracies are most likely to align themselves with the United
States and be sympathetic to its worldview. In addition, there is a chance—small as it may be—that once states are
governed democratically, the likelihood of conflict with be reduced further. Natan Sharansky makes the argument that once
Arabs are governed democratically, they will not wish to continue the conflict against Israel. This idea has had a big effect
on President George W. Bush. He has said that Sharansky’s worldview “is part of my presidential DNA.” Whether
democracy in the Middle East would have this impact is debatable. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed
to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where
8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in October 2004, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened
them. Elections were held in Iraq in January 2005, the first free elections in that country’s history. The military power of
the United States put Iraq on the path to democracy. Democracy has spread to Latin America, Europe, Asia, the Caucuses,
and now even the Middle East is becoming increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies,
but democratic progress has been made in Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt, The
march of democracies has been impressive. Although democracies have their flaws, simply put, democracy is the best form
of government. Winston Churchill recognized this over half a century ago: “Democracy is the worst form of government
except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” The United States should do what it can to foster the
spread of democracy throughout the world.
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Rearmament Link - Okinawa
Okinawa withdrawal undermines US extended deterrence – causes nuclearization
William Choong, Senior Writer at The Straits Times, January 26, 20 10, “US-Japan security pact not as solid as it seems; Battle to
move marines' air base in Okinawa shows fragility of long-standing alliance”, Lexis |
The last two are the most pertinent. There are two interconnected dynamics here: Japanese fears of a 'Group of 2', or
G-2, between Beijing and Washington, might compel it to abandon its 'three noes' nuclear position and adopt an
independent nuclear deterrent. For now, at least, there is nothing to suggest that Japan would do so. But calls for it to go
nuclear will grow as China and the US become increasingly tied in what one former US State Department official
has called a 'mutual death grip' of shared interests. Japan's problem can be boiled down to two words: extended
deterrence. For decades, Japan has depended on Washington's extended deterrence posture - a sophisticated
term for saying that the country's security is guaranteed by America's nuclear umbrella. The doubt is simple: In
a nuclear confrontation with a nuclear-armed state such as China, for example, would the US risk Los Angeles in order to
save Tokyo? If at some point Tokyo feels that the US guarantee is no longer ironclad, it might decide to mull over other
alternatives. In the battle for Okinawa in May 1945, the US and its allies fought tooth and nail to secure Okinawa
as a base for the conquest of Japan. Allied victory in that war and a long-standing US-Japan alliance has secured
dividends not only for Tokyo, but also the Asia-Pacific. Hopefully, the second 'battle' for Okinawa will not lead to the US
exiting Japan via that island.
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Compensation Link - Okinawa
U.S. sales of F-22s are stalled because of a gridlock about military bases. Withdrawal from Okinawa
allows for compensation with F-22 sales
Christopher Bolkcom Specialist in Military Aviation and Emma Chanlett-Avery Specialist in Asian Affairs, 03/11/09,
Congressional Research Service, “Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan”, pg online @
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22684.pdf//)
The F-22A Raptor1 is the U.S. Air Force’s, and according to many observers, the world’s, most advanced manned combat
aircraft. Developed principally to defeat Soviet aircraft in air-to-air combat, the F-22 exploits the latest developments in
stealth technology to reduce detection by enemy radar, as well as thrust-vectoring engines for more maneuverability, and
avionics that fuse and display information from on-board and off-board sensors in a single battlefield display. Current plans
call for the U.S. purchase of 183 F-22s, with the last aircraft being procured with FY2009 funds. Air Force leaders say that
they require 381 F-22s, but lack the funds to purchase 198 additional aircraft. The debate over the export of F-22s, though
not new, has become more pointed as the end of procurement funding (FY2009), and the closure of the assembly line,
nears. Whether to continue production of the F-22 is an issue that will confront the 111th Congress early in its first session.
The Department of Defense (DoD) is officially neutral on whether the F-22 should be exported, but senior leaders have
suggested that they favor foreign sales of the F-22.2 However, since 1998, Congress has prohibited the use of appropriated
funds to approve or license the sale of the F-22 to any foreign government.3 This provision, known as the “Obey
Amendment,” was debated in the 109th Congress. The House Defense Appropriations Bill for FY2007 proposed to repeal
the law, but export opponents in the House prevailed with the Senate in conference. 4 Japan’s Defense Policy For the United
States, its alliance with Japan provides a platform for U.S. military readiness in Asia. About 53,000 U.S. troops are
stationed in Japan and have the exclusive use of 89 facilities throughout the archipelago. Okinawa, hosting 37 of the
facilities, is the major U.S. forward logistics base in the Asia-Pacific region. Echoing his predecessors, President Obama
has labeled the U.S.-Japan alliance the “cornerstone of East Asian security.” High-level U.S.-Japan bilateral initiatives
since 2001 declared an expanded commitment to security cooperation by outlining major command changes and calling for
greater interoperability between the two militaries.5 Several of the agreements have stalled, however, due to resistance to
base realignment by local host governments and political gridlock in Tokyo. Japan faces a challenging regional context:
both direct and potential security threats, as well as suspicion from other states that changes to Tokyo’s defense policy
indicate a return to its militarist past. North Korea poses a particularly acute and proximate threat to Japan, heightened
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Resolve Links – Okinawa
Maintaining a strong presence in Okinawa is vital—relocation would devastate deterrence and power
projection
Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation , 2009 (“U.S.
Should Stay Firm on Implementation of Okinawa Force Realignment,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2352, December 15 th,
Available Online at http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2352.cfm)
Okinawa's strategic location contributes to potent U.S. deterrent and power projection capabilities as well as enabling rapid
and flexible contingency response, including to natural disasters in Asia. Marine ground units on Okinawa can utilize
Futenma airlift to deploy quickly to amphibious assault and landing ships stationed at the nearby U.S. Naval Base at
Sasebo, Nagasaki Prefecture. Okinawa has four long runways: two at Kadena Air Base, one at Futenma, and one at Naha
civilian airfield. The Futenma runway would likely be eliminated after return to Okinawa control to enable further civilian
urban expansion. The planned FRF would compensate by building two new (albeit shorter) runways at Camp Schwab.
However, if the Futenma unit redeployed to Guam instead, no new runway on Okinawa would be built. Japan would have
thus lost a strategic national security asset, which includes the capability to augment U.S. or Japanese forces during a crisis
in the region. Not having runways at Futenma or Schwab would be like sinking one's own aircraft carrier, putting further
strain on the two runways at Kadena. Redeploying U.S. forces from Japan and Okinawa to Guam would reduce alliance
deterrent and combat capabilities. Guam is 1,400 miles, a three-hour flight, and multiple refueling operations farther from
potential conflict zones. Furthermore, moving fixed-wing aircraft to Guam would drastically reduce the number of combat
aircraft sorties that U.S. forces could conduct during crises with North Korea or China, while exponentially increasing
refueling and logistic requirements.
Normal means would relocate forces to Guam—that makes rapid response impossible—distance will
decimate security.
Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, 2009 (“U.S.
Should Stay Firm on Implementation of Okinawa Force Realignment,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2352, December 15 th,
Available Online at http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2352.cfm)
The rapid crisis response capabilities provided by the presence of the Marine Corps forces constitute a critical alliance
capability.... [S]ustaining those capabilities, which consist of air, ground, logistics and command elements, remains
dependent upon the interaction of those elements in regular training, exercises and operations. [Therefore,] the FRF must be
located within Okinawa...near the other elements with which they operate on a regular basis. --U.S.-Japan Joint
Statement[18] The Marine Corps trains, deploys, and fights in combined-arms units under the doctrine of Marine Air
Ground Task Force. This method of operation requires co-location, interaction, and training of integrated Marine Corps air,
ground, logistics, and command elements. The 3rd Marine Division ground component located on Okinawa relies on the 1st
Marine Air Wing at Futenma to conduct operations and training outside Okinawa. Marine Corps rapid reaction is a core
capability of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Marine transport helicopters on Okinawa can self-deploy to Southeast Asia for theater
security operations by island-hopping. This is not possible from Guam because some helicopters would need to be
transported by ship, which is a three-day transit. The DPJ advocacy for removing Marine helicopter units from Okinawa is
analogous to a town demanding the removal of a police or fire station, but still expecting the same level of protection,
which is impossible given the tyranny of distance.
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