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The Road to Pearl Harbor: The United States and East Asia, 1915-1941
Lesson Plan #1: The Growth of U.S.-Japanese Hostility, 1915-1932
I. Introduction
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had its origins in a growing antagonism between the
United States and Japan that first developed during World War I. Japan claimed a special
“sphere of influence” in China, in which it would have economic, and even to some
extent political dominance. Americans, however, stood for the principle of the “Open
Door”—that all countries should have an equal opportunity to market their products to
the Chinese. By the late 1920s Japan was in the midst of an economic crisis, and in 1931
would seize the rich Chinese province of Manchuria. The foundations were fully laid for
a full-scale showdown with the United States.
Using contemporary documents, students in this lesson will explore the rise of animosity
between the United States and Japan. It will begin with Japan’s “Twenty-One Demands”
on China during World War I, and will continue through the Manchurian Incident of
1931.
II. Guiding Question
What accounts for the growing hostility that had developed between the United States
and Japan by the early 1930s?
III. Learning Objectives
After completing this lesson, students should be able to:
 Explain how Japan’s ambitions in China conflicted with the American concept of
the “Open Door.”
 Discuss the means by which the United States and Japan sought peaceful means
of resolving their differences.
 Articulate why U.S. trade and immigration policies angered the Japanese.
 Explain the importance of the Manchurian Incident of 1931, and the American
response to it, for the deterioration in U.S.-Japanese relations.
IV. Background Information for the Teacher
While the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, came as a shock to
Americans, there had long been talk of the possibility that a war might occur between the
United States and Japan. Here was a case of two emerging world powers, both of whom
with interests in China, increasingly coming into contact during a period when the powers
that had traditionally dominated the region—the European colonial powers—were falling
into decline. The United States was engaged in a lucrative trade with China, trade which
was protected from bases in the Philippines, which had been a U.S. possession since
1898. Japan, on the other hand, had emerged victorious in two wars (the Sino-Japanese
War of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05) that left the country in possession
of an empire that included Taiwan and Korea, as well as substantial interests in the
Chinese province of Manchuria.
U.S. policy in China was based on the principle of the “open door”
[http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/opendoor.html]—that is, all countries were to
have equal opportunities for trade and investment opportunities in China. However, this
principle faced a severe challenge during World War I. Japan, having entered the war on
the side of the Allies, captured the Chinese province of Shantung, which had been a
German colony. Tokyo in 1915 then issued a set of “Twenty-One Demands”
[http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/21demands.htm] on China, which included not
only Chinese recognition of Japanese ownership of Shantung, but acceptance of a
Japanese sphere of influence over much of northern China. After much protest from the
United States (as well as, needless to say, from China), Tokyo moderated its demands
somewhat, and in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917
[http://www.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/japanvisit/JapanA2.htm] the United States
and Japan pledged to oppose “the acquisition by any government of any special rights or
privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that
would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal
opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.”
Soon after the end of World War I the United States sponsored the Washington
Conference of 1921-1922, which brought Japan into two new international agreements.
The first was the Five-Power Pact [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/prewar/1922/nav_lim.html] in which the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and
Italy agreed to reduce the size of their navies. Britain and the United States were to have
the world’s largest fleets, while that of Japan would be limited to three-fifths that of the
British and the Americans. At Washington the Japanese delegation also signed the NinePower Pact [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/1922v1/tr22-01.htm],
in which the signatories agreed to respect China’s sovereignty and independence, and
renounced any desire to seek “special rights or privileges” in China.
While these treaties may have appeared to settle differences between Japan and the
United States, neither one really addressed the issue of Japanese ambitions. Japan in the
1920s faced overpopulation and economic crisis. Moreover, America’s trade and
immigration policies—which raised tariffs to unprecedented levels, and effectively ended
Japanese immigration to the United States—were viewed as direct threats to Tokyo’s
interests. All of this strengthened the hand of elements in the Japanese Army and Navy,
who claimed that the nation’s problems could only be remedied by the conquest of
Manchuria, both as a source of raw materials for Japan’s factories and as area to be
settled by Japanese colonists. Japanese naval officers in particular objected as well to the
Five-Power Pact, claiming that national honor demanded a navy equal in size to that of
the United States or Great Britain.
Through the rest of the 1920s the government in Tokyo continued to seek good relations
with the West. However, the army and navy were growing increasingly restless as
Japan’s economy continued to decline through the rest of the decade. Finally, concluding
that the government would not act, officers of the Japanese Army stationed in southern
Manchuria decided to force the issue. In September 1931, outside the town of Mukden, a
small group of officers secretly blew up a length of track belonging to a Japanese-owned
railway. Then, after blaming the sabotage on Chinese “bandits,” the Japanese Army
moved to occupy all of Manchuria. Japan’s civilian government had not authorized this
operation, but after an unsuccessful attempt to restrain the army in Manchuria the leaders
in Tokyo decided to go along with it.
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria was a clear violation of both the Nine-Power Pact
and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact
[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/kbpact/kbpact.htm], also signed by Japan, in which
the signatories agreed to renounce war “as an instrument of national policy.” The
international response, therefore, was one of alarm. Nevertheless, given that most of the
industrialized world was in the grip of the Great Depression, no concrete steps were taken
to block this act of aggression. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Stimson responded with a
policy of “non-recognition”—that is, he announced that the United States would not
recognize “any situation, treaty, or agreement” that impaired “the sovereignty, the
independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China.”
In late 1932 a commission formed by the League of Nations officially branded the
occupation of Manchuria an act of aggression, but took no further action.
All of this, of course, meant that Japan believed that it could proceed with its plans for
China without foreign interference. In March 1932 Tokyo announced the creation of an
“independent” state of Manchukuo [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/prewar/320915a.html], to be ruled by the former Chinese Emperor (who had been deposed
twenty years earlier, at the age of five). That December the Japanese Army invaded the
neighboring Chinese province of Jehol, which was promptly declared part of Manchukuo.
The following year Japan withdrew its delegation from the League of Nations
[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/pre-war/330327a.html]. The situation in Asia was
rapidly growing dangerous, although few in the United States recognized this fact. One
of the few who did was Joseph Grew, U.S. ambassador to Tokyo. As he put it in an
August 13, 1932 letter to Secretary of State Stimson
[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/010.html], the Japanese military “has been built for war,
feels prepared for war and would welcome war. It has never yet been beaten and
possesses unlimited self confidence. I am not an alarmist but I believe that we should
have our eyes open to all possible future contingencies. The facts of history would render
it criminal to close them.”
V. Preparing to Teach this Lesson
Review the lesson plan. Locate and bookmark suggested materials and links from
EDSITEment-reviewed websites used in this lesson. Download and print out selected
documents and duplicate copies as necessary for student viewing.
Download the Text Document for this lesson, available here as a PDF file. This file
contains excerpted versions of the documents used in the various activities, as well as
questions for students to answer. Print out and make an appropriate number of copies of
the handouts you plan to use in class.
Finally, familiarize yourself the interactive timeline “America on the Sidelines: The
United States and World Affairs, 1931-1941 [temporarily being housed at
http://www.kfallon.com/civ] that accompanies this lesson. This timeline will, through
text and maps, guide students through the major events in Asia in the 1930s (although for
this particular lesson students will only be looking at the events of 1931-1932), and will
ask students for each event to identify (choosing from among a menu of options) how the
United States responded to it.
Analyzing primary sources:
If your students lack experience in dealing with primary sources, you might use one or
more preliminary exercises to help them develop these skills. The Learning Page at the
American Memory Project of the Library of Congress
(http://memory.loc.gov/learn/start/prim_sources.html#) includes a set of such activities.
Another useful resource is the Digital Classroom of the National Archives, which
features a set of Document Analysis Worksheets
(http://www.archives.gov/digital_classroom/lessons/analysis_worksheets/worksheets.htm
l). Finally, History Matters offers helpful pages on “Making Sense of Documentary
Photography” (http://historymatters.gmu.edu/mse/Photos/) and “Making Sense of Maps”
(http://historymatters.gmu.edu/mse/maps/) which give helpful advice to teachers in
getting their students to use such sources effectively.
VI. Suggested Activities
Activity #1: The United States, Japan, and the “Open Door” in China
In this activity students will look at four documents pertaining to U.S. and Japanese
policies in China. By examining these, and answering questions about them, they should
gain an understanding of why tensions developed between the two countries.
Hand out the following documents to students, which are found on pages 2-6 of the Text
Document, and in their complete form at the EDSITEment-reviewed World War I
Document Archive (http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/), First World War.com
(http://www.firstworldwar.com/), and the Avalon Project at Yale University
(http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon).

The First “Open Door” Note, 6 September 1899:
http://www.lib.bye.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/opendoor.html

“Twenty-One Demands” Made by Japan to China, 18 January 1915:
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/21demands.htm

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, November 2, 1917:
http://www.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/japanvisit/JapanA2.htm

The Nine Power Treaty Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922:
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/1922v1/tr22-01.htm
To help guide their reading (which might be usefully assigned as homework), students
should answer the following questions, which are also found on page 1 of the Text
Document.

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
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What does Secretary of State Hay mean by an “open door” in China?
How might “spheres of interest” by other powers in China conflict with the
principle of the “open door”?
Generally speaking, what did Japan want from China in 1915?
How might the “Twenty-one Demands” come into conflict with the “open door”
principle?
How did the Lansing-Ishii Agreement try to resolve differences between the
United States and Japan?
Could the Lansing-Ishii Agreement be interpreted in more than one way? How
might a Japanese diplomat interpret it differently from an American?
In what sense might the Nine-Power Treaty be considered an improvement over
the Lansing-Ishii Agreement?
After students have read the documents and answered the questions, break the students
into groups of four to discuss their answers. To conclude, hold a brief class discussion in
which students are asked how these documents show illustrate potential friction in U.S.Japan relations.
Activity #2: Japan’s Grievances
For the second activity, students will read excerpts from two articles by Japanese
journalists, the first from the American journal The Nation and the second an editorial
from a Japanese newspaper. By reading these, and drawing political cartoons based on
them, they will gain an understanding of why the Japanese grew determined to build an
empire in Asia.
To begin, hand out the following documents, located on pages 7-9 of the Text Document
and in their complete form at the EDSITEment reviewed resources Teaching American
History (http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org) and History Matters
(www.historymatters.gmu.edu).

K.K. Kawakami, “The Problem of Japan: A Japanese View,” November 1921:
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1501

“The Senate’s Declaration of War”: Japan Responds to Japanese Exclusion:
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5077
Read both of these documents orally in class. Then, instruct students to create a set of
cartoons that graphically portray Japan’s grievances against the United States and other
western powers. Each cartoon should showcase a different grievance. These could be
started in class and completed for homework. To conclude, ask volunteers during the
next class session to present their cartoons to the class. As a class, make a list of Japan’s
grievances. How might these grievances translate into a demand for Asian colonies?
Activity #3: The United States and the Manchurian Crisis, 1931-32
In 1931 Japanese troops overran the Chinese province of Manchuria, in clear violation of
both the Nine-Power pact and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. However, with most of
the world in the grip of the Great Depression, the United States and League of Nations
responded with little more than mild diplomatic protests. In this exercise students will
read several documents pertaining to the policy of Secretary of State Henry Stimson—
that of “nonrecognition”—and assess whether this was an adequate response to the crisis.
To begin, have students consult the interactive timeline “America on the Sidelines: The
United States and World Affairs, 1931-1941” [temporarily being housed at
http://www.kfallon.com/civ] and read the September 1931 event “Japan invades
Manchuria.” Ask students to consider the various options available to the United
States—listed along the left-hand side—and select what they think the actual response
was. If they choose the wrong response, they should continue to make selections until
they have found find the right one (in this case, “No formal action”).
Next hand out the following documents, which are available in their excerpted form on
pages 10-12 of the Text Document, and in their entirety at “World War II Resources”
(http://www.ibiblio.org/pha), which is linked from the EDSITEment-reviewed site
Digital History (http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu).

Memorandum Handed by Secretary of State Henry Stimson to the Japanese
Ambassador in Washington, September 22, 1931:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/002.html

Secretary of State Henry Stimson to the Japanese Foreign Minister, January 7,
1932: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/005.html

The Ambassador to Japan (Joseph Grew) to Secretary of State Henry Stimson,
August 13, 1932: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/010.html
These documents can either be read orally in class or for homework. Once students are
done with their readings, ask the students to imagine that it is 1932, and they are advisers
to Secretary of State Henry Stimson. Tell them that the Secretary has asked for their
candid assessment of his policy of “nonrecognition.” Based on the documents they have
read for this activity, as well as what they have learned from the previous two activities,
ask them whether they believe that this is an adequate response to Japan’s aggression in
Manchuria. Ask them to consider other options, such as economic sanctions or military
action. However, in addition to addressing whether such alternative measures might be
more effective, they should also consider their feasibility. For example, how likely is it
that the American public, in the midst of the Depression, would be willing to go to war
against Japan? It is probably a good idea to remind students that, since the discussion is
assumed to be taking place in 1932, they should not use arguments based on subsequent
events (for example, “we should go to war with them before they attack us at Pearl
Harbor”).
VII. Assessment
The questions from activity #1 and the cartoons from activity #2 may both be used as
formal means of assessment.
In addition, students should be able to write an essay on the following:

Why did Japan invade Manchuria in 1931, and why did the United States consider
this a matter of concern?
In addition, students should be able to locate the following on a blank map of East Asia:
 China
 Japan
 Manchuria (Manchukuo)
Finally, students should be able to identify and explain the significance of the following:
 “open door”
 “Twenty-One Demands”
 Lansing-Ishii Agreement
 Nine-Power Pact
 “non-recognition”
VIII. Extending the Lesson
In addition to violating the Nine-Power Treaty, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria also
violated the Kellogg-Briand Pact, in which Japan and some fifty other nations agreed to
renounce war “as an instrument of national policy.” Teachers may wish to have their
students read the text of this treaty, which may be found at the Avalon Project
(http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/kbpact/kbpact.htm). Arguments for and against the
“outlawry of war” may be found at Teaching American History
(http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1499 and
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1500). Students
might be asked to read these documents, and then to ask whether Japan’s invasion of
Manchuria justified the critics’ claims that the Pact was practically worthless.
Teachers may also wish to delve more deeply into Japanese history to seek explanations
and precedents for Tokyo’s expansionist policies. The EDSITEment-reviewed site
“Visualizing Cultures” (http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/Foreign-Languages-andLiteratures/21F-027JVisualizing-CulturesSpring2003/Units/index.htm) includes a
number of units dealing with Japanese history during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Of particular relevance to this lesson are the collections of postcards pertaining to the
1853 “opening” of Japan, and the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. After
studying some of these students might ask what they suggest about Japanese views of the
world and their country’s place within it.
IX. EDSITEment-reviewed Web Resources Used in this Lesson
The Avalon Project at Yale University: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon
The Nine-Power Treaty Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922:
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/1922v1/tr22-01.htm
World War I Document Archive: http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/
The First “Open Door” Note, 6 September 1899:
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/opendoor.html
The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, November 2, 1917:
http://www.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/japanvisit/JapanA2.htm
First World War.com: http://www.firstworldwar.com/
“Twenty-One Demands” Made by Japan to China, 18 January 1915:
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/21demands.htm
History Matters: http://historymatters.gmu.edu
“The Senate’s Declaration of War”: Japan Responds to Japanese Exclusion:
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5077
Teaching American History: http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org
K.K. Kawakami, “The Problem of Japan: A Japanese View,” November 1921:
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=150
1
Digital History: http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/
WWII Resources: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/index.html
Words of Peace, Words of War:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/index.html
Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, September 15, 1932:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/pre-war/320915a.html
The Imperial Rescript Relating to Withdrawal from the League of
Nations, March 27, 1933:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/pre-war/330327a.html
Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/index.html
Memorandum Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese
Ambassador (Debuchi), September 22, 1931:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/002.html
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Forbes),
January 7, 1932: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/005.html
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson),
February 12, 1932:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/008.html
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
(Stimson), August 13, 1932:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/010.html
Visualizing Cultures: http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/Foreign-Languages-andLiteratures/21F-027JVisualizing-CulturesSpring2003/Units/index.htm
Black Ships & Samurai: Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan, 1853-1854:
http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027j/black_ships_and_samurai/bss_int
ro.html
Throwing Off Asia: Woodblock Prints of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) &
Russo-Japanese War (1904-5):
http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027j/throwing_off_asia/index.html
Asia Rising: Japanese Postcards of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5):
http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027j/asia_rising/index.html
X. Additional Information
 Grade levels: 10-12
 Subject Areas: U.S. History
 Time Required: 3-4 class periods
 Skills:
o Analyzing and comparing first hand accounts
o Debating key issues and topics
o Interpreting written information
o Information gathering
o Making inferences and drawing conclusions
o Observing and describing
o Representing ideas and information orally, graphically and in writing.
o Utilizing the writing process
o Utilizing technology for research and study of primary source
documents
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o Vocabulary development
o Working collaboratively
Standards Alignment: www.ncss.org/standards/strands/
o NCSS-2—Time, Continuity, and Change: The study of the ways
human beings view themselves in and over time.
o NCSS-3—People, Places and Environment: The study of people,
places, and environments
o NCSS-5—Individuals, Groups, and Institutions: The study of
interactions among individuals, groups, and institutions.
o NCSS-6—Power, Authority, and Governance: How people create and
change structures of power, authority, and governance.
Lesson Writers:
o John Moser, Ashland University, Ashland, OH
o Lori Hahn, Sheffield Middle Senior High School, Warren, PA
Teacher/Student Resources:
o Text Document
Related EDSITEment Lesson Plans:
o American Diplomacy in World War II
[http://edsitement.neh.gov/view_lesson_plan.asp?id=702]
o “The Proper Application of Overwhelming Force”: The United States
in World War II
[http://edsitement.neh.gov/view_lesson_plan.asp?id=653]
o The United States and Europe: From Neutrality to War, 1921-1941