Download In order to facilitate an examination of these claims, we shall explore

Brian Hornbeck
History 497
November 12, 2006
White Defeat in the Russian Civil War
On October 25, 1917 members of the Bolshevik Party seized control of the
Winter Palace from the Kerensky Provisional Government in the Russian capital
of Petrograd (now St. Petersburg). This quick and bloodless coup was one of the
most significant events of the twentieth century. It signaled an end to the move
toward a parliamentary system of government in the Russian Empire and began
a series of events that would culminate in the Russian Civil War and the
establishment of the Soviet Union. The Russian Civil War would rage for years
and would lead to the death of approximately seven to ten million people,
civilian and military, throughout Russia.1 The warring factions were the
Bolsheviks (Reds) and the anti-Bolshevik coalition (Whites). The political,
military, and social climate throughout Russia for the duration of the war made
it impossible for the White forces to emerge victorious. The vast numerical
superiority of the Bolshevik forces, the inconsistency of Allied support and the
inability of the Whites to form a cohesive front (militarily or politically) against
the Reds were the crippling factors that ultimately led to the defeat of the Whites.
In order to facilitate an examination of these claims, we shall explore events
surroundings two of the most important theatres of the war: Siberia and
Southern Russia.
1
Mawdsley, Evan, The Russian Civil War. Winchester, MA:Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1987. 287.
2
The Russian Civil War on the Siberian front began on May 25, 1918 with
the strange and unique events surrounding the revolt of the so called ‘Czech
Legion.’ The Czech Legion was formed from Czechs who decided to fight with
the Russians against the Central Powers instead of joining the armies of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Their ranks were bolstered further by recruitment of
captured Slavic and Czech POWs. When the Bolsheviks took power in October of
1917, the Czechs did not disintegrate as the rest of the Russian forces did. After
much debate, in March of 1918, the Soviet government in Moscow agreed to let
them leave the country via the Tran-Siberian Railroad and Vladivostok. The
Czech Legion at this time numbered approximately 40,000.2 After a deadly
scuffle with Hungarian POWs on May 14, the Czechs seized the town of
Chiliabinsk. The War Commissariat ordered the regional soviets to disband the
Czech Legion by disarming them and putting them into miscellaneous Red
Army units or labor detachments. This was unacceptable to the Czech Legion
and after a conference by the Czech leaders it was decided that they would not
be disarmed and they would break through to Vladivostok. The final insult for
the Czechs came on May 25 when Trotsky gave this order to the local soviets,
“Every armed Czechoslovak found on the railway is to be shot on the spot.”3
The Czech Legion was to be critical in the birth of the White movement in
Siberia. The events surrounding the Legion’s participation in and eventual
2
3
Mawdsey, 47
Ibid., 48.
3
withdrawal from the war also illustrate the lack of a collective Allied policy
regarding the spawning civil war in Russia. To refer to “Allied” policy at this
time is a misnomer. This term generally refers to France and Britain, but the
United States and Japan also had roles to play. The reason that their policy was
anything but “Allied” is that each nation pursued policies which were in their
own best interests rather than coming to a collective policy. Toward the end of
the conflict the French and British representatives in Russia even began to view
themselves as rivals. These two representatives were French General Maurice
Janin and English Major-General Alfred Knox.
This rivalry was developed because of the different approaches taken by
the French and British governments. It became clear in the fall of 1918 that the
American and Japanese forces were not going to be offering any kind of real
assistance to the plight of the Czech Legion.4 This forced the French and British
to take the leading role in Allied intervention in Siberia. The British approach
was more long term in nature. They recognized that the Czechs would
eventually have to be withdrawn from Siberia and a power vacuum would be
left in their absence. Their vision was to use the Czechs to support the White
movement and a gradual hand-over of power from the Czech Legion to the
White leadership. The French envisioned the Czech Legion handling the majority
of the fighting, supported by the Allies, with the eventual destruction of the
Bolsheviks. The Whites were to only play a minor role in the French plans. This
4
Bradley, John. Allied Intervention in Russia. New York: Basic Books Inc, 1968. 106-107.
4
was a reflection of the view of the French Military Mission that the Russians
“were incapable of planning military operations.”5
These strategies were being formed in September and October of 1918.
The conclusions drawn by the French and British missions to Siberia were
grossly out-of-sync with the realities prevailing at the front between the Czechs
and their White allies fighting the Bolshevik forces. The French plans specifically
just would not work with the events unfolding at the front. Indications were
becoming increasingly clear that the Czech soldiers were on the verge of
collapse, and the morale of the Russians fighting beside them had never been
particularly stout. This was clear to the Russian Supreme Commander at the time
General Boldyrev. He saw the imminent collapse of the Czechs and knew that
the Whites would be the only real option to continue the struggle against the
Bolsheviks. He also knew that the problem which plagued the various White
governments was a lack of unity. The Allies were so surprised and concerned
about White disunity that when the British High Commissioner, Sir Charles
Eliot, arrived in Omsk in early October of 1918, his first task was to convey that
very concern to the Russians.6 The title of ‘Supreme Commander’ really meant
nothing. The Whites were constantly questioning each other, and had no real
chain of command. This problem of competing governments would eventually
lead to the coup that would place Admiral Kolchak at the head of the White
5
6
Bradley, 111.
Ibid., 110-111.
5
government in Omsk and him being declared Supreme Ruler of Russia. The
effect of the Allied efforts at intervention can be summed up by Major General
Knox in correspondence to the War Office in January of 1919. “I confess that all
my sympathy is with Kolchak, who has more grit, pluck and honest patriotism
than anyone else in Siberia and whose difficult task is being made almost
impossible by the selfishness of the Japanese, the vanity of the French and the
indifference of the other allies.”7
The Whites themselves further made the efforts of the Allies ineffective.
When the Allied aid did reach the Whites in Siberia, it seldom made it to the
troops who were fighting at the front. A large portion of the war material
assistance that was received was wasted or misused. Incompetence, dishonesty
and neglect were prevalent in all stages of the distribution of these war materials.
When Allied representatives brought the rampant waste to the attention of White
leadership, and attempted to get the Russians to change these methods, the
Russians simply felt insulted. In the beginning of August 1919, Major General
Knox cabled the following to the War Office, “I am of the opinion that it would
be useless to send any more military assistance to Siberia unless we have some
guarantee that it will be used with ordinary common sense.”8 The supply system
of the White army was not dictated by the needs of the troops at the front but
rather by the rapidly expanding black market. The prices of luxury goods and
7
8
Fleming, Peter. The Fate of Admiral Kolchak. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc, 1963. 143.
Ibid., 153.
6
commodities were inflated twenty five times over from Vladivostok to Omsk. A
simple bribe was enough to get these goods attached to a military supply train.
All that was needed was for the train to be delivered to a depot, Omsk was
always preferable, with a ready supply of customers. This led to the troops in the
rear areas generally being given priority over those troops who were actually at
the front doing the fighting.9
Another factor, besides the misguided attempts at Allied intervention,
which led to White defeat in Siberia was the lack of political cohesion and
efficiency. This problem was to plague other White movements throughout
Russia, but was especially troublesome in Siberia. The lack of political efficiency
was to have many symptoms. These included the afore mentioned squandering
of Allied aid, inability to secure popular support and the resulting partisan
groups that sprang up and the ineptness of White leadership in Siberia at even
the highest levels.
The partisan movement against Kolchak began in the autumn of 1918.
Initially it was a response to the conscription being imposed by the Whites. By
July of 1919 these partisan bands were becoming a serious problem. The bands
themselves did not pose a threat to the Trans Siberian Railway or to any of the
major settlements. They did, however, tie down much needed troops and
resources that could have been put to good use elsewhere.10 These groups were
9
Flmeing, 137.
Mawdsley, 150.
10
7
to become even more troublesome as Kolchak’s armies began to disintegrate.
They began to invade small towns and set up small local governments that were
run at first by Mensheviks and SRs but would eventually be overtaken by the
Bolsheviks. It was one of these local governments in Irkutsk, called the Political
Center, to whom Admiral Kolchak was given by General Janin breaking the
Allies’ promise of safe passage out of Russia and ultimately leading to his
death.11
Admiral Kolchak was widely known and respected throughout Russia
when he was declared Supreme Ruler, a post that he had accepted very
reluctantly. It is important to note that Kolchak’s training was in naval warfare.
There would be no opportunities for this type of combat on the Siberian front. He
was forced to rely on the advice and experience of other officers. It is in the
selection of these officers that became Admiral Kolchak’s greatest failing.
Kolchak’s military headquarters, the Stavka, is described as “embodying all of
the worst technical vices of Russian military bureaucracy, was rotten to the core
with dishonesty, nepotism and intrigue.”12 It was also much too large and
cumbersome and therefore deprived the combat units of desperately needed
officers. Kolchak also did not have the availability of qualified officers that
General Denikin had. Kolchak wrote, “The company is awful, I am surrounded
11
Lehovich, Dimitry. White Against Red: The Life of General Anton Denikin. New York: WW Norton &
Company, 1974. 377.
12
Fleming, 158.
8
by moral decay, cowardice, greed and treachery.”13 Out of the 17,000 officers at
Kolchak’s disposal, only 1,000 had been officers before 1915, and had therefore
received adequate training. Kolchak’s forces had only one true general at their
disposal, all of the others were promoted former colonels.14 Despite these
handicaps, Admiral Kolchak should have been able to choose better leaders,
military and political, with which to surround himself.
Kolchak’s chief of staff from November 1918 to June 1919 was a thirty six
year old wartime colonel named Lebedev. For reasons unknown, Kolchak passed
over a number of more qualified candidates and installed Lebedev over the
competent General Boldyrev. Lebedev became know for his misuse of power. In
July of 1919 a British Military Mission reported the following on Lebedev.
Lebedev’s increased power has brought about a rapid turn to the
extreme right which is supported by a handful of his closest
associates and a few hangers-on of the Cossack officer type, who
believe that men, provided they are beaten and flogged sufficiently,
will fight for the present Government. The latter have learnt
nothing from the Revolution and are the rottenest and most
harmful element in the country.15
It was this type of personnel decision making that would plague Kolchak’s
regime for its short existence.
The last and most straightforward of the mounting conditions that would
hamper Kolchak’s campaigns was simple numbers. The Red army vastly
outnumbered its White counterpart in terms of both men and equipment. In May
13
Fleming, 136.
Mawdsley, 145.
15
Fleming, 158.
14
9
of 1919, the approximate peak of the White war effort, the total strength of
Kolchak’s armies was about 450,000. About 110,000 of these were combatants.
These were the largest forces available to the Whites throughout Russia. Facing
these forces was the Red Army’s Eastern Army Group. These forces numbered
about 360,000 with another 195,000 in reserve and available. The Reds simply
had a reserve of manpower which the White armies could not match. The
Eastern Army Group also had 372 artillery pieces and 1,471 machine guns with
another 184 artillery pieces and 231 machine guns available in the three military
districts behind it. The Whites could only muster 256 artillery pieces and 1235
machine guns.16
At about the same time that Admiral Kolchak was taking the reigns of
leadership in Siberia, General Denikin was trying to figure out how the recent
armistice would affect his Volunteer Army. Denikin’s Volunteer Army had just
completed successful campaigns which secured the Don and the Kuban regions
and cut off the resource rich Caucasus region from Red control. By the end of
February, the Volunteers had taken the north Caucasus region capturing 50,000
prisoners, 150 artillery pieces and 350 machine guns. A 150,000 strong Red army
group was eliminated from the war. The Volunteers accomplished this with
scarcely 25,000 troops at their disposal.17 It was the largest loss the Reds would
suffer during the entire conflict.
16
17
Mawdsley, 146.
Ibid., 163.
10
Denikin, however, was also very curious as to the full extent of Allied aid
that his movement could expect. He tried to get answers by sending General
Shcherbachev to ask the Commander in Chief of Allied forces in Rumania,
Transylvania and South Russia, the French General Berthelot, these very
questions. General Shcherbachev met with Berthelot on November 3, 1918. The
results of that meeting far exceeded anything that Denikin could have expected.
In a letter from Shcherbachev to Denikin, the Allies allegedly made the following
promises:
Twelve divisions will be sent as soon as possible to occupy the
south of Russia. One of them is expected to reach Odessa within the
next few days. The divisions will consist of French and Greek
troops… Besides Odessa and Sebastopol, which they will
undoubtedly have occupied they the time this letter reaches you,
the Allies plan to occupy, soon after their arrival, Kiev and
Kharkov, with the Krivoirog and Donets basins, the Don region,
and the Kuban, in order to allow the Volunteer and Don Cossack
armies the possibility of consolidating their strength and to leave
them free to engage in wider active operations. Odessa, as the
principal Allied base, will receive huge quantities of war supplies
of all kinds: arms, ammunition, tanks, clothing, railroad and
highway equipment, airplanes, foodstuffs, etc. The rich stockpiles
at the former Rumanian front, in Bessarabia and the Ukraine, as
well as the ones at the Don, can from now on be considered at your
complete disposal…18
Upon reading this letter Denikin must have been beside himself. Denikin would
now be able to give his hard pressed soldiers a much needed rest. The Allied
presence would prevent the Reds from occupying the vast areas being
abandoned by the retreating German and Austro-Hungarian armies. Denikin
18
Lehovich, 253.
11
hoped the Allies would provide him a base from which to form a Russian army
and to prepare for his ultimate goal of launching an offensive into central Russia.
The letter from General Shcherbachev was not the only source of
optimism for Denikin and the Volunteers. The British Prime Minister, Lloyd
George, made several public statements making reference to British policy in
Russia. In these statements Lloyd George made it clear that Great Britain wanted
to stand by Russia, that they wanted Russia to be “great, powerful, but without
German influence.”19 The British had also rejected overtures of peace from the
Bolshevik government. Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, made this
statement defending the decision to decline those peace offers, “The Bolsheviks
followed a deliberate policy of exterminating their political opponents… we shall
therefore not strengthen this government.”20 The French attitude was very
similar to that of the British, only they were even more outspoken in their
support of their Russian ally and their condemnations of the Bolsheviks. France
was bitter about the Bolshevik signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The attitude
of the French was expressed summarily by the French Ambassador in Russia,
Joseph Noulens, “France and her Allies will not abandon the Russian people to
the Bolsheviks.”21
However, just as in Siberia, the Allies had no real plan to oust the
Bolsheviks. On November 29, 1918 the Balfour Memorandum was issued by the
19
Bradley, 132.
Ibid., 133.
21
Ibid., 133.
20
12
British government. It decreed that no British troops would be used directly in
the conflict in Russia. Their only collective plan seemed to talk big and do little.
When the Allies met for the Peace Conference there was only one coordinated
plan prepared for consideration. It had been prepared by Supreme Allied
Commander Marshal Foch and the Allied War Council. Foch’s plan involved a
coordinated offensive against the Bolsheviks with a multi-national army. The
bulk of the troops would be Polish, Rumanian and Baltic. The Czech Legion and
the White forces would play supporting roles. The intervention forces would be
supplied by the allies and of course under the overall command of Marshal Foch
himself.22 While militarily the Foch plan may have been feasible, it was
politically flawed. First of all Poland, Rumania and the newly independent Baltic
states had no desire to fight bolshevism in Russia. The Russians objected because
they felt that the plan was simply foreign interference in Russian internal affairs.
When Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Woodrow Wilson all opposed the plan, it
was rejected. The only proposal for a collective Allied policy was put to rest.
In early December 1918, the French finally arrived in Odessa. By March of
the following year, the Allies had two Greek divisions, one and a half French
divisions and a Polish brigade in the Odessa district numbering between 40,000
and 45,000.23 This was a far cry from the twelve divisions that Denikin thought
he was promised. This was partially because the French thought that they would
22
23
Bradley, 143.
Lehovich, 259.
13
be joined by other Allied troops. At the Peace Conference the French implored
her allies for a more concrete plan for Russia. The French felt that many of the
trouble being experienced by the Allies could be avoided by a cohesive Allied
policy.
The French arrival was not the experience that Denikin expected it to be.
There were a number of clashes between Denikin and the French that stemmed
from miscommunications and false expectations of the other. Tensions were
made higher when rumors began to circulate of French negotiation with the
newly formed Ukrainian government. In a sharply worded letter Denikin
expressed his frustrations to General Berthelot. The letter closed with this, “What
was the purpose of the Allies’ arrival? To lend their help to a mortally wounded
Russia or to subject it to their occupation with all the dire consequences that we
would have to suffer as a result?”24 The French experiment in Odessa was not to
last very long. They withdrew in early April without giving Denikin any
notification. He only became aware of the evacuation five days after the fact, by
which time most of the city was in Bolshevik hands. These clashes between
Denikin and the French were the result of a number of factors. Included in these
was the French High Command’s ignorance of the political climate in South
Russia upon their arrival. They were totally unaware of the clashing political
groups which included various Russian groups and Ukrainian nationalists.
24
Lehovich, 261.
14
Denikin’s dealings with the British went much better. It helped that
Winston Churchill was made Secretary of War in January of 1919. Churchill’s
opinion of the dangers of Bolshevism mirrored Denikin’s. Churchill also would
not abandon those Russians who had kept their word to the Allies and refused to
compromise with the Germans. They also had similar views on Russian unity
and Churchill would spend a great deal of energy combating the influence of the
Soviets. The problem with the British, from Denikin’s perspective, was that
Lloyd George did not share these views with Churchill. Lloyd George supported
the newly independent states and the dismemberment of the former Russian
Empire. Denikin became so frustrated with dual nature of the British and their
lack of a clearly laid out policy that he once asked them “whether they had come
to the Caucasus as friends or enemies.” 25Regardless of the conflict of ideals at
the top of the British government, the flow of supplies to Denikin was not
compromised. Denikin’s forces received 198,000 rifles, 6,200 machine guns,
500,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 1121 artillery pieces, 1,900,000
artillery shells, 460,000 greatcoats, 645,000 pairs of boots, 168 aircraft and 60
tanks during 1919.26
Despite all of Denikin’s successes, he was unable to achieve popular
support just as Kolchak wasn’t. Denikin’s armies fought under the slogan of
“Russia, one and indivisible.” This program created an automatic clash with the
25
26
Lehovich, 268.
Mawdsley, 168.
15
territories that were to form the base of his territory. The Cossack territories
which provided a large percentage of his forces and formed his most stable base,
all believed in local autonomy. By accepting this autonomy, Denikin did not
allow his territory to be united into any kind of cohesive effort. When Denikin
occupied large areas of the Ukraine, these areas contributed practically nothing.
His banner of a united Russia prevented him from coming to terms with the
Ukrainians and their nationalist fervor.
Most damaging for Denikin’s movement however was his lack of political
reform to win over the majority of the Russian population: the peasants. White
armies in southern Russia used the policy of self supply. At its best this lead to
soldiers taking peasant property, more often it just led to an excuse for looting.
His troops also became associated with the returning landlord. The landlords
followed the advancing White armies to take back the land he had lost to the
peasant in 1917 and 1918. Although Denikin himself favored moderate land
reform, his advisors and local officials were far more conservative. The White
movement after all was basically a movement of the military and property
owners. Only after his forces were in clear decline did Denikin fully realize his
folly with peasants and began to push the slogan, “Land to the peasants and the
laboring Cossacks.”27 By that time it was too late.
Denikin also failed to create stable political institutions capable of
administering the vast areas under his umbrella. Thus there was not any kind of
27
Mawdsley, 211.
16
reform that would serve to create any White loyalty amongst the peasants. Not
only did they fail to make reform, they failed to communicate any kind of real
policy to the populace. They didn’t make any promises. The Bolsheviks did.
Denikin’s Information Department was grossly inadequate. The Whites, both in
Siberia and in southern Russia, failed to match the intensity of Bolshevik
propaganda. These are the reasons that Denikin’s forces didn’t receive the
upsurge of recruiting that he hoped for as they advance further into central
Russia.
Perhaps the most important factor in Denikin’s defeat, and Kolchak’s, was
the overwhelming manpower of the Red Army. In November of 1919, Denikin’s
combat forces numbered between 97,000 and 99,000 with at least 6,177 machine
guns and 1,121 artillery pieces. Supporting the White armies were approximately
160,000 second line troops. The opposing Red forces facing Denikin’s armies at
that time numbered 127,000 infantry and 21,000 cavalry with 3,974 machine guns
and 864 artillery pieces. Bolshevik supporting forces numbered 529,000 with
another 575,000 in neighboring military districts.28 It is clear why the Whites
were simply unable to match the reserves of manpower that the Reds could
muster.
After years of war and political intrigue, the Russian Civil War slowly
ground to a halt. Although the Whites had indeed put a great deal of pressure on
the Bolsheviks, the events that they needed for victory just never happened. The
28
Mawdsley, 214.
17
Allies never whole heartedly embraced their intervention. The White movement
itself was unable to capture the loyalty of the Russian people, or even to find a
united message. The larger Red armies prevailed. The un-united, isolated White
movements were incapable of overcoming the obstacles that they were faced
with.
18
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Inc, 1963.
Kenez, Peter. “The Ideology of the White Movement.” Soviet Studies 32:1 (January
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