Download Lecture Notes – BATTLE OF ANTIETAM

Lecture Notes – BATTLE OF ANTIETAM
Battle of Sharpsburg
September 17, 1862
BLOODIEST SINGLE DAY OF THE CIVIL WAR
Pre-Battle
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Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia entered Union territory (Maryland) on September
3, 1862
 After major victory at 2nd Battle of Bull Run
 @ 55K men strong
 Goals –
 Battle victory on northern soil = successful invasion
o Maybe gain recognition and financial support from France and
GB
 Gain support form Confederate sympathizers in border states.
McClellan and the Army of the Potomac were 90 K strong
 Moved to intercept Lee
 Two Union soldiers found 3 cigars wrapped in writing paper
 Cigars belonged to Robert E. Lee
 Paper was a listing of the Confederate army battle plans
 Known as “Special Order 191”
o Orders indicated Lee had split his army and sent portions to
three separate areas
 Harpers Ferry, WV (Jackson)
 Hagerstown, MD (Longstreet)
 Stayed with Lee
 McClellan spent 18 hours sitting on the orders before moving
 Had a chance (if he moved fast enough) to hit all three section
separately
 Could have destroyed Lee and the Confederate main army
Significant engagements before Antietam
 Stonewall Jackson captured Harper’s Ferry
 Attending to the surrender of the Union garrison there
 Made him late for the beginning of the battle at Antietam
 McClellan passes through the Blue Ridge Mountains and ends up in a small
skirmish (Battle of South Mountain)
 Keeps McClellan at bay for a bit allowing Lee to concentrate his forces in
Sharpsburg, MD
ARMIES
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Confederate – ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA
 Commander – Robert E. Lee
 Two main divisions
o MG James Longstreet
o MG Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson
 One cavalry division
o J.E.B. Stuart
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Union – ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
 Commander – George McClellan
 Six divisions
o MG Joseph Hooker
o MG Edwin Sumner
o MG Fitz John Porter
o MG William Franklin
o MG Ambrose Burnside
o MG Joseph Mansfield
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Located near the town of Sharpsburg, MD,
Lee was able to deploy defensive forces behind Antietam Creek
 Set up along a low ridge
 Began on September 15th
 Effective, but not impregnable
 Benefits
o Rail and stone fences
o Limestone outcroppings
o Antietam Creek to the front of them
 Possible problems
o Potomac River to the rear could make retreat a major problem
 Only one place to retreat (Boteler’s Ford) was available
to cross the Potomac
o Antietam Creek was fordable in many places and crossed by
three stone bridges each one mile apart
 Lower bridge = Burnside Bridge
o Separation of Confederate forces meant Lee only had @ 18 K
men with him on September 15th.
First Union troops arrived (afternoon) September 15th
 Bulk of the remainder of the union troops arrives that evening
 McClellan had a HUGE advantage (troop wise) on the morning of September
16th
 Of course, as was his history, McClellan moved far too slow
 Believed Lee had over 100 K men (where is he getting this information
you ask? Allan Pinkerton)
 Allows Lee’s men to arrive and move into position
o Jackson takes the Confederate left (north)
 A.P. Hill’s division is late – had been left behind to
secure Harper’s Ferry
o Longstreet takes the Confederate right (south)
 Corps for the confederates would overlap considerably
as the battle progressed
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September 16
 McClellan orders Hookers men to cross the Antietam Creek and test where the
confederate positions were.
 Small skirmishes ensued, causing some artillery fire from both sides
BATTLE
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McClellan positioned the majority of his troops to the north
o Lower bridge was dominated by artillery for the Confederates
on a bluff
o Middle bridge could be hit by Confederate artillery from the
bluffs by the town of Sharpsburg
o Upper bridge was 2 miles from Confederate artillery
 McClellan planned to overwhelm the Confederate left (north)
o Would use diversionary attacks on the CSA right and center if
needed
o The test skirmishes by McClellan gave away his plan to Lee, who
shifted his troops accordingly
 There would be terrible coordination of troops for McClellan
 Resulted in three “separate” battles for the day
o North – morning
o Center – mid-day
o South – afternoon
 Had his command post a mile behind the battle front – made
communication difficult/impossible
 This lack of coordination/communication allowed CSA to nullify the
Union troop advantage
September 17th – battle begins @ 5:30am
 Hooker moves in from the north along the Hagerstown Turnpike
 Goes through the North Woods and towards the cornfield
 Target – Dunker Church
 As the Union emerges from the North Woods, artillery fire greets them
from their right and their front
o J.E.B. Stuart along Nicodemus Hill (to Union right)
o Col. Stephen Lee to Union front (across road from Dunker
Church)
 Union returns fire from artillery set behind the North Woods
o Heavy casualties on both sides
o Lee – “artillery hell”
 Hooker sees glint from Confederate bayonets waiting in the cornfield
 Halts infantry and brings in four batteries of artillery
 Fire shot and canister into the field
o Absolutely ripped the field, and the men hiding inside it, apart
 Confederates reorganize and train artillery also on the cornfield
 Both sides take terrible casualties here
 Union reinforcements had a hard time arriving
o One Colonel even got scared, dismounted his horse, and fled to
the back of the troops (William A. Christian)
 CSA eventually sends the Louisiana “Tiger” Brigade into the Cornfield
 Knock back the Union at first
o Cause 12th Massachusetts Infantry to take 67% casualty rate
 Eventually cut down, literally, by direct point-blank fire into the
cornfield
o Lose 323 of 500 men (dead – not injured)
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Cornfield remains a stalemate – Union is still doing well on the far right Union
flank
 John Gibbons “Iron Brigade” is able to push through the men of
Stonewall Jackson
o Stalled when met with 1150 men from Starke’s CSA brigade 30
yards away
 Fierce return fire causes the CSA to pull back
 Starke is killed in action
o Iron Brigade continues advance on Dunker Church
CSA receives reinforcements around 7am
 John Bell Hood’s men enter the fight through the West Woods and push
the Union back through the Cornfield
o Assisted by D.H. Hill & Jubal Early
 Fire returned by John Gibbon’s “Iron Brigade”
 Hood’s men took a 60% casualty rate
o Able to prevent the crumble of the CSA defense and repel the
Union
o When asked by a fellow officer where his division was, Hood
replied simply “dead on the field”
Hookers men paid heavily for the morning fight
 2 hours + 2500 casualties = no net gain for Union
 Called for support from Mansfield’s 12th Corps (7200 men)
o Mansfield had 40 years of experience, but none as commander
of such a large unit
o Marched his men in a tight formation (10 ranks instead of
normal 2)
 EASY potential target for CSA artillery
 CSA is unable to stop their advance though
 Mansfield is killed on the field by a sniper
 Command passes the Alpheus Williams
 Mansfield’s men were raw recruits, but fought hard
 Able to actually break through the CSA forces,
causing them to pull back
 2nd Division of the 12th Corps (Mansfield’s men)
under George Greene able to make it to Dunker
Church able drive off the CSA artillery
 Hooker tries to gather the remnants of the 1st corps and reorganize
o Shot through foot by a confederate sharpshooter
o Command falls to General George Meade
 With Hooker gone, nobody left to rally both the 1st &
12th Corps
 Greene’s men from the 12th Corps com under serious
fire from the West Woods
 Have to abandon Dunker Church
One final attack of the morning came from the Union 2nd Corps (Edwin Sumner)
 Cross Antietam Creek, hit the CSA right, and force them south into an
attack from Burnside
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Became separated from the rest of the Corps
o Assaulted by 3 divisions of CSA troops
o Forced to retreat in disorder
o Took over 2200 casualties
 Morning phase ends with little movement by either side
 13 K casualties total (both sides)
o 3 Union commanders
 Mansfield (killed)
 Hooker (wounded)
 Ricketts (wounded)
September 17th – mid-day battle
 Action had shifted to the center of the CSA line
 French’s division had lost contact with Sumner and Sedgwick and began to
move south
 French found a few skirmishers and ordered his men forward
 Would be told by Sumner’s aide (once he found him) to divert CSA
attention and attack the center of the CSA line
o Hoped to take CSA troops from defending the West Woods
 French moves to confront D.H. Hill’s division
 Hill – 2500 men (less than half the number of French’s)
o Much of his division had be decimated by the morning fighting
 Theoretically, this was the weakest part of Longstreets line
o Hill’s men had a good defensive position though
 Atop a ridge in a sunken road
 Later known as “Bloody Lane”
 French launches a series of attacks on this position
o First attack - BG Max Weber’s men
 Cut down by heavy rifle fire
o 2nd attack – Col. Dwight Morris
 Subjected also to heavy fire
 Able to beat back a counterattack by an Alabama
brigade
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o 3 attack – BG Nathan Kimball
 3 veteran regiments
 Fell to fire from the sunken road
o Reinforcements came on both sides
 CSA right to try and overtake the Union left flank
 Union left (last of Sumners troops) to cover their
casualties thus far
o 4th attack – Irish brigade of BG Thomas Meagher
 Had a priest (most of them were Irish catholics)
shouting absolution as they strode ahead
 Lost 540 men before ordered to withdraw
o 5th attack – BG John Caldwell
 Able to turn the momentum of the battle
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Took control of a small knoll that allowed them
to drop fire into the sunken road on the
Confederates
 A mistaken command by the CSA caused them
to turn and abandon the road they had held
 Union was in pursuit when assembled artillery
was able to turn them back to the sunken road
 Stopped the collapse of the CSA line, especially
the center of their line
 2 Union commanders were wounded, placing Winfield
Hancock in division command
 The change of command sapped Union
momentum
 Union lost around 3 K men in the mid day fighting, CSA 2600
 Union was VERY close to breaking the CSA
 Union had @ 25K men in reserve
o 22K infantry
o 3500 cavalry
 MG William Franklin and MG Winfield Hancock wanted to call up the
reserves and attack
 Sumner disagreed – called upon McClellan to make the final decision
o He backed Sumner
o Union loses another opportunity
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September 17 – afternoon battle
 Action moves to the south end of the battlefield
 Plan calls for Ambrose Burnside to launch a diversionary attack
 Pull attention away from the main attack of Joe Hooker in the north
 Orders did not reach Burnside until 10am
o He waited for EXPLICIT orders to attack
o Upset with McClellan he had taken away his “wing command”
of all corps on his end
 Burnside had @ 12,500 men and 50 guns on his side of Antietam Creek
 CSA had only 3K men and 12 guns
o Many troops had been diverted to help at bloody lane
 Bridge between them was Rohrbach’s Bridge (to become known as Burnside’s
Bridge)
 125 feet long
 Dominated with a 100 foot bluff held by the CSA on the west side
 Also had old boulders allowing for infantry and sharpshooters to take
cover
o DANGEROUS for Union
 Antietam Creek was 75-100’ feet wide
 Barely waist deep
o Burnside is WIDELY criticized for ignoring this, although the
terrain on the opposing side could be dangerous.
 Burnside planned to storm the bridge, while crossing the river a half mile
downstream at a ford built by McClellan’s engineers
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Could not work with the banks on the river – too high
Ended up having to set up the Ford 2 miles downstream
Takes multiple assaults to cross the bridge
o Continued to send men ACROSS THE BRIDGE funneling them
into fire by the CSA
o McClellan sends multiple couriers to Burnside telling him to
MOVE
 One said “If it even costs you 10 K men, you must go
now”
o Burnside is able to get his men to within 25 yards of the CSA
 CSA ammo is running low and begins to pull back
 Still, they had held the CSA at bay for over 3
hours, both at the bridge and at the Ford below
o Burnside’s troops bottleneck the bridge with ammo and artillery
crossing
 2 hour delay – used by Robert E. Lee to bolster the CSA
right
 Orders up every available unit
 Counts on the arrival of A.P. Hill’s division
o Reaches the field at 2:30pm and saves
Lee
 Union attacks are able to push the CSA back to within 200 yards of
Sharpsburg
o Streets of Sharpsburg are clogged with retreating CSA members
 A.P. Hill engages his men at 3:30pm
o Sends 2 brigades SE to guard the flank
o The rest (@ 2k men) go straight into the fighting and try to
counterattack
o Many of the CSA members of Hill’s troops were wearing Union
blue troops captured from Harper’s Ferry
 Able to overrun the union troops and push them back
to Antietam Creek
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Burnsides 9 corps still had twice the number of CSA men facing them
 Burnside was so unnerved by the collapse of his flank, he ordered
everybody BACK ACROSS the creek
o Requested more men from McClellan
o McClellan says he has no more men to give
 In actual, he had 2 fresh corps who had seen no action
 Porter’s V
 Franklin’s VI
 Refused to use them due to fear of a massive counter
attack from Lee
 Burnsides men spent the rest of the day guarding the bridge
AFTERMATH
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Battle was over by 5:30pm
Casualties
 Union – 12,401 (25% of their troops)
 CSA – 10, 318 (31% of their troops)
 More Americans died on this day (3,654) than any other in US military history to
that point
September 18th
 Lee prepares to defend against a Union assault
 Never comes
 Improvised truce for both sides to recover wounded
 Lee begins withdrawing across the Potomac that evening
 Lincoln is disappointed with McClellan
 Moved too slowly, poor coordination of actions
 Caused a “draw” with the CSA instead of dealing them a MAJOR
DEFEAT
 September 17 – October 26
 McClellan refuses to pursue Lee across the Potomac into Virginia
o Refuses requests from the War Department and the President
himself
o Lincoln relieves McClellan of command on November 7,
basically ending his military career
 Side note – McClellan runs for President in 1860 and
carries a couple states
Some people question the designation of a “Union strategic victory”
 McClellan screwed up the campaign
 Lee does a great job leading his troops and holding his own against a Union
army that GREATLY outnumbered him
 However – CSA loses more people (percentage wise)
 Lee withdraws from the field first, the technical definition of a LOSS in battle
Despite these issues, this is a turning point for the war
 Ends Lee’s first invasion of the north
 Allows Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation
 Frees all slaves in the SOUTH only
o Intended to do this earlier, but did it after a Union win to avoid
looking desperate
 Plays a MAJOR role in stopping recognition of the south from France &
GB
 Basically, puts the CSA on their own