Download December 2004 - Dr. Harold C. Deutsch WWII History Roundtable

May 2005
Volume 13 Number 9
Published by The WW II History Roundtable
Edited by Jim Gerber
Welcome to the May meeting of the Dr. Harold C. Deutsch World War Two History Roundtable.
Tonight’s program is about the Italian Campaign. Our speaker this evening is Flint Whitlock,
author and historian. Flint is the author of: Soldiers on Skis, Rock of Anzio, The Fighting First and
his latest book, Given Up for Dead. Flint is a regular contributor to World War II magazine and
World War Two History magazine. He is the co-founder of the Colorado Military History Museum,
Inc. We look forward to his presentation tonight.
Here is the preliminary schedule for the 2005 - 2006 season:
September 13th Airborne Division
October Seizing Nazi Technology
November Truman and the Post-war Era
December Saipan
January War on the Eastern Front
February Navy Patrol Planes
March Operation Varsity
April Hitler’s Final Defeat in the West
May US First Army - The Longest Battle
The Italian Campaign
When the Allies decided to invade Italy, rather than southern France or the Balkins, they hoped
for an easy task. The Italians were not going to fight, and the Allied High Command doubted
whether the Germans could transfer sufficient troops into Italy to impede an Allied drive to the
north. But there was a severe shock in store: Italy was no ‘soft underbelly’ geographically, and
despite easy successes at Taranto and Messina, the landing at Salerno was the Allied forces’
most desperate and closely-run battle yet.
The Allied invasions of North Africa and Sicily were concerned primarily with ensuring the safety
of the sea lanes between Gibraltar and Suez, thereby making voyages around Africa
unnecessary. The invasion of southern Italy marked a new strategic phase, in which, General Sir
Harold R. L. G. Alexander later wrote: “The Mediterranean theater would no longer receive the
first priority of resources and its operations would become preparatory and subsidiary to the great
invasion based on the United Kingdom.”
The decision to invade southern Italy stemmed from the Casablanca Conference, held in French
Morocco during January 1943, while the Tunisian campaign was still in progress. Having decided
to invade Sicily in hopes of securing Mediterranean lines of communication, diverting German
strength from the Russian front, and forcing Italy out of the war, Prime Minister Churchill and
President Roosevelt, together with their principal military advisors, discussed what to do after
conquering Sicily.
Since they had agreed to seek ultimate victory in Europe by means of a cross-Channel operation,
was any other Mediterranean undertaking feasible? Because the available resources precluded
simultaneous major campaigns in both areas, Mediterranean operations would draw off the buildup being accumulated in the United Kingdom for the cross-Channel attack and would probably
postpone the decisive action. Yet the southern shoreline of Europe between Spain and Turkey,
occupied by Axis troops, was close at hand and a tempting target for invasion. Was it better to
halt after Sicily and conserve resources for a quicker thrust into north-west Europe, or to employ,
against the European underbelly, the men and material gathered in the Mediterranean? The
Americans, more conscious of the war in the Pacific, leaned toward an early cross-Channel
invasion, while the British, who generally regarded a cross-Channel operation as the decisive
strike against a weakened Germany, favored continuing the war in the Mediterranean. As it
became clear during the spring of 1943 that shortages of assault shipping and the German
strength would prevent a cross-Channel effort that year, Mediterranean ventures beyond Sicily
became increasingly practicable and attractive.
But where to go? The Americans generally looked toward the western Mediterranean, with the
conquest of Sardinia and Corsica leading to an invasion of southern France in order to
complement a main effort across the Channel. The British generally looked to the eastern
Mediterranean, with landings at the foot of Italy leading to an invasion of the Balkans in order to
support the Yugoslav Partisans, draw Turkey into the war, and open a shorter sea route to the
USSR for lend-lease supplies. Both courses of action had serious disadvantages.
One hope intrigued the Allies: If invasion of Sicily failed to force Italy out of the war, would an
additional blow do so? If Italy surrendered, the Germans would be doubly stretched over the
periphery of Europe; they might even withdraw from Italy, thereby giving the Allies the airfield they
needed for intensified bombing attacks. But if the Germans chose to fight in the rugged Italian
terrain, they might provoke a protracted campaign that would probably require the Allies to
increase the resources in a theater relegated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to subsidiary
importance.
When the Allied leaders met in Washington for the Trident Conference during May 1943, they
confirmed their plans to invade Sicily, scheduled the operation for July, and decided on their
Mediterranean goals: they would try to knock Italy out of the war, and at the same time engage
the maximum number of German forces.
More Reading on Tonight’s Topic:
The Rock of Anzio
by Flint Whitlock
Westview Press
Boulder, Colo.
1998
Cassino; the Hollow Victory
by John Ellis
McGraw-Hill Book Company
New York, New York
1984
Cassino
by Dominich Graham
Ballantine Books
New York, New York
1970
Salerno; Foothold in Europe
by David Mason
Ballantine Books
New York, New York
1972
Anzio; the Bid for Rome
by Christopher Hibbert
Ballantine Books
New York, New York
1970
The Last Ridge
by McKay Jenkins
Random House Pub.
New York, New York
2003
Climb to Conquer
by Peter Shelton
Scribner
New York, New York
2003
Have a great summer and we’ll see you in the fall.