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Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter 8 Table of Contents Section Title Page 8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 8.1-1 8.1.2.1 Utility Power Grid Description .................................................................. 8.1-1 8.2 Offsite Power Systems ........................................................................................... 8.2-1 8.2.1.1 Transmission System .............................................................................. 8.2-1 8.2.1.2 Offsite Power System .............................................................................. 8.2-3 8.2.2.1 Stability and Reliability of the Offsite Transmission Power System ........ 8.2-7 8.2.2.2 Regulatory Analysis ................................................................................ 8.2-9 8.2.2.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis ........................................................ 8.2-9 8.2.4 COL Unit-Specific Information ......................................................................... 8.2-11 8.2.5 References ...................................................................................................... 8.2-12 8.3 Onsite Power Systems ........................................................................................... 8.3-1 8.3.1.2 Analysis ................................................................................................... 8.3-1 Appendix 8A Miscellaneous Electrical Systems ..................................................................8.A-1 8A.2.1 Description .........................................................................................................8.A-1 8A.2.3 COL Information .......................................................................................8.A-1 8-i Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter 8 List of Tables Number Table 8.2-201 Title Transmission Line Historical Outage Data 8-ii Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter 8 List of Figures Number Title Figure 8.2-201 Site Switchyard-Substation One Line Diagram Figure 8.2-202 VCS Site and Why Substation Location Plan Figure 8.2-203 Overall 345 kV Transmission Interconnection Configuration Figure 8.2-204 Transmission Corridors Conceptual Location Plan 8-iii Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report 8.1 Introduction This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements. 8.1.2.1 Utility Power Grid Description Add the following to the end of the first paragraph. VCS SUP 8.1-1 The output of each unit of the VCS is delivered to the AEP Why Substation located adjacent to the VCS via the unit main power transformers and unit switchyards. From the Why Substation it flows to the regional transmission system. The Why Substation, while adjacent to the VCS, is considered a portion of the offsite power system. There are six new (two double-circuit and four single-circuit) 345 kV transmission lines from the Why Substation that connect to the existing grid through five existing and one new remote 345 kV substations. These lines exit the Why Substation in three different directions. The existing substations are Coleto Creek, Hillje, South Texas Project, Blessing and White Point. The new transmission substation is Cholla. The details of the Why Substation, each unit switchyard, the new transmission lines, and the interconnecting transmission substations are further discussed in Section 8.2. 8.1.5.2.4 Regulatory Requirements Replace the bullet on Regulatory Guide 1.81 under NRC Regulatory Guides with the following. VCS SUP 8.1-2 • Regulatory Guide 1.81, “Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants” – The VCS is a two-unit plant. The onsite emergency and shutdown electric systems of the plant are not shared between the VCS units. 8.1-1 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report 8.2 Offsite Power Systems This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements. 8.2.1.1 Transmission System Replace this subsection with the following. VCS COL 8.2.4-1-A The transmission system provides electric power from the utility grid to the offsite power system. The system is designed and located to minimize the likelihood of simultaneous failure during DBA and adverse environmental conditions. VCS Units 1 and 2 are connected to the AEP regional transmission system via VCS Unit Switchyards 1 and 2 and the AEP Why Substation by six 345 kV transmission lines. Two of the lines are double-circuit. There are a total of eight 345 kV transmission circuits. The Unit 1 and 2 main generators each feed electric power through 27 kV isolated-phase buses to a bank of three single-phase main transformers, stepping the generator voltage up to the transmission voltage of 345 kV. Figure 8.2-201 provides a one-line diagram of the high-voltage electric system onsite from the switchyards and substation to the offsite system. The physical arrangement of high-voltage power lines onsite, from the offsite power sources, is shown in Figure 8.2-202. Figure 8.2-203 provides the offsite transmission configuration. Figure 8.2-204 orients the offsite transmission line corridors. The transmission lines connecting the Why Substation to the transmission system are as follows: • A double-circuit 345 kV overhead line running generally west to Coleto Creek Substation (approximately 20 miles) • A single-circuit 345 kV overhead line running generally northwest to Cholla Substation (approximately 40 miles) • A double-circuit 345 kV overhead line running generally northeast to Hillje Substation (approximately 60 miles) • A single-circuit 345 kV overhead line running generally east-northeast to Blessing Substation (approximately 60 miles) • A single-circuit 345 kV overhead line running generally east-northeast to South Texas Project (STP) Substation (approximately 90 miles) 8.2-1 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report • A single-circuit 345 kV overhead line running generally south to White Point Substation) (approximately 80 miles) The lines to the Coleto Creek and Cholla substations are located in separate rights-of-way in a designated corridor. The lines to Hillje, Blessing, STP and White Point substations are colocated and adjacent for some portion of their routes in a corridor separate from the Coleto Creek and Cholla lines corridor. There are no crossings of these independent lines from Why Substation. Transmission corridor location options for the Coleto Creek, Hillje, and Blessing Substation lines were studied via a detailed corridor study (Reference 8.2.5-201). Options for the corridor to the Cholla Substation include corridors to the west and then northwest paralleling other rights-of-way where practical. The lines to STP and White Point are primarily existing infrastructure. New transmission lines are routed in corridors that are generally located in flat or gently rolling terrain. There is no rugged terrain associated with any of the transmission corridors. Transmission tower separation, line installation, and clearances are consistent with the National Electric Safety Code and AEP or owner’s transmission line standards. Basic tower structural design parameters, including the number and size of conductors, height, materials, color, and finish are consistent with established AEP or owner’s transmission line design standards and practices. Galloping conductors are not a common event in the areas of the transmission corridor. Conductor spacings are, however, sufficient to prevent conductor-to-conductor flashover if galloping should occur. AEP transmission tower design standards address hurricane wind loadings. Ice loading of conductors in this area is bounded by the hurricane loading design conditions. Thunderstorm and lightning occurrence is moderately high in the Texas Gulf Coast area and transmission system insulation (BIL) levels are applied to minimize lightning-related flashovers and line outages. 8.2-2 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report 8.2.1.2 Offsite Power System Replace the first three paragraphs with the following and delete the last paragraph. VCS COL 8.2.4-3-A VCS COL 8.2.4-4-A The offsite power system is a nonsafety-related system. Power is supplied to the plant from multiple independent and physically separate offsite power sources through the Why Substation that is adjacent to VCS Units 1 and 2; however, the Why Substation is considered offsite for the purposes of this discussion. There are eight circuits that are supported from six separate transmission tower lines. The normal preferred power source is any one of the six 345 kV lines, and the alternate preferred power source is any other one of the six 345 kV lines. The normal preferred power source is supplied to the unit auxiliary transformers (UATs) through the motor-operated disconnects (MODs) and isolation circuit breakers. The normal preferred power interface with the offsite power system occurs at the high-voltage terminals of the main generator circuit breaker MOD and UAT MODs located in the Units 1 and 2 switchyards. The MOD feeding a faulted UAT will be opened after the UAT high-voltage breaker opens. The alternate preferred power source is supplied to the reserve auxiliary transformers (RATs) through the motor-operated disconnects. The alternate preferred power interface between onsite and offsite power occurs at the MODs before the high-voltage terminals of the RATs as shown in Figure 8.2-201. The MOD feeding a faulted RAT will be opened, after the AEP breakers in Why Substation open. Fully OPEN indication of the MOD for the faulted RAT will allow the AEP breaker in Why Substation to be re-closed to the unaffected RAT. All onsite high-voltage lines and buses are air-insulated overhead construction. The normal and emergency rating of each transmission line is as follows 8.2-3 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report Rating (Normal/Emergency in MVA Line Why - Cholla 1852/2740 Why - Blessing 1852/2740 Why - Coleto Creek 1852/2740 Why - Hillje 1852/2740 STP - Why - White Point 1011/1011 ERCOT maintains a "Responsive Reserve Margin" (at the operation end of the spectrum) that provides for any shortfall in generation. Based on the responsive reserve margin, connections to other generation and line capacity, the offsite power sources have sufficient capacity and capability from the transmission network to feed the auxiliary power loads of VCS Units 1 and 2 under all operating conditions. The capacity and electrical characteristics for Why Substation and the unit switchyards equipment are as follows: Why Substation Voltage Rating (kV) Current Rating (A) Interrupting Current (kA) Breakers 345 5000 63 Main Buses 345 5000 63 Bay Buses 345 5000 63 Voltage Rating (kV) Current Rating (A) Interrupting Current (kA) Breakers 345 4000 63 Buses 345 4000 63 Equipment Unit Switchyards Equipment 8.2-4 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report 8.2.1.2.1 Substation and Unit Switchyards Change the title and replace the last paragraph with the following: VCS COL 8.2.4-2-A VCS COL 8.2.4-5-A VCS COL 8.2.4-6-A VCS COL 8.2.4-7-A VCS COL 8.2.4-8-A The high-voltage interconnection to the VCS plant is through the Why Substation and each unit’s switchyard. The Why Substation is a 345 kV, air-insulated, breaker-and-a-half bus arrangement. The unit switchyards are air-insulated radial collector buses with circuit breakers provided for the main transformers and for the individual unit auxiliary transformers. The unit switchyards include a separate collector bus with motor operated disconnect switches for the reserve auxiliary transformer connections. The configuration, physical location, and electrical interconnection of the Why Substation and unit switchyards are shown in Figures 8.2-201 and 8.2-202. Control and relay protection systems are provided and are redundant where necessary. Support systems such as grounding, raceway, lighting, AC/DC station service, and lightning protection are also provided. Essential power is supplied from separate and redundant DC systems supplied from separate and dedicated batteries and battery chargers in both the substation and at the unit switchyards. Battery chargers and other important AC loads are supplied from separate and redundant AC power sources and panelboards. Add Subsection 8.2.1.2.2 as follows VCS SUP 8.2-1 8.2.1.2.2 Protective Relaying The 345 kV transmission lines are protected with redundant high-speed relay schemes with re-closing and communication equipment to minimize line outages. The 345 kV substation and switchyard buses have redundant bus differential protection using separate and independent current and control circuits. Generating unit tie-lines and auxiliary transformer circuits are protected with redundant high-speed relay schemes. Breakers are equipped with dual-trip coils. Each redundant protection circuit that supplies a trip signal is powered from its redundant DC power load group and connected to a separate trip coil. Equipment and cabling 8.2-5 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report associated with each redundant system is physically separated from its redundant counterpart. Breakers are provided with a breaker failure scheme that isolates a breaker that fails to trip due to a malfunction. Add Subsection 8.2.1.2.3 as follows. VCS SUP 8.2-2 8.2.1.2.3 Testing and Inspection Transmission lines are inspected via an aerial and/or ground inspection program approximately once a year. The inspection focuses on such items as right-of-way encroachment, vegetation management, conductor and line hardware condition, and the condition of supporting structures. Routine switchyard and substation inspection activities include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: • Daily transformer inspections • Periodic inspections of circuit breakers and batteries • Quarterly infrared scans • Semiannual infrared scans (relay panels) • Semiannual inspection of substation equipment • Annual infrared scans • Annual corona camera scan Routine switchyard and substation testing activities include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: • Biennial circuit breaker profile or timing tests • Biennial 345 kV relay testing • 5-year battery discharge testing • 8-year potential transformer testing • 8-year ground grid testing • 10-year coupling capacitor voltage transformer testing • 10-year surge arrester testing • 10-year wave trap testing 8.2-6 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report 8.2.2.1 VCS COL 8.2.4-9-A Stability and Reliability of the Offsite Transmission Power System Replace this subsection with the following. A system impact study by AEP analyzed load flow, transient stability, and fault analysis for the addition of Units 1 and 2 (Reference 8.2.5-202). The study is based on the ERCOT 2013 load case. The analysis was performed by AEP technical staff. The analysis was performed using Siemens Power Technology International Software PSS/E. The analysis considered the worst-case grid disturbances. The analysis examined conditions involving loss of the largest generating unit, loss of the most critical transmission line, and multiple facility contingencies. The infrastructure considered is from the point of interconnection of Units 1 and 2 to the substation and out to the 345 kV regional transmission system. This included the projected loading and transmission additions needed for the proposed expansion of the STP. (Reference 8.2.5-202) The results of the grid stability analysis show that loss of the largest single generator or supply to the grid does not result in the complete loss of preferred power. The analysis also considers the result of removal of the largest load from the grid, or loss of the most critical transmission line. In determining the most critical transmission line, the analysis also considers circuits that use a common tower to be a single line. The study concluded that, with the additional generating capacity of Units 1 and 2, the transmission system remains stable under the analyzed conditions, preserving the grid connection and supporting the normal and shutdown power requirements of Units 1 and 2 via the multiple transmission circuits. The maximum and minimum switchyard voltage limits for the 345 kV system are 105 and 95% that the transmission system provider/operator maintains without any reactive power support from the nuclear power plant (Reference 8.2.5-202, Appendix 5). ERCOT and AEP provide notice to the power plant of any voltage inadequacy at the plant switchyard that cannot be corrected within 30 minutes. ERCOT procedures specify the plant switchyard voltage limits.. Available transmission grid performance data over the past 3–26 years was also examined for the existing regional transmission lines that are 8.2-7 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report nearby or associated with the interconnection to Why Substation and it was confirmed that the system has been highly reliable with minimal outages due to lightning, weather events, or equipment failures. The reliability of the overall transmission system design is supported by there being no recorded pattern of widespread system interruptions. Failure rates of individual facilities are low. This data is summarized in Table 8.2-201. A formal agreement will be put in place between the VCS and AEP for necessary ongoing analysis to ensure the preferred offsite power source remains capable of supporting plant startup, and the ability to shut down the plant under normal and emergency conditions. The agreement will identify the transmission line and substation equipment that is considered for review and approval by ERCOT as the approving grid organization. Grid stability is evaluated by ERCOT on an ongoing basis based on load growth, the addition of new transmission lines, or new generation capacity. (Reference 8.2.5-202, Appendix 6) The transmission system operator provides analysis capabilities for both long-term planning and real-time operations. System conditions are evaluated to ensure a bounding analysis and model parameters are selected that are influential in determining the system’s ability to provide offsite power adequacy. Elements included in the analysis are system load forecasts (including sufficient margin to ensure a bounding analysis over the life of the study), system generator dispatch (including outages of generators known to be particularly influential in offsite power adequacy of affected nuclear units), outage schedules for transmission elements that have significant influence on offsite power adequacy, cross-system power transfers and power imports/exports, and system modification plans and schedules. A real-time state estimator is used to assist in the evaluation of actual system conditions. These capabilities are described in the system analysis protocol of the interface agreement. The anal ysis is performed usi ng Siemens Power Technol ogy International Software PSS/E and PSS/MUST.} VCS COL 8.2.4-10-A An interface agreement and protocols for maintenance, communications, substation control, and system operation, sufficient to safely operate and maintain the power station interconnection to the transmission system, will be in place. 8.2-8 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report 8.2.2.2 Regulatory Analysis Replace first bullet under Applicable Criteria. VCS SUP 8.2-3 • GDC 5, “Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components,” and Regulatory Guide 1.81, “Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants” – Offsite power systems are not important to safety per DCD Chapter 8, thus GDC 5 and RG 1.81 are not applicable. Add Subsection 8.2.2.3. VCS SUP 8.2-4 8.2.2.3 8.2.2.3.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Introduction The presence of multiple offsite transmission circuits and lines, grouped into three geographically dispersed corridors, ensures that there are no single failures that can prevent the VCS offsite power system from performing its function to provide power to Unit 1 and/or 2. 8.2.2.3.2 Transmission System Evaluation Units 1 and 2 are connected to the AEP regional transmission system via eight 345 kV transmission circuits grouped into six separate lines located in three separate corridors. The normal preferred power source is any one of the eight 345 kV circuits contained in these three corridors. (See Subsections 8.2.1.1 and 8.2.1.2.) The 345 kV transmission lines supporting towers provide clearances consistent with the NESC. The towers are grounded with either ground rods or a counterpoise ground system. Failure of any one tower due to structural failure can at most disrupt and cause a loss of one (1) circuit for single-circuit lines and two (2) circuits for double-circuit lines, and any immediately adjacent line. Failure of a line conductor would cause the loss of only one of the eight circuits. 8.2.2.3.3 Substation Evaluation A breaker-and-a-half scheme is incorporated in the design of the substation. The equipment in the substation is rated and positioned within the bus configuration according to the following criteria in order to maintain incoming and outgoing load flow from Units 1 and 2: 8.2-9 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report • Equipment continuous current ratings are such that no single contingency in the substation (e.g., a breaker being out of service for maintenance) results in current exceeding 100% of the continuous current rating of the equipment. • Interrupting duties are specified such that no faults occurring on the system exceed the breaker’s interrupting rating. • Momentary ratings are specified such that no faults occurring on the system exceed the equipment momentary rating. • Voltage ratings for the equipment are specified to be greater than the maximum expected operating voltage. • Control power for all primary and secondary protective relaying schemes is supplied from separate 125 VDC systems supported by separate battery chargers. • AC station service power is provided by redundant transformers and distribution panel boards supplied from separate sources. • Primary- and backup-related control cables for the switchyard breakers are routed through separate and independent cable raceway systems. • All relay schemes used for protection of the offsite power circuits and the substation equipment include primary and backup protection features. All breakers are equipped with dual trip coils. Each protection circuit that supplies a trip signal is connected to a separate trip coil. The breaker-and-a-half substation arrangement offers the following flexibility to control a failed condition within the substation: • Any faulted transmission line or circuit into the substation can be isolated without affecting any other transmission line. • Either substation bus can be isolated without interruption of any transmission line, circuit, or other bus. • Any circuit breaker can be isolated for maintenance or inspection without interruption to any transmission line, circuit or bus. 8.2.2.3.4 Unit Switchyards Evaluation The unit switchyards are an integral part of the normal and alternate preferred power supply. The failure of any component within a unit switchyard may disrupt the normal or alternate preferred power supply to 8.2-10 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report that unit, but not both. Therefore, the power supply will remain available to supply the unit load. The equipment in each unit switchyard is rated according to the following criteria: • Interrupting duties are specified such that no faults occurring on the system exceed the breaker’s interrupting rating. • Momentary ratings are specified such that no faults occurring on the system exceed the equipment momentary rating. • Voltage ratings are specified to be greater than the maximum expected operating voltage. • Circuit breaker continuous current ratings are chosen such that no single contingency will result in a load exceeding 100% of the nameplate continuous current rating of the breaker. The normal preferred and alternate preferred power supplies are electrically independent and are physically separate from each other. Therefore, a minimum of one preferred source of power remains available to supply the load during all plant conditions. 8.2.4 VCS COL 8.2.4-1-A COL Unit-Specific Information 8.2.4-1-A Transmission System Description This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.1. VCS COL 8.2.4-2-A 8.2.4-2-A Switchyard Description This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1. VCS COL 8.2.4-3-A 8.2.4-3-A Normal Preferred Power This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2. VCS COL 8.2.4-4-A 8.2-4-4-A Alternate Preferred Power This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2. VCS COL 8.2.4-5-A 8.2.4-5-A Protective Relaying This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1. VCS COL 8.2.4-6-A 8.2.4-6-A Switchyard DC Power This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1. VCS COL 8.2.4-7-A 8.2.4-7-A Switchyard AC Power This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1. VCS COL 8.2.4-8-A 8.2.4-8-A Switchyard Transformer Protection This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1. 8.2-11 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report VCS COL 8.2.4-9-A 8.2.4-9-A Stability and Reliability of the Offsite Transmission Power System This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.2.1. VCS COL 8.2.4-10-A 8.2.4-10-A Interface Requirements This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.2.1. 8.2.5 References Add the following references: 8.2.5-201 Photo Science, Inc., Electric Transmission Corridor Study for the Proposed Victoria Texas Nuclear Site, May 1, 2008. 8.2.5-202 AEP, Interconnection Study for New Generation in Victoria County, Report for Generation 11INR0011, May 28, 2008. 8.2-12 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report Add the following table for outage data. VCS SUP 8.2-6 Table 8.2-201 Transmission Line Historical Outage Data Outage Cause Description STPBlessing 44 Line STP-White Point 39 Line Broken Insulator/ Conductor 4 Insulator Flashover/ Contamination 1 Lightning 3 2 Tree/Vines into Circuits 1 1 5 Unknown (Instantaneous/Lockout/ Phase to Ground Trip) 3 57 Carrier Problems Duration of Data 4 7 Weather (Thunderstorm) Total Lon Hill-Coleto Creek Line 3 Personnel Error Relay Misoperation PawneeColeto Creek Line 6 10 1 6 78 14 10 1980-2006 1980-2006 2004-2007 2000-2007 8.2-13 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 8.2-201 Site Switchyard-Substation One Line Diagram 8.2-14 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 8.2-202 VCS Site and Why Substation Location Plan 8.2-15 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 8.2-203 Overall 345 kV Transmission Interconnection Configuration 8.2-16 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 8.2-204 Transmission Corridors Conceptual Location Plan 8.2-17 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report 8.3 Onsite Power Systems This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements. 8.3.1.2 8.3.1.2.1 Analysis General Design Criteria and Regulatory Guidance Compliance Insert after description of GDC 4, Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases and before GDC 17, Electric Power Systems. VCS SUP 8.3-1 GDC 5, Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components The Structures, Systems and Components (SSC) of the plant Onsite AC Power System(s) that are important to safety, are not shared between the units. 8.3.2.2.2 Regulatory Requirements and Guide Insert a new bullet under GDC: VCS SUP 8.3-2 • GDC 5 — The Structures, Systems and Components (SSC) of the plant Onsite DC Power Systems(s) that are important to safety, are not shared between the units. Insert a new bullet under Regulatory Guides between Regulatory Guide 1.75 and Regulatory Guide 1.106: • Regulatory Guide 1.81, “Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants.” The Structures, Systems and Components (SSC) of the plant Onsite DC Power System(s) that are important to safety, are not shared between the units. 8.3-1 Revision 0 Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2 COL Application Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report Appendix 8A Miscellaneous Electrical Systems This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements. 8A.2.1 Description Replace Section 8A.2.1 with the following: VCS COL 8A.2.3-1-A A cathodic protection system is provided to the extent required. The system is designed in accordance with the requirements of the National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE) Standards (DCD Reference 8A-5). 8A.2.3 COL Information 8A.2.3-1-A Cathodic Protection System VCS COL 8A.2.3-1-A This COL item is addressed in Section 8A.2.1. 8A-1 Revision 0