Download Chapter 8 Table of Contents Section Title Page

Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2
COL Application
Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
Chapter 8 Table of Contents
Section
Title
Page
8.1
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 8.1-1
8.1.2.1 Utility Power Grid Description .................................................................. 8.1-1
8.2 Offsite Power Systems ........................................................................................... 8.2-1
8.2.1.1 Transmission System .............................................................................. 8.2-1
8.2.1.2 Offsite Power System .............................................................................. 8.2-3
8.2.2.1 Stability and Reliability of the Offsite Transmission Power System ........ 8.2-7
8.2.2.2 Regulatory Analysis ................................................................................ 8.2-9
8.2.2.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis ........................................................ 8.2-9
8.2.4 COL Unit-Specific Information ......................................................................... 8.2-11
8.2.5 References ...................................................................................................... 8.2-12
8.3 Onsite Power Systems ........................................................................................... 8.3-1
8.3.1.2 Analysis ................................................................................................... 8.3-1
Appendix 8A Miscellaneous Electrical Systems ..................................................................8.A-1
8A.2.1 Description .........................................................................................................8.A-1
8A.2.3
COL Information .......................................................................................8.A-1
8-i
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Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
Chapter 8 List of Tables
Number
Table 8.2-201
Title
Transmission Line Historical Outage Data
8-ii
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COL Application
Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
Chapter 8 List of Figures
Number
Title
Figure 8.2-201
Site Switchyard-Substation One Line Diagram
Figure 8.2-202
VCS Site and Why Substation Location Plan
Figure 8.2-203
Overall 345 kV Transmission Interconnection Configuration
Figure 8.2-204
Transmission Corridors Conceptual Location Plan
8-iii
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Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2
COL Application
Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
8.1
Introduction
This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the
following departures and/or supplements.
8.1.2.1
Utility Power Grid Description
Add the following to the end of the first paragraph.
VCS SUP 8.1-1
The output of each unit of the VCS is delivered to the AEP Why
Substation located adjacent to the VCS via the unit main power
transformers and unit switchyards. From the Why Substation it flows to
the regional transmission system. The Why Substation, while adjacent to
the VCS, is considered a portion of the offsite power system.
There are six new (two double-circuit and four single-circuit) 345 kV
transmission lines from the Why Substation that connect to the existing
grid through five existing and one new remote 345 kV substations.
These lines exit the Why Substation in three different directions. The
existing substations are Coleto Creek, Hillje, South Texas Project,
Blessing and White Point. The new transmission substation is Cholla.
The details of the Why Substation, each unit switchyard, the new
transmission lines, and the interconnecting transmission substations are
further discussed in Section 8.2.
8.1.5.2.4
Regulatory Requirements
Replace the bullet on Regulatory Guide 1.81 under NRC Regulatory
Guides with the following.
VCS SUP 8.1-2
•
Regulatory Guide 1.81, “Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric
Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants” – The VCS is a two-unit
plant. The onsite emergency and shutdown electric systems of the
plant are not shared between the VCS units.
8.1-1
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Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2
COL Application
Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
8.2
Offsite Power Systems
This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the
following departures and/or supplements.
8.2.1.1
Transmission System
Replace this subsection with the following.
VCS COL 8.2.4-1-A
The transmission system provides electric power from the utility grid to
the offsite power system. The system is designed and located to
minimize the likelihood of simultaneous failure during DBA and adverse
environmental conditions.
VCS Units 1 and 2 are connected to the AEP regional transmission
system via VCS Unit Switchyards 1 and 2 and the AEP Why Substation
by six 345 kV transmission lines. Two of the lines are double-circuit.
There are a total of eight 345 kV transmission circuits.
The Unit 1 and 2 main generators each feed electric power through 27 kV
isolated-phase buses to a bank of three single-phase main transformers,
stepping the generator voltage up to the transmission voltage of 345 kV.
Figure 8.2-201 provides a one-line diagram of the high-voltage electric
system onsite from the switchyards and substation to the offsite system.
The physical arrangement of high-voltage power lines onsite, from the
offsite power sources, is shown in Figure 8.2-202. Figure 8.2-203
provides the offsite transmission configuration. Figure 8.2-204 orients the
offsite transmission line corridors.
The transmission lines connecting the Why Substation to the
transmission system are as follows:
•
A double-circuit 345 kV overhead line running generally west to
Coleto Creek Substation (approximately 20 miles)
•
A single-circuit 345 kV overhead line running generally northwest to
Cholla Substation (approximately 40 miles)
•
A double-circuit 345 kV overhead line running generally northeast to
Hillje Substation (approximately 60 miles)
•
A single-circuit 345 kV overhead line running generally east-northeast
to Blessing Substation (approximately 60 miles)
•
A single-circuit 345 kV overhead line running generally east-northeast
to South Texas Project (STP) Substation (approximately 90 miles)
8.2-1
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•
A single-circuit 345 kV overhead line running generally south to White
Point Substation) (approximately 80 miles)
The lines to the Coleto Creek and Cholla substations are located in
separate rights-of-way in a designated corridor. The lines to Hillje,
Blessing, STP and White Point substations are colocated and adjacent
for some portion of their routes in a corridor separate from the Coleto
Creek and Cholla lines corridor.
There are no crossings of these independent lines from Why Substation.
Transmission corridor location options for the Coleto Creek, Hillje, and
Blessing Substation lines were studied via a detailed corridor study
(Reference 8.2.5-201). Options for the corridor to the Cholla Substation
include corridors to the west and then northwest paralleling other
rights-of-way where practical. The lines to STP and White Point are
primarily existing infrastructure.
New transmission lines are routed in corridors that are generally located
in flat or gently rolling terrain. There is no rugged terrain associated with
any of the transmission corridors.
Transmission tower separation, line installation, and clearances are
consistent with the National Electric Safety Code and AEP or owner’s
transmission line standards. Basic tower structural design parameters,
including the number and size of conductors, height, materials, color, and
finish are consistent with established AEP or owner’s transmission line
design standards and practices.
Galloping conductors are not a common event in the areas of the
transmission corridor. Conductor spacings are, however, sufficient to
prevent conductor-to-conductor flashover if galloping should occur. AEP
transmission tower design standards address hurricane wind loadings.
Ice loading of conductors in this area is bounded by the hurricane loading
design conditions. Thunderstorm and lightning occurrence is moderately
high in the Texas Gulf Coast area and transmission system insulation
(BIL) levels are applied to minimize lightning-related flashovers and line
outages.
8.2-2
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Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2
COL Application
Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
8.2.1.2
Offsite Power System
Replace the first three paragraphs with the following and delete the last
paragraph.
VCS COL 8.2.4-3-A
VCS COL 8.2.4-4-A
The offsite power system is a nonsafety-related system. Power is
supplied to the plant from multiple independent and physically separate
offsite power sources through the Why Substation that is adjacent to VCS
Units 1 and 2; however, the Why Substation is considered offsite for the
purposes of this discussion. There are eight circuits that are supported
from six separate transmission tower lines. The normal preferred power
source is any one of the six 345 kV lines, and the alternate preferred
power source is any other one of the six 345 kV lines.
The normal preferred power source is supplied to the unit auxiliary
transformers (UATs) through the motor-operated disconnects (MODs)
and isolation circuit breakers. The normal preferred power interface with
the offsite power system occurs at the high-voltage terminals of the main
generator circuit breaker MOD and UAT MODs located in the Units 1 and
2 switchyards. The MOD feeding a faulted UAT will be opened after the
UAT high-voltage breaker opens.
The alternate preferred power source is supplied to the reserve auxiliary
transformers (RATs) through the motor-operated disconnects. The
alternate preferred power interface between onsite and offsite power
occurs at the MODs before the high-voltage terminals of the RATs as
shown in Figure 8.2-201. The MOD feeding a faulted RAT will be opened,
after the AEP breakers in Why Substation open. Fully OPEN indication of
the MOD for the faulted RAT will allow the AEP breaker in Why
Substation to be re-closed to the unaffected RAT.
All onsite high-voltage lines and buses are air-insulated overhead
construction.
The normal and emergency rating of each transmission line is as follows
8.2-3
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Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2
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Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
Rating (Normal/Emergency
in MVA
Line
Why - Cholla
1852/2740
Why - Blessing
1852/2740
Why - Coleto Creek
1852/2740
Why - Hillje
1852/2740
STP - Why - White Point
1011/1011
ERCOT maintains a "Responsive Reserve Margin" (at the operation end
of the spectrum) that provides for any shortfall in generation. Based on
the responsive reserve margin, connections to other generation and line
capacity, the offsite power sources have sufficient capacity and capability
from the transmission network to feed the auxiliary power loads of VCS
Units 1 and 2 under all operating conditions.
The capacity and electrical characteristics for Why Substation and the
unit switchyards equipment are as follows:
Why Substation
Voltage
Rating
(kV)
Current
Rating
(A)
Interrupting
Current (kA)
Breakers
345
5000
63
Main Buses
345
5000
63
Bay Buses
345
5000
63
Voltage
Rating
(kV)
Current
Rating
(A)
Interrupting
Current (kA)
Breakers
345
4000
63
Buses
345
4000
63
Equipment
Unit Switchyards
Equipment
8.2-4
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Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
8.2.1.2.1
Substation and Unit Switchyards
Change the title and replace the last paragraph with the following:
VCS COL 8.2.4-2-A
VCS COL 8.2.4-5-A
VCS COL 8.2.4-6-A
VCS COL 8.2.4-7-A
VCS COL 8.2.4-8-A
The high-voltage interconnection to the VCS plant is through the Why
Substation and each unit’s switchyard.
The Why Substation is a 345 kV, air-insulated, breaker-and-a-half bus
arrangement.
The unit switchyards are air-insulated radial collector buses with circuit
breakers provided for the main transformers and for the individual unit
auxiliary transformers. The unit switchyards include a separate collector
bus with motor operated disconnect switches for the reserve auxiliary
transformer connections.
The configuration, physical location, and electrical interconnection of the
Why Substation and unit switchyards are shown in Figures 8.2-201 and
8.2-202.
Control and relay protection systems are provided and are redundant
where necessary. Support systems such as grounding, raceway, lighting,
AC/DC station service, and lightning protection are also provided.
Essential power is supplied from separate and redundant DC systems
supplied from separate and dedicated batteries and battery chargers in
both the substation and at the unit switchyards. Battery chargers and
other important AC loads are supplied from separate and redundant AC
power sources and panelboards.
Add Subsection 8.2.1.2.2 as follows
VCS SUP 8.2-1
8.2.1.2.2
Protective Relaying
The 345 kV transmission lines are protected with redundant high-speed
relay schemes with re-closing and communication equipment to minimize
line outages. The 345 kV substation and switchyard buses have
redundant bus differential protection using separate and independent
current and control circuits. Generating unit tie-lines and auxiliary
transformer circuits are protected with redundant high-speed relay
schemes.
Breakers are equipped with dual-trip coils. Each redundant protection
circuit that supplies a trip signal is powered from its redundant DC power
load group and connected to a separate trip coil. Equipment and cabling
8.2-5
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associated with each redundant system is physically separated from its
redundant counterpart. Breakers are provided with a breaker failure
scheme that isolates a breaker that fails to trip due to a malfunction.
Add Subsection 8.2.1.2.3 as follows.
VCS SUP 8.2-2
8.2.1.2.3
Testing and Inspection
Transmission lines are inspected via an aerial and/or ground inspection
program approximately once a year. The inspection focuses on such
items as right-of-way encroachment, vegetation management, conductor
and line hardware condition, and the condition of supporting structures.
Routine switchyard and substation inspection activities include, but are
not necessarily limited to, the following:
•
Daily transformer inspections
•
Periodic inspections of circuit breakers and batteries
•
Quarterly infrared scans
•
Semiannual infrared scans (relay panels)
•
Semiannual inspection of substation equipment
•
Annual infrared scans
•
Annual corona camera scan
Routine switchyard and substation testing activities include, but are not
necessarily limited to, the following:
•
Biennial circuit breaker profile or timing tests
•
Biennial 345 kV relay testing
•
5-year battery discharge testing
•
8-year potential transformer testing
•
8-year ground grid testing
•
10-year coupling capacitor voltage transformer testing
•
10-year surge arrester testing
•
10-year wave trap testing
8.2-6
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8.2.2.1
VCS COL 8.2.4-9-A
Stability and Reliability of the Offsite Transmission Power
System
Replace this subsection with the following.
A system impact study by AEP analyzed load flow, transient stability, and
fault analysis for the addition of Units 1 and 2 (Reference 8.2.5-202). The
study is based on the ERCOT 2013 load case.
The analysis was performed by AEP technical staff. The analysis was
performed using Siemens Power Technology International Software
PSS/E. The analysis considered the worst-case grid disturbances. The
analysis examined conditions involving loss of the largest generating unit,
loss of the most critical transmission line, and multiple facility
contingencies.
The infrastructure considered is from the point of interconnection of Units
1 and 2 to the substation and out to the 345 kV regional transmission
system. This included the projected loading and transmission additions
needed for the proposed expansion of the STP. (Reference 8.2.5-202)
The results of the grid stability analysis show that loss of the largest
single generator or supply to the grid does not result in the complete loss
of preferred power. The analysis also considers the result of removal of
the largest load from the grid, or loss of the most critical transmission line.
In determining the most critical transmission line, the analysis also
considers circuits that use a common tower to be a single line. The study
concluded that, with the additional generating capacity of Units 1 and 2,
the transmission system remains stable under the analyzed conditions,
preserving the grid connection and supporting the normal and shutdown
power requirements of Units 1 and 2 via the multiple transmission
circuits.
The maximum and minimum switchyard voltage limits for the 345 kV
system are 105 and 95% that the transmission system provider/operator
maintains without any reactive power support from the nuclear power
plant (Reference 8.2.5-202, Appendix 5). ERCOT and AEP provide
notice to the power plant of any voltage inadequacy at the plant
switchyard that cannot be corrected within 30 minutes. ERCOT
procedures specify the plant switchyard voltage limits..
Available transmission grid performance data over the past 3–26 years
was also examined for the existing regional transmission lines that are
8.2-7
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Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
nearby or associated with the interconnection to Why Substation and it
was confirmed that the system has been highly reliable with minimal
outages due to lightning, weather events, or equipment failures. The
reliability of the overall transmission system design is supported by there
being no recorded pattern of widespread system interruptions. Failure
rates of individual facilities are low. This data is summarized in
Table 8.2-201.
A formal agreement will be put in place between the VCS and AEP for
necessary ongoing analysis to ensure the preferred offsite power source
remains capable of supporting plant startup, and the ability to shut down
the plant under normal and emergency conditions. The agreement will
identify the transmission line and substation equipment that is considered
for review and approval by ERCOT as the approving grid organization.
Grid stability is evaluated by ERCOT on an ongoing basis based on load
growth, the addition of new transmission lines, or new generation
capacity. (Reference 8.2.5-202, Appendix 6)
The transmission system operator provides analysis capabilities for both
long-term planning and real-time operations. System conditions are
evaluated to ensure a bounding analysis and model parameters are
selected that are influential in determining the system’s ability to provide
offsite power adequacy. Elements included in the analysis are system
load forecasts (including sufficient margin to ensure a bounding analysis
over the life of the study), system generator dispatch (including outages
of generators known to be particularly influential in offsite power
adequacy of affected nuclear units), outage schedules for transmission
elements that have significant influence on offsite power adequacy,
cross-system power transfers and power imports/exports, and system
modification plans and schedules. A real-time state estimator is used to
assist in the evaluation of actual system conditions. These capabilities
are described in the system analysis protocol of the interface agreement.
The anal ysis is performed usi ng Siemens Power Technol ogy
International Software PSS/E and PSS/MUST.}
VCS COL 8.2.4-10-A
An interface agreement and protocols for maintenance, communications,
substation control, and system operation, sufficient to safely operate and
maintain the power station interconnection to the transmission system,
will be in place.
8.2-8
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Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
8.2.2.2
Regulatory Analysis
Replace first bullet under Applicable Criteria.
VCS SUP 8.2-3
•
GDC 5, “Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components,” and
Regulatory Guide 1.81, “Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric
Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants” – Offsite power
systems are not important to safety per DCD Chapter 8, thus GDC 5
and RG 1.81 are not applicable.
Add Subsection 8.2.2.3.
VCS SUP 8.2-4
8.2.2.3
8.2.2.3.1
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Introduction
The presence of multiple offsite transmission circuits and lines, grouped
into three geographically dispersed corridors, ensures that there are no
single failures that can prevent the VCS offsite power system from
performing its function to provide power to Unit 1 and/or 2.
8.2.2.3.2
Transmission System Evaluation
Units 1 and 2 are connected to the AEP regional transmission system via
eight 345 kV transmission circuits grouped into six separate lines located
in three separate corridors. The normal preferred power source is any
one of the eight 345 kV circuits contained in these three corridors. (See
Subsections 8.2.1.1 and 8.2.1.2.)
The 345 kV transmission lines supporting towers provide clearances
consistent with the NESC. The towers are grounded with either ground
rods or a counterpoise ground system. Failure of any one tower due to
structural failure can at most disrupt and cause a loss of one (1) circuit for
single-circuit lines and two (2) circuits for double-circuit lines, and any
immediately adjacent line. Failure of a line conductor would cause the
loss of only one of the eight circuits.
8.2.2.3.3
Substation Evaluation
A breaker-and-a-half scheme is incorporated in the design of the
substation. The equipment in the substation is rated and positioned within
the bus configuration according to the following criteria in order to
maintain incoming and outgoing load flow from Units 1 and 2:
8.2-9
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•
Equipment continuous current ratings are such that no single
contingency in the substation (e.g., a breaker being out of service for
maintenance) results in current exceeding 100% of the continuous
current rating of the equipment.
•
Interrupting duties are specified such that no faults occurring on the
system exceed the breaker’s interrupting rating.
•
Momentary ratings are specified such that no faults occurring on the
system exceed the equipment momentary rating.
•
Voltage ratings for the equipment are specified to be greater than the
maximum expected operating voltage.
•
Control power for all primary and secondary protective relaying
schemes is supplied from separate 125 VDC systems supported by
separate battery chargers.
•
AC station service power is provided by redundant transformers and
distribution panel boards supplied from separate sources.
•
Primary- and backup-related control cables for the switchyard
breakers are routed through separate and independent cable
raceway systems.
•
All relay schemes used for protection of the offsite power circuits and
the substation equipment include primary and backup protection
features. All breakers are equipped with dual trip coils. Each
protection circuit that supplies a trip signal is connected to a separate
trip coil.
The breaker-and-a-half substation arrangement offers the following
flexibility to control a failed condition within the substation:
•
Any faulted transmission line or circuit into the substation can be
isolated without affecting any other transmission line.
•
Either substation bus can be isolated without interruption of any
transmission line, circuit, or other bus.
•
Any circuit breaker can be isolated for maintenance or inspection
without interruption to any transmission line, circuit or bus.
8.2.2.3.4
Unit Switchyards Evaluation
The unit switchyards are an integral part of the normal and alternate
preferred power supply. The failure of any component within a unit
switchyard may disrupt the normal or alternate preferred power supply to
8.2-10
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COL Application
Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
that unit, but not both. Therefore, the power supply will remain available
to supply the unit load. The equipment in each unit switchyard is rated
according to the following criteria:
•
Interrupting duties are specified such that no faults occurring on the
system exceed the breaker’s interrupting rating.
•
Momentary ratings are specified such that no faults occurring on the
system exceed the equipment momentary rating.
•
Voltage ratings are specified to be greater than the maximum
expected operating voltage.
•
Circuit breaker continuous current ratings are chosen such that no
single contingency will result in a load exceeding 100% of the
nameplate continuous current rating of the breaker.
The normal preferred and alternate preferred power supplies are
electrically independent and are physically separate from each other.
Therefore, a minimum of one preferred source of power remains
available to supply the load during all plant conditions.
8.2.4
VCS COL 8.2.4-1-A
COL Unit-Specific Information
8.2.4-1-A
Transmission System Description
This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.1.
VCS COL 8.2.4-2-A
8.2.4-2-A
Switchyard Description
This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1.
VCS COL 8.2.4-3-A
8.2.4-3-A
Normal Preferred Power
This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.
VCS COL 8.2.4-4-A
8.2-4-4-A Alternate Preferred Power
This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.
VCS COL 8.2.4-5-A
8.2.4-5-A
Protective Relaying
This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1.
VCS COL 8.2.4-6-A
8.2.4-6-A
Switchyard DC Power
This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1.
VCS COL 8.2.4-7-A
8.2.4-7-A
Switchyard AC Power
This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1.
VCS COL 8.2.4-8-A
8.2.4-8-A
Switchyard Transformer Protection
This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1.
8.2-11
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VCS COL 8.2.4-9-A
8.2.4-9-A
Stability and Reliability of the Offsite Transmission
Power System
This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.2.1.
VCS COL 8.2.4-10-A
8.2.4-10-A Interface Requirements
This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.2.1.
8.2.5
References
Add the following references:
8.2.5-201
Photo Science, Inc., Electric Transmission Corridor Study for
the Proposed Victoria Texas Nuclear Site, May 1, 2008.
8.2.5-202
AEP, Interconnection Study for New Generation in Victoria
County, Report for Generation 11INR0011, May 28, 2008.
8.2-12
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Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
Add the following table for outage data.
VCS SUP 8.2-6
Table 8.2-201
Transmission Line Historical Outage Data
Outage Cause
Description
STPBlessing
44 Line
STP-White
Point 39
Line
Broken Insulator/
Conductor
4
Insulator Flashover/
Contamination
1
Lightning
3
2
Tree/Vines into Circuits
1
1
5
Unknown
(Instantaneous/Lockout/
Phase to Ground Trip)
3
57
Carrier Problems
Duration of Data
4
7
Weather (Thunderstorm)
Total
Lon
Hill-Coleto
Creek Line
3
Personnel Error
Relay Misoperation
PawneeColeto
Creek Line
6
10
1
6
78
14
10
1980-2006
1980-2006
2004-2007
2000-2007
8.2-13
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Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
Figure 8.2-201 Site Switchyard-Substation One Line Diagram
8.2-14
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COL Application
Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
Figure 8.2-202 VCS Site and Why Substation Location Plan
8.2-15
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COL Application
Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
Figure 8.2-203 Overall 345 kV Transmission Interconnection Configuration
8.2-16
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Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
Figure 8.2-204 Transmission Corridors Conceptual Location Plan
8.2-17
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Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
8.3
Onsite Power Systems
This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the
following departures and/or supplements.
8.3.1.2
8.3.1.2.1
Analysis
General Design Criteria and Regulatory Guidance
Compliance
Insert after description of GDC 4, Environmental and Dynamic Effects
Design Bases and before GDC 17, Electric Power Systems.
VCS SUP 8.3-1
GDC 5, Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components
The Structures, Systems and Components (SSC) of the plant Onsite AC
Power System(s) that are important to safety, are not shared between the
units.
8.3.2.2.2
Regulatory Requirements and Guide
Insert a new bullet under GDC:
VCS SUP 8.3-2
•
GDC 5 — The Structures, Systems and Components (SSC) of the
plant Onsite DC Power Systems(s) that are important to safety, are
not shared between the units.
Insert a new bullet under Regulatory Guides between Regulatory Guide
1.75 and Regulatory Guide 1.106:
•
Regulatory Guide 1.81, “Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric
Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants.” The Structures,
Systems and Components (SSC) of the plant Onsite DC Power
System(s) that are important to safety, are not shared between the
units.
8.3-1
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Victoria County Station, Units 1 and 2
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Part 2 — Final Safety Analysis Report
Appendix 8A Miscellaneous Electrical Systems
This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the
following departures and/or supplements.
8A.2.1 Description
Replace Section 8A.2.1 with the following:
VCS COL 8A.2.3-1-A
A cathodic protection system is provided to the extent required. The
system is designed in accordance with the requirements of the National
Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE) Standards (DCD Reference
8A-5).
8A.2.3
COL Information
8A.2.3-1-A Cathodic Protection System
VCS COL 8A.2.3-1-A
This COL item is addressed in Section 8A.2.1.
8A-1
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