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K.Nikhila Reddy, N.Naresh Reddy,
Dr.P.Raja Prakash Rao / International Journal of
Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com
Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.599-604
Self-Organized Trust-Based Public-Key Security Management for
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
K.Nikhila Reddy
N.Naresh Reddy
Dr.P.Raja Prakash Rao
PG Student
Asst.Professor
Professor & Head of CSE
TRR Engineering College, JNTU Gopal Reddy Engineering College TRR Engineering College, JNTU
Abstract
MANETs (Mobile Ad hoc networks) are
unplanned, self-organizing networks composed of
mobile nodes that utilize mesh networking
principles for inter-connectivity. MANETs have
several advantages compared to traditional
wireless networks. These include ease of
deployment, speed of deployment and decreased
dependency on a fixed infrastructure. There have
been many studies done in this area to improve
the quality and efficiency of the routing protocols
in MANETs. However unique characteristics of
MANETs topology such as open peer-to-peer
architecture, dynamic network topology, shared
wireless medium and limited resource (battery,
memory and computation power) pose a number
of non-trivial challenges to security design. The
fixed infrastructure less environment makes the
transactions less secure. Existing traditional
routing algorithms in MANETs do not work with
cryptographic techniques.
In this paper, we propose Cryptography
procedures to make secure transactions. Security
is paramount in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
(MANET) as they are not conducive to centralized
trusted authorities. Several solutions have been
proposed MANET in the areas of key
management, secure routing, nodal cooperation,
and trust management. In this work, we are
focusing on the evaluation of trust evidence in Ad
Hoc Networks.
Index Terms --- Mobile Ad Hoc Network, TrustBased Security, Ad Hoc Routing, Attacks in
MANETs, Public Key Distribution, Cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
BY definition, a mobile ad hoc network [1],
[2] does not rely on any fixed infrastructure; instead,
all networking functions (e.g., routing, mobility
management, etc.) are performed by the nodes
themselves in a self organizing manner. For this
reason, securing mobile ad hoc networks is
challenging and, as we show in this paper, in some
applications this requires a shift in paradigms with
respect to the traditional security solutions for
wireless networks. Meanwhile, we still rely on
traditional cryptographic primitives.
In our view, there are two extreme ways to
introduce security in mobile ad hoc networks:
1) Through a single authority domain, where
certificates and/or keys are issued by a single
authority, typically, in the system setup phase or
2) through full self-organization, where security does
not rely on any trusted authority or fixed server, not
even in the initialization phase. Ad hoc routing
protocols must be integrated into authentication
architectures, such as public key infrastructure (PKI)
and certificate authority (CA), to achieve the security
requirements including confidentiality, integrity,
authentication, and non-repudiation services. Thus in
our project, we take the second approach and we
propose a self-organizing public-key management
system that allows users to create, store, distribute,
and revoke their public keys without the help of any
trusted authority or fixed server. Moreover, in our
solution, we do not assign specific missions to a
subset of nodes (i.e., all the nodes have the same
role). Our main motivation for taking this approach
comes from the self-organized nature of mobile ad
hoc networks and from the need to allow users to
fully control the security settings of the system. As
such, our approach is developed mainly for “open”
networks, in which users can join and leave the
network without any centralized control.
In this paper, we make the following
contributions to the area of secure routing protocols
for ad hoc networks. First, how to detect and defend
internal attacks against routing protocols has been a
particularly challenging problem. The problem has
often been avoided by most secure routing protocols
by assuming that the nodes should be trusted once
authenticated. This is, unfortunately, not the case for
real-world environments. Second, what kind of
authentication and key management schemes are
needed to dynamically maintain a trustworthy
topology and defend against malicious attacks? The
security measures in mobile telecommunication
networks can rely on a CA or ID-based cryptosystem.
However, a MANET cannot use such a CA server.
Thus, The main problem of any public-key based
security system is to make each user’s public key
available to others in such a way that its authenticity
is verifiable. Third, the existing practice in
developing secure routing protocols is by first
establishing a PKI and then using cryptographic
primitives to protect the messages exchanged in the
routing protocols. The security and routing
mechanisms are separately designed to meet the
599 | P a g e
K.Nikhila Reddy, N.Naresh Reddy,
Dr.P.Raja Prakash Rao / International Journal of
Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com
Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.599-604
conflicting requirements: security requires using
intensive computations, whereas routing needs to be
efficient to properly scale. Thus, the resulting
protocols may be secure but not feasible or vice
versa. This paper proposes a novel attack detection
and defense algorithm to solve the preceding
problems for MANETs. Fourth, As secure routing
protocols are not designed to guarantee the
availability of network, they are extremely vulnerable
to attacks such as flooding and packet drop attacks.
These attacks completely disrupt the functioning of
network. Although solutions have been proposed [3,
4] to induce cooperation among nodes, they fail to
counteract flooding attacks. The reason rests on the
fact that cooperation models fail to consider the
behavioral patterns of nodes, and hence overlook to
measure the trustworthiness for nodes. Recently, few
reputation and trust models have been proposed [5, 6]
to evaluate the trustworthiness for intermediate
nodes. However, these models introduce additional
issues and modify the basic routing operations in
order to collect evidence of trustworthiness for
intermediate nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. In Section II, we report on existing
approaches to define the general security architecture
for MANETs. We then provide the general routing
protocols in ad hoc networks in Section III. Security
being the core issue in MANETs we present the types
of major attacks in Section IV. This is followed by
Cryptographic solution to security breaches in
MANETs in Section V. We then demonstrate how
trust is evaluated among the nodes in Section VI. The
last section concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In works on security for MANETs Ariadne
[7]
employs
broadcast
and
hop-by-hop
authentication, while Secure Routing Protocol (SRP)
[8] performs end-to-end authentication through
symmetric key based mechanism. These secure
routing protocols are primarily designed to discover
secure paths, and therefore they fail to defend against
both flooding and packet drop attacks. Zhou and Hass
[9] introduce two types of nodes known as server and
combiner apart from the normal nodes (called as
client nodes) to play the role of Certificate Authority
(CA). They deploy threshold based cryptography to
establish the services of CA. In [10], Luo et al.
replaced the abovementioned specialized server
nodes by distributing the capability of CA to all
nodes. Distributed Key Pre-distribution Scheme
(DKPS) [11] is a fully distributed and self-organized
key pre-distribution which does not rely on any
infrastructure
support.
Nevertheless,
these
approaches are prone to refresh keys with malicious
and compromised nodes.
Nuglets [3] enforces nodes to cooperate by using
virtual currencies. In spite of efficiency, the usage of
tamper-resistant
hardware
makes
Nuglets
unattractive. Alternatively, Sprite [4] uses incentives
to motivate cooperation among selfish nodes. Sprite
is non-generic as it relies on a central authority to
manage incentives and also fails to address malicious
nodes. In [5], Liu and Yang collect reputations from
recommenders and combine them to update the
reputation for recommended node. The main
drawback of the model is that the malicious nodes are
assumed to recommend truthfully irrespective of their
misbehaviors. Yan Lindsay et al. [6] proposed a trust
model based on information theory for improving the
security of ad hoc routing protocols. Similar to other
models, they monitor other nodes and exchange
recommendations with other nodes in a distributed
manner for establishing trust relationships.
III. ROUTING IN MANETS
In mobile ad-hoc networks where there is no
infrastructure support as is the case with wireless
networks, and since a destination node might be out
of range of a source node transmitting packets; a
routing procedure is always needed to find a path so
as to forward the packets appropriately between the
source and the destination. Within a cell, a base
station can reach all mobile nodes without routing via
broadcast in common wireless networks. In the case
of ad-hoc networks, each node must be able to
forward data for other nodes. This creates additional
problems along with the problems of dynamic
topology which is unpredictable connectivity changes
[12].
Asymmetric links: Most of the wired
networks rely on the symmetric links which are
always fixed. But this is not a case with ad-hoc
networks as the nodes are mobile and constantly
changing their position within network. For example
consider a MANET where node B sends a signal to
node A but this does not tell anything about the
quality of the connection in the reverse direction [13].
– Routing Overhead: In wireless ad hoc networks,
nodes often change their location within network. So,
some stale routes are generated in the routing table
which leads to unnecessary routing overhead.
– Interference: This is the major problem with mobile
ad-hoc networks as links come and go depending on
the transmission characteristics, one transmission
might interfere with another one and node might
overhear transmissions of other nodes and can
corrupt the total transmission.
– Dynamic Topology: This is also the major problem
with ad-hoc routing since the topology is not
constant. The mobile node might move or medium
characteristics might change. In ad-hoc networks,
routing tables must somehow reflect these changes in
topology and routing algorithms have to be adapted.
For example in a fixed network routing table
updating takes place for every 30sec [13]. This
updating frequency might be very low for ad-hoc
networks.
600 | P a g e
K.Nikhila Reddy, N.Naresh Reddy,
Dr.P.Raja Prakash Rao / International Journal of
Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com
Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.599-604
asymmetric algorithm such as RSA to establish
IV COMMON ATTACK SCENARIOS
There are six main properties that any secure
networking system should be able to provide:
Secrecy, authenticity, integrity, availability, nonrepudiation, and access control. It is a breach of
security if one or more of these security objectives
are contravened by any attack on a computer system.
Some of the most common attacks that occur on a
distributed computer system [21] are as given below:
• Denial of Service: This takes place when there is
non-availability of a network service owing to excess
load or breakdown.
• Information theft: This occurs when interpretation
of data is through an unauthorized instance.
• Intrusion: This happens when unauthorized person
gains admittance to several restricted services
• Tampering: This ensues when data is distorted by
an unauthorized person.
Attacks and security goals that an ad hoc network
encounters is similar to that of other networks. It
becomes easy to gain access to data or to lose the
stored (e.g. passwords, cryptographic keys, etc.) data
on a node because the substantial network
contributors are mobile devices. Based on these
factors, it is all the more important that in an ad hoc
network the overall security should not depend on
any one factor. One of the most popular means of
communication in mobile networks is radio
transmission. Eavesdropping on a node is much
easier vis-à-vis wired networks. Sometimes
intermediate nodes maybe disguised eavesdropper
and not linked to some trusted infrastructure.
Therefore, end-to-end encryption becomes a vital
issue that has to be dealt with in all cases. This is
usually the case because all the nodes of an Ad hoc
network work together to make the discovery of
network typology and forward packets easy to
overcome. These nodes can also produce stale or
wrong routes, black holes or routing loops. In
addition, there is a strong momentum available for
non-participation in the routing system of an Ad hoc
network. Selfish nodes often want to hoard resources
for their own use due to consumption of a node’s
battery power, CPU time, and bandwidth in both the
routing system and the forwarding of foreign packets
which are limited in mobile devices.
DYNAMIC
SCHEME
V.
KEY
MANAGEMENT
In the network layer, the most possible
attacks are data and routing information tampering.
The majority of external attacks against routing
protocols can be prevented by simple link layer
encryption and authentication. We propose to have
every node share a unique symmetric key with the
source if it needs to transmit data.
A. Dynamic Key Management Scheme There are two
basic key management approaches, i.e., public and
secret key-based schemes. The public key-based
scheme uses a pair of public/private keys and an
session keys and authenticate nodes. In the latter
scheme, a secret key is a symmetric key shared by
two nodes, which is used to verify the data integrity.
There are several methods to set up the shared keys:
1)Bootstrap the shared keys from a PKI, which might
be a strong assumption for MANETs; 2) use a key
distribution center, which has a shared key with each
node, to build up a shared key between two nodes by
using the Kerberos protocol; or 3) embed the shared
keys in each node during its initialization before
deployment. In this paper, we assume that each node
has a unique ID or address and an initial pair of
public/private keys, which can be embedded into
each node at the initialization of the network, or
created by a self organized public key management
system.
Fig 1. Demonstration of message and route
redundancy. Multiple secret keys are shared between
a source and the intermediate nodes and the
destination node. Multiple copies of a message are
received at a destination node via different routes.
We first define a network, as shown in Fig.
1, and then describe a framework of dynamic key
management. Let G = (V ;E) be a network whose
vertices in V are nodes and whose edges in E are
direct wireless links among nodes. We define for
each node x the set N1(x), which contains the vertices
in the network G that are hop-l or direct neighbors of
x, i.e
N1(x)= ( y : (x;y) £ E and y ≠ x ) (1)
Similarly, we define the hop-2 neighbors of
a node as follows. For each node x, N2(x) contains
the vertices in the network G that are hop-2 neighbors
of x, which include neither vertices in N1(x) nor x
itself, i.e.,
N2(x)= { z: ( y;z) £ E and y € N1(X), z ≠ x }
(2)
Similarly, we can define the hop-n neighbors
of x [Nn(x)] in terms of Nn-1(x) if the flooding path
from the source to destination has n links. As in the
existing secure routing protocols, the initial trust
among the nodes is built into the network by using
some external mechanisms. After that, unlike the
existing secure routing protocols, our framework
allows a node to build up its trust on its neighboring
nodes based on its observations of their behaviors.
Here, important behavior is whether a node correctly
601 | P a g e
K.Nikhila Reddy, N.Naresh Reddy,
Dr.P.Raja Prakash Rao / International Journal of
Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com
Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.599-604
routes and forwards a message to its neighbors.
Initially, a node x has a public key K x,pub that is
distributed to N1(x) by using PKI or CA. Similarly, a
node y has public key
Ky,pub distributed to N1(y). Thus, for example, if y £
N1(x) and x £ N1(y), i.e., x and yare hop-l neighbors,
then x can authenticate y by issuing a certificate (which
is a proof of y' sID and public key with x's signature)
that is signed by x with x's private key. Those who hold
x's public key can now read the certificate and trust the
binding of y and its public key. Based on the available
certificate and key information, two hop-l neighboring
nodes can easily establish a secret key between them
by using methods such as a three-way handshake.
Key Distribution and Node Authentication
We define the notations as follows. s denotes the
sender node; r denotes the receiver node; Ks,pub and
Ks,pri denote the public and private keys of node s,
respectively; E(m,K) denotes the public key
encryption algorithm with a key K on message m,
where
m = M +{IDf } + SN, and M is the original message;
IDf denotes the ID off, which is the node that
forwards the message m; SN is the sequence number
of the message; and h(m + k) denotes the keyed hash
algorithm with a key k on message m, where +
denotes the concatenation of strings. It can be seen
that any node that handles the message has to append
its ID for non repudiation service. The ID is protected
together with the forwarded message. Whenever
there is a need for a node to initiate a route discovery
process, it creates pair wise shared keys with
intermediate nodes, hop by hop, until it reaches the
destination. First, it picks random number num. Then,
it signs num with its private key by using a public
key algorithm like RSA. After that, the route
discovery message is protected by a keyed hash
MAC algorithm such as MD5. Finally, the hash value
and signature can now be attached to the route
discovery message and sent out to its neighbors. The
complete route request (RREQ) packet sent by the
node can be summarized as
m+ h(m + num) + E(num, Ks,pri). (3)
Those who are s's neighbors and have its public key
are able to verify the signature and thus decrypt the
key in the message. Suppose that z £ N1(s) is one of
s's hop-l neighbors. Whenever there is a need for s to
initiate a route discovery process, it picks a key kl at
random, which will serve as the shared secret key
between s and z. Then, s encrypts the key kl by using
its neighbor's public key Kz,pub. After that, it
encrypts the above encrypted key by using its own
private key Ks,pri. The result serves as a signature for
the route discovery message, which is protected by a
keyed hash MAC algorithm such as MD5. The
complete procedure is called Keyed MD5. The
complete RREQ sent by s can be summarized as
mq + h(mq + k1) + E(E(k1, Kz,pub), Ks,pri) , for z £
N1(s) (4)
where mq stands for the message used in RREQ. This
way, only the node that has z's private key can read
the key k1, the receiving node is also assured that the
key and message come from s, and finally, the
integrity of message m can be verified by the
receiving node after it decrypts the key. Then, z sends
back s a route reply (RREP ) packet in a similar
format
mp + h(mp + k1) + E(E(k1, Ks,pub), Kz,pri) , for z £
N1(s) (5)
where mp stands for the message used in
RREP. By decrypting the message and comparing the
key, s can authenticate z and distribute a shared key
to z. Similarly, s establishes a shared key with each
of its hop-I neighbors. Suppose that y £ N1(z).z c an
also similarly find out its hop-I neighbors and also
establishes a shared key with each of them. For s to
send messages to its hop-2 neighbors, i.e., N2( s ), for
example, y, s requests z to forward the message to y.
In z's handshaking with y, z can pick s's public key
instead of a random key and send it to y. This way,
s's public key can be delivered to its hop-2 neighbors.
Similarly, s can obtain the public keys of its hop-2
neighbors. By checking the acknowledgement
message back from y via z, s can find out all of its
hop-2 neighbors N2( s ). Therefore, s can send a
message to r £ N2( s ), via z £ N1(z) in the following
in format:
m2 + h (m2 + k1), k1 =: shared key between s and
y (6)
where
m2 = m + h( m + k2) + E (E(k2 , K r, pub ) K s, pri
) for r £ N2(s) (7)
where k2 is the shared key between s and its hop-2
neighbor r. Similarly, by using the double hash and
signature operations, the shared key between s and its
hop-n neighbors,
i.e., kn, is created by s and distributed to Nn(s) where
n = 2,3, ....
In the above key distribution process, the
same message m has been sent to the destination
multiple times and protected by different secret keys
at each time. This is what we call message
redundancy. To utilize the message redundancy, the
implementation is simple: each node is required to
receive multiple copies of the same route discovery
message before sending back an acknowledgment. It
is noted that receiving multiple copies, instead of the
first copy, incurs overhead to the route discovery
process. The number of copies is determined by two
factors. The first one is security, i.e., the
trustworthiness of the nodes in the network. To build
a route with a certain amount of trustworthiness, the
destination needs to evaluate more copies in a lesstrusted environment than in a more-trusted one. The
602 | P a g e
K.Nikhila Reddy, N.Naresh Reddy,
Dr.P.Raja Prakash Rao / International Journal of
Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com
Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.599-604
second one is performance, i.e, the timeout value of
the route request message.
VI. TRUST MODELING AND OPTIMAL
ROUTING
We define the trustworthiness on a node n
by another node x as the probability that n will
perform a particular action expected by x, which is
denoted as Tx(n), irrespective of the ability to
monitor or control n. The trustworthiness can be
evaluated by x in terms of its knowledge accumulated
during a specific operation period by using weighting
average over the trust on each category of actions,
including route request, route reply, route error, and
data transmission. We assume that during an
observation period, x has received a total of m t
message transmissions from n, among which mc's are
found to be correct; the total number of attempted
transmissions is ma; and the total number of
successful transmissions is ms. Then
where 0 < £ < 1 a weighing factor that
represents a ratio of the successful transmissions,
which reflects the probability that the link correctly
works. Here, we adopt a statistical model similar to
the one used for measuring link quality in, which is
different from the trust level evaluation. The model in
(9) not only evaluates the trustworthiness but also
partially reflects the link quality. Other more
complicated measurements used to model the link
quality, such as the collision detection and signal
separation technique, and link adaptation and power
control algorithm may also be applied to obtain a
more accurate trustworthiness value. Denote by
Tx(n;j) the trustworthiness in node n, which is
assigned by node x during the jth trustworthiness
updating cycle. Every time a new observation comes
in, the node updates its repository and calculates a
trustworthiness value by using a weighted average or
moving average model. Assume that during the jth
trustworthiness updating cycle the measurement of
Tx(n;j) is denoted as ~Tx(n;j ) which is computed
based on n's current behavior when x checks the
correctness and validity of the messages that come
from n. During the (j + l)th trustworthiness updating
cycle, these values are used to obtain an estimate of
the trust-worthiness, which is denoted as ^Tx(n;j) To
obtain a smooth estimation, we use a moving average
model
Tx (n;j+1)=α Tx (n;j) +( 1- α) Tx (n;j) for n £ N1(x)
(9)
where 0 < α < I is a weighting factor used to tradeoff
between current measurement value and previous
estimate. Consider a path p £ Ps→x, where Ps→x is
the set of paths that start from a source node s to a
destination node x, i.e., Ps→x = {all paths from s to
x}. Denote by Tx(P;j) the trustworthiness of the path
assigned by node x. Thus, the path trustworthiness
can be expressed as
Tx(p;j)= ΠnEp Tx(n;j) (10)
If Y is on the route from s to x, i.e., y £ p,
then y £ N)(x ). Denote by pI the path from s to y.
Therefore, x can build up its trustworthiness on a
path based on its trustworthiness on its neighboring
nodes. The relationship in (10) is also used as a
routing metric for a node to make routing decisions
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed an attack detection
and defense mechanism by using both the route
redundancy in ad hoc networks and the message
redundancy in topology discovery of the routing
protocols. This paper also develops an optimal
routing algorithm by combining both trustworthiness
and performance. To our knowledge, this is the first
secure routing that quantitatively considers not only
the detection of difficult internal attacks but the
network performance as well. The proposed attack
detection and routing algorithms can be integrated
into existing routing protocols for MANETs, such as
AODV and DSR. In this and other secure routing
protocols, the computational burden at each node is
still a major issue in deployment. It requires both
analytical
investigations
and
engineering
considerations. For example, how many neighbors
should a node have without degrading network
performance and security? How many copies should
a node receive before sending back an
acknowledgement? Current paper considers the link
performance as a routing metric. Considering the
mobility is expected to increase the prediction
accuracy and thus reduce the link breakage rate
during deployment. All these problems will further
be investigated in future work
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K.Nikhila Reddy, N.Naresh Reddy,
Dr.P.Raja Prakash Rao / International Journal of
Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com
Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.599-604
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