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Transcript
and management), or the government may let the firm go into liquidation where the losses
given resolution may be proportionately much greater than the losses that result from a
routine corporate bankruptcy.
So forming a view on the risk of a financial institution involves forming a view on what the
authorities would do, if the institution required resolution. It is part and parcel of the risk
assessment. Until the onset of the crisis resolution of troubled financial institutions was a
relatively rare event (certainly compared to the numbers of corporate bankruptcies that occur
each year). So the way the authorities resolve a particular institution may have a marked
impact on the market’s expectations of how the authorities might resolve the next.
The cases of Bear Stearns (March 2008) and Lehman Brothers (September 2008) illustrate
this well. In March the US authorities elected to rescue Bear Stearns on the grounds that its
failure could cause repercussions in financial markets that were too complex to contemplate.
No stakeholder in Bear Stearns experienced any loss with the exception of Bear Stearns’
management and stockholders. This rescue created expectations in the market that larger
broker dealers would be resolved in a similar manner, if the broker-dealer were to require
resolution.
The resolution of Lehman Brothers abruptly reversed that expectation. Contrary to
expectations in the marketplace, the US authorities allowed Lehman Brothers to fail.
Although the decision to keep the US broker dealer in operation for a few days after the
holding company had declared bankruptcy permitted the settlement of outstanding trades
with that particular entity, the bankruptcy of the entire group caused severe disruption in
markets around the world. The failure of Lehman caused market participants to review
quickly their securities lending arrangements, limit rehypothecation and reallocate free cash
balances. That had very significant knock-on effects on other broker dealers.
The resolution of Washington Mutual, also in September, compounded these effects. The US
authorities failed to keep whole the senior debt holders in the bank. This contrasted markedly
with their behaviour in resolving other bank failures. This change in resolution practice
caused market participants to revise their estimates of risk in senior, unsecured obligations of
banks, further aggravating the funding squeeze.
Other bank failures compounded the problem, including Bradford & Bingley here in the UK,
Fortis in Belgium/Netherlands, HRE in Germany, and the collapse of much of the Icelandic
banking system. So did the extended debate in the United States about whether and how to
enact the $700 billion TARP programme as well as the growing realisation that, even it were
enacted, it would take time to implement.
The implications of these resolution practices for supervision are profound. First, reversals of
resolution practice can have very significant impacts on market expectations and therefore on
the liquidity and capital of banks. Such reversals of resolution practice may be difficult for
supervisors to forecast or take into account, particularly if the resolution authority is in
another country. Indeed, the Lehman bankruptcy demonstrates that financial institutions may
be global in life, but they are national in death -- they become a series of local legal entities
when they become subject to administration and/or liquidation.
Second, resolutions have followed the principle “the home country pays, therefore the home
country decides”. In practically all cases, the institution’s home country has assumed sole
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