Download Denial of Service Resilience in Ad Hoc Networks

Denial of Service Resilience
in Ad Hoc Networks
Imad Aad, Jean-Pierre Hubaux,
and Edward W. Knightly
Designed by Yao Zhao
Motivation
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Do ad hoc networks have sufficiently
redundant paths and counter-DoS
mechanisms to make DoS attacks
largely ineffective?
Or are there attack and system factors
that can lead to devastating effects?
Outline
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Introduction and system model
DoS attacks
Analytical model
Evaluation
Related works
Conclusion
Introduction to Ad hoc
networks
System Model (1)
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Ensure node authentication
Ensure message authentication
Ensure one identity per node
Prevent control plane misbehavior
(query floods, rushing attacks)
System Model (2)
Outline
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Introduction and system model
DoS attacks
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JellyFish
Black holes
Analytical model
Evaluation
Related works
Conclusion
JellyFish Attack
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Protocol Compliance
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Protocols with congestion control such as TCP
Just like any IP service, it can:
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But
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Drop packets, Reorder packets, Delay / jitter packets
in a MALICIOUS way
Detection and diagnosis are time consuming!
Three attack ways
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JF Reorder Attack
JF Periodic Dropping Attack
JF Delay Variance Attack
JF Reorder Attack
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Facts
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TCP’s use of cumulative acknowledgements
All such TCP variants assume that
reordering events are rare
Attack strategy
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deliver all packets, yet after placing them
in a re-ordering buffer rather than a FIFO
buffer.
Attack strategy
Impact of JF Reorder Attack
JF Periodic Dropping Attack
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Facts
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If losses occur periodically near the retransmission
time out (RTO) timescale (in the 1s range as RTO
is intended to address severe congestion), then
end-to-end throughput is nearly zero
Endpoint attack
Attack strategy
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Periodic dropping attack in which attacking nodes
drop all packets for a short duration (e.g., tens of
ms) once per RTO
Passive
Attack strategy
Impact of JF Periodic Dropping Attack
JF Delay Variance Attack
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High delay will
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cause TCP to send traffic in bursts due to “selfclocking,” leading to increased collisions and loss
cause mis-estimations of available bandwidth for
delay-based congestion control protocols such as
TCP Westwood and Vegas,
lead to an excessively high RTO value
Attack strategy
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wait a random time before servicing each packet,
maintaining FIFO order, but significantly increasing
delay variance.
Attack strategy
Impact of JF Delay Variance Attack
Black Hole Attacks (1)
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Passive
Forwards routing packets
"Absorbs" all data packets
Hard to detect
Black Hole Attacks (2)
Misbehavior Diagnosis
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Detection of MAC Layer Failure
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Passive Acknowledgement (PACK)
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Cross-layer design in DSR
Watchdog
Endpoint Detection
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If severe loss detected
Can find the malicious guy?
PACK
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Energy Efficient
Transmission: i cannot
overhear j
Directional Antennas: j
pretends to i to forward
to k
Variable Power: j
pretends to i to forward
to k
Victim Response
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Establish an alternate path
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Employ multipath routing
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Establishment of backup routes
Outline
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Introduction and system model
DoS attacks
Analytical model
Evaluation
Related works
Conclusion
Analytical Model
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N nodes and pN nodes are JF or Black
Holes
If the selected nodes represent a
random sample of the N network nodes,
then the path contains no attacking
nodes with probability (1-p)h.
Theoretical Results (1)
Theoretical Results (2)
Outline
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Introduction and system model
DoS attacks
Analytical model
Evaluation
Related works
Conclusion
Methodology
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System fairness
Number of hops for received packets
Total system throughput
Probability of interception
Baseline
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200 nodes move randomly in a 2000m×2000m
topology
Maximum velocity of 10 m/s, pausing for 10 s on
average. (Random Walk)
IEEE 802.11 MAC with a node receive range of 250 m.
100 of these nodes communicate with each other to
create 50 flows
UDP packets are transmitted at a constant rate of
800 bits/s, corresponding to one 500 byte packet
every 5 s.
JF nodes are placed in grid
JF Placement
Distribution of the number of
hops for received packets
Fairness
Average number of hops for
received packets
Extensive simulations
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Offered Load and TCP
JellyFish Placement
Mobility
Node Density
System Size
Related Work
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Securing Routing Protocols
Usage of Multiple Routes
Securing Packet Forwarding
Conclusion
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TCP collapses with malicious
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Dropping, reordering, jitter ...
More generally, all closed-loop mechanisms are
vulnerable to malicious tampering
“Protocol-compliance” makes defense more
problematic
First paper to quantify DoS effects on ad-hoc
networks:
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DoS increases capacity! BUT…
Network gets partitioned
Fairness decreases
System throughput, alone, is not enough to measure DoS
impacts