Download Korea

⦿ Gojoseon
⦿ Goguryeo, Silla, and Baekje
⦿ Goryeo
⦿ Choseun
⦿ Japanese colonial
⦿ Religion
⦿ Money
⦿ Tradition
⦿ Language
⦿ Writing
⦿ Leadership
⦿ Official language of Korea
⦿ Formed in the Chosun Dynasty
⦿ 500 years ago
⦿ Exchange rate about 1000 : 1
⦿ 3 different forms of language for different
situtation/ages
⦿ Respecting elders/role of elders
⦿ Clothing
⦿ Eating
⦿ Confucianism
⦿ Buddhism
⦿ Taoism
⦿ Shamanism
⦿ Christianity
Sino-Japanese War
⦿ Two separate wars
⦿ First in 1894
⦿ Second in 1937
Russo-Japanese War
⦿ 1904-1905
⦿ Enabled Japan to control East Asia
WW2 in SEAsia
⦿ France surrendered
⦿ Japan took over French-Indochina
Japanese Imperial Rule
⦿ 1910 to 1945
⦿ Exploited Korea for all resources
Did
Korea
matter?
The Division of Korea: 1945
--The North occupied by the USSR
--The South occupied by the US
Both sides began to look for supporters
among the native population of Korea
The Division of Korea:
--The US initially restored Japanese colonial administrators and collaborators to their
previous positions of power within Korea and refused to recognize the existing
political organizations that had been established by the Korean people.
--In December 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to administer
the country under the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission and agreed that Korea would
govern independently after four years of international oversight. However, both the
U.S. and the USSR approved Korean-led governments in their respective halves,
each of which were favorable to the occupying power's political ideology.
In the North, this meant Kim Jong-Il. In the South, this was Syngman Rhee
--The Korean people seemed to reject both governments, and this led to social
unrest, much of which in the South was directed at US forces.
--In 1948, the US called for elections in all of Korea. Since the population of the
South was double that of the North, the Soviets knew that Kim Il-sung would lose
the election.
--the Soviets called off the agreement to allow elections, and instead, by 1948, two
separate Korean nations had emerged.
The creation of an independent South Korea became UN policy in early 1948.
Southern communists opposed this, and by autumn partisan warfare had engulfed
parts of every Korean province below the 38th parallel. The fighting expanded into a
limited border war between the South's newly formed Republic of Korea Army
(ROKA) and the North Korean border constabulary as well as the North's Korean
People's Army (KPA). The North launched 10 cross-border guerrilla incursions in
order to draw ROKA units away from their guerrilla-suppression campaign in the
South.
In its larger purpose the partisan uprising failed: the Republic of Korea (ROK) was
formed in August 1948, with Syngman Rhee as president. Nevertheless, almost 8,000
members of the South Korean security forces and at least 30,000 other Koreans lost
their lives. Many of the victims were not security forces or armed guerrillas at all but
simply people identified as “rightists” or “reds” by the belligerents. Small-scale
atrocities became a way of life.
Despite this, or because of this, both the Soviets and the Americans withdrew
all their forces save “advisors” by 1949.
Why did the North invade the South? A look at
the players by 1949:
➢Syngman Rhee
➢Kim Jong-Il
➢Stalin
➢The U.S.
I color-coded them so you
know who plays for which
team…
⦿
⦿
⦿
⦿
⦿
⦿
⦿
⦿
Had long history with US—primarily trying to enlist US aid against
Japan, which was never forthcoming, but well-spoken in English, a
graduate from Princeton and Harvard; a Christian from a Buddhist
country.
Dulles on Rhee and Chiang—“Well, I’ll tell you this. No matter what
you say about them, these two gentlemen are the modern day
equivalents of the founders of the Church. They are Christian
gentlemen who have suffered for their faith.”
US victory, and his own connections to China Firsters, makes him
“Little Chiang.”
Rhee’s own goals mean unification, not democratization.
Wanted US to lift restraints against him attacking the North.
As he’s known to the Americans there: “devious, emotionally
unstable, brutal, corrupt, and wildly unpredictable”
But he’s also anti-communist…
consider Kennan’s reminder about dangers of working with local
regimes…
Lived most of life in Manchuria, fought against
Japanese, fell under Communist sway from age 19
⦿ Representative of peasant class, rather than bougie
elites like Rhee
⦿ Ideologically pure, relatively unknown, and pliable
⦿ Proved most successful at adopting Stalin’s leadership
model
⦿ Mao’s success frustrated him
⦿ Wanted a unified Korea, and believed southern
peasants would rally to him
⦿ Promised Stalin an easy victory
⦿
Didn’t want to push the US into military action
May have felt pressured by militarization of
Japan
⦿ Kind of liked low grade war between south and
north prior to Kim’s assault--kept things
contained and unstable
⦿ Also saw American unwillingness to save
Chiang as symbolic of larger unwillingness to
get involved in Asia
⦿ Feared Mao might go the way of Tito
⦿
⦿
⦿
⦿
⦿
⦿
⦿
1949--Stalin and Mao meet and Stalin suggests that North
Koreans serving in Chinese army be moved to North Korea—
seems to green-light Kim but without putting Russia in the
mix
In 1950, Kim is told to work with Mao, which absolves Stalin of
any responsibility while calling due on debt Mao owes Stalin
for promising help on assault on Taiwan and financial
assistance
Stalin was also asserting his right to dictate policy over Korea
to the exclusion of China
Kept Mao in the dark regarding Kim’s overall plans, and
Russian shipments of arms and other materiel, but China
was expected to help Kim militarily
Warned Kim: “If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not
lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for all the help.”
MacArthur not interested in Korea.
⦿ Kennan found him arrogant AND ignorant, ie:
MacArthur claimed US presence in Korea
unnecessary because US could bomb it from
Okinawa bases. Kennan knew bombing hadn’t
done a thing against Chinese army in civil army,
and was concerned over Chinese designs on
Korea.
⦿ Mac only wanted jurisdiction over Japan. He
claimed Korea was “State’s problem—let the
gov’t deal with it.”
⦿
Sec’y of State
Dean
Acheson—
“A Cold
Warrior’s
Cold Warrior”
1950/01/12 –Acheson’s “Perimeter" Speech to National Press Club
“[T]he speech turned to ‘the questions of military security.’ Its purpose was to
bring home what the United States Government had done to defend vital
interests in the Pacific, not to speculate on what it might do in the event of
various exigencies in Asia. Our defense stations beyond the western
hemisphere and our island possessions were the Philippines and defeated,
disarmed, and occupied Japan. These were our inescapable responsibilities.
We had moved our line of defense, a line fortified and manned by our own
ground, sea, and air forces, to the very edges of the western Pacific.” -- Acheson
Acheson followed Douglas MacArthur's statement March 1, 1949: "Our defensive
dispositions against Asiatic aggression used to be based on the west coast of the
American continent. The Pacific was looked upon as the avenue of possible enemy
approach. Now the Pacific has become an Anglo-Saxon lake and our line of defense
runs through the chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia. It starts from the
Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu Archipelago, which includes its main
bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain
to Alaska."
What happens if
you draw
MacArthur’s line
on the map?
Why did the North Invade the South?
--Rhee’s authoritarian tactics created guerilla war in the
South
--Long-term slow boiling civil war between the two
Koreas
--Stalin’s attempt to assert control over Asian
Communism
--Kim’s attempt to model himself on Mao’s success
--Lack of strong US presence in the Korean Peninsula
--Acheson’s Perimeter Speech
⦿ The decision to act
⦿ The United Nations Resolution
⦿ The US forces in action
⦿ The landing at Inchon
⦿ 25 Jun 1950
⦿ NSC-68, in 1950
⦿ Memories of appeasement
⦿ The importance of the United Nations for
U.S. hopes
⦿ According to
NSC-68, primarily authored by
Paul Nitze of the Policy Planning Staff, the
Soviets were engaged in a rational,
calculating, gradual plan to conquer the
world.
⦿ Thus, by the logic of NSC-68, a defeat for
anti- communists anywhere was a defeat
everywhere, with the very fate of Western
Civilization at stake.
⦿
⦿
NSC-68 advocated not only the vigorous development of
the American nuclear capability, but also, the production
and maintenance of a sufficient stockpile of
thermonuclear weapons. It cautioned that it was urgent
for the US to increase its air, ground, sea and civilian
defense power so as not to be militarily so "heavily
dependent on atomic weapons."
Beyond this, the report went one step further to reject
explicitly the possibility of negotiating with the Soviets,
unless they fundamentally modified their attitudes and
intentions. Equally, it refused to denounce the first use of
atomic weapons.
Notes from
Truman’s
meeting with
security
advisor
George Elsey,
June 26, 1950
On the way there I was going over in my mind the Japanese invasion of
Manchuria in 1931 . . . . And then I thought about Mussolini's entrance into
Ethiopia and Haile Selassie's protest to the League of Nations on that invasion.
I also thought about Hitler's march into the Saar Valley, which could have been
stopped by the French and the British if they had acted in unison on the
subject. Then Hitler's march into Austria and his overthrow of Czechoslovakia
and Poland, and it occurred to me that if the Russian totalitarian state was
intending to follow in the path of the dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini,
they should be met head on in Korea . . . .
I was sure that they [the Russians] had trained the North Koreans in order to
create a communist state in Korea as a whole and that their intention was to
overthrow the Republic of Korea which had been set up by the United Nations
with the Russians' approval. . . . The conclusion that I had come to was that
force was the only language that the Russian dictatorship could understand.
We had to meet them on that basis . . . .
President Harry S. Truman
Truman was determined to use the United Nations.
This was the perfect opportunity to show the strength of what was hoped to be
an international organization that could face down aggression. (Remember the
failure of the League of Nations.)
The same day the war had officially begun (June 25), the United Nations
immediately drafted UNSC Resolution 82, which called for:
1.
all hostilities to end and North Korea to withdraw to the
38th Parallel;
2.
a UN Commission on Korea to be formed to monitor the
situation and report to the Security Council;
3.
all UN members to support the United Nations in
achieving this, and refrain from providing assistance to the North
Korean authorities.
On June 27, the United Nations promised military assistance to the ROK.
It was perfectly clear that the United Nations would and must denounce an aggression. It
could not do otherwise. The charter prohibited an aggression. This was clearly one. There was
a report from the United Nations Commission [on Korea] itself in Korea branding this as an
aggression from the North. Therefore, it was certain that the United Nations, in some form or
other would denounce this action . . . . This we knew would occur.
But one says, suppose [the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations] Mr. [Jacob A.] Malik
appeared and interposed a veto? One thing that one can be fairly sure about in the Soviet
system is that they are not capable of making instantaneous decisions. And, here was
something which occurred. Undoubtedly, they had inspired it. Undoubtedly, they had not
expected us to take the action that we did. They had boycotted the United Nations because of
the Nationalist Chinese. This would have taken a major decision of the Politburo to turn this
around.
Now, I think if he had appeared, we would have immediately adjusted ourselves to that and
taken some other action, either through the General Assembly or unilaterally. I think Mr.
Truman is quite right that the interest of the United States and its allies, and of the free world
was so great in defeating this aggression against Korea that it had to be done. And if, through
some sort of legal mechanism one operation was blocked, then another operation would have
to be found to do it.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
The resolution led to direct action by the United States,
whose forces were joined by troops and supplies from 15
other UN members: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, UK,
France, South Africa, Turkey, Thailand, Greece, the
Netherlands, Ethiopia, Colombia, the Philippines, Belgium,
and Luxembourg. Even Japan gave military support with
minesweeping and the service and repair of military
equipment.
However, the United States provided 50% of the ground
forces (South Korea provided most of the remainder), 86%
of the naval power, and 93% of the air power. Some
historians have called the mission "a U.S. operation behind
a blue international fig leaf."
The first significant foreign military
intervention was the American Task Force
Smith, part of the U.S. Army’s 24th Infantry
Division based in Japan. On July 5, it was
defeated with heavy losses. The victorious
North Korean forces advanced southwards,
and the half-strength 24th Division was
forced to retreat.
By August, the South Korean forces and the
U.S. Eighth Army under General Walton
Walker had been driven back into a small area
in the southeast corner of the Korean
peninsula around the city of Pusan. As the
North Koreans advanced, they rounded up
and killed civil servants.
By September, only the area around Pusan —
about 10 percent of the Korean peninsula —
was still in coalition hands. With the aid of
massive American supplies, air support, and
additional reinforcements, the UN forces
managed to stabilize a line which became
known in the United States as the Pusan
Perimeter.
Inchon--the beginning of the “Surge”
The approaches to Inchon were two restricted passages, Flying Fish and Eastern
channels, which could be easily blocked by mines. The current of the channels was
also dangerously quick three to eight knots. Finally, the anchorage was small and the
harbor surrounded by tall seawalls. Commander Arlie G. Capps noted "We drew up a
list of every natural and geographic handicap and Inchon had 'em all."
A briefing led by Admiral James
Doyle concluded "the best that I
can say is that Inchon is not
impossible."
MacArthur said that because it was
so heavily defended, the enemy
would not expect an attack there,
that victory at Inchon would avoid
a brutal winter campaign, and that,
by invading a northern strong
point, the UN forces could cut off
North Korean lines of
communication. Inchon was also
chosen because of its proximity to
Seoul
15 Sep 1950 - Inchon landing of
UN forces
29 Sep 1950 - UN troops
complete recapture of Seoul
Then what?
The terrain of the rugged peninsula was described by the United States
Air Force (and many others) as "an inhospitable site for a war." Korea is
about the size of Minnesota, but unlike that state Korea is
predominantly rough and mountainous, with peaks rising to 8,700 feet
in the northeast.
From those mountains a range extends south along the east coast of
Korea. That range then supports several smaller spurs that run
southwest. The mountains thus tend to restrict movement in any
direction across the country and effectively shrink the size of the
country in terms of "fighting space."
Because of this the war tended to be restricted to certain key sectors,
usually urban, and most of those involved heavy civilian populations. It
was a recipe for terrible loss of life.
See, for example, the case of Seoul…
Civilians suffered dramatically…
As an organized field force, the KPA disintegrated, having lost 13,000 as prisoners and
50,000 as casualties in August and September. Nevertheless, about 25,000 of its best
troops took to the mountains and marched home as cohesive units; another 10,000
remained in South Korea as partisans. As the communists headed north, they took
thousands of South Koreans with them as hostages and slave labourers and left
additional thousands executed in their wake—most infamously at Taejon, where 5,000
civilians were massacred.
The ROK army and national police, for their part, showed little sympathy to any
southern communists they found or suspected, and U.S. aircraft attacked people and
places with little restraint. As a result, the last two weeks of September saw atrocities
rivaling those seen in Europe during the fratricidal Thirty Years' War of the 17th century.