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The Triple Crisis and the Global Aid Architecture Tony Addison, Channing Arndt & Finn Tarp UNU-WIDER UNU Worldwide UNU Office at the United Nations, New York 28 January 2010 Introduction • The global economy in turmoil: Immediate concern the financial crisis • But there are – in reality – at least three global crises at work: Finance, food and climate • At present the three crises sit in their separate ”policy silos” • Key argument: the three crises interact – a ”triple crisis” with implications for development assistance 2 CRISIS 1: FINANCE 3 -4 -2 0 2 4 IMF Forecast 6 8 Real GDP Growth in World and Major Economic Groupings (1970-2014) 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Year 2000 World 2005 2010 2015 Advanced Economies Emerging and Developing Economies Source:IMF World Economic Outlook Database October (2009) Present economic downturn deepest in 60 years, and no region untouched + a lot speculation as to recovery 4 0 5 IMF Forecast 10 15 World Trade Volume (1970-2014) -2.66 Dot Com Bubble Second Oil Crisis -10 -5 First Oil Crisis 0.24 -0.93 -11.89 -15 Financial Crisis 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Year 2000 2005 2010 2015 World Trade Volume Source:IMF World Economic Outlook Database October (2009) World trade has experienced its sharpest decline in decades + 5 uncertain future 3 Net Private Capital Flows to Emerging and Developing Economies (1990-2014) 0 1 2 IMF Forecast 2.98 -1 -0.71 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Year Net Private Capital Flows Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Data Base April (2009) Net private capital flows to the South have fallen dramatically 6 Changes in Private Capital Flows by Region Between 2007 and 2008 ($ Billion) -$88 Billion (-41%) 500 400 -$221 Billion (-47%) 300 -$78 Billion (-28%) 200 -$46 Billion (-41 %) 100 a fri c si a A A S ub S ah ar an or th N E as ta nd S ou th A fri c ib ea n ar r C -$19.5 Billion (-35.3%) M id dl e an d ic a A m er La tin pe E ur o E as t A an d si a C an d en tra P lA si a ac ifi c 0 a +2.5 Billion (+11%) 2007 2008 Source:World Bank Global Development Finance Report(2009) Note:2008 is an estimate by the World Bank And this is true for all regions, except the Middle East and North Africa (but now Dubai!) 7 30.0 32.4 35.4 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Global FDI Inflows (Annual Growth) 50.1 -14.2 2004 2005 2006 Year 2007 2008 Global FDI Inflows(Annual Growth) Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2009 Global FDI inflows turned negative 8 30 Remittance Growth Rate in Developing Countries 20 25.2 0 10 World Bank Forecast -10 -7.3 -10.10 2006 2007 Base Case Forecast 2008 year 2009 2010 Low Case Forecast Source:World Bank Migration and Development Brief July 2009 Note:2008 is an estimate by the World Bank And remittances to developing countries fell sharply 9 0 20 40 World Bank Forecast 60 80 Remmitance Flows to Main Regions 1999-2010($ Billion) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 year 2006 2007 2008 East Asia and Pacific Latin America and Caribbean SSA South Asia 2009 2010 Source:World Bank Migration and Development Brief July 2009 Note: 2008 is an estimate by the World Bank. And again: this is is so in all regions 10 The Response • Unprecedented monetary and fiscal expansion (a very heavy dose of Keynesian medicine) • Will it work? Some optimism – but in reality much too early to say …. • Northern governments close to borrowing limits, and reductions in fiscal deficits already being discussed • Implications potentially serious for the South where social impact much bigger • Will the North respond to the need for increased development assistance? 11 The Impact on Aid • The average banking crisis reduces output per capita by 10% - and the loss is not restored within 7 years of the crisis onset • The target for raising aid is expressed as a percentage of economic size (0.7% of GNI) • To maintain the VOLUME of aid, aid will have to rise faster as a % of total spending • Is this likely under business as usual scenarios? No 12 1 Net ODA as Percentage of Donor GNI in 2008 .98 .92 .88 .8 .82 .8 .6 UN Target (0.7) .58 Average Country Effort (0.47) .34 .32 .3 .3 .27 .2 .18 .18 Japan United States Portugal New Zealand TOTAL DAC Canada Australia Germany France Switzerland Austria Finland Spain United Kingdom Belgium Ireland Netherlands Denmark Norway Luxembourg Sweden 0 .2 Greece .42 .41 .39 .38 Italy .43 .43 .43 .2 .4 .47 ODA/GNI Source: OECD-DAC Online Data Base Many donors far from achieving the UN goal 13 100 150 Net ODA Disbursement and ODA/GNI (% Change Between 2005 and 2008 ) 122 88 80 63 38 36 60 29 16 11 41 38 6 0 18 26 37 33 4 42 26 26 21 14 1 -6 -6 -7 -7 -9 -11 7 -7 -17 -19 -22 Net ODA Disbursement (% Change) US Austria France Belgium UK Finland Switzerland Canada Norway Netherlands Denmark Sweden Germany New Zealand Luxembourg Greece Portugal Australia Ireland Spain -50 -2 9 6 -13 -31-29-36 Japan 50 59 Italy 84 ODA/GNI (% Change) Note: ODA Disbursement is expressed in current prices(Millions of USD). Data for 2008 is preliminary. Source: OECD-DAC Online Data Base The ODA/GNI ratio fell for 12 out of 22 DAC donors before the crisis 14 90000 Net ODA Disbursement to Developing Countries Constant Prices (1980-2007) Gleneagles G8 Summit 90,277 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 64,227 1980 1985 1990 Net Disbursement, Total 1995 Year 2000 2005 2010 Net Disbursement, Excl. Debt Relief Source: OECD-DAC Online Data Base Net ODA disbursements ”inflated” by debt relief 15 35000 Net ODA Disbursement to Africa Constant Prices(1981-2007) 34,224 30000 Gleneagles G8 Summit 20000 25000 27,712 17,643 10000 15000 17,282 1980 1985 1990 Net Disbursement,Total 1995 Year 2000 2005 2010 Net Disbursement Excluding Debt Relief Source: OECD-DAC Online Data Base Netting out debt relief foreign assistance to Africa has not risen in real terms since the late 1980s 16 Should We Worry? • Aid’s critics would say NO (some would say growth will rise if aid is eliminated, others say aid has no effect) • Weight of empirical evidence: Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2009) – aid’s aggegate impact conforms to priors from modern growth theory • The present financial climate not a good time to experiment with Dambisa Moyo’s proposal to kill aid 17 Capital Flows to SSA and Selected Countries (% of GDP) Average of 2003-2007 Mozambique Rwanda 1.2 4.1 Zambia Ethiopia 4.0 3.8 1.3 SSA Nigeria 0 .02 14.5 3.2 3.3 .04 15.5 3.5 1.8 .02 15.4 3.6 .9 0 14.7 6.1 .7 Tanzania .1 Ghana 21.9 .8 .7 Uganda 0 21.7 0 11.2 2.7 1.2 5.0 2.9 3.2 0 .6 10 Remittance 20 FDI 30 ODA Portfolio Note: Portfolio refers to portfolio investment equity flows in current $. These flows are net and include non-debt-creating portfolio equity flows (the sum of country funds, depository receipts, and direct purchases of shares by foreign investors.) Source: World Development Indicators and Author's Computation Despite some improvements in other flows ODA continues to dominate total capital flows to SSA 18 25 SSA Government Revenue Excluding Grant 1997-2009 (% of GDP) 25.1 24 24.8 23 24.1 24.1 22.9 22 22.3 22.3 21 21.2 20 21.0 20.9 20.8 19.9 19 19.5 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Year SSA Government Revenue Excluding Grant (% of GDP) Source:IMF African Regional Economic Outlook October (2009) Tax revenues are down (especially trade taxes) 19 Changes in Private Capital Flows by Region Between 2007 and 2008 ($ Billion) -$88 Billion (-41%) 500 400 -$221 Billion (-47%) 300 -$78 Billion (-28%) 200 -$46 Billion (-41 %) 100 a Af ric ia Ea Su b Sa ha ra n As So ut h Af or th N st an d -$19.5 Billion (-35.3%) M id dl e in La t ric ar rib ea n C an d Am er ic a an d pe Eu ro Ea st As ia C an d en tra lA si a Pa ci fic 0 a +2.5 Billion (+11%) 2007 2008 Source:World Bank Global Development Finance Report(2009) Note:2008 is an estimate by the World Bank Private flows are sharply down in Africa after years of growth 20 Prospects • More difficult to sell government bonds + poorer countries risk being crowded out by financing requirements of advanced countries • Aid at a critical juncture: Will be stretched by the food and climate crises which will intensify if growth resumes 21 CRISIS 2: FOOD 22 0 50 100 150 200 250 Cereal Prices in Indices of Market Prices (1957-2008) 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Year Rice Wheat Maize Soybeans Source : IMF Primary Commodity Price Data Base Note: Rice:Thailand(Bangkok); Wheat:US Gulf ; Maize:US ; Soybeans: US Food prices soared in 2007-2008 and then fell back: prospects?23 Food Crisis (1) • Food price developments reflect: – Low priority to agriculture/food production – Shifting demand patterns – Biofuels (+ lack of research in alternative energy sources) • Underlying structural drivers behind 2007-2008 spike remain in place – if growth resumes food prices likely to increase again • Global food architecture not geared to deal with supply shortages – governments may intensify protection to try to satisfy domestic consumers 24 Food Crisis (2) • National responses to food crisis have varied • Africa: Macro-policies main tool to limit impact of world price shocks • Elsewhere: Greater focus on social protection • But too much social protection ad hoc, stop-go, high cost – needs to be systematic • A double bind: – If recovery stalls: new trade and financial shocks – If recovery is sustained: food and energy prices will climb and hit energy and food importers • Need for public action – but fiscal space limited in the smaller and poorer economies 25 CRISIS 3: CLIMATE 26 Climate Change (1) • Present global growth model clearly unsustainable – the challenges are unprecedented • To respond, the world must transform existing energy systems (mitigation) and simultaneously adapt to the climate change that is already built into global climate (adaptation) • Failure in shifting from fossil-fuel dependence evident in run-up in oil price prior to the financial crisis (due to lack of investment in energy research) 27 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Oil Prices ( January 1998 to October 2009) 01jan1998 01jan2000 01jan2002 01jan2004 Daily 01jan2006 01jan2008 01jan2010 Note:Oil prices refer to Brent; US dollars per barrel Source:US Department of Energy Huge run-up, then a fall as recession set in – but what next? 28 Climate Change (2) • If growth resumes energy prices will move back up • Places huge burdens on poor countries – a range of fiscal effects, which make states more aid-dependent, not less • Costs far exceed current level of aid: – Per annum mitigation in developing countries by 2030: USD 140-175 billion – Per annum adaptation costs by 2050: USD 30-109 billion – Aid is presently around USD 100 billion in total • COP15 demonstrated – climate change finance fragmented as traditional aid, unclear funding will be additional, and who takes control of supply (how much voice for the South?) • Climate change financing seen as compensation – but aid processes remain conditional 29 Conclusion (1) • A WIDER perspective needed: – Not one – but three interrelated global crises: The Triple Crisis • Unclear how financial crisis will evolve, but we do know recovery should not be business as usual • Whether growth resumes or not the world must address the triple crisis – and break out of the ”policy silos” • Global problems require global solutions, including for example: – Comprehensive action on climate change – A new global food architecture – And increased development assistance delivered in new ways 30 Conclusion (2) • So far action has been chaotic: • Economic recovery at best extremely fragile • The coming reduction in in fiscal deficits will force unpleasant spending choices – and aid may be the loser • A pronounced risk of collapse in the confidence in international food markets • Aid falling – not increasing – and far from clear that climate financing will be additional • Carbon taxes (or the alternative of auctioning carbon-emission licenses) need to be at the core of any serious attempt to come to grips with climate change – but progress at best tentative • Global institutions are needed for global action • The world at a turning point: Will the future be unilateral or multilateral? 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