Download Franco-Prussian War: Traitor or Scapegoat

Franco-Prussian War: Traitor or Scapegoat?
Marshal Francois Achille Bazaine was a veteran of wars in Algeria, the
Crimea and Mexico. But none of those conflicts had prepared him for
Prussia's Helmuth von Moltke.
By Paul B. Hatley for Military History Magazine
The closing weeks of July 1870 witnessed the armies of
France and the German states mobilizing for a war declared Subscribe Now
by the French in an attempt to maintain hegemony in
Europe. Instead, by the end of January 1871 the war had
toppled the empire, had brought an end to an outdated
Napoleonic military tradition of "we will always manage
somehow," and had established the newly united German
empire as the dominant European military power. In
addition to these major military and political developments,
the war subjected soldiers of both sides to unusually brutal
hardships and prolonged suffering.
Chief among those who suffered was Marshal Francois
Achille Bazaine and the men of his ill-fated Army of the
Rhine. Surrounded by Prussian Prince Friedrich Karl's army
of investment, Bazaine and his troops held out behind the
walls of Metz for more than two months in the face of
appalling physical deprivations and diseases of every sort.
With the marshal's surrender in late October 1870 came
allegations from Leon Gambetta, head of the Government
of National Defense, accusing Bazaine of both military
incompetence and treachery. This initial assessment was
accepted quickly throughout France and led to his eventual
court-martial in 1873, which found the marshal solely
responsible, from beginning to end, for the fate that befell
the Army of the Rhine. That verdict, however, was
exaggerated and unfair.
More of this Feature
• Part 2:
• Part 3:
• Part 4:
Chosen
• Part 5:
• Part 6:
A Weak Army
Initial Defeat
The Scapegoat Is
Necessary Surrender
Betrayed by a Nation?
Join the Discussion
Was Marshal Bazaine betrayed
by his country and his superiors,
or did he deserve to be found
guilty? Tell us what you think in
the Forum.
Related Resources
• France under the Napoleons
Since 1866, the French had viewed the prospect of war
• The Second Reich
with Prussia as a foregone conclusion. In that year,
however, they had been shocked by the news of the
Elsewhere on the Web
overwhelming defeat of General Ludwig August von
• Franco-Prussian War
Benedek's Austrian army near Königgrätz (Sadowa) at the • The Franco-Prussian War
hands of General Helmuth von Moltke and his disciplined
legions. Prussian military reforms proposed and overseen
decades earlier by Gerhard Johann Scharnhorst, Hermann von Boyen and August von
Gneisenau continued to be modified and improved upon by men such as Moltke and
the minister of war, Count Albrecht von Roon, with impressive results. The French
viewed the possibility of a unified German nation-state, imbued with Prussian
military expertise, with great dread and thus clamored to destroy it before it could
become a formidable European rival.
The immediate causes of the Franco-Prussian War may seem trivial by today's
standards, but in 1870 influential members of the government, plus the ordinary
French citizens, believed that affronts, real or imagined, to their national honor were
cause enough to take up arms. The declaration of war proceeded from a dispute that
centered around the vacant throne of Spain. After he had rejected several unsuitable
candidates, Marshal Don Juan Prim, president of the Spanish Council of Ministers,
offered the throne to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a distant relative
of the ruling Hohenzollerns of Prussia.
France reacted with shock and outrage. The attitude that swept the nation was
expressed best by the Duke of Gramont, the minister of foreign affairs, who stated
that the entire situation was "nothing less than an insult to France" contrived by
Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Accordingly, Gramont instructed his
ambassador to Prussia to obtain assurances from Prussian King Wilhelm I that his
family would give up any designs on the Spanish throne. The ambassador linked up
with the king at Bad Ems and communicated Gramont's demand. The king explained
calmly that he could make no such guarantee, at which point the ambassador
continued to press the issue. Wilhelm repeated himself and brought the conversation
to an abrupt close.
Wilhelm briefed Bismarck of the incident in the now famous "Ems telegram," and
Bismarck then proceeded to condense the document and see that it was published in
newspapers throughout the North German Confederation and France. The French
press demanded retribution for Wilhelm's rudeness to their ambassador--and so did
Napoleon III, the country's weak and unstable ruler. The legislature complied and
hurriedly issued a declaration of war on July 19, 1870.
With hindsight, historians realize that Napoleon III's decision to go to war with
Prussia ranks among the great military blunders in history. Despite claims from the
eager-to-please minister of war, Marshal Edmond Le Boeuf, that the French military
was "ready down to the last gaiter button," the armies of the empire were far from
prepared for combat.
Many influential French political and military leaders falsely believed at that time that
their army possessed two technological advances that would give their fighting men
a decisive advantage: the chassepot rifle and the secret Montigny mitrailleuse. The
mitrailleuse was a hand-cranked machine gun mounted on an artillery carriage. In
1870, French artillery regiments were reorganized into two batteries (instead of
three) of six guns and another equipped with 10 mitrailleuses. That change
effectively reduced each regiment's firepower by a third and cost them dearly in
artillery exchanges with the Germans.
The chassepot rifle could be loaded and fired more quickly and had a greater
effective range than the Dreyse needle gun carried by the Germans, but the rifles
could not offset the deficiencies stemming from poor training and leadership.
Foreshadowings of the myriad setbacks that Marshal Bazaine and his Army of the
Rhine would experience became apparent before the opposing armies clashed.
Weeks prior to the declaration of war, France began mobilizing for what it believed
would be a series of rapid offensive strikes against the North German Confederation
and the South German States. The simple plan of attack, devised in 1868 by Louis
Napoleon himself, looked entirely feasible on paper. Eight army corps were to be
divided among three armies. The first, known as the Army of Lorraine, would consist
of three corps totaling 130,000 men, to be deployed in the neighborhood of Metz and
commanded by Bazaine. The second, the Army of Alsace, under the command of
Marshal Patrice MacMahon, would consist of 121,000 men deployed in three corps
around Strasbourg. The remaining two corps, amounting to 87,000 men and forming
the Army of Chalons, would be commanded by Marshal Francois Certain Canrobert
and held in reserve at the military training camp of Chalons-sur-Marne.
Realizing that the Prussian canton system would quickly enable his enemy to
mobilize an initial force of 484,000 men, the emperor intended to gamble that he
could compensate for what he lacked in numbers with speed. By invading southern
Germany rapidly, he hoped to prevent the linkup of the South German contingents
with the Prussian army. Once the South Germans were neutralized, the emperor
Napoleon entertained notions that Austria, seeking revenge for the Seven Weeks'
War, would send armies to join him as he wheeled his forces to engage the Prussians
somewhere along the Main River. It would be Canrobert's job to cover the rear of the
French advance. This latter-day Napoleon's ultimate objective, of course, was Berlin.
To carry out such a plan, the French would have to cross the Rhine before the
Germans could mobilize completely. Thus, in keeping with the principles of the highly
regarded military theorist General Antoine Henri Jomini, the French armies would
maneuver "so as to...[commit their] forces only against fractions of the enemy's
strength... [and] to concentrate the bulk of their forces at the decisive point."
Part 2: A Weak Army
Napoleon's "surprise offensive" was doomed to failure,
however, due to insurmountable problems with the French Subscribe Now
procedures for mobilization. Unlike the Prussians, the
French had a cripplingly overcentralized system. Once
given the order to mobilize in early July 1870, French
reservists encountered numerous difficulties. Because the
army units were not localized, the typical reservist went
first to his depot company, oftentimes far from home, to
pick up his combat equipment. With equipment in hand and
on his back, he then hurried back to his regiment, which, in
many cases, was close to his home. If a unit experienced a
mix-up with clothing, pay or whatever, the problem usually
could not be rectified among the lower or even higher
echelons of the army. Instead, problems had to be referred More of this Feature
to the Paris War Office, which ultimately could not cope
• Part 1: War!
• Part 3: Initial Defeat
with the urgent needs of a mobilizing combat force.
A concomitant weakness that also hampered mobilization
was the lack of a clear understanding as to how French
soldiers were to reach their respective zones of
concentration along the German frontier. The French
generally assumed that transport would be handled by rail,
but when mobilization began there was no one with the
primary responsibility of overseeing and coordinating rail
transportation--that vital ingredient in the emporer's
surprise offensive simply had been overlooked. It would not
be until August 11 (almost a month after war had been
declared) that the Ministry of Public Works appointed the
Count of Bonville "to oversee to the greatest extent
possible the military transport required by the present
war."
• Part 4: The Scapegoat Is
Chosen
• Part 5: Necessary Surrender
• Part 6: Betrayed by a Nation?
Join the Discussion
Was Marshal Bazaine betrayed
by his country and his superiors,
or did he deserve to be found
guilty? Tell us what you think in
the Forum.
Related Resources
• France under the Napoleons
• The Second Reich
Elsewhere on the Web
• Franco-Prussian War
The French also placed entirely too much confidence in
• The Franco-Prussian War
some of the defunct military traditions born during the
Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon I had conquered most of
Europe with armies under his personal command and had maintained them with
what one historian has aptly called "a sustained improvisation." But the nature of
warfare had changed by 1870. The addition of railroads, for those with foresight, had
made it possible for large numbers of men and materiel to be transported rapidly to
strategically or tactically important points. Unlike the Prussians, the French never
fully appreciated the military applications of the railroad. In fact, until his death,
Jomini never viewed the railroad as a particularly important development for the
military.
Napoleon III chose to emulate the Napoleonic tradition of exercising personal
command. Under Napoleon I, command had been extremely centralized, reducing
the opportunity for individual initiative among his subordinates. Nevertheless, his
decisiveness and military genius, coupled with the known results of his mere
presence on the battlefield, had effectively negated the need for such initiative.
Napoleon III stood in stark contrast to his uncle. More of a politician than a
commander in chief, this Napoleon was often immobilized by illness and remained
great distances from the front. Thus, a lack of initiative on the part of French
commanders waiting for orders from an emperor out of his element ensured costly
defeats.
While commanders and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) worked feverishly to
remedy the countless problems wreaking havoc with their units, the emperor
compounded their worries. On July 11, for reasons not yet fully understood,
Napoleon scrapped his original notion of three armies and opted to combine his eight
corps into a single formation: the Army of the Rhine. It was comprised of: 1st Corps,
under Marshal Patrice MacMahon, at Strasbourg; 2nd Corps, under General Charles
Frossard, at St. Avold; 3rd Corps, under Marshal Francois Bazaine, at Metz; 4th
Corps, under General de Ladmirault, at Thionville; 5th Corps, under General Pierre
de Failly, at Bitsch; 6th Corps, under Marshal Francois Certain Canrobert, at Chalons;
7th Corps, under General Felix Douay, at Belfort; and the Imperial Guard, under
General Charles Bourbaki, at Nancy.
The bewildered and frantic French general staff responded accordingly. Within three
days , orders establishing new commands, repositioning corps and reeassigning
service and support units had been issued. Of course, it took a few more days for
orders on paper to be translated into action in the field.
The emperor, seconded by chief of staff Marshal Edmond Le Boeuf, took direct
command of the new army. Because of affairs of state keeping him in Paris,
however, Napoleon could not leave for the front immediately and ordered Marshal
Bazaine to assume temporary command.
Over the previous six years, Bazaine had commanded two army corps along the
German frontier, duty assignments that had given him firsthand knowledge of the
French border fortresses. They were neither adequately constructed nor well enough
supplied to meet the needs of an army preparing to embark on a major offensive
into German territory. Despite his serious misgivings concerning his country's state
of military preparedness, Bazaine obeyed his emperor's order. But, as he boarded a
train to the east on July 16, he was heard to remark gloomily, "We are matching
toward disaster!"
Part 3: Initial Defeat
Upon his arrival in Metz, the marshal moved quickly Subscribe Now
to assess the combat readiness of the Army of the
Rhine. What he discovered was appalling, but not
entirely unexpected: the frontier fortresses were
grossly undermanned; rations were scarce; units
arrived without commanders, commanders arrived
without units to command; and the mitrailleuses, the
secret weapons that many believed would win the
war for France, arrived at railheads without
personnel who knew how to operate them. Bazaine
rushed here and there attempting to bring the weight of his
rank and position to bear against the most immediate
problems, but he was powerless to make a rapid impact.
The congested railways were backed up for miles while the More of this Feature
emperor in Paris, according to his wife the Empress
• Part 1: War!
• Part 2: A Weak Army
Eugénie, "Was suffering from [kidney stones] to such a
• Part 4: The Scapegoat Is
degree that his physical, intellectual and even moral
Chosen
activities were quite paralyzed."
• Part 5: Necessary Surrender
• Part 6: Betrayed by a Nation?
By July 28, however, the emperor felt well enough to
travel. After transferring supreme governmental authority
to the empress, the infirm Napoleon and his imperial
headquarters proceeded to Metz. He assumed overall
command upon arrival and assembled his corps
commanders. In keeping with his plan of 1868, the
emperor presented possible objectives along the French
axis of advance.
Join the Discussion
Was Marshal Bazaine betrayed
by his country and his superiors,
or did he deserve to be found
guilty? Tell us what you think in
the Forum.
Related Resources
• France under the Napoleons
His line and staff officers, however, were decidedly
• The Second Reich
unconvinced that the surprise offensive could be
implemented successfully. French divisions were not yet at
Elsewhere on the Web
full strength, whereas Moltke had almost finished wheeling
• Franco-Prussian War
his three armies into position. Furthermore, the French did • The Franco-Prussian War
not have the reserve forces necessary to follow up and
capitalize on any successes gained by the lead echelons.
With those facts in mind, Napoleon's officers called for a massive strike against
German rail operations in and around the small border town of Saarbrücken. The
emperor agreed.
March orders were given to the various corps during the last three days of July.
Despite the fact that few French units were up to full, effective strength, the 2nd, 3rd
and 5th corps began moving toward Saarbrücken. The hot and dry summer days
provided dusty, hard dirt roads over which the French columns marched, pulling their
bronze muzzleloading artillery behind them. On the morning of August 2, two
divisions of Frossard's 2nd Corps crossed the Saar and proceeded to attack the small
German outpost garrison.
The fighting, which lasted four hours, ended with a complete German withdrawal
from the town. The numbers killed and wounded on both sides were light--4 officers
and 71 soldiers for the Germans and 6 officers and 80 men for the French. The
French press touted the outcome of the battle as a major victory. Shouts of "On to
Berlin!" were heard throughout the nation. At last, France gloated, the Prussians of
1870 would learn the lessons that Napoleon I had taught their forefathers at the
battle of Jena in 1806.
In reality, the Prussians were slow to grasp the significance of what the French were
laboring to teach them. The "possession of Saarbrücken at [the] present time," said
Moltke, "is of no importance to us." Instead of compelling him to retreat toward
Berlin to prepare for the French onslaught as Napoleon and his commanders had
hoped, the capture of Saarbrücken had no effect on Moltke's plans. The three
German armies continued their steady advance unabated. As the Germans drew
closer, Napoleon finally deduced that Moltke was probably issuing orders instructing
his commanders to begin concentrating their forces in preparation for imminent and
simultaneous offensive thrusts. Accordingly, the emperor hurriedly attempted to
array his forces in a defensive posture.
The Army of the Rhine was divided into two wings. The left, consisting of the 2nd,
3rd and 4th corps, came under the command of Bazaine; the right, consisting of the
1st, 5th and 7th corps, was given to MacMahon. Napoleon held supreme command
and maintained the 6th Corps and the Imperial Guard under his personal control.
Curiously enough, the two marshals received no staffs to go with their new
commands. Hence, the staff of the 3rd Corps became the staff for the left wing and
the staff of the 1st Corps that of the right. To make the situation even more
confusing, Napoleon continued to overdo his personal involvement.
On August 4, Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm and his Third Army crossed
the frontier and overran elements of the French 5th Corps at Wissembourg.
MacMahon had units within less than a day's march, but he pulled them south in an
attempt to consolidate his wing in the vicinity of the town of Wörth. Here the hero of
Sebastopol and former commander of the combined land and sea forces of Algeria
intended to halt and turn back Friedrich Wilhelm's advance.
Timely intelligence reports from cavalry patrols, however, alerted the Germans to
MacMahon's intentions. On the morning of August 5, the crown prince fell on
MacMahon, routed his wing, and forced him to retreat. The demoralized remnants of
MacMahon's corps retreated rapidly toward the towns of Savern and Nancy and,
within 10 days, began regrouping at the camp of Chalons-sur-Marne. The marshal's
defeat had far-reaching and serious ramifications for Bazaine as well as for France.
The entire right wing of the French line of defense had been penetrated by the
Germans in a matter of hours, revealing the glaring inability of the emperor and his
staff to coordinate successful military operations. Concurrently, the morale of the
French soldier began to decline as he lost confidence in the abilities of both his
leaders and himself. Bazaine now had the responsibility to give the empire the
victories it needed so badly.
Part 4: The Scapegoat Is Chosen
Marshal Bazaine had proven himself a competent military
commander during a career spanning almost 40 years. He Subscribe Now
had fought in Spain during the Carlist War (1835); held a
French outpost against overwhelming odds in Algeria
(1840); commanded a regiment in the Crimean War (185456) and a brigade in the Italian War (1859). These
successes gained him the emperor's favor, which later
accorded him overall command of the French army of
Mexico (1862-67). But none of the adversaries Bazaine had
faced before were as well trained, equipped or led as those
now streaming over the Rhine.
Needless to say, Bazaine took command of the left wing at
an extreme disadvantage. To add to his worries, the forces More of this Feature
• Part 1: War!
of his new command, which had been deployed earlier by
• Part 2: A Weak Army
the imperial headquarters, were strung out precariously
• Part 3: Initial Defeat
along a convoluted front roughly 60 miles long. The
• Part 5: Necessary Surrender
• Part 6: Betrayed by a Nation?
marshal struggled to consolidate his wing while divisions
from the German First Army and Second Army blasted
Frossard's corps out of positions in and around the towns of Join the Discussion
Saarbrücken and Spicheren. During the battle, Bazaine
Was Marshal Bazaine betrayed
reportedly had ordered General Decaen's 3rd Corps, located by his country and his superiors,
a few kilometers to Frossard's rear, to advance. Strangely or did he deserve to be found
guilty? Tell us what you think in
enough, Decaen responded sluggishly and sent forward
the Forum.
only two divisions, which arrived after the battle was
already lost.
Related Resources
Bazaine's detractors have always been quick to point out
that whether the marshal gave the order or not is
inconsequential; commanders are ultimately responsible for
all their subordinates do and fail to do. Be that as it may,
Decaen's slow response to a situation requiring rapid action
cannot be viewed as an indication of Bazaine's ability or
inability as a commander.
• France under the Napoleons
• The Second Reich
Elsewhere on the Web
• Franco-Prussian War
• The Franco-Prussian War
Bazaine received word on August 7 from the commander of the 4th Corps, General
Ladmirault, concerning orders from Napoleon himself: "I have received a direct order
from the Emperor," wrote Ladmirault, "for me to fall back on Metz with my entire
corps." The corps commander went on to write that he would instruct his three
division commanders to begin their retreat immediately. Bazaine was incensed. The
emperor, without consulting Bazaine first, had maneuvered the marshal's corps, and
thus disregarded a fundamental rule of chain of command.
In accordance with the emperor's orders, Bazaine joined the withdrawal on Metz. In
the meantime, he proposed to the imperial headquarters that his corps be allowed to
regroup and link up with those of the former right wing, presently at the camp of
Chalons. From there, argued Bazaine, the expected German advance on Paris could
be halted and the offensive against Germany resumed. The imperial headquarters
agreed.
A physically ill and mentally exhausted Napoleon issued his final orders five days
later. Bazaine's forces were strengthened with the addition of the flamboyant Greek
General Charles Bourbaki and his Imperial Guard. The emperor then relinquished his
own position as commander in chief and gave the dubious honor to Bazaine. It is
interesting to note that as the German hordes poured into France, Napoleon left
Bazaine in the untenable position of saving the empire. If the marshal succeeded,
the empire would be preserved; if not, the emperor could save his own skin,
perhaps, by blaming the military reverses on the unfortunate Bazaine -- a convenient
and badly needed scapegoat.
Dawn the next day found the last of Bazaine's dispersed elements stumbling into an
area just south of Metz, where Bazaine hoped his Army of the Rhine would cross the
Moselle River. Having accomplished this, the army was to proceed to a position just
west of the Argonne Forest where, if all went as planned, MacMahon would be
waiting to effect a junction of the two armies. Anticipating such a plan, Moltke took
swift action to disrupt it. He ordered the First Army to cross the Moselle north of
Metz in order to block Bazaine's escape route, the Second to strike the Army of the
Rhine from the rear, and the Third to protect the German left, just in case elements
of MacMahon's army attempted to intervene.
On August 14, while attempting to reach the left bank of the Moselle, the First
German Army slammed into Bazaine's rear guard. Accordingly, the marshal had little
choice but to wheel the main body of his troops and attempt to beat back the
German assault. By nightfall, both sides claimed victory. Victorious or not, Moltke's
plan proved tactically sound: the French marshal's withdrawal had been delayed long
enough to allow Friedrich Karl to cross the river, thus permanently obstructing
Bazaine's line of march.
The French retreat, suspended during the battle, resumed at a dilatory pace the
following day. Columns bumped into one another, supply trains choked the narrow
streets, and a general confusion among the men--concerning the reasons for retreat
when two weeks earlier a triumphant march down the Berlin street of Under den
Linden had been a foregone conclusion--contributed to their lack of enthusiasm.
Safely clear of the Moselle, Bazaine's corps began heading toward Verdun on August
16. The Germans fell on them quickly, but by nightfall, Bazaine had successfully
driven his opponents from the field. The Germans, however, remained undeterred;
Bazaine had to be denied his objective. Prussian King Wilhelm I himself gave the
order to attack. Simultaneous assaults on the French flanks at Gravelotte and
Saint-Privat proved fruitful, but temporary. Watching his corps fall back,
Bazaine ordered a counterattack that repulsed the Germans and reestablished the French line where it had been at the start of the battle.
The armies fought for nine hours what proved to be the most bloody
engagement of the entire war. Bayonet charges, the withering fire of the
mitrailleuse, the chassepot rifle and the Prussian Dreyse needle gun all took
their deadly toll. Outnumbered and running short of ammunition, the French
left the field to the Germans and fell back on Metz. Both sides suffered
appalling casualties; the French lost 23,000 men killed or wounded, with
5,000 taken prisoner, against 25,000 casualties inflicted on the Germans.
Part 5: Necessary Surrender
The only error in judgment that Bazaine then made at Metz Subscribe Now
was his inertia from the end of August into early
September, which may have ensured that he would have
no option but to surrender the fortress town by late
October. Once his soldiers had replenished their provisions,
Bazaine sat idly waiting to hear from MacMahon at Chalons.
The idle hours gave the Germans ample time to draw the
noose around Metz tighter and tighter. If Bazaine had
massed his forces and struck the Germans at a weak point
in their line of investment, the regrettable events of Metz
might never have occurred. Bazaine's decision to wait from
MacMahon, however, is typical of the behavior in chains of
command in which major unit commanders are controlled
tightly from the top.
More of this Feature
Word of Bazaine's predicament produced a rapid response
from the War Office. MacMahon received orders to proceed
at once to the relief of Metz. Hoping to take the Germans
by surprise, he began a circuitous march from the north,
but Moltke guessed his plan. By September 1, the Germans
had forced MacMahon to withdraw into the fortress of
Sedan, had brought about its subsequent capitulation, and
had captured the "Man of Destiny" himself--Emperor
Napoleon III.
Meanwhile, in Paris, the Bonaparte dynasty had been
deposed, and the Third Republic had been proclaimed as a
German army drew nearer. Fearful of the fate that met
Marie Antoinette, the Empress Eugénie fled the city and
found asylum in England, where she was joined by her
husband after the war. Trapped inside Metz, Bazaine was
left with the only regular French army in the country and
placed in the untenable position of having to break free of
his German captors and march to the defense of the
capital.
• Part 1:
• Part 2:
• Part 3:
• Part 4:
Chosen
• Part 6:
War!
A Weak Army
Initial Defeat
The Scapegoat Is
Betrayed by a Nation?
Join the Discussion
Was Marshal Bazaine betrayed
by his country and his superiors,
or did he deserve to be found
guilty? Tell us what you think in
the Forum.
Related Resources
• France under the Napoleons
• The Second Reich
Elsewhere on the Web
• Franco-Prussian War
• The Franco-Prussian War
News of MacMahon's defeat reached Metz quickly. All hope of relief had disappeared,
but Bazaine and his men vowed to hold the fortress to the last. The besieged French
attempted numerous sorties throughout September, but each was repulsed by an
enemy who, by using an observatory telescope and a system of telegraphs, could
place substantial reaction forces at any point in 15 minutes. Those failures prompted
Bazaine to employ the same tactics Porfirio Diaz and his guerrillas had used against
him in Mexico.
The plan was distributed to the troops in an operations order: "The first thing to be
done is to worry the enemy, to act towards him as men in a bullfight act when they
annoy and weary the bull, and attack him in an unexpected manner from every point
of the compass. This can be done with flying columns, which will never suffer a
defeat, because they can always take refuge behind the walls of our fortified works.
This kind of offensive reconnoitering will have the further advantage of making us
acquainted with the strength of the enemy and the positions he holds; they will
supply us with the means to capture his provisions and even his guns."
At first these small bands of marauding Frenchmen created serious problems for the
besieging Germans. By the end of the month, however, the Germans had
successfully managed to hold them in check with counterguerrilla flying columns.
The situation in Metz deteriorated rapidly during October. French deserters
began arriving at the German outposts in such numbers that they had to be
turned back. Yet the reports these wretched men gave were all the same:
Famine was taking its brutal toll; diarrhea, dysentery and typhus were
rampant. Smallpox, which had raged in France since the fall of 1869, finally
had reached the fortress and continued to spread at an alarming rate. All
told, 20,000 French soldiers lay ill in the fortress hospitals.
Wanting to bring an end to the suffering, Bazaine called his War Council together and
determined to open peace negotiations. Bazaine dispatched his adjutant, Brig. Gen.
Boyer, to the Royal (Prussian) Headquarters at Versailles with a letter asking that the
army at Metz be allowed to march to freedom, under the condition that none of its
soldiers would take up arms against the Germans for the remainder of the war.
Boyer met with a courteous yet noncommittal Count Otto von Bismarck and later
traveled to Chislehurst, England, where Eugénie agreed to send a letter to Bismarck
requesting an immediate ceasefire at Metz. Boyer's mission ultimately proved to be
abortive, however.
Part 6: Betrayed by a
Nation?
Subscribe Now
Elsewhere on the Web
• Franco-Prussian War
• The Franco-Prussian War
The ordeal then facing
Bazaine was similar in
many respects to the
one he had experienced
30 years earlier as a
captain with the Foreign
Legion. While in Algeria,
Bazaine had been left
with 1,200 men to hold a
small outpost captured
recently from the
enemy. Enduring daily
raids from Kabyle
tribesmen, as well as the
ravages of dysentery,
Bazaine and his men
managed to hold out for
four months. By the time
help finally arrived, only
60 of the original
number remained and
20 more died before the
next day. Unlike the
heroic stand at Miliana,
however, there was no
hope that help would
ever reach Metz. Rather
than put his men
through more suffering
and death, Bazaine
opted to bring an end to
the siege.
The marshal assembled
his staff and corps
commanders on October
24 and declared that it
was senseless to hold
http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/foxtrot/franceprussia1870.htm
The armistice of January 28 included a provision for the election of a French National Assembly,
which would have the authority to conclude a definite peace. This settlement was finally
negotiated by Adolphe Thiers and Favre and was signed February 26 and ratified March 1.
Between then and the conclusion of the formal Treaty of Frankfurt on May 10, 1871, the
republican government was threatened by an insurrection in Paris, in which radicals established
their own short-lived government, the Paris Commune. The Commune was suppressed after two
months, and the harsh provisions of the Treaty of Frankfurt were then implemented: Germany
annexed Alsace and half of Lorraine, with Metz. Furthermore, France had to pay an indemnity of
5 billion francs and cover the costs of the German occupation of France's northern provinces until
the indemnity was paid. The culminating triumph of Bismarck's plans came on Jan. 18, 1871,
when King William I of Prussia was proclaimed German emperor at Versailles, the former palace
of the kings of France.
The Franco-German War had far-reaching consequences. It established both the German Empire
and the French Third Republic. With Napoleon III no longer in power to protect them, the Papal
States were annexed by Italy (Sept. 20, 1870), thereby completing that nation's unification. The
Germans' crushing victory over France in the war consolidated their faith in Prussian militarism,
which would remain a dominant force in German society until 1945. (Additionally, the Prussian
system of conscript armies controlled by a highly trained general staff was soon adopted by the
other great powers.) Most importantly, Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine aroused a deep
longing for revenge in the French people. The years from 1871 to 1914 were marked by an
extremely unstable peace, since France's determination to recover Alsace-Lorraine and
Germany's mounting imperialist ambitions kept the two nations constantly poised for conflict.
Their mutual animosity proved to be the driving force behind the prolonged slaughter on the
Western Front in World War I.