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Microeconomics Course E John Hey Welcome! • Professoressa Maria Covadonga de la Iglesia Villasol, • Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, • Universidad Complutense de Madrid. • Is here through Erasmus to share ideas on teaching. This week • The final week of the course. • Today, Tuesday: Duopoly. • Tomorrow, Wednesday: Example 1 of the exams. • Thursday: Example 2 of the exams. • Before tomorrow, try Example 1 and before Thursday, try Example 2. • It is a waste of your time coming to the lectures if you have not done so. Game Theory • In Chapter 29 we talked about games, in which two players have to choose simultaneously the value of some decision variables, the values of which affect both players. • We introduced the idea of a Nash Equilibrium in which each is optimising given the decision of the other. • Today we will apply that in Duopoly. Chapter 31 • Duopoly • A market in which there are two sellers – two firms – Firm 1 and Firm 2, selling an identical good. • The demand curve in the market is given by: • p = a – b(q1 + q2) The Cournot Model • Each firm chooses independently its output. • The price is determined by the demand curve. • What outputs do the firms choose? Profits • Let us denote the profit of firm 1 by π1. • Suppose that the total cost function is given by: C(q1) = cq1. • Hence profits are given by: • π1.= pq1 - cq1 = [a – b(q1 + q2)]q1 - cq1 Isoprofit Curves • For firm 1 an isoprofit curve is given by: • π1.= constant • Hence • [a – b(q1 + q2)]q1 - cq1 = constant Reaction Curves • If Firm 1 chooses its output to maximise its profits given a level of output of Firm 2, we get: • q1 = (a-c-bq2 )/2b • …the reaction curve of Firm 1. The Nash Equilibrium • … is given by the intersection of the two reaction curves… • Total output = 2(a-c)/3b • With monopoly = (a-c)/2b • With perfect competition = (a-c)/b • The output with a duopoly is between the monopoly output and the competitive output. • Let’s go to Maple... The Bertrand Model • Each firm independently chooses its price. • The demand all goes to the firm with the lowest price. • What prices will the firms choose? What happens with a duopoly • Is very sensitive to the rules of the game… Summary • With quantity-setting rules in the Nash Equilibrium the total output with a duopoly is between the monopoly output and the competitive output. • A collusive outcome is better for both firms – but is unstable. • For a firm it is better to be the leader. • With price-setting the Nash Equilibrium has price equal to marginal cost (and therefore like competition). Chapter 31 • Goodbye!