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CENTRAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
MONETARY POLICY REPORT 2005-III
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
CONTENTS
1.
INTRODUCTION
1
2.
INFLATION DEVELOPMENTS
3
3.
SUPPLY and DEMAND DEVELOPMENTS
8
3.1. Supply and Demand Balance
4.
3.2. Foreign Demand
15
3.3. Costs
17
DEVELOPMENTS in FINANCIAL MARKETS and MONETARY POLICY
5.
23
4.1. CBRT Monetary Policy
23
4.2. CBRT’s Exchange Rate Policy and Exchange Rate Developments
30
4.3. Banking and Credit Development
32
PUBLIC FINANCE
5.1. Developments in Debt Stock
6.
8
OUTLOOK
38
41
47
6.1. Supply and Demand Factors
47
6.2. Cost Factors
48
6.3. Exogenous Factors Affecting Inflation
49
6.4. Monetary and Fiscal Discipline
50
GRAPHS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
52
TABLES
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
53
ABBREVIATIONS
2005-III
54
I
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
1. Introduction1
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This report is based on the data gathered until 24 October 2005.
2005-III
1
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPOT
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2005-III
2
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
2. Inflation Developments
•G ›ŒG ™š›G ••ŒG ”–•›šG –G YWW\SG ›ŒG jwpG •Š™ŒˆšŒ‹G ‰ G ZU`ZG —Œ™ŠŒ•›UG
I
jwpG •“ˆ›–•G ‰ŒŠˆ”ŒG XU^[G —Œ™ŠŒ•›G •G xYG ˆ•‹G XUZWG —Œ™ŠŒ•›G •G xZUG
m–““–ž•ŽG ›ŒG ™šŒG •G ›ŒG h—™“Tqœ•ŒG —Œ™–‹SG •“ˆ›–•G Œˆ‹Œ‹G
CPI increased by
3.93 percent in the
first nine months of
the year.
‹–ž•žˆ™‹šG •G qœ“ G ˆŽˆ•G ˆ•‹G Œ““G ‰Œ•‹G ›ŒG Œ•‹T Œˆ™G ›ˆ™ŽŒ›UG
tŒˆ•ž“ŒSG›ŒG‹ŒŠ“•ŒG•Gˆ••œˆ“G•“ˆ›–•G–G›ŒGz—ŒŠˆ“GjwpGhŽŽ™ŒŽˆ›ŒšG
mGˆ•‹GnSGžŠGˆ™ŒG›ŒGjwpGˆŽŽ™ŒŽˆ›ŒšGž›G›ŒG•ˆ™™–žŒš›GšŠ–—ŒSGšGš›““G
Š–•›•œ•ŽGOn™ˆ—GYUXPUG
Graph 2.1. CPI and Special CPI Aggregates (F and G)
(Annual, Percentage Change)
10,0
9,5
9,0
8,5
8,0
7,5
7,0
CPI
F
G
6,5
05-09
05-08
05-07
05-06
05-05
05-04
05-03
05-02
05-01
6,0
F: CPI excluding energy, alcoholic beverages and tobacco products, other administered prices and indirect taxes.
G: CPI excluding energy, alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, other administered prices, indirect taxes and
unprocessed food.
Source: SIS.
w™ŠŒG ‹ŒŒ“–—”Œ•›šG •G šŒˆš–•ˆ“G —™–‹œŠ›šSG ‹™ŒŠ›G ˆ•‹G •‹™ŒŠ›GŒŒŠ›šG–G
–“G —™–‹œŠ›šG ˆ•‹G —™ŠŒG •Š™Œ”Œ•›šG •G ˆ“Š––“ŠG ‰ŒŒ™ˆŽŒšG ˆ•‹G ›–‰ˆŠŠ–G
Ž™–œ—G‰ŒŠˆ”ŒG›ŒGˆŠ›–™šG›ˆ›GˆŒŠ›Œ‹G•“ˆ›–•G•G›ŒGšŒŠ–•‹G˜œˆ™›Œ™G–G
›ŒG Œˆ™UGGGGGGG
w™ŠŒG ‹ŒŒ“–—”Œ•›šG •G ›ŒG ––‹G ˆ•‹G Š“–›•ŽG Ž™–œ—šSG žŠG Š–•›ˆ•G
šŒˆš–•ˆ“G —™–‹œŠ›šG •G ›ŒG Š–•šœ”—›–•G ‰ˆš’Œ›SG ”ˆ‹ŒG ˆG —–š›ŒG
Š–•›™‰œ›–•G ›–G jwpG •“ˆ›–•G •G xZUG j“–›•ŽG ˆ•‹G ––›žŒˆ™G —™ŠŒšG
‹ŒŠ™ŒˆšŒ‹G ‰ G XXUXZG —Œ™ŠŒ•›G •G ›ŒG qœ“ TzŒ—›Œ”‰Œ™G —Œ™–‹G On™ˆ—G YUYPUG
h•G Œˆ“œˆ›–•G –G ›šG ‹ŒŒ“–—”Œ•›G ›–ŽŒ›Œ™G ž›G ›ŒG ‹ŒŒ“–—”Œ•›šG •G
›ŒGšˆ”ŒG—Œ™–‹G“ˆš›G Œˆ™Gˆ•‹G•G›ŒG™š›Gˆ“G–G›ŒG Œˆ™GšœŽŽŒš›šG›ˆ›G
›ŒG—™Š•ŽG‰Œˆ–™G•G›ŒGŠ“–›•ŽGˆ•‹G––›žŒˆ™GŽ™–œ—G”ˆ G‹Œ™G™–”G
›ŒG —ˆš›UGo–žŒŒ™SGžŒ›Œ™G›šG‹Œ™Œ•ŠŒGšG—Œ™”ˆ•Œ•›G–™G•–›Gž““G‰ŒG
2005-III
3
Price increments in
tobacco products
and seasonal
products became
the factors that
influenced inflation
in Q3.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
Š“Œˆ™G •G ›ŒG œ—Š–”•ŽG —Œ™–‹UG p•G ›ŒG ›™‹G ˜œˆ™›Œ™SG —™ŠŒG •Š™Œ”Œ•›šG •G
›ŒG ––‹G ˆ•‹G •–•Tˆ“Š––“ŠG ‰ŒŒ™ˆŽŒšG Ž™–œ—G žŒ™ŒG ˜œ›ŒG “”›Œ‹UG
tŒˆ•ž“ŒSG ‹œŒG ›–G ›ŒG ˆ‹‘œš›”Œ•›G ”ˆ‹ŒG •G ›ŒG šŠ–—ŒG –G ›ŒG š—ŒŠˆ“G
Š–•šœ”—›–•G ›ˆŸG “ŒŒ‹G –•G ›–‰ˆŠŠ–G —™–‹œŠ›šG•Gqœ“ SG—™ŠŒšG–Gˆ“Š––“ŠG
‰ŒŒ™ˆŽŒšGˆ•‹G›–‰ˆŠŠ–GŽ™–œ—G‹š—“ˆ Œ‹GˆG™ˆ—‹G™šŒG•GhœŽœš›UGp›Gš–œ“‹G
‰ŒG Œ”—ˆš¡Œ‹G ›ˆ›G ›šG •Š™ŒˆšŒSG žŠG š›Œ””Œ‹G ™–”G ˆG š›™œŠ›œ™ˆ“G
Šˆ•ŽŒSGž““G•–›GˆŒŠ›G›ŒG•“ˆ›–•G›™Œ•‹G•G›ŒG”Œ‹œ”T›Œ™”Gš•ŠŒG›šG
Šˆ•ŽŒGšGˆG–•ŒT–G”Œˆšœ™ŒUGGG
Graph 2.2. CPI and Selected CPI Sub-groups
(Percentage Change)
25
July-September 2004
July-September 2005
19.18
20
15
10
4.64
5
2.20
1.30
1.59
2.28
0.77
0.10
0
-1.99
-5
-4.52
-2.65
-10
-11.13
-15
CPI
Food and Clothing and Household
NonFootware
Goods
alcoholic
Beverages
Health
Alcoholic
Beverages
and Tobacco
Source: SIS, CBRT.
~“ŒG—™ŠŒšG•G›ŒGŒˆ“›Gˆ•‹G–œšŒ–“‹GŽ––‹šGŽ™–œ—šG‹ŒŠ™ŒˆšŒ‹G•G›ŒG
›™‹G ˜œˆ™›Œ™G –G YWW\SG —™ŠŒšG •G ›™ˆ•š—–™›ˆ›–•G ˆ•‹G Œ‹œŠˆ›–•G Ž™–œ—G
•Š™ŒˆšŒ‹UG {ŒG ‹ŒŠ™ŒˆšŒG •G Œˆ“›G —™ŠŒšG ”ˆ•“ G ™Œšœ“›Œ‹G ™–”G ›ŒG
‹ŒŠ“•ŒG•G—™ŠŒšG–G”Œ‹Š•ŒšUGp•G›ŒG–œšŒ–“‹GŽ––‹šGŽ™–œ—SG—™ŠŒšG–G
‰–›G œ™•›œ™ŒG ˆ•‹G Œ“ŒŠ›™Šˆ“G ˆ•‹G •–•TŒ“ŒŠ›™Šˆ“G ˆ——“ˆ•ŠŒšG šœ‰TŽ™–œ—šG
‹™–——Œ‹UG t–Œ”Œ•›šG •G ›ŒG Œˆ“›G ˆ•‹G –œšŒ–“‹G Ž––‹šG Ž™–œ—šG Šˆ•G ‰ŒG
‰ˆšŠˆ““ G ˆ››™‰œ›Œ‹G ›–G ›ŒG š›ˆ‰“ŒG Š–œ™šŒG –G uŒžG {œ™’šG “™ˆG O€{sPUG
~“ŒG ›Œ™ŒG ˆŒG ‰ŒŒ•G šŒˆš–•ˆ“G —™ŠŒG •Š™Œ”Œ•›šG •G ›ŒG Œ‹œŠˆ›–•G
Ž™–œ—SG ›ŒG ™šŒG •G ›™ˆ•š—–™›ˆ›–•G —™ŠŒšG ”ˆ•“ G ™Œ“ŒŠ›šG ›ŒG •Š™ŒˆšŒG •G
–“G—™ŠŒšUGG
hG Š–”—ˆ™š–•G ‰Œ›žŒŒ•G ›ŒG ••ŒT”–•›G Šœ”œ“ˆ›ŒG ™ˆ›ŒšG –G •Š™ŒˆšŒG •G
šœ‰TŽ™–œ—šG ›ˆ›G ˆ““G •G ›ŒG šŠ–—ŒG –G šŒ™ŠŒšG Ž™–œ—G œ•‹Œ™G ›ŒG jwpG
—Œ™›ˆ••ŽG ›–G YWW\G ˆ•‹G YWW[G ŽŒšG ˆG ŽŒ•Œ™ˆ“G ‹ŒˆG –G ›ŒG šœš›ˆ•Œ‹G
™Ž‹› G •G ›ŒG šŒ™ŠŒšG —™ŠŒšUG ~“ŒG Šœ”œ“ˆ›ŒG —™ŠŒG •Š™Œ”Œ•›šG •G
–œš•ŽG ˆ•‹G ™Œš›ˆœ™ˆ•›šG ˆ•‹G –›Œ“šG Ž™–œ—šG ˆ™ŒG Š“–šŒG ›–G ›ŒG —™ŠŒG
2005-III
4
The prices in
health and
household goods
groups decreased
while prices in
transportation and
education group
increased in Q3.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
•Š™Œ”Œ•›šG –G “ˆš›G Œˆ™SG ›ŒG ••ŒT”–•›G Šœ”œ“ˆ›ŒG —™ŠŒG •Š™Œ”Œ•›G •G
›™ˆ•š—–™›ˆ›–•GŽ™–œ—šGˆšGŒŸŠŒŒ‹Œ‹G›ŒG™šŒG™ŒŠ–™‹Œ‹G“ˆš›G Œˆ™GOn™ˆ—G
YUZPUG tŒˆ•ž“ŒSG ›G šG –‰šŒ™Œ‹G ›ˆ›G ›ŒG ™ˆ›ŒG –G •Š™ŒˆšŒG –G —™ŠŒšG •G
Œ‹œŠˆ›–•G ˆšG ™Œ”ˆ•Œ‹G œ•‹Œ™G ›ˆ›G –G“ˆš›G Œˆ™UG~›•G›šG™ˆ”Œž–™’SG
›G Šˆ•G ‰ŒG ˆššŒ™›Œ‹G ›ˆ›G ›ŒG ™šŒG •G ›ŒG —™ŠŒšG –G Œ‹œŠˆ›–•G Ž™–œ—G šG
Š–•Šœ™™Œ•›G ž›G ›ŒG Œ•‹T Œˆ™G ›ˆ™ŽŒ›UG o–žŒŒ™SG ™Ž‹› G •G ›ŒG –›Œ™G
Ž™–œ—šG ™ŒŒ™™Œ‹G ›–G šG Š–•›•œ•ŽUG lŒ•G ›–œŽG ›Œ™ŒG šG ˆG ‹ŒŠ“•ŒG •G
Œˆ“›G—™ŠŒšSG—™ŠŒG•Š™Œ”Œ•›šG•GŒˆ“›GšŒ™ŠŒšGŽ™–œ—šGˆ™ŒGŠ–•›•œ•ŽSG
š•ŠŒG ›šG ‹ŒŠ“•ŒG ”ˆ•“ G š›Œ”šG ™–”G ›ŒG ‹ŒŠ“•ŒG •G ›ŒG —™ŠŒG –G
”Œ‹Š•ŒšUG {ŒG ™šŒG •G ™Œ•›šSG žŠG šG ˆ•G ”—–™›ˆ•›G Š–”—–•Œ•›G –G ›ŒG
™Ž‹› G •G ›ŒG –œš•ŽG Ž™–œ—SG ™ŒˆŠŒ‹G X\U_WG —Œ™ŠŒ•›G •G ›ŒG ™š›G ••ŒG
”–•›šG –G ›ŒG Œˆ™G ž›G ›ŒG ŒŒŠ›G –G ŽG •Š™ŒˆšŒšG •G ›ŒG “ˆš›G ›ž–G
”–•›šUGG
Graph 2.3. Selected Sub-Groups Containing Services (CPI)
(Percentage Change)
20
17.41
18
January-September 2004
16
January-September 2005
14
12
11.82
11.68
11.54
10.48
10
6.97
8
7.23
8.04
6.68
6
4
2
0
-2
-0.75
Health
Education
Transportation
Housing
Restaurants and
Hotels
Source: SIS, CBRT.
v“G —™ŠŒšG šG –•ŒG –G ›ŒG •“œŒ•›ˆ“G ˆŠ›–™šG ›ˆ›G ˆŒŠ›G Š–•šœ”Œ™G —™ŠŒšG
•“ˆ›–•UG hG ™šŒG •G –“G —™ŠŒšG ‹™ŒŠ›“ G ˆ•‹G •‹™ŒŠ›“ G ˆŒŠ›šG —™ŠŒšG –G
šŒ™ŠŒšG ˆ•‹G Ž––‹šG ž›•G ›ŒG Š–•šœ”—›–•G ‰ˆš’Œ›UG ~“ŒG ›ŒG —™ŠŒšG –G
–“G —™–‹œŠ›šG •G ›ŒG jwpG •Š™ŒˆšŒ‹G ‰ G ^UXYG —Œ™ŠŒ•›G •G xZSG ›ŒG —™ŠŒšG –G
•–•T–“G —™–‹œŠ›šG ™–šŒG –•“ G ‰ G WUZ_G —Œ™ŠŒ•›G O{ˆ‰“ŒG YUXPUG {ŒG —™ŠŒšG –G
šŒ™ŠŒšSGžŠGˆ™ŒG•‹™ŒŠ›“ GˆŒŠ›Œ‹G‰ G–“G—™ŠŒšSG•Š™ŒˆšŒ‹G‰ GX[UZZG
—Œ™ŠŒ•›G •G ›ŒG qˆ•œˆ™ TzŒ—›Œ”‰Œ™G —Œ™–‹UG ~›•G ›šG ™ˆ”Œž–™’SG ›G šG
–‰šŒ™Œ‹G›ˆ›G›ŒG™Ž‹› G•G›ŒG—™ŠŒšG–GšŒ™ŠŒšGš›““G—Œ™šš›šSGŒŒ•GG
›ŒG•‹™ŒŠ›G”—ˆŠ›G–G–“G—™ŠŒšG–•G›ŒGšŒ™ŠŒšGšŒŠ›–™GšGˆ‹‘œš›Œ‹UGGG
2005-III
5
A rise in oil prices
directly and
indirectly affects
the prices of goods
and services within
the consumption
basket.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
Table 2.1. Effects of Oil Prices on Goods and Services
(Percentage Change)
January-September 2005
July-September 2005
Petroleum Products
16.21
7.12
Non-Petroleum Goods
0.83
0.38
Services Susceptible to Oil Prices
14.33
4.31
Services not Susceptible to Oil Prices
9.80
3.50
Goods Group
Services Group
Source: CBRT.
wœ‰“ŠG—™ŠŒGˆ‹‘œš›”Œ•›šGˆ•‹G›ˆŸGˆ™™ˆ•ŽŒ”Œ•›šGŒš—ŒŠˆ““ G•“œŒ•ŠŒ‹G›ŒG
—™ŠŒšG–G—Œ›™–“Œœ”G—™–‹œŠ›šSG›–‰ˆŠŠ–G—™–‹œŠ›šGˆ•‹G›ŒGŒ‹œŠˆ›–•GŽ™–œ—G
•G ›ŒG ›™‹G ˜œˆ™›Œ™UG {ŒG —™ŠŒG •Š™Œ”Œ•›šG –G œ•Œ™š› G ›œ›–•G ˆ•‹G
‹–™”›–™ G™ˆ›ŒšG•G›ŒGŒ‹œŠˆ›–•GŽ™–œ—Gˆ™ŒGˆ‹‘œš›Œ‹G–•Gˆ•Gˆ••œˆ“G‰ˆššUG
l•Œ™Ž G—™ŠŒšSGžŠG”ˆ’ŒGœ—G›ŒG”ˆ•G—ˆ™›G–G›ŒGˆ‹”•š›Œ™Œ‹GŽ––‹šG
—™ŠŒšSG •Š™ŒˆšŒ‹G ‰ G ]UXYG —Œ™ŠŒ•›G •G ›ŒG ™š›G ••ŒG ”–•›šG –G ›ŒG Œˆ™UG
h‹‹›–•ˆ““ SG–›Œ™Gˆ‹”•š›Œ™Œ‹G—™ŠŒšG™–šŒG‰ G[U\]G—Œ™ŠŒ•›G•G›ŒGšˆ”ŒG
—Œ™–‹UGh••œˆ“G—™ŠŒG•Š™ŒˆšŒšG–G›ŒG”Œ•›–•Œ‹GŽ™–œ—šGˆ™ŒG—™–‘ŒŠ›Œ‹G›–G
”–ŒG œ—žˆ™‹šG •G ›ŒG “ˆš›G ˜œˆ™›Œ™G ‹œŒG ›–G šŒˆš–•ˆ“G ˆŠ›–™šG On™ˆ—G YU[PUG
~›•G ›šG ™ˆ”Œž–™’SG ›G šG ›ˆ“G ›–G ’ŒŒ—G —œ‰“ŠG —™ŠŒG ˆ‹‘œš›”Œ•›šG ˆ•‹G
›ˆŸG—–“ŠŒšG•GŠ–•–™”› Gž›G›ŒGŒ•‹T Œˆ™G•“ˆ›–•G›ˆ™ŽŒ›G•G–™‹Œ™G›–G
ˆŠŒŒG›ŒG›ˆ™ŽŒ›Œ‹G™ˆ›ŒG–G•“ˆ›–•UGGGG
GG
Graph 2.4. Energy and Other Administered Prices
(Annual Percentage Change)
18
16
Othe r Adm inis te re d P ric e s
Ene rgy
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Source SIS, CBRT.
G
2005-III
6
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
z•ŠŒG ›ŒG wwpG ž›G ›ŒG ‰ˆšŒG Œˆ™G –G YWWZG šG Š–”—“Œ‹G ž›G —™–‹œŠŒ™G
—™ŠŒšG ŒŸŠ“œ‹•ŽG ›ˆŸŒšSG ›G ˆšG ‰ŒŠ–”ŒG ”–™ŒG šœšŠŒ—›‰“ŒG ›–G Š–š›šG ˆ•‹G
ŒŸŠˆ•ŽŒG ™ˆ›ŒG ‹ŒŒ“–—”Œ•›šG Š–”—ˆ™Œ‹G ›–G ›ŒG ~–“Œšˆ“ŒG w™ŠŒG p•‹ŒŸG
ž›G ›ŒG ‰ˆšŒG Œˆ™G –G X``[UG hŠŠ–™‹•Ž“ SG ‹ŒŒ“–—”Œ•›šG •G –“G —™ŠŒšSG
žŠGŠ–”ŒG›–G›ŒG–™ŒGˆ”–•ŽG–›Œ™GŠ–š›GˆŠ›–™šSGˆšG‰ŒŠ–”ŒGˆG“Œˆ‹•ŽG
ˆŠ›–™GˆŒŠ›•ŽG›ŒG›™Œ•‹G–G›ŒGwwpUGtŒˆ•ž“ŒSG›GšG–‰šŒ™Œ‹G›ˆ›G›ŒG
ˆ••œˆ“G ™šŒG •G •–•T—Œ›™–“Œœ”G ”ˆ•œˆŠ›œ™•ŽG •‹œš›™ G OŒŸŠ“œ‹•ŽG Š–’ŒSG
Š–ˆ“G ˆ•‹G ™Œ•Œ‹G —Œ›™–“Œœ”G —™–‹œŠ›šPG —™ŠŒšG G šG “–žŒ™G ›ˆ•G ›ˆ›G –G
”ˆ•œˆŠ›œ™•ŽG •‹œš›™ G —™ŠŒšG On™ˆ—G YU\PUG {šG ‹ˆ›ˆG —–•›šG ›–G ›ŒG ˆŠ›G
›ˆ›G žŒ•G ›ŒG ŒŒŠ›G –G –“G —™ŠŒšG šG ˆ‹‘œš›Œ‹SG ”ˆ•œˆŠ›œ™•ŽG •‹œš›™ G
—™ŠŒšG —œ™šœŒG ˆG ˆ–™ˆ‰“ŒG Š–œ™šŒG ˆ•‹G ”ˆ’ŒG ˆG —–š›ŒG Š–•›™‰œ›–•G ›–G
Š–•šœ”Œ™G—™ŠŒšG•“ˆ›–•UGG
Graph 2.5. Manufacturing Industry and Non-Oil Manufacturing Industry Prices
(Annual Percentage Change)
25
Manufacturing Industry
Non-petroleum Manufacturing Industry
20
15
10
6.15
5
2.02
09/05
07/05
05/05
03/05
01/05
11/04
09/04
07/04
05/04
03/04
01/04
0
Source:SIS, CBRT.
2005-III
7
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
3. Demand and Supply Developments
3.1. Supply-Demand Balance
E
! "
#
$
# ! #
#
$
% !
$
#
!
$
#
# "
! # # &
'& #
( ')&!// // # & '& #
!
!
//
Percent
Graph 3.1.1. Annual GNP Growth Rate Expectations in the CBRT Expectations Survey
9.5
9.0
8.5
8.0
7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
End-year GNP Growth Rate
Expectations
GNP Projection
I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II
Jan.Feb.
March
AprilMayJuneJulyAug.Sept.Oct.Nov.Dec.Jan.Feb.
March
AprilMayJuneJulyAug.Sep.Oct.
2004
2005
Source: CBRT.
*+
,
! #
( -!
# #
2005-III
8
Seasonally adjusted
data point to an
acceleration in
economic activity in
Q2-2005.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
%
!
&
+
$
#%
./0 1$
*#!
+
& 2 ) #3
4))5
( *%* 6
%
%$ ! 7
8&(
* +
8
(
# 6! $
*
#
#
#
6#! - - (
# # 9!&
!
6!
#
(
///
h•ˆ“ ¡•ŽG‹ŒŒ“–—”Œ•›š
!
# #
8 (
% ! ! &! &
# 3
! &
! #
&
#
!
#
!
#
#
$
( *%*! 2
7 8&(
! 9! 2
#
$
-
// !
2
! 2005-III
9
The developments in
the sectoral
composition of the
manufacturing
industry production
confirm the current
trend in investment
expenditures.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
#
$
# +2
//
Table 3.1.1. GDP Developments by Expenditure Side
(Annual Percentage Change)
2003
1-Consumption Expenditures
Public
Private
Durable Goods
Food and Beverages
Semi-dur and Non-dur. Goods
2-Fixed Capital Formation
Public
Private
3- Stock Change*
4-Exports of Goods and Services
5-Imports of Goods and Services
6-Total Domestic Demand
7-Total Final Domestic Demand
8-GDP (Expenditure Side)
*Contribution to GDP growth, percent.
Source: SIS.
2004
Annual
5.6
-2.4
6.6
24.0
4.1
2.1
10.0
-11.5
20.3
3.0
16.0
27.1
9.3
6.5
5.8
I
11.6
2.6
12.4
48.0
5.3
8.2
57.6
-5.9
65.5
2.5
10.9
31.3
20.6
19.8
11.8
II
15.4
-7.8
18.4
61.4
2.6
36.8
47.4
-8.7
63.1
1.4
17.2
32.7
21.4
22.9
14.4
2005
III
5.9
-7.0
7.3
28.9
0.0
18.3
26.1
-10.8
38.9
-1.2
8.2
16.1
8.1
9.9
5.3
IV Annual
4.7
9.0
11.1
0.5
3.6
10.1
-5.7
29.7
5.4
2.8
16.3
18.8
11.2
32.4
0.9
-4.7
17.7
45.5
2.5
1.1
14.4
12.5
19.6
24.7
8.5
14.1
6.3
14.1
6.3
9.0
I
4.0
4.3
4.0
1.5
4.6
12.0
6.9
36.6
4.8
0.1
11.3
9.3
4.4
4.7
4.8
SixMonthAl
II tı Aylık
4.4
4.2
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.2
2.6
2.1
8.8
6.7
4.2
8.2
17.9
13.1
31.1
32.6
15.8
10.8
-0.9
-0.4
4.7
7.7
9.2
9.2
6.4
5.4
8.2
6.5
4.2
4.4
" , #
2 $
! #
!
')& # ! ' % +
! # 4
)5 6! ! 2 , ')! $,
'
Graph 3.1.2. Total Investment and Total Final Domestic Demand
(Seasonally Adjusted)
Thnd YTL
Thnd YTL
36000
11000
33000
9500
30000
8000
27000
6500
24000
5000
03-I
03-II
03-III
03-IV
Total Investment, right axis
04-I
04-II
04-III
04-IV
05-I
05-II
Total Final Domestic Demand, left axis
Source: SIS, CBRT.
2005-III
10
According to
seasonally adjusted
data, total final
domestic demand
displayed an
accelerated rise in Q2
compared to Q1.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
"
#
#
-
!
2
2#
!
#
&#! #
#
%
$
!
# # ! &
&
% +
! &
#
!
')6!
!&
& $
% 8&*
! ) ! #!
" +
! # 4 )5 % ! # ./0 #
.
%$ 4./0 .%5
$
4)5
Graph 3.1.3. Domestic Sales of White Goods and Motor Vehicles
(Seasonally Adjusted)
Thnd
Thnd
1500
250
200
1200
150
900
100
600
50
0
300
03-I
03-II
03-III 03-IV
04-I
White Goods, left axis
04-II
04-III 04-IV
05-I
05-II
05-III
Motor Vehicles, right axis
Source: AMA, CBRT.
9#! #
$
##
6!
&
+
2005-III
11
Domestic demand
composition in Q22005 seems to be
relatively more
favorable compared
to the previous period
in terms of mediumterm growth-inflation
relationship.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
#
#
$
% ! When demand
developments are
analyzed in terms of
medium-term trends,
$
growth in labor supply
Graph 3.1.4 . Private Consumption and CBRTPCI
Thnd YTL
25000
120
Private Consumption, seasonally adjusted, left axis
CBRTPCI, right axis
22500
110
100
20000
90
17500
80
15000
70
05-II
03-
04-III
03-I
02-II
00-
01-III
00-I
99-II
97-
98-III
97-I
96-II
95-III
94-
60
94-I
12500
Source: SIS, CBRT.
% ! # #
$
$
9! #
$
, '&
$
(
')!
$
' 6! #
$
, ! ): ')!
7 '& #
+
#
&
#
!
')&!
): '! #
! - #
$
#
%
'& &
; 8&(
9#!
&
! $
#
#
2005-III
12
along with the public
incomes policy
consistent with
inflation target is
expected to ease the
pressure on wages
and thus help stable
growth in demand
continue.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
(
6!
)
&
#
); # '
#
# #
./0 /
*# *
!
#
!##
4)5
Graph 3.1.5. CBRT BTS Expectation of TL Credit Interest Rate and Investment Expenditure
Tendency
80
60
40
20
0
-20
-40
-60
0508
0505
0502
0411
0408
0405
0402
0311
0308
0305
0302
0211
0208
0205
0202
0111
0108
0105
0102
0011
0008
0005
-80
Next Twelve Months Investment Expenditure Tendency, More-Less
Credit Interest Rate Expected Over The Next 12 Months (Percent, Adjusted Average)
Source: CBRT BTS.
/
&
#
!
#
# 2! # &
7
7; ! #! 8&(
!
!
#
# :
&
# # ! #
$
2 # #
' ') # '
#
$
1
For a detailed evaluation of the developments in the construction sector, please see Box 3.1.
2005-III
13
Current data indicate
that total investment
expenditures will
continue to increase
in the third quarter as
well.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
#
&
$ -
#
$
#
#
#
#
#
! #
&
! ! 2
-
-
Graph 3.1.6. Output Gap/ Potential GDP (Percent)
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
05-III
05-I
04-III
04-I
03-III
03-I
02-III
02-I
01-III
01-I
00-III
00-I
-10
Source: CBRT.
{ŒGŒš›”ˆ›ŒšG–™G›ŒG–œ›—œ›GŽˆ—
#
- ' # %
-!
!
!
# # 4 ):5 %
# - # ! # 2
<
'&9#!
- 6!
#
9&
## # $ 9#! #
! $ 2005-III
14
Although it is believed
that current demand
conditions are not at a
level that may exert a
pressure on prices, it
is a fact that their
contribution to the
disinflation process
has weakened
compared to the last
three years.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
3
!
#
-
- ! 0 :! #
(
!
$
. ! ( # ! = > $
= > ! &
#!
-
9# &
!
= > #
$
? ! $
#
$
)
!
./0 / *#!
-
# = > $
2 9#! $
#
= > ! - :
3.2.Foreign Demand
@*)
"2!
2<
#
4%%%)5%
8&(
! @* 2 @* )7 % ! # $ 2005-III
15
A likely deterioration
in expectations that
may stem from the
rise in oil prices –if it
persists too long to
become permanent still poses risk on the
2006 inflation target.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
Graph 3.2.1. Current Account Balance / GNP*
(Percent)
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
05-II
04-III
03-IV
03-I
02-II
01-III
00-IV
00-I
99-II
98-III
97-IV
97-I
96-II
95-III
94-IV
94-I
-7
* Annualized data.
Source: CBRT.
(
*%*!
! $
); ( 1( 4 - 1$
(5 !
$
*
1#
$
!
%
;
"
7! )7 ; !
"
$!
): $ 6
A *
# $# " 2! 2005-III
16
In the first eight
months of 2005, rise in
imports was led mostly
by imports of
intermediary goods.
The rise in oil prices
made significant
contribution to the rise
in imports.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
#
&
2
-
3.3.Costs
% ! ): % #
! ) & 9#! &
$
!
$
&
!
%
!
#
) ! # 4 %%%)5
Table 3.3.1. Employment, Real Wage and Productivity Developments in Manufacturing Industry
(Percentage Change Compared to the same period last year)
2003
Annual
I
II
2004
III
IV
Annual
2005
I
1.8
-6.8
3.1
-1.9
-5.3
0.6
0.7
-13.6
2.4
0.2
2.9
2.5
2.7
-11.0
4.5
5.1
7.7
7.5
2.2
-9.6
3.7
3.4
5.6
5.3
2.2
-9.7
3.6
1.6
2.9
3.9
2.0
-11.0
3.6
2.5
4.7
4.8
1.9
-10.2
3.1
3.2
8.7
3.5
-1.6
-7.8
-1.1
2.1
5.4
2.0
7.2
8.1
7.9
-6.3
-5.6
-4.7
8.5
14.8
9.0
-0.6
-0.6
2.6
13.6
13.1
15.0
3.7
9.2
5.8
6.4
5.6
7.6
1.5
1.2
4.6
1.6
8.5
1.2
-0.5
2.5
2.3
7.3
10.5
8.0
1.3
3.2
4.3
5.1
7.0
6.1
3.1
10.6
3.2
4.3
12.6
3.3
2.6
3.3
3.0
II
Employment
(1)
Public
Private
Wages(2)
Public
Private
Productivity(
3)
Public
Private
Earnings(4)
Public
Private
(1) SIS, Manufacturing Industry Production Worker Index, 1997=100.
(2) SIS, Manufacturing Industry Real Wages Index per Production Hours Worked, 1997=100.
(3) SIS, Manufacturing Industry Partial Productivity Index per Production Hours Worked, 1997=100.
(4) SIS, Manufacturing Industry Real Earnings Index per Production Worker,1997=100.
$
#
!
#
! ; 4
)5 (
#!
2005-III
17
Developments in
productivity and real
wages in the first half
indicate that the
favorable trend in
costs continues.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
Graph 3.3.1. Private Manufacturing Industry Unit Real Wage Index *
(1997=100)
125
115
105
95
85
75
65
05-I
04-III
04-I
03-III
03-I
02-III
02-I
01-III
01-I
00-III
00-I
99-III
99-I
98-III
98-I
97-III
97-I
55
* The total real wage index of the SIS, which is formed by multiplying SIS private manufacturing industry real wages index per production
hours worked by SIS private manufacturing industry production hours, is divided by the SIS quarterly private manufacturing industry
production index. In other words, the unit real wage index is the ratio of real wages to partial labor productivity.
Source: SIS, SPO, CBRT.
!
""#$
%
Y
&$
'
""#$
$
( )
*"
+
&
,
-.
""#Z
/
%0 $
2
According to the protocol signed in July 2005, public workers’ salaries will be increased by 3 percent each in the first and second
halves of the second year of the protocol. However, in case the CPI exceed the increment ratio, 80 percent of the difference will be
added to salaries in the first half and 100 percent of the difference will be added to the salaries in the second half.
3
Ministry of Finance, “Presentation of the Budget for 2006” (TGNA Plan and Budget Commission), 28 October 2005, p 44.
2005-III
18
Provided the salary
increases in private
sector stays close to
the
increases in
public workers’
salaries, no cost
pressure is expected
to generate from
wages and salaries
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
{–œŽ
$
$
$
1 2
3
$
'"
%
%
4$
%
3
$
$
$
$
$
$
%
Table 3.3.2. Indicators of Production Costs
2003
2004
Annual
Imports Unit Price Index
I
II
III
2005
IV
Annual
I
100.0
111.4
112.7
116.6
123.3
116.0
Crude Oil Prices ($/Barrel)
27.0
30.0
32.0
36.7
39.6
34.6
41.7
Metal Prices Index
98.2
130.0
130.2
133.8
141.9
134.0
161.5
II
III
(1)
122.0(1)
47.6
55.3(2)
125.3 123.6
163.5 167.2(1)
(1) The data pertaining to Q3-2005 covers July-August period.
(2) August and September values are estimated values.
Source: SIS, SPO, IFS.
2005-III
19
The high level of
raw material prices,
especially of oil
prices, poses risk to
inflation.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
BOX 3.1. PRODUCTION IN CONSTRUCTION SECTOR AND HOUSE SUPPLY
Construction sector has started to recover as of the end of 2003 after a long period of stagnation. Private
investments on buildings and houses that had tended to shrink by 1996 have started to grow since the
last quarter of 2003, thus increasing their share in GNP. (Box 3.1.Graph 1). Increased loan opportunities
and the decline in interest rates as well as recovery in deferred demand stimulated by economic stability
became the factors that helped recovery. Value added in construction started to increase parallel to the
revival in investments in buildings and houses. Demand has stimulated recovery in the sector and
housing prices started to climb. The developments in the last few years helped recovery in deferred
demand for houses and brought housing to the fore as an important investment instrument. These
developments supported the process that increases the supply of houses. The formation of the necessary
legal infrastructure that enables the borrower to buy residential property by using a mortgage to pledge
real property to the lender as security against the debt is believed to rest demand process on a more
sound ground.
In Turkey, the periods of shrinkage in construction sector have always coincided with the periods of
decline in GDP. The value added of construction sector rapidly decreased in 1994, 1999 and 2001, when
economy underwent serious contraction. However, recovery in construction sector was rather delayed
compared to the GDP. For instance, value added of construction sector started to decrease due to the
economic crisis in 2001 and did not recover until the end of 2003, although the economy entered upward
trend in 2002 and 2003. The growth in the value added in construction sector was quite high in the first
half of 2005. Therefore, the share of the value added in construction sector in GDP started to increase.
Box 3.1.Graph 1. The Share of Private Sector Construction-Housing Investments and
Value Added of Construction in GDP
15
Private Sector ConstructionHousing Investments
Construction Value Added
Percent
12
9
6
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
3
One of the most important indicators of demand for housing is the statistics pertaining to construction
permits. After 1994, and especially after the 1999 earthquake and the 2001 economic crisis, there has not
been a significant increase in the number of construction permits for houses despite the rise in population.
The number of construction permits granted for apartments started to increase rapidly after years of
decline. Meanwhile, the construction permits show that recovery in housing production started to be
manifested in housing supply only in a limited manner in 2005. (Box 3.1.Table.1). Therefore, despite the
revival in housing production, housing supply has not yet reached a level that is adequate to meet the
deferred demand. The rise in investment expenditures with the ease of uncertainties led to an increase in
the construction of industrial and commercial buildings -though not as much as housing- and contributed
to the value added in construction sector.
2005-III
20
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
Box 3.1. Table 1. Housing Production by Years (According to Construction Permits Received
and Residence Permits)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005*
Construction Permits
No. Of
Apartments
Annual % Change
381,408
-7.7
392,943
3.0
467,024
18.9
548,129
17.4
523,791
-4.4
518,236
-1.1
454,295
-12.3
464,117
2.2
414,573
-10.7
339,446
-18.1
315,162
-7.2
279,616
-11.3
145,397
-48.0
202,237
39.1
323,927
60.2
204,094
57.4
Residence Permit
No. Of
Annual %
Apartments
Change
232,018
-7.4
227,471
-2.0
268,804
18.2
269,695
0.3
245,610
-8.9
248,946
1.4
267,306
7.4
277,056
3.6
219,737
-20.7
215,613
-1.9
245,155
13.7
243,464
-0.7
166,318
-31.7
162,776
-2.1
160,116
-1.6
86,593
18.6
* For the first 6 months
Source: SPO.
While SIS calculates the value added in private construction sector, a building that has been granted
construction permit is deemed to be completed within 5 years at the latest. According to the SIS method,
the value added calculated for any given year contains the total area of buildings that have received
construction permits in the last two years as well.1 Therefore, the rise in the number of construction
permits received in 2003 and 2004 precedes the increase in the value added in construction sector in
2005. In other words, movements in construction permits are reflected on the national construction
statistics with delays (Box 3.1.Graph 2). Within this framework, the ongoing rise in the number of permits
received in the first half of 2005 hints that growth in the value added in construction sector will continue to
increase in the upcoming period too.
Box 3.1. Graph 2. Construction Permits of Private Sector and Value Added of
Construction (Annualized)
Thnd m2
Thnd YTL
5600
160000
140000
5400
120000
5200
100000
80000
5000
60000
40000
20000
Private Sector Construction Permits, left
4800
Construction value added, right
4600
0
4400
4
1
2
3
2003
4
1
2
2004
3
4
1
2
2005
Source: CBRT.
In the mean time, the vigorous activity in construction sector boosts production in many sub-sectors of
manufacturing industry, such as metallic goods, main metals and especially non-metallic minerals. The
strong relationship between the developments in sectors providing intermediate input to construction
sector and the value added in the construction sector is illustrated in Box 3.1 Graph 3. Therefore, it can be
asserted that construction sector, within respect to the relations between sectors, will continue to
contribute to growth substantially in the upcoming period.
1
For details see, “Gross National Product: Concept, Methodology and Sources” (in Turkish), SIS, Nov. 1994, Pub. No. 1710.
2005-III
21
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
Box 3.1. Graph 3. Developments in Sectors Providing Intermediate Input to Construction
Sector
(Annualised)
Thnd YTL
7000
150
6000
130
5000
110
4000
90
3000
70
2000
50
4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Construction Value Added, left
Non Metallic Minerals, right
Metallic Goods, right
Main Metals, right
With the achievement of lasting economic stability and the decline in interest rates, buying a house has
become more attractive. Within this framework, the housing financing system based on mortgage, which
is planned to be implemented in 2006, is expected to boost the activity in construction sector. Therefore, it
is projected that the building and housing investments will continue to boost in order to meet the deferred
demand and rapid urbanization. Thus, the share of value added in construction sector in economic
activities will continue to rise. As was emphasized above, Turkish economy involves the necessary
conditions for going beyond the level reached in 1990s.
DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSTRUCTION SECTOR AND LABOR MARKET
The reflections of the developments in housing sector on labor market shall be evaluated by taking
account of the fact that the convergence of Turkish economy with the European Union countries will be
accelerated in the accession period. In this period, labor force will gradually shift from agricultural sector
to industrial and services sectors. Demand for houses will grow parallel to the rise in population and the
need for urbanization, and accordingly, investments in buildings and housing will increase, which, in turn,
will support growth and employment.
Parallel to the rise in the share of value added in construction sector, employment in the sector has
increased substantially. The share of construction sector in total employment became approximately 5
percent in 2004 (Box 3.1.Graph 4). Therefore, the contribution of construction sector to the employment
problem alone remains quite limited. However, as it is expected that activities in construction sector will
accelerate and the share of agricultural sector in total employment will continue to decrease, it is believed
that construction sector will play a very important role in the process marked by shift from agricultural
sector to industrial and services sectors and the share of construction sector in total employment will
expand.
Box 3.1. Graph.4. The Share of Construction Sector in Total Employment
7.0
6.5
Percent
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
2005-III
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
4.0
22
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
4. Developments in Financial Markets and Monetary Policy
A
! " # "$
%&
' ( $ %
& $ % " )
$%
&
&*:
) $ % + , -"./01 23
&
+ ,/.1 + #
.1 ,
/ . "
4.1. CBRT Monetary Policy
# 4 3*0 $ % 5 4 6 $ % 1
The operational framework of the new regime and the details of its decision-making mechanism will be made public in December.
2005-III
23
With the belief that
the preconditions
are met in general,
the Central Bank
is in preparation to
adopt the full
fledged inflation
targeting regime as
of the beginning of
2006.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
%
$ % &
#, ) #, # )
0
*)0
) & &
720)
, 8 ) 0 0 8 #,
# &
9 : ; 5 *< ; 53=> 3?
Table 4.1.1. Performance Criteria, Indicative Values and Their Realizations
Base Money Upper Limit
(Billion YTL)
31 December 2004
31 May 2005
30 June 2005
30 September 2005
31 December 2005
Target
20.9 (P)
23.6(P)
23.6(P)
24.7(P)
25.0(G)
Realization
19.19
22.98
22.6
26.8
-
Net Domestic Assets Upper
Limit
(Billion YTL)
Target
Realization
35.0(G)
30.12
37.7(G)
31.32
37.7(G)
23.99
(G)
37.8
23.7
36.4(G)
-
Net International Reserve Level
(Billion Dollars)
Target
-2.0(P)
2.0(P)
2.0(P)
2.75(P)
3.8(G)
Realization
1.29
5.84
10.46
13.2
-
Source: CBRT.
(1) Upper limits are calculated on the average of the stocks on the mentioned dates and the last five working days preceding these dates and up to this date.
(P): Performance criterion; (I ): Indicative target
2005-III
24
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
,
$%
) : " @
" ) ; 5
A
"
; 5& 7
# A >?
! " >? # " &
)
B
:
#,& ( " 2005-III
! 25
The monetary
expansion in Turkey is
considered to be a
non-inflationary and
healthy development
that stemmed from the
increase in economic
stability.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
*
#
$%
6
& &
&
& & " "
&
#
&>
? 8 0 $ % -C #, " , $%:
0"
# $ % 8 ) 9 30 9&
A 4 0
7=0
4 -C >D
3?
2005-III
26
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
Graph 4.1.1. Interest Rates Developments
95
ISE Bonds and Bills Market Interest Rates (Benchmark securities, compound)
CBRT O/N Borrowing Rate
85
75
65
55
45
35
25
15
10.12.05
08.05.05
06.01.05
03.25.05
01.17.05
11.09.04
09.02.04
06.28.04
04.20.04
02.13.04
12.04.03
09.24.03
07.21.03
05.13.03
03.05.03
12.17.02
10.03.02
07.25.02
05.21.02
03.12.02
01.02.02
5
Source: CBRT.
$%"
& " "
# &&
&9
# $ %! $
%! &&
# $ % $
2005-III
27
It is possible to say
that the efficiency of
Central Bank’s interest
rate decisions within
the transmission
mechanism is
gradually increasing.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
% " -C#,
$%
) " $ % " 7 A 0 -C >D3?
) $%
; 5 E
):$%
# " $ % & 7=0
0F
$ " %: ; " E # $%&
&
'
, C9 >D3?
2
As of August 2005, CBRT real interest rates were approximately 4.50 points below the real interest rates of Brazil.
2005-III
28
The gradual reduction
made by the Central
Bank in short-term
interest rates, from 59
percent at the
beginning of 2002, to
13.75 percent, already
points to/the
remarkable decline.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
Graph 4.1.2. Treasury Auctions Real Interest Rate and Risk Premium
Real Interest Developments in Treasury Auctions
( Calculated According to Annual CPI Inflation Expectations, %)
Spread (JP Morgan Index)
900
800
27
700
22
600
500
17
400
12
300
38443
38353
38261
38169
38078
37987
37895
37803
37712
Jul-05
Sep-05
May-05
Jan-05
Mar-05
Nov-04
Jul-04
Sep-04
May-04
Jan-04
Mar-04
Nov-03
Jul-03
Sep-03
May-03
Jan-03
Mar-03
37622
200
7
! "
#$%&'(
Graph 4.1.3. Yield Curves
31-Dec-02
31-Dec-03
31-Dec-04
14-Oct-05
interest rates
59
49
39
29
19
9
1M
2M
3M
6M
9M
12M
months to maturity
Source: CBRT.
2005-III
29
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
4.2. CBRT’s Exchange Rate Policy and Exchange Rate Developments
) &
"
*
*
+,
-.
/
0
% / &
1 / 2* 3)
0
+ 4 3)
3
5)4 / +
2* 6 /#$%&(#,%&(
2005-III
30
Continuation of the
structural reforms and
completion of the
necessary legal
process for this will
have a key role in
terms of the strong
position of YTL.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
Graph 4.2.1. Exchange Rate Developments
EURO/USD Exchange Rate (Left axis)
Real Effective Exchange Rate (CPI based) (Left axis)
Annual Inflation Rate (CPI)(Right axis)
YTL/USD Exchange Rate (Right axis)
1.4
1.80
160
35
150
30
140
25
130
20
120
15
110
10
100
5
1.70
1.3
1.60
1.2
1.50
1.1
1.40
Apr-05
Jan-05
Oct-04
Jul-04
Jan-04
Apr-04
Oct-03
9/2/2005
5/2/2005
1/2/2005
9/2/2004
5/2/2004
1/2/2004
9/2/2003
5/2/2003
1/2/2003
9/2/2002
5/2/2002
1.00
1/2/2002
0.8
Jul-03
1.10
Apr-03
1.20
0.9
Jan-03
1.30
1
" *7 +,
*7 2 6 0
*
+
89
+/
+ ,6 *7 *
*7
+,
+
, *7 *7 " 0
. *7 *7 + , 8 % *70
)4&!8%
! *
2005-III
31
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
.
)4%!
+ , *7
:
"1!
% 1 ! 3) *7
2 3 ; < ! *7 + ,
)4%%&%1!
4.3. Banking and Credit Developments
8 !
0
! #%'&(
Table 4.3.1. Development of Consumer Loans and Claims from Credit Cards
(Quarterly Percentage Change in Real Terms)
Consumer Loans
Housing Loans
Vehicle Loans
Other Loans
Credit Cards
2004Q3
7,7
12,4
4,5
8,3
14,6
2004Q4
4.0
9.1
0.7
4.4
2005Q1
17.6
33.7
-0.7
23.8
2005Q2
23.4
61.9
11.7
11.7
2005Q3
23.3
50,6
11.4
11.3
25.5
-2.4
8.4
6,3
Source: CBRT.
+ 3) #$%'&(
2 6 2005-III
32
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
Graph 4.3.1. Credits Extended to Real Sector/GNP (percent)
28
24
20
16
05Q3*
04Q3
03Q3
02Q3
01Q3
00Q3
99Q3
98Q3
97Q3
96Q3
12
*Estimated figures are used for the GNP in the third quarter of 2005.
Source: CBRT.
# %'( Table 4.3.2. Distribution of Consumer Loans According to Bank Groups
(Nominal Monthly Percentage Change)
Consumer
Loans
Public Banks Private Banks
Foreign Banks*
December 2004
4.1
2.1
4.6
7.8
January 2005
1.0
-0.9
1.7
3.3
February 2005
10.9
26.3
3.3
6.5
March 2005
5.8
2.0
7.8
9.7
April 2005
9.5
5.7
11.6
11.2
May 2005
6.8
3.9
8.7
5.7
June 2005
7.4
3.6
9.1
9.7
July 2005
9.3
2.7
9.9
29.4
August 2005
6.3
3.4
8.1
6.1
September 2005
7.2
5.2
8.4
6.0
*The high increase observed in the consumer loans of foreign banks in July stemmed from the fact that Dışbank
attained the status of a foreign bank.
Source: CBRT.
8
0
*7
+,
- " + , 2005-III
33
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
9
" " 6 *7"
0
"
3)
8
9 2005-III
34
The Central Bank
continues to monitor
the acceleration in
bank loans closely,
especially that of the
housing loans.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
BOX 4.1. DE-DOLLARIZATION PROCESS AND TURKEY
In its simplest meaning, dollarization is defined as the situation in which economic agents hold foreign currency and assets
denominated in foreign currency. The high inflation environment caused by macroeconomic instability leads economic
agents to holding assets in foreign currency by stimulating their motivation to diversify their portfolios and to protect the
value of financial assets against the depreciation of the domestic currency. Furthermore, in such an environment, firms,
households and governments borrow in terms of foreign currency from both domestic and foreign sources. With all these
features, dollarization is a specific characteristic of many developing countries.
There are various definitions of dollarization in economic literature. Asset Dollarization is defined as the situation in which
a foreign currency performs one or all of the functions (unit of account, medium of exchange and store of value functions)
expected from a domestic currency. Traditional dollarization literature considers the share of FX deposits in total deposits or
in broad money supply (M2Y) as an indicator of the dollarization level in a country.1 Co-utilization of foreign currency and the
domestic currency as the medium of payment and the unit of account is also considered as an indicator of currency
substitution.2 Having said that, the best indicator for asset dollarization in a country is believed to be the share of foreign
currency-portfolio of households and firms (non-banking sector) in the total portfolio. In this framework, depending on the
availability of data, the degree of asset dollarization (v*) in Turkey is calculated as below: 3
FX Portfolio
FX Banknotes + FX Deposits+ FX and FX-indexed Government
Domestic Debt Instruments + Eurobond + FX Mutual Funds +
FX SFH Participation Account + Foreign Equities and Assets +
Other Assets
Total Portfolio
Currency in Circulation + Deposits + Government Domestic
Debt Instruments + Mutual Funds + SFH Participation Account
+ Equities, Insurance and Other Assets + Repo
Degree of Asset
Dollarization (v*)=
In addition to asset dollarization, residents’ liabilities to residents and/or to non-residents in terms of foreign currency are
defined as Liability Dollarization in literature. The “Liability Dollarization” literature, which appeared especially after the
Asian crisis, together with the third generation crisis models4 towards the end of the 1990s, suggests that the foreign
exchange denominated items listed in the balance sheets of the sectors in the economy can be important indicators for the
determination of the degree of dollarization in a country.5 This new literature has been frequently discussed in recent years,
especially in terms of developing countries, which are dependent on foreign deposits and especially foreign credits, due to
their current account deficits. Analyzing the experiences of other countries, it is seen that the banking sector tends to create
FX assets to balance the FX items in the asset and liability sections of their balance sheets, against the FX assets of the
non-banking sector and the foreign assets denominated in FX. Moreover, the degree of liability dollarization becomes an
important indicator in cases where the public sector borrows in terms of foreign currency from domestic sources.
Following literature on the subject, some indicators are chosen by analyzing the liability sections of the balance sheets of
economic agents and the degree of liability dollarization (y*) is computed for Turkey by calculating the weighted average of
these indicators:
The Degree of Liability
Dollarization (y*)
FX Credits
=
+
Total Credits
Foreign Exchange and
FX-indexed Domestic
Debt Stock
Total Domestic Debt
Stock
Total External Debt
Stock
+
GDP
Although there is no clear and generally accepted definition for the measurement of financial dollarization in a country, the
“composite dollarization index” defined by Reinhart et al. (2003) is an important indicator containing information for both
asset and liability dollarization.6 In this framework, the following method of calculation is believed to be appropriate for the
composite dollarization index of the Turkish economy (d*), by taking into account the indicators of both the asset and liability
structures of the balance sheets of economic agents: 7
Composite Dollarization Index (d*)
= wv*v*+wy*y*
1 Primarily, the FXD/M2Y ratio indicates only one dimension of dollarization and does not comprise investment instruments other than deposits. However, due to the
lack of data, other studies in the literature generally use this definition.
2The difficulties in predicting the amount of foreign currency held by the non-banking sector in a country pose an obstacle to determining the level of currency
substitution.
3FX Banknotes, Foreign Equities and Assets though originally planned to be included in the calculations, ended up being omitted, due to the lack of data.
4These models, which analyze the effects of liability dollarization on the economy – and which can be defined as a branch of the third generation crisis models -,
emphasize the roles of balance sheet imbalances arising from currency mismatch, in financial crises.
5Calvo (2002), Krugman (2001), Aghion et al (2000).
6In the article, an economy dominated by dollarization-is defined as an economy where part of the portfolios of the non-banking sector is composed of FX assets
and/or public and private sectors borrowed in terms of foreign currency (from residents and/or non-residents). In this context, the composite dollarization index is
calculated by using indicators such as the ratio of FX deposits (DTH) to broad money supply (M2Y), the ratio of total external debt stock to Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and the share of the Treasury’s FX-denominated and/or FX-indexed domestic debt in the total domestic debt. The index is formed by the addition of the said
ratios, after they have been normalized to a value of 10. Later on, the dollarization levels of countries are classified according to the index values, as low (0-3),
medium (4-8), high (9-13) and very high (14-30). The mentioned index is the starting point for the composite dollarization index that is being attempted to be calculated
for Turkey.
7Asset and liability dollarization levels are transformed into indices with 1997 as the base year. Later on, these indices are combined to form the composite
dollarization index Weights of the asset and liability sectors are equal in the composite dollarization index (wv= wy) and the geometric mean is used
2005-III
35
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
De-dollarization Process in Turkey
Asset dollarization displayed an upward trend in the 1990s as a result of the high inflationary periods in the history of the
Turkish economy on one hand, and legal developments such as allowing residents to hold FX deposits in the Turkish
banking system, in the framework of the liberalization of capital movements, on the other (Box 4.1. Graph 1). This trend
increased significantly in 2001 due to financial crises as residents preferred FX-denominated investment instruments, which
they considered safe. Furthermore, the stability program that has been implemented with determination since 2002 and
helped reducing inflation to single-digit figures, is evidently successful in reversing the asset dollarization trend.8 An
important finding comprised by the constituted degree of the asset dollarization indicators is that the change in global
liquidity perceptions observed in the Second Iraq War and in May 2004 was in the form of a halt in the de-dollarization
process rather than the start of a new dollarization process.
Box 4.1 Graph 1. Degree of Asset Dollarization (Jul.96-Nov.05)
44
42
40
38
36
34
32
30
28
26
24
v1*
Jul-05
Jan-05
Jul-04
Jul-03
Jan-04
Jul-02
Jan-03
Jul-01
Jan-02
Jan-01
Jul-00
Jan-00
Jul-99
Jul-98
Jan-99
Jul-97
Jan-98
Jul-96
Jan-97
v2*
v1*: based on nominal YTL/USD exchange rate and nominal EURO/USD parity;
v2*: based nominal YTL/USD exchange rate and constant EURO/USD parity.
Liability dollarization displays a similar trend to that of asset dollarization (Box 4.1.Graph 2). Liability dollarization was 25
percent in the period from the 1990s to the 2001 financial crisis. The operation that was carried out as part of crisis
management in order to strengthen the financial structure of the banking sector increased the Treasury’s borrowing
requirement. In this framework, The Treasury conducted a swap operation in June 2001. Moreover, degree of liability
dollarization reached very high levels in 2001, also as a result of the external debt stock that increased remarkably. Having
said that, as shown in Box 4.1. Graph 2, the level of liability dollarization displays a downward trend since the beginning of
2002.
Box 4.1. Graph 2. Degree of Liability Dollarization, y* (nominal, percent)
Box 4.1. Graph 3. External Debt Stock/ GDP
(nominal, percent)
115
65
105
55
95
45
85
35
75
65
25
55
Box 4.1. Graph 4. FX Credits/ Total Credits
(nominal, percent)
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
45
Jul-96
Dec-96
May-97
Oct-97
Mar-98
Aug-98
Jan-99
Jun-99
Nov-99
Apr-00
Sep-00
Feb-01
Jul-01
Dec-01
May-02
Oct-02
Mar-03
Aug-03
Jan-04
Jun-04
Nov-04
Apr-05
Sep-05
05
S
Apr-05
Nov-04
Jan-04
Jun-04
Aug-03
Oct-02
Mar-03
May-02
Jul-01
Dec-01
Sep-00
Feb-01
Apr-00
Nov-99
Jan-99
Jun-99
Aug-98
Oct-97
Mar-98
May-97
Jul-96
Dec-96
15
Box. 4.1. Graph 5. FX Denominated and FX Indexed Domestic Debt Stock/ Total
Domestic Debt Stock
38
34
30
26
22
Jun-05
Sep-05
Mar-05
Sep-04
Dec-04
Jun-04
Dec-03
Mar-04
Jun-03
Sep-03
Mar-03
Sep-02
Dec-02
Jun-02
Dec-01
14
Mar-02
Jul-96
Dec-96
May-97
Oct-97
Mar-98
Aug-98
Jan-99
Jun-99
Nov-99
Apr-00
Sep-00
Feb-01
Jul-01
Dec-01
May-02
Oct-02
Mar-03
Aug-03
Jan-04
Jun-04
Nov-04
Apr-05
Sep-05
18
Thirdly, the composite dollarization index is calculated for Turkey and shown in Box 4.1. Graph 6.
8
An important point that should be underlined here is that the asset dollarization indices may display a downward bias (appear lower than their actual values) as the
aggregates such as the amount of foreign currency banknotes cannot be included in the analysis due to lack of data.
2005-III
36
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
Box 4.1.Graph 6. Composite Dollarization Index
(Geometric average, 1997=100)
Jan-05
Jan-04
Jan-03
Jan-02
Jan-01
Jan-00
Jan-99
Jan-98
Jan-97
Jan-96
175
160
145
130
115
100
85
As seen in Box 4.1.Graph 6, one of the reflections of the economic program that has been implemented since the beginning
of 2002 is the reversal in the dollarization trend. However, as stated by Reinhart et al. (2003) dollarization is still at high
levels in the Turkish economy.
An important question is whether the de-dollarization process in Turkey will continue or not. Considering country
experiences, it is seen that achieving financial stability, the independence of the central bank and the decline in inflation
initially could not affect the inertia of the dollarization trend significantly. Reinhart et al. (2003), suggest that in the countries
that experienced chronic inflation for years, a probable increase in inflation rates makes it difficult to break the inertia of the
dollarization trend and hence, inflation rates should be kept at low and stable levels for a very long time in order to erase the
memories of high inflation.
The pre-requisite of a long-lasting and comprehensive de-dollarization process is maintaining lasting monetary and financial
stability in the long term. Furthermore, along with the belief that structural problems are completely solved, there is a need to
diversify the instruments, which will protect the real values of the investments in domestic currency, and to build a maturity
structure that ensures long-term protection as FX investments. Moreover, the formation and development of derivatives
markets is very important for the countries where dollarization is at high levels. Reinhart et al. (2003) state that the two
countries, which gained huge and long-lasting success with their determined economic policies in the de-dollarization
process in the long run, are Israel and Poland. The experiences of the said countries are important because the negative
effects of the de-dollarization process on financial intermediation and capital inflows were minimal in both cases.
Conditions for the de-dollarization process, which is expected to be healthy and long-lived in Turkey are rapidly maturing.
These processes can be summarized as: i) monetary and financial stability, which have been continuing since 2002, ii)
deepening of the markets for government securities and extending borrowing maturities; iii) increasing risk-averseness and
the development of the Derivatives Exchange (Turkdex); iv) the new economic program that largely reduces the probability
of inflation to reach high levels again, the convergence process with the EU and the ongoing reforms in this framework, vi)
foreigners’ YTL-denominated bond issues.
In conclusion, under the assumption that current economic and structural implementations will continue without main
deviations in the upcoming periods, the Turkish economy is expected to display a similar development to that of the
countries, which gained remarkable success in the de-dollarization process. Provided that steps are taken towards
protecting the evident downward trend, significant success will be achieved in the fight against one of the (key) sources of
fragility in the financial system; i.e. dollarization, in the medium and long term.
Source:Akıncı, Ö., Y. Barlas and B. Usta (2005), “ Dollarization Indices: Indicators for the Dollarization Process in Turkey”
(Dolarizasyon Endeksleri: Türkiye’deki Dolarizasyon Sürecine İlişkin Göstergeler), Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey,
Working Paper No. 05/17.
2005-III
37
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
5. Public Finance
I
•G ™ŒŠŒ•›G Œˆ™šSG ˆG šŽ•Šˆ•›G ‹š›ˆ•ŠŒG ˆšG ‰ŒŒ•G Š–Œ™Œ‹G •G ™Œ‹œŠ•ŽG
šŠˆ“G ‹–”•ˆ•ŠŒG ˆ•‹G Œš›ˆ‰“š•ŽG ˆG š›ˆ‰“› G Œ•™–•”Œ•›UG p•G ›ŒG
œ—Š–”•ŽG —Œ™–‹SG ŒŸ—ŒŠ›ˆ›–•šG š–œ“‹G •–›G ‹Œ›Œ™–™ˆ›ŒG •G –™‹Œ™G ›–G
”ˆ•›ˆ•G ›ŒG ˆŠŒŒ”Œ•›šG ˆ•‹G ›–G Œ•šœ™ŒG ›ŒG Š–•šš›Œ•Š G ‰Œ›žŒŒ•G
•“ˆ›–•G™Œˆ“¡ˆ›–•šGˆ•‹G›ˆ™ŽŒ›šG•GYWW]Gˆ•‹Gˆ›Œ™žˆ™‹šUGp•G›šG™Œš—ŒŠ›SG
›ŒG šœš›ˆ•ˆ‰“› G –G šŠˆ“G ‹šŠ—“•ŒG ˆ•‹G š›™œŠ›œ™ˆ“G ™Œ–™”šG ˆ™ŒG š›““G
ŒŸ›™Œ”Œ““ GG”—–™›ˆ•›UGG
p•G›ŒGqˆ•œˆ™ TzŒ—›Œ”‰Œ™GYWW\G—Œ™–‹SG›ŒGŠ–•š–“‹ˆ›Œ‹G‰œ‹ŽŒ›G—™”ˆ™ G
‰ˆ“ˆ•ŠŒG—™–‹œŠŒ‹GˆGšœ™—“œšG–G€{sGY^G‰““–•UG{šGˆ”–œ•›GŠ–™™Œš—–•‹šG
›–GˆGXYUXG—Œ™ŠŒ•›G•Š™ŒˆšŒGŠ–”—ˆ™Œ‹G›–G›ŒGšˆ”ŒG—Œ™–‹G–GYWW[UGp•G›ŒG
šˆ”ŒG—Œ™–‹SG›ŒGŠ–•š–“‹ˆ›Œ‹G‰œ‹ŽŒ›G‹ŒŠ›G‹ŒŠ™ŒˆšŒ‹G‰ G]XUXG—Œ™ŠŒ•›G
‹œŒG ›–G ›ŒG ‹ŒŠ“•ŒG •G •›Œ™Œš›G ŒŸ—Œ•‹›œ™ŒšG ˆ•‹G žˆšG ™Œˆ“¡Œ‹G ˆšG Y_UXG
—Œ™ŠŒ•›G –G ›ŒG Œ•‹T Œˆ™G ›ˆ™ŽŒ›G O{ˆ‰“ŒG \UXPUG tŒˆ•ž“ŒSG ŽG •Š™ŒˆšŒšG
•G —™”ˆ™ G ŒŸ—Œ•‹›œ™ŒšG ™Œš›™Š›Œ‹G ›ŒG •Š™ŒˆšŒG •G ›ŒG —™”ˆ™ G ‰œ‹ŽŒ›G
šœ™—“œšUG {ŒG šˆ‹G ˆ‹Œ™šŒG ŒŒŠ›G šG ”–™ŒG Š“Œˆ™“ G –‰šŒ™Œ‹G •G ›ŒG
—™”ˆ™ G šœ™—“œšG Žœ™ŒšG š›—œ“ˆ›Œ‹G •G ›ŒG —™–Ž™ˆ”UG {šG œ•ˆ–œ™ˆ‰“ŒG
–œ›Š–”ŒG ˆ™šŒšG ™–”G ›ŒG ŒŸŠ“œš–•G –G ›ŒG ‹‹Œ•‹G —ˆ ”Œ•›šG –G š›ˆ›ŒG
‰ˆ•’šG ˆ•‹G •›Œ™Œš›G ™ŒŒ•œŒšSG žŠG ”ˆ’ŒG œ—G ]UZG —Œ™ŠŒ•›G –G ›ŒG
™ŒŒ•œŒšGŠ–““ŒŠ›Œ‹G•G›ŒG™š›G••ŒG”–•›šG–GYWW\SG™–”G›ŒG—™–Ž™ˆ”T
‹Œ•Œ‹GŠ–•š–“‹ˆ›Œ‹G‰œ‹ŽŒ›G™ŒŒ•œŒšUGG
Table 5.1. Consolidated Budget Aggregates
Ratio of Figures to Initial
Budget Appropriations (1)
(Percentage)
2004
2005
Percentage Increase
2004
2005
JanuaryJanuary-September January-September January-September January-September
December
79,778
95,525
19.7
72.1
75.5
64,851
77,817
20.0
72.0
73.0
19,842
22,951
15.7
70.8
82.9
45,009
54,866
21.9
72.5
69.5
12,840
14,998
16.8
73.4
87.0
100,858
103,718
2.8
71.5
66.6
45,176
35,235
-22.0
80.0
62.4
55,683
68,483
23.0
65.9
69.0
21,953
24,244
10.4
75.8
76.0
5,244
7,393
41.0
41.3
51.2
20,989
26,375
25.7
75.8
81.2
14,800
18,050
22.0
76.6
82.1
3,235
5,006
54.7
40.2
49.7
-21,080
-8,193
-61.1
69.6
28.1
24,095
27,042
12.2
92.0
99.0
20,928
21,123
0.9
95.4
90.1
Budget Figures (Million YTL)
Revenues
Tax Revenues
Direct Taxes
Indirect Taxes
Non-Tax Revenues
Expenditures
Interest
Non-Interest
Personnel
Goods and Services Procurement
Current Transfers
Social Security Institutions
Capital Expenditures
Budget Balance
Primary Balance
Primary Balance (Program definition)
Source: Ministry of Finance.
1 Shows the share in end-year figures for 2004.
2005-III
38
In the JanuarySeptember 2005
period, consolidated
budget primary
balance increased by
12.1 percent
compared to the same
period of 2004.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
p•G›ŒG™š›G›™ŒŒG˜œˆ™›Œ™šG–GYWW\SG›ŒG•Š™ŒˆšŒG•G—™”ˆ™ GŒŸ—Œ•‹›œ™ŒšG
ŒŸŠŒŒ‹Œ‹G ›ŒG •Š™ŒˆšŒG •G ™ŒŒ•œŒšUG {ŒG ŽG •Š™ŒˆšŒG •G —™”ˆ™ G
ŒŸ—Œ•‹›œ™ŒšG”ˆ•“ G™Œšœ“›Œ‹G™–”G›ŒG“ŒŒ“G–G›™ˆ•šŒ™GŒŸ—Œ•‹›œ™ŒšG›–G
š–Šˆ“GšŒŠœ™› G•š››œ›–•šUGtŒˆ•ž“ŒSGšœ‰Ž™–œ—šG–GŽ––‹šGˆ•‹GšŒ™ŠŒšG
—™–Šœ™Œ”Œ•›G ˆ•‹G Šˆ—›ˆ“G ŒŸ—Œ•‹›œ™ŒšG ˆ“š–G Œ“‹Œ‹G ŽG ™ˆ›ŒšG –G
•Š™ŒˆšŒUG o–žŒŒ™SG •G ›ŒG ‰œ‹ŽŒ›G ™Œˆ“¡ˆ›–•G –™ŒŠˆš›šG –™G Œ•‹T Œˆ™G
In the first three
quarters of 2005, the
increase in
consolidated budget
primary expenditures
exceeded the increase
in revenues.
YWW\SGˆ••–œ•ŠŒ‹G‰ G›ŒGt•š›™ G–Gm•ˆ•ŠŒG•GvŠ›–‰Œ™SG›GšGˆ•›Š—ˆ›Œ‹G
›ˆ›G ‰–›G —™”ˆ™ G ŒŸ—Œ•‹›œ™ŒšG ˆ•‹G —™”ˆ™ G ŒŸ—Œ•‹›œ™ŒšG ŒŸŠ“œ‹•ŽG
Šœ™™Œ•›G ›™ˆ•šŒ™šG ž““G •–›G ŒŸŠŒŒ‹G ›ŒG •›ˆ“G ˆ——™–—™ˆ›–•šUG t–™Œ–Œ™SG
ž›•G ›ŒG ™ˆ”Œž–™’G –G ›ŒG Œ•‹T Œˆ™G –™ŒŠˆš›šG –G ›ŒG t•š›™ G –G
m•ˆ•ŠŒSG ›G šG Œš›”ˆ›Œ‹G ›ˆ›G ›ŒG Š–•š–“‹ˆ›Œ‹G ‰œ‹ŽŒ›G —™”ˆ™ G šœ™—“œšG
ž““G ŒŸŠŒŒ‹G ›ŒG Œ•‹T Œˆ™G •›ˆ“G ˆ——™–—™ˆ›–•G ‰ G €{sG [U\G ‰““–•G ˆ•‹G
‰ŒŠ–”ŒG €{sG ZXU_G ‰““–•UG o–žŒŒ™SG Žœ™ŒšG –™G ›ŒG qˆ•œˆ™ TzŒ—›Œ”‰Œ™G
—Œ™–‹Gš–žG›ˆ›GŒ•‹T Œˆ™GŽœ™ŒšG–G›ŒG—™–Ž™ˆ”T‹Œ•Œ‹GŠ–•š–“‹ˆ›Œ‹G
‰œ‹ŽŒ›G—™”ˆ™ Gšœ™—“œšG”ˆ G™Œ”ˆ•G‰Œ“–žG›ŒGŒŸ—ŒŠ›Œ‹G“ŒŒ“UGh“›–œŽG
›ŒG —Œ™–™”ˆ•ŠŒG –G ›ŒG —™”ˆ™ G šœ™—“œšG š›—œ“ˆ›Œ‹G ‰ G ›ŒG —™–Ž™ˆ”G šG
‰Œ“–žG›ŒGŒŸ—ŒŠ›Œ‹G“ŒŒ“SGŒ•‹T Œˆ™G›ˆ™ŽŒ›šGˆ™ŒG•–›GŒŸ—ŒŠ›Œ‹G›–G‹Œˆ›ŒG
›–GšœŠGˆ•GŒŸ›Œ•›G›ˆ›Gž““G‹ˆ”ˆŽŒGŒŸ—ŒŠ›ˆ›–•šUG{šGŒžGšGšœ——–™›Œ‹G
‰ G›ŒG“ŒŒ“G–G›ŒG—™–Ž™ˆ”T‹Œ•Œ‹G—™”ˆ™ Gšœ™—“œšGˆšG–GzŒ—›Œ”‰Œ™GˆšG
žŒ““G ˆšG ‰ G ›ŒG —™–‘ŒŠ›–•G –G ›ŒG t•š›™ G –G m•ˆ•ŠŒG ›ˆ›G Œ•‹T Œˆ™G
—™”ˆ™ G šœ™—“œšG ŒŸ—Œ•‹›œ™ŒšG ž““G •–›G ”ˆ•Œš›G ˆ• G ‹Œˆ›–•G ™–”G ›ŒG
•›ˆ“Gˆ——™–—™ˆ›–•UGGG
p›G šG –G Š™›Šˆ“G ”—–™›ˆ•ŠŒG ›ˆ›G ›ŒG ™Œ–™”šG ›–G ‰ŒG ”ˆ‹ŒG •G ˆ™ŒˆšG –G
š–Šˆ“G šŒŠœ™› SG —œ‰“ŠG ŒŸ—Œ•‹›œ™ŒšG ˆ•‹G ›ˆŸŒšSG žŠG ˆ™ŒG ˆ”Œ‹G ˆ›G
—Œ™”ˆ•Œ•›“ G Œš›ˆ‰“š•ŽG šŠˆ“G ‹šŠ—“•ŒSG š–œ“‹G ‰ŒG —™Œ—ˆ™Œ‹G ˆ•‹G —œ›G
•›–G ŒŒŠ›G ž›–œ›G ‹Œ“ˆ UG hšG šG ’•–ž•SG š›™œŠ›œ™ˆ“G ˆ‹‘œš›”Œ•›šG •G ›ŒG
š–Šˆ“GšŒŠœ™› Gš š›Œ”G›ˆ›GŒˆ›œ™ŒG–•G›ŒG™Œ–™”GˆŽŒ•‹ˆG–G›ŒG—œ‰“ŠG
šŒŠ›–™Gˆ™ŒGˆ“š–G•Š“œ‹Œ‹G•G›ŒG™ˆ”Œž–™’G–Gš›™œŠ›œ™ˆ“GŠ–•‹›–•ˆ“›ŒšG
šŒ›G–œ›G•G›ŒG—™–Ž™ˆ”Gœ•‹Œ™›ˆ’Œ•Gž›G›ŒGptmUGp•G›šG™ˆ”Œž–™’SG›ŒG
k™ˆ›G sˆžG –•G z–Šˆ“G zŒŠœ™› G ˆ•‹G nŒ•Œ™ˆ“G oŒˆ“›G p•šœ™ˆ•ŠŒSG žŠG
•Š“œ‹ŒšGˆ‹‘œš›”Œ•›šG™ŒŽˆ™‹•ŽG™Œ›™Œ”Œ•›G™Œ–™”SGUŒUG›ŒG—Œ™–™”ˆ•ŠŒG
Š™›Œ™–•SG žˆšG šœ‰”››Œ‹G –™G ›ŒG ˆ——™–ˆ“G –G ›ŒG n™ˆ•‹G uˆ›–•ˆ“G
hššŒ”‰“ G –G {œ™’Œ G Onuh{PG •G h—™“UG h“š–SG ›Œ™ŒG ˆ™ŒG ›ž–G ”–™ŒG k™ˆ›G
sˆžšG •G ›ŒG ——Œ“•ŒaG {ŒG k™ˆ›G sˆžG –•G ›ŒG z–Šˆ“G zŒŠœ™› G
h‹”•š›™ˆ›ŒG yŒ–™”SG žŠG šG ˆG š›™œŠ›œ™ˆ“G Š™›Œ™–•G ˆ‹‘œš›•ŽG ›ŒG
ˆ‹”•š›™ˆ›ŒG š›™œŠ›œ™•ŽG –G ›ŒG š–Šˆ“G šŒŠœ™› G ™Œ–™”bG ˆ•‹G ›ŒG k™ˆ›G
sˆžG –•G z–Šˆ“G h‹G ˆ•‹G u–•Tw™Œ”œ”G wˆ ”Œ•›šSG žŠG ˆ”šG ˆ›G ›ŒG
ŒŒŠ›ŒGœšŒG–G›ŒG™Œš–œ™ŠŒšGˆ““–Šˆ›Œ‹G–™Gš–Šˆ“Gˆ‹UGG
2005-III
39
It is of critical
importance that the
structural reforms to
be made in areas of
social security, public
expenditures and
taxes, which are
aimed to establish
fiscal discipline
permanently, should
be prepared and
implemented without
any delay.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
{ŒG tŒ‹œ”T{Œ™”G w“ˆ•G –™G ›ŒG YWW]TYWW_G —Œ™–‹G •–“ŒšG ”Œˆšœ™ŒšG
™ŒŽˆ™‹•ŽG —œ‰“ŠG ŒŸ—Œ•‹›œ™ŒšG ˆ•‹G ›ŒG ›ˆŸG š š›Œ”UG p•G ›šG ™Œš—ŒŠ›SG ›ŒG
™Œ–™”G –•G š—Œ•‹•ŽG ˆ”šG ›–G •Š™ŒˆšŒG ŒŒŠ›Œ•ŒššSG ›™ˆ•š—ˆ™Œ•Š G ˆ•‹G
ˆŠŠ–œ•›ˆ‰“› G •G —œ‰“ŠG ŒŸ—Œ•‹›œ™ŒšUG p•G ›ŒG ™ˆ”Œž–™’G –G ›ŒG w“ˆ•SG
The Medium-Term
Plan for the 2006-2008
period includes
measures regarding
public expenditures
and the tax system.
š›™ˆ›ŒŽŒšG –™G ˆ•G ŒŒŠ›ŒG ˆ•‹G š”—“ŒG ›ˆŸG š š›Œ”SG šœ——–™›•ŽG Ž™–ž›G
ˆ•‹GŒ”—“– ”Œ•›Gˆ•‹G™Œ‹œŠ•ŽG›ŒGœ•™ŒŽš›Œ™Œ‹GŒŠ–•–” SGˆŒG‰ŒŒ•G—œ›G
–™žˆ™‹UG p•G ›šG Š–•›ŒŸ›SG ›G šG •›Œ•‹Œ‹G ›–G š”—“ G •Š–”ŒG ˆ•‹G
Š–™—–™ˆ›–•G ›ˆŸŒšG ˆ•‹G ›–G ŒŸ—ˆ•‹G ›ŒG šŠ–—ŒG –G •Š–”ŒG ›ˆŸG •G ›ŒG
œ—Š–”•ŽG —Œ™–‹SG ˆ•‹G ˆ“š–G ›–G Šœ›G ›ŒG ™ˆ›ŒšG –G Š–™—–™ˆ›–•G ›ˆŸG •G YWW]G
ˆ•‹G YWW^UG ~›G ›ŒG •ŒžG ”—“Œ”Œ•›ˆ›–•G –G ›ˆŸŒšSG ›ŒG •ŒžG ž›–“‹•ŽG
š š›Œ”G ž““G ‰ŒG —œ›G •›–G ŒŒŠ›G –™G ›ŒG ›ˆŸˆ›–•G –G šŒŠœ™›ŒšG ˆšG –G
qˆ•œˆ™ GYWW]UGp•G›ŒG™ˆ”Œž–™’G–G›ŒG•ŒžGš š›Œ”SG•›Œ™Œš›G•Š–”ŒG–™G
›™ˆ‹•ŽG—™–ŠŒŒ‹šG–GŽ–Œ™•”Œ•›G—ˆ—Œ™šGššœŒ‹GˆšG–Gqˆ•œˆ™ GYWW]Gž““G
‰ŒGšœ‰‘ŒŠ›G›–GˆGž›–“‹•ŽG›ˆŸG–GX\G—Œ™ŠŒ•›UG
h•–›Œ™G šŽ•Šˆ•›G ššœŒG›ˆ›Gš–œ“‹G‰ŒG™Œˆ“¡Œ‹GŠ–•Šœ™™Œ•›“ Gž›G›ˆŸG
ˆ•‹G š–Šˆ“G šŒŠœ™› G ™Œ–™”šG •G –™‹Œ™G ›–G Œ•šœ™ŒG ›ŒG šœš›ˆ•ˆ‰“› G –G
šŠˆ“G‹šŠ—“•ŒGˆ•‹G™Œš“Œ•ŠŒG–GšŠˆ“G—–“Š GšG›–G™ŒŠ–™‹Gœ•™ŒŽš›Œ™Œ‹G
ˆŠ››ŒšUGjˆ•ŽŒšG›–G‰ŒG”ˆ‹ŒG•G›ŒG›ˆŸGš š›Œ”Gˆ™ŒGˆ”Œ‹Gˆ›G™Œ‹œŠ•ŽG
œ•™ŒŽš›Œ™Œ‹GˆŠ››ŒšGˆ•‹G›ˆŸGŒˆš–•UGp•G›šGŠ–•›ŒŸ›SG›ŒGŽ›GˆŽˆ•š›G
›ŒG œ•™ŒŽš›Œ™Œ‹G ŒŠ–•–” G šG ›ŒG —™–™› UG p•G›šG™ˆ”Œž–™’SG”—–™›ˆ•›G
•›ˆ›ŒšGˆŒG‰ŒŒ•Gœ•‹Œ™›ˆ’Œ•G›–Gš›–—G›ˆŸGŒˆš–•G–•GœŒ“G–“G•GYWW\UG
~›G›ŒG•ŒžG‰œ‹ŽŒ›G”—“Œ”Œ•›ˆ›–•G›–G‰ŒG—œ›G•›–GŒŒŠ›Gˆ›G›ŒGš›ˆ™›G–G
YWW]SG –•ŒG –G ›ŒG š›™œŠ›œ™ˆ“G ™Œ–™”šG •G —œ‰“ŠG ˆ‹”•š›™ˆ›–•G ž““G ‰ŒG
‰™–œŽ›G •›–G “ŒUG {ŒG ”œ“›G ˆ••œˆ“G ŠŒ•›™ˆ“G ˆ‹”•š›™ˆ›–•G ‰œ‹ŽŒ›G
š š›Œ”SG žŠG ˆšG ‰ŒŒ•G —™Œ—ˆ™Œ‹G ˆŠŠ–™‹•ŽG ›–G ›ŒG wœ‰“ŠG m•ˆ•ŠŒG
h‹”•š›™ˆ›–•G ˆ•‹G j–•›™–“G sˆžG ˆ•‹G šG Š–”—ˆ›‰“ŒG ž›G •›Œ™•ˆ›–•ˆ“G
š›ˆ•‹ˆ™‹šSG ž““G ‰ŒG ”—“Œ”Œ•›Œ‹UG {ŒG •ŒžG š š›Œ”G ˆ”šG ˆ›G •Š™Œˆš•ŽG
›™ˆ•š—ˆ™Œ•Š G ˆ•‹G Œ•ˆ•Š•ŽG šœ—Œ™š–•G –Œ™G ›ŒG ‰œ‹ŽŒ›G —™Œ—ˆ™ˆ›–•G
ˆ•‹G ”—“Œ”Œ•›ˆ›–•G —™–ŠŒššUG {ŒG ‰œ‹ŽŒ›G —™–—–šˆ“G –™G ›ŒG YWW]TYWW_G
—Œ™–‹G —™Œ—ˆ™Œ‹G •G ›šG ™ˆ”Œž–™’G žˆšG šœ‰”››Œ‹G –™G ›ŒG ˆ——™–ˆ“G –G
›ŒGn™ˆ•‹Guˆ›–•ˆ“GhššŒ”‰“ G–G{œ™’Œ G–•GvŠ›–‰Œ™GX_SGYWW\UG{ŒG•ŒžG
š š›Œ”G •Š“œ‹ŒšG ›ŒG Š–™—–™ˆ›–•šG ˆ•‹G •š››œ›–•šG ›ˆ›G žŒ™ŒG —™Œ–œš“ G
ŒŸŠ“œ‹Œ‹G™–”G›ŒG‰œ‹ŽŒ›UGp•G›šG™ˆ”Œž–™’SG›ŒGŠŒ•›™ˆ“Gˆ‹”•š›™ˆ›–•G
‰œ‹ŽŒ›G Š–•šš›šG –G ‰œ‹ŽŒ›šG TG •G ›ŒG šŠ–—ŒG –G ›ŒG ŽŒ•Œ™ˆ“G ‰œ‹ŽŒ›G TG –G
—œ‰“ŠG ˆœ›–™›ŒšG ›ˆ›G Šˆ™™ G –œ›G ›ŒG —™•Š—ˆ“G œ•Š›–•šG –G ›ŒG š›ˆ›ŒSG
•š››œ›–•šG ž›G ˆG š—ŒŠˆ“G ‰œ‹ŽŒ›SG žŠG ˆ™ŒG ”ˆ•“ G ”ˆ‹ŒG œ—G –G
œ•Œ™š›ŒšSG ˆ•‹G ™ŒŽœ“ˆ›–™ G ˆ•‹G šœ—Œ™š–™ G ˆŽŒ•ŠŒšUG p•G –™‹Œ™G ›–G
Œ•ˆ‰“ŒG ›šG ”—“Œ”Œ•›ˆ›–•G ž›G •Š™ŒˆšŒ‹G ›™ˆ•š—ˆ™Œ•Š G ˆšG›ˆ™ŽŒ›Œ‹SG›G
2005-III
40
With the new budget
implementation to be
put in to effect at the
start of 2006, one of
the structural reforms
in public
administration will be
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
šG –G Ž™Œˆ›G ”—–™›ˆ•ŠŒG ›ˆ›G ›ŒG ‰œ‹ŽŒ›G Žœ™ŒšG ›–G ‰ŒG ˆ••–œ•ŠŒ‹G
ˆŠŠ–™‹•ŽG ›–G ›ŒG •ŒžG š š›Œ”G ˆ•‹G ‰œ‹ŽŒ›G Žœ™ŒšG –G —™Œ–œšG —Œ™–‹šG
š–œ“‹G‰ŒG—™–‹Œ‹G•GšœŠGˆGžˆ G›ˆ›Gž““Gˆ““–žG–™GŠ–”—ˆ™š–•UG
5.1. Developments in Debt Stock
{ŒG —œ‰“ŠG šŒŠ›–™G ‰œ‹ŽŒ›G ‹ŒŠ›G Šˆ•G ‰ŒG •ˆ•ŠŒ‹G ˆG ‰–™™–ž•ŽSG
™Œš–œ™ŠŒšG –›Œ™G ›ˆ•G ‰–™™–ž•ŽG –™G ŠˆšG œ›“¡ˆ›–•UG {ŒG ˆ”–œ•›G ˆ•‹G
˜œˆ“› G –G ‰–™™–ž•ŽG ‹Œ›Œ™”•ŒG ›ŒG “ŒŒ“G –G ˆ•‹G š›™œŠ›œ™ˆ“G Šˆ•ŽŒG •G
‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’UGp•G›ŒGqˆ•œˆ™ TzŒ—›Œ”‰Œ™GYWW\G—Œ™–‹SG•Œ›G‰–™™–ž•ŽGžˆšG
™Œˆ“¡Œ‹Gˆ‰–ŒG›ŒG•ˆ•Š•ŽG™Œ˜œ™Œ”Œ•›SGˆ•‹G›ŒGš›™ˆ›ŒŽ Gˆ‹–—›Œ‹GžˆšG
ˆ”Œ‹G ˆ›G œ™›Œ™G •Š™Œˆš•ŽG ›ŒG ŠˆšG ™ŒšŒ™ŒšUG {ŒG {™Œˆšœ™ G ”ˆ•“ G
™Œš–™›Œ‹G›–G•Œ›G‹–”Œš›ŠG‰–™™–ž•ŽG•G•ˆ•Š•ŽG›ŒG‰œ‹ŽŒ›G‹ŒŠ›SGˆ•‹G
žˆšG ˆG •Œ›G —ˆ Œ™G •G ŒŸ›Œ™•ˆ“G ‰–™™–ž•ŽUG kœ™•ŽG ›šG —Œ™–‹SG zˆ•ŽšG
kŒ—–š›G p•šœ™ˆ•ŠŒG mœ•‹G OzkpmPG ™Œ‹Œ”—›–•šG ˆ•‹G ›™ˆ•šŒ™šG ™–”G
—™ˆ›¡ˆ›–•G ™ŒŒ•œŒšG Š–•›™‰œ›Œ‹G ›–G ›ŒG •ˆ•Š•ŽG –G ›ŒG {™Œˆšœ™ UG
In the JanuarySeptember 2005
period, the Treasury
mainly resorted to net
domestic borrowing in
financing budget
deficit, and was a net
borrower in external
borrowing. During this
period, Savings
Deposit Insurance
Fund (SDIF)
redemptions and
transfers from
privatization revenues
contributed to the
financing of the
Treasury.
yŒŒ•œŒšG —™–‹Œ‹G ™–”G ›ŒG šˆ‹G Šˆ••Œ“šG ”ˆ’ŒG œ—G YZG —Œ™ŠŒ•›G –G ›ŒG
•ˆ•Š•ŽG™Œ˜œ™Œ”Œ•›GO{ˆ‰“ŒG\UXUXPUGz”“ˆ™“ SG›GšGˆ•›Š—ˆ›Œ‹G›ˆ›G›ŒG
zkpmG™Œ‹Œ”—›–•šGˆ•‹G—™ˆ›¡ˆ›–•G™ŒŒ•œŒšGž““GŒˆšŒG—œ‰“ŠG•ˆ•Š•ŽG
•G›ŒGœ—Š–”•ŽG—Œ™–‹UGG
Table 5.1.1. January-September 2005 Period, Consolidated Budget Financing
Financing
Borrowing (Net)
External Borrowing (Net)
Domestic Borrowing (Net)
Privatization Revenues
Transfers from SDIF
Receipts from Onlending
Lending (-)
Currency/Deposit and Other Transactions*
Source: Treasury.
* Negative value indicates an increase.
Million YTL
10.334
17.201
-2.592
19.792
1.773
640
92
919
-8.452
Share %
100,0
166,5
-25,1
191,5
17,2
6,2
0,9
8,9
-81,8
z›ˆ™›•ŽG ™–”G tˆ SG ›ŒG zˆ•ŽšG kŒ—–š›G p•šœ™ˆ•ŠŒG mœ•‹G ˆšG š›ˆ™›Œ‹G ›–G
™Œ—ˆ G {™Œˆšœ™ G ™ŒŠŒˆ‰“ŒšG š›Œ””•ŽG ™–”G ›ŒG —™ˆ›ŒG —“ˆŠŒ”Œ•›G
šŒŠœ™›ŒšG ššœŒ‹G ˆšG ˆG “–ˆ•G ›–G ›ŒG zkpmG •G ›ŒG ™ˆ”Œž–™’G –G ›ŒG
•ˆ•Š•ŽG –G ‰ˆ•’•ŽG š š›Œ”G ™Œš›™œŠ›œ™•ŽUG p•G ›ŒG œ—Š–”•ŽG—Œ™–‹SG›ŒG
zkpmGž““GŠ–•›•œŒG›–G™Œ—ˆ G›šG‹Œ‰›šG›–G›ŒG{™Œˆšœ™ SG‹Œ—Œ•‹•ŽG–•G›šG
Š–““ŒŠ›–•G—Œ™–™”ˆ•ŠŒUGG
w™ˆ›¡ˆ›–•G Žˆ•Œ‹G ”–”Œ•›œ”G •G YWW\UG p•Š“œ‹•ŽG ›ŒG l™ŒŽ“G p™–•G ˆ•‹G
z›ŒŒ“G l•›Œ™—™šŒšG hœŠ›–•SG ›ŒG ˆ”–œ•›G ›ˆ›G žˆšG ™ˆšŒ‹G ™–”G
—™ˆ›¡ˆ›–•G ™ŒˆŠŒ‹G |zG ‹–““ˆ™G X^G ‰““–•G ‰ G vŠ›–‰Œ™G YWW\UG p•G ›ŒG
œ—Š–”•ŽG —Œ™–‹SG ˆG —–™›–•G –G ›ŒG Š–““ŒŠ›Œ‹G —™ˆ›¡ˆ›–•G ™ŒŒ•œŒšG ž““G
‰ŒG ›™ˆ•šŒ™™Œ‹G ›–G ›ŒG {™Œˆšœ™ UG wœ™šœˆ•›G ›–G ›ŒG sˆžG u–UG [\]_SG žŠG
2005-III
41
Privatization
implementations
gained momentum
in 2005.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
žˆšG—œ›G•›–GŒŒŠ›G–•GY]Gtˆ GYWWWSG—™ˆ›¡ˆ›–•G™ŒŒ•œŒšGˆ™ŒGœšŒ‹G–™G
›ŒG ŒŸ—Œ•šŒšG –G ›ŒG w™ˆ›¡ˆ›–•G mœ•‹G •G ›ŒG ™š›G —“ˆŠŒSG ˆ•‹G ›ŒG
™Œ”ˆ••ŽGŠˆšGˆ”–œ•›GšG›™ˆ•šŒ™™Œ‹G›–G›ŒG{™Œˆšœ™ G–™G‹–”Œš›ŠGˆ•‹G
ŒŸ›Œ™•ˆ“G ‹Œ‰›G —ˆ ”Œ•›šG Oi–ŸG \UXPUG {œšSG ›ŒG ˆ”–œ•›G –G —™ˆ›¡ˆ›–•G
™ŒŒ•œŒšG›–G‰ŒG›™ˆ•šŒ™™Œ‹G›–G›ŒG{™Œˆšœ™ G•G›ŒGœ—Š–”•ŽG—Œ™–‹Gž““G
‰ŒG ‹Œ›Œ™”•Œ‹G •G Š–•š‹Œ™ˆ›–•G –G ›ŒG ŒŸ—Œ•šŒšG –G ›ŒG {œ™’šG
w™ˆ›¡ˆ›–•G h‹”•š›™ˆ›–•UG p›G šG ”—–™›ˆ•›G ›ˆ›G ›ŒG šˆ‹G ™ŒŒ•œŒšG
–‰›ˆ•Œ‹G™–”Gšˆ“ŒšG–GŠŒ™›ˆ•GŒ•›Œ™—™šŒšG•G—œ‰“ŠG–ž•Œ™š—Gˆ™ŒGœšŒ‹G
”ˆ•“ G ›–G Œ•ˆ‰“ŒG ˆG —Œ™”ˆ•Œ•›G ”—™–Œ”Œ•›G •G ›ŒG —œ‰“ŠG ‰ˆ“ˆ•ŠŒUG
yŒ‹œŠ•ŽG ›ŒG —œ‰“ŠG šŒŠ›–™G ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G Š–•›•œŒšG ›–G ‰ŒG ˆG šŽ•Šˆ•›G
ššœŒG •G ›Œ™”šG –G ”ˆ•›ˆ••ŽG ŒŠ–•–”ŠG š›ˆ‰“› UG {ŒG “ŒŒ“G ˆ•‹G
š›™œŠ›œ™ŒG–G‹Œ‰›Gš›–Š’Gˆ™ŒG›ŒGˆŠ›–™šG›ˆ›G™Œš›™Š›G›ŒGŒŒŠ›Œ•ŒššG–G
”–•Œ›ˆ™ G —–“Š G ˆ•‹G ™Œ‹œŠŒG ›ŒG ™Œš“Œ•ŠŒG –G šŠˆ“G —–“Š UG h“›–œŽG ›G
ˆšG žŒˆ’Œ•Œ‹G š•ŠŒG YWWYSG ›ŒG šˆ‹G œ•ˆ–™ˆ‰“ŒG ŒŒŠ›G ›ˆ›G ™Œš›™Š›šG
”–•Œ›ˆ™ G ˆ•‹G šŠˆ“G —–“ŠŒšG šG š›““G Œ“›G ›–G ˆG ŠŒ™›ˆ•G ŒŸ›Œ•›UG|•‹Œ™G›šG
Š™Šœ”š›ˆ•ŠŒšSG—™ˆ›¡ˆ›–•G™ŒŒ•œŒšG—™–‹ŒGˆ•G–——–™›œ•› G›–G™Œ‹œŠŒG
‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G ˆ•‹G ŒˆšŒG ›šG šŒ•š›› G ›–G ŒŸŠˆ•ŽŒG ™ˆ›ŒG ˆ•‹G •›Œ™Œš›G ™ˆ›ŒG
”–Œ”Œ•›šUGp•G›ŒGœ—Š–”•ŽG—Œ™–‹SG•–™”•ŽG›ŒG—œ‰“ŠG–G›ŒGœšŒG–G
—™ˆ›¡ˆ›–•G ™ŒŒ•œŒšG ž““G ‰ŒG –G Ž™Œˆ›G ”—–™›ˆ•ŠŒG ž›G ™Œš—ŒŠ›G ›–G
›™ˆ•š—ˆ™Œ•Š UGG
Graph 5.1.1. Maturity of Cash Borrowing and Structure of Cash Domestic Debt Stock
Borrowing Maturity and Interest Structure of Cash
Domestic Debt Stock in YTL
40
Structure of Cash Domestic Debt Stock
3,7
2,9
2,4
16,1
15,7
15,6
15,6
74,9
79,3
80,6
81,5
82,0
2003
2004
Jun
Sep
12,2
35
50
80%
30
40
12,9
25
30
20
Month
Percentage
4,7
100%
60
60%
15
20
10
10
40%
5
0
S
J
A
J
A
M
M
J
F
2004
2003
0
20%
2005
Avg. Maturity of YTL Denominated Cash Borrowing
(Months)
Floating Rate/ Fixed Rate (Percentage)
0%
2005
YTL Denominated
Source: Treasury, CBRT.
Mar
FX Denominated
FX Indexed
Source: Treasury.
{ŒG”—™–Œ”Œ•›G›ˆ›GˆšG‰ŒŒ•G–‰šŒ™Œ‹G•G›ŒGš›™œŠ›œ™ŒG–G‰–™™–ž•ŽG
ˆ•‹G ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G š•ŠŒG YWWYG Š–•›•œŒ‹G •G YWW\G •G ˆG šŽ•Šˆ•›G ”ˆ••Œ™UG
{ŒG •Š™ŒˆšŒG •G ‹–”Œš›ŠG ˆ•‹G ŒŸ›Œ™•ˆ“G ‰–™™–ž•ŽG ”ˆ›œ™›ŒšG ˆ•‹G ›ŒG
‹ŒŠ™ŒˆšŒG •G –™ŒŽ•G ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G žŒ™ŒG ›ž–G šŽ•Šˆ•›G ‹ŒŒ“–—”Œ•›šG
–‰šŒ™Œ‹G•G›šG—Œ™–‹UG{ŒG”ˆ›œ™› G–GŠˆšG‰–™™–ž•ŽSGžŠGžˆšGX\G
2005-III
42
The improvement
observed in the
structure of
borrowing and debt
stock since 2002
continued in 2005
in a marked
manner.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
”–•›šG •G YWW[SG žˆšG ŒŸ›Œ•‹Œ‹G ›–G Y^G ”–•›šUG pššœˆ•ŠŒG –G “–ˆ›•ŽG ™ˆ›ŒG
‰–•‹šG ž›G ”ˆ›œ™›ŒšG –G ›™ŒŒG ˆ•‹G ŒG Œˆ™šG “Œ‹G ›–G ›ŒG •Š™ŒˆšŒG
–‰šŒ™Œ‹G •G ›ŒG ”ˆ›œ™› G –G ‹–”Œš›ŠG ‰–™™–ž•ŽUG {ŒG šˆ”ŒG —™–ŠŒššG šG
ˆ“š–G ŒŸ—Œ™Œ•ŠŒ‹G •G {œ™’šG “™ˆG ‹Œ•–”•ˆ›Œ‹G ŠˆšG ‰–™™–ž•ŽUG hšG ˆG
™Œšœ“›G –G ›šG —™–ŠŒššSG ›ŒG žŒŽ›G –G “–ˆ›•ŽG ™ˆ›ŒG ‰–•‹šG ž›•G ›ŒG
‹–”Œš›ŠG ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G šG •Š™Œˆš•ŽG On™ˆ—G \UXUXSG {ˆ‰“ŒG \UXUYPUG m“–ˆ›•ŽG
™ˆ›ŒG ‰–•‹šG ˆ™ŒG ‹ŒŒ”Œ‹G ›–G ‰ŒG ™š’ G š•ŠŒG ›Œ G “ŒˆŒG ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G
šœšŠŒ—›‰“ŒG ›–G •›Œ™Œš›G ™ˆ›ŒG ”–Œ”Œ•›šUG o–žŒŒ™SG ššœˆ•ŠŒG –G ›ŒšŒG
‰–•‹šG šG Š–•š‹Œ™Œ‹G ›–G ‰ŒG ˆG ˆ–™ˆ‰“ŒG ‹ŒŒ“–—”Œ•›G –ž•ŽG ›–G ›ŒG
™Œ“ˆ›Œ“ G “–•ŽŒ™G ”ˆ›œ™› G –G ›Œ™G Šˆ—›ˆ“G ˆ•‹G Š–œ—–•G —ˆ ”Œ•›šUG p•G
ˆ‹‹›–•SG žŒ•G Š–”—ˆ™Œ‹G ›–G ‹šŠ–œ•›Œ‹G ŸŒ‹G ™ˆ›ŒG šŒŠœ™›ŒšSG “–ˆ›•ŽG
™ˆ›ŒG‰–•‹šG•–›G–•“ GŒŸ›Œ•‹Œ‹G›ŒG‰–™™–ž•ŽG”ˆ›œ™› SG‰œ›Gˆ“š–G—™–‹Œ‹G
›ŒG–——–™›œ•› G›–G‰Œ•Œ›G™–”G›ŒGŒ•™–•”Œ•›G–G‹ŒŠ™Œˆš•ŽG•›Œ™Œš›G
™ˆ›ŒšUG {ŒG –•Ž–•ŽG šŠˆ“G ‹–”•ˆ•ŠŒG ˆ•‹G ˆ——™–ˆŠ•ŽG ‹ˆ›ŒG –G ”ˆ›œ™› G
–G•–•TŠˆšG‹Œ‰›Gš›–Š’G‰™•ŽG›ŒG”—–™›ˆ•ŠŒG–G™Œ‹œŠ•ŽG›ŒG™š’G—–šŒ‹G
‰ G ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G ˆ•‹G ŒŸ›Œ•‹•ŽG ›ŒG ”ˆ›œ™› G –G ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G •›–G ›šG
™ˆ”Œž–™’UG {ŒšŒG ˆ–™ˆ‰“ŒG ‹ŒŒ“–—”Œ•›šG •G ŠˆšG ‰–™™–ž•ŽG ˆ™ŒG ˆ“š–G
™Œ“ŒŠ›Œ‹G–•G›ŒG”ˆ›œ™› G–G›ŒGŠˆšG‹Œ‰›Gš›–Š’GO{ˆ‰“ŒG\UXUYPUG
Table 5.1.2. Consolidated Budget Debt Stock – FX, Interest and Maturity Structure
Total Debt Stock
Domestic Debt
Stock
TL
Fixed
Variable
Foreign exch./
FX-Indexed
Fixed
Variable
External Debt Stock
Fixed
Variable
Domestic Debt
Stock.
Maturity
Cash
Non-cash
Domestic
Borrowing
Maturity
Cash
Non-cash
US Dollar Buying
Rate
Source: Treasury.
2002
Million
YTL
242.707
%
100,0
2003
Million
YTL
282.894
%
100,0
2004
Million
YTL
316.471
149.870
101.694
37.576
64.118
61,7
41,9
15,5
26,4
48.176
16.814
31.362
92.837
54.808
38.030
Ay
%
100,0
194.387
151.790
68.614
83.175
68,7
53,7
24,3
29,4
224.483
185.020
94.930
90.090
70,9
58,5
30,0
28,5
243.207
204.446
97.820
106.626
73,8
62,0
29,7
32,3
19,8
6,9
12,9
38,3
22,6
15,7
%
42.597
16.418
26.179
88.507
53.244
35.263
Ay
15,1
5,8
9,3
31,3
18,8
12,5
%
39.463
20.642
18.821
91.989
54.756
37.233
Ay
12,5
6,5
5,9
29,1
17,3
11,8
%
38.761
10.271
28.489
86.427
54.048
32.379
Ay
11,8
3,1
8,6
26,2
16,4
9,8
%
32.1
12.8
60.4
100,0
59,6
40,4
25.1
12.4
51.2
100,0
67,1
32,9
20.6
11.8
45.5
100,0
73,8
26,2
22.5
17.7
39.0
100,0
77,6
22,4
20.6
11.1
59.5
100,0
80,4
19,6
18.1
14.7
50.4
100,0
90,5
9,5
17.3
15.0
73.9
100,0
96,1
3,9
27.0
27.0
0.0
100,0
100,0
0,0
1,63450
1,39584
1,34210
2005 Eylül
Million
YTL
%
329.634
100,0
1,34060
p•G YWW\SG •G “•ŒG ž›G ›ŒG ‰–™™–ž•ŽG š›™ˆ›ŒŽ G ‹Œ›Œ™”•Œ‹G ‰ G ›ŒG
{™Œˆšœ™ SG‹–”Œš›ŠG‰–™™–ž•ŽGžˆšG”ˆ•“ G™Œˆ“¡Œ‹G•GuŒžG{œ™’šG“™ˆG
‹Œ•–”•ˆ›–•šUG o–žŒŒ™G ™Œš›™Š›Œ‹G ›G ”ˆ G ‰ŒSG ‰–™™–ž•ŽG •G –™ŒŽ•G
ŒŸŠˆ•ŽŒG ‹Œ•–”•ˆ›–•šG ˆšG š“ˆŠ’Œ•Œ‹G ›ŒG ‹–ž•žˆ™‹G ”–Œ”Œ•›G –G
2005-III
43
In 2005, 11.8
percent of the
domestic debt
stock is composed
of foreign
exchange
denominated and
foreign exchangeindexed securities.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
šˆ™ŒšG–G–™ŒŽ•GŒŸŠˆ•ŽŒG‹Œ•–”•ˆ›Œ‹Gˆ•‹G–™ŒŽ•GŒŸŠˆ•ŽŒT•‹ŒŸŒ‹G
šŒŠœ™›ŒšG •G ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G On™ˆ—G \UXUXPUG hšG ˆG ™Œšœ“›G –G ›šG
”—“Œ”Œ•›ˆ›–•SG –™ŒŽ•G ŒŸŠˆ•ŽŒG ‹Œ•–”•ˆ›Œ‹G ˆ•‹G –™ŒŽ•G ŒŸŠˆ•ŽŒT
•‹ŒŸŒ‹G šŒŠœ™›ŒšG ™ŒˆŠŒ‹G XXU_G —Œ™ŠŒ•›G –G ›ŒG ‹–”Œš›ŠG‹Œ‰›Gš›–Š’G•G
YWW\UGG
hšG –G qœ•ŒG YWW\SG ›ŒG ™ˆ›–G –G ›–›ˆ“G Ž™–ššG —œ‰“ŠG ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G ˆ•‹G
Š–•š–“‹ˆ›Œ‹G‰œ‹ŽŒ›G‹Œ‰›Gš›–Š’G›–GnuwG‹ŒŠ™ŒˆšŒ‹G‰ GYU_Gˆ•‹GYU^G—–•›šG
Š–”—ˆ™Œ‹G›–GŒ•‹TYWW[Gˆ•‹G‰ŒŠˆ”ŒG^[U]Gˆ•‹G^XUXG—Œ™ŠŒ•›SG™Œš—ŒŠ›Œ“ G
On™ˆ—G\UXUYPUGp•G›ŒGšŒŠ–•‹G˜œˆ™›Œ™G–GYWW\SG›GšG–‰šŒ™Œ‹G›ˆ›G›ŒG•Œ›G
›–›ˆ“G—œ‰“ŠG‹Œ‰›Gš›–Š’G‹ŒŠ™ŒˆšŒ‹Gˆ›GˆG”–™ŒGˆŠŠŒ“Œ™ˆ›Œ‹G—ˆŠŒGŠ–”—ˆ™Œ‹G
›–G Ž™–ššG ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G ˆŽŽ™ŒŽˆ›ŒšSG ‹œŒG ›–G ›ŒG •Š™ŒˆšŒG •G jŒ•›™ˆ“G iˆ•’G
™ŒšŒ™ŒšG ˆ•‹G—œ‰“ŠG‹Œ—–š›šUGp•G›ŒG›™‹G˜œˆ™›Œ™G–GYWW\SG›ŒG™ˆ›–G–G
j–•š–“‹ˆ›Œ‹Giœ‹ŽŒ›GkŒ‰›Gz›–Š’G›–GnuwGšGŒŸ—ŒŠ›Œ‹G›–G‹ŒŠ™ŒˆšŒG›–G^WG
—Œ™ŠŒ•›UG j–•š–“‹ˆ›Œ‹G ‰œ‹ŽŒ›G ›–›ˆ“G ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’SG žŠG ”ˆ’ŒšG œ—G
ˆ——™–Ÿ”ˆ›Œ“ G `\G —Œ™ŠŒ•›G –G ›–›ˆ“G —œ‰“ŠG ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’SG •Š™ŒˆšŒ‹G ‰ G [UYG
—Œ™ŠŒ•›G •G zŒ—›Œ”‰Œ™G Š–”—ˆ™Œ‹G ›–G Œ•‹TYWW[UG kœ™•ŽG ›šG —Œ™–‹SG ›ŒG
ˆ”–œ•›G –G •Œ›G ‰–™™–ž•ŽG žˆšG ™ˆ›Œ™G “–žG Š–”—ˆ™Œ‹G ›–G —™Œ–œšG Œˆ™šSG
‹œŒG ›–G ›ŒG ˆ““G •G •›Œ™Œš›G ™ˆ›ŒšG ˆ•‹G ›ŒG ŽG “ŒŒ“G –G —™”ˆ™ G šœ™—“œšUG
{ŒG •Š™ŒˆšŒG •G Š–•š–“‹ˆ›Œ‹G ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G ™Œšœ“›Œ‹G ™–”G •Œ›G ‹–”Œš›ŠG
‰–™™–ž•ŽUGhšGŒ”—ˆš¡Œ‹G‰Œ–™ŒSG›ŒG{™Œˆšœ™ GžˆšGˆG•Œ›G–™ŒŽ•G‹Œ‰›G
—ˆ Œ™G•G›ŒGqˆ•œˆ™ TzŒ—›Œ”‰Œ™GYWW\G—Œ™–‹UGp•G›šG—Œ™–‹SG›ŒG”—ˆŠ›G
–G ›ŒG ŒŸŠˆ•ŽŒG ™ˆ›ŒG –•G ‹Œ‰›G š›–Š’G žˆšG “”›Œ‹G O{ˆ‰“ŒG \UXUYSG n™ˆ—G
\UXUYPUG
Graph 5.1.2. Public Sector Debt Stock Aggregates
90
Analysis of the Change in Consolidated Budget Total Debt
Stock
93.6
88.3
83.4
79.3
80
Percent
78.6
80
77.4
73.7
77.4
73.9
74.6
71.1
60
70.2
Billion YTL
100
70.4
70
63.5
62.3
60
58.4
50
40
20
0
-20
-40
40
2002
2003
2004
Mar
Jun
2002
2003
2004
2005
Sep(2)
Total Exchange Rate
Effect(1)
14.9
-19.4
-4.7
-0.9
Net Foreign
Borrowing
26.0
10.8
7.2
-5.5
Net Domestic
Borrowing
23.9
48.8
31.2
19.5
Sep(1)
2005
Total Public Gross Debt Stock/GNP
Consolidated Budget Total Debt Stock/GNP
Total Public Net Debt Stock/GNP
Expectation.
Source: Treasury, CBRT.
(1)
(1Does
(2)
2005-III
not include changes resulting from cross-rate movements.
Shows the change compared to 2004.
44
As of June 2005,
the ratio of total
gross public debt
stock and
consolidated
budget debt stock
to GNP became
74.6 and 71.1
percent,
respectively.
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
BOX 5.1. PRIVATIZATION IMPLEMENTATIONS IN TURKEY1
Privatization implementations, which started in Turkey in 1980’s, have been aimed to reduce the role of the
state in industrial and trade activities to a minimum level. These implementations have also been planned to
help reduce the financing burden of the State Economic Enterprises (SEE) on the state budget, form a market
economy based on competitiveness, improve the capital market and increase effectiveness as well as
productivity. Privatization has been on the agenda in Turkey since 1983, while privatization implementations
started with the transfer of some unfinished facilities to the private sector in 1985. Total amount raised from the
privatization implementations since 1985 has reached US dollar 17.8 billion (Box 5.1.Table 1). US dollar 8.2
billion of the said amount belongs to implementations carried out by way of sales and transfers in 2005.
Including the privatizations, whose auctions have been completed but contracts are waiting for approval and
signature, the amount raised from privatization in 2005 is US dollar 16.9 billion as of November. The Turkish Oil
Refineries Company (TÜPRAŞ), Turk Telecommunications Inc. (Türk Telekom) and Eregli Iron and Steel
Enterprises (ERDEMİR) are the main institutions privatized in 2005. Privatized large public enterprises will need
a high amount of renewal investments in the coming periods. Considering the the high level of current public
debt stock, keeping these enterprises in the public sector would significantly increase the public sector’s need
for resource. Privatization of such enterprises is expected to contribute to the continuation of productivity in the
economy via allowing the private sector to make the renewal investments.
As is seen, privatization implementations gained momentum in 2005. Including the enterprises that wait for
approval and signature, total amount raised from sales of privatized enterprises exceeded the privatization
revenues raised in the 1986-2004 period. Privatizations belonging to the 1985-2005 period were mainly made
with the block sale method (Box 5.1.Table 1).
Box 5.1.Table 1. Privatization Operations belonging to the 1986 - 2005 Period ( Million dollars)(*)
1986 - 2003
2004
2005(**)
TOTAL
Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%)
Block Sales
Facility/Asset Sales
Public Offering
Istanbul Stock Excchange
(ISE) Sales
Unfinished Facility Sales
Value Transfers
3,524
863
2,669
43.1
10.6
32.7
400
607
191
31.5
47.9
15.1
7,054
399
274
85.9 11,053
4.9 1,.927
3.3 3,182
61.9
10.8
17.8
801
4
308
9.8
0.1
3.8
0
0
69
0.0
0.0
5.5
454
0
27
5.5 1,.265
0.0
4
0.3
414
7.1
0.0
2.3
TOTAL
8,170
100.0
1,267
100.0
8,208
100.0 17,845
100.0
Source: Turkish Privatization Administration.
(*) Figures shown in the tables are sales figures of the amounts raised from implementations in the related years.
(**)Figures for the amounts raised from privatization of intitutions whose sale/transfer procedure has been completed as of November.
1
For more detailed information about privatization implementations, see Turkish Privatization Administration, 2005, Privatization
Implementations in Turkey. Available on http://www.oib.gov.tr/program/turkiyede_ozellestirme.htm.
2005-III
45
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
Box 5.1. Table 2 shows the resources and expenditure figures of the Turkish Privatization Administration
belonging to the 1985-2004 period. In the said period, total amount of resources of the Turkish
Privatization Administration was registered as US dollar 14.3 billion, US dollar 8.6 billion of which
belonged to privatization collections. 74 percent of the acquired resources was used for debt payments of
enterprises within the scope of privatization as well as for privatization expenditures2, while 24.5 percent
of them was transferred to the Treasury. However, privatization revenues were not transferred to the
Treasury in 2003 and 2004. Including those to be raised from the enterprises waiting for approval and
signature, privatization revenues have reached high levels in 2005. However, the whole of privatization
revenues will not be collected in the period the sales procedure is completed, since there will be the
3
option to pay in installments. It is planned that the privatization implementations will continue in the
upcoming period. In the framework of the Medium Term Program, the target amount of privatization
revenues for the 2006-2008 period is set at US dollar 9 billion.
Box 5.1.Table 2. 1986-2004 Period Privatization Administration Resources-Expenditures Table (Millon dollars) (*)
1986 - 2002
2003
2004
TOTAL
(%)
Resources
Collections Obtained from
Privatization Procedures
Revenues from Sales of Pledged
Securities
Dividend Income
Debt Principal Collections Obtained
from Enterprises within the Sphere of
the Privatization Administration
Interest Income from Debts/Bonds
Granted to Enterprises within the
Sphere of the Privatization
Administration
Other Revenues
Borrowing
11,199.7
487.2
2,633.6
14,320.5
100.0
7,225.9
255.1
1,133.7
8,614.7
60.2
60.4
0.0
0.0
60.4
0.4
2,068.1
63.1
223.3
2,354.5
16.4
39.9
15.2
3.9
59.0
0.4
17.7
0.7
0.0
18.3
0.1
73.7
1,714.0
17.9
135.3
14.5
1,258.2
106.0
3,107.4
0.7
21.7
Expenditures
Payments Related to Enterprises
within the Sphere of the Privatization
Administration
Payments Related to Privatization
Implementations
Debt Payments
Other Expenditures
Transfers to the Treasury
10,958.8
494.1
2,428.5
13,881.4
100.0
5,276.0
385.9
464.5
6,126.3
44.1
239.0
4.8
8.1
251.9
1.8
1,915.6
3,528.2
3,403.8
91.2
12.1
0.0
1,930.6
25.3
0.0
3,937.5
3,565.7
3,403.8
28.4
25.7
24.5
Source: Turkish Privatization Administration
(*) Figures in this table show cash amounts of inflows and outflows in the Privatization Fund Account as well as in other special accounts
related to privatization implementations
2
Payments to the institutions within the scope of privatization consist of capital equities, granted credits, compensation for
damages stemming from loss of job, payments of post-privatization compensations and retirement premium.
3
US dollar 1.3 billion of the total amount of US dollar 6.5 billion raised from the privatziation of the Turk
Telecommunications Inc., whose sales procedures were completed in November 2005, was collected in cash in November.
The remaining amount has been divided into installments extending up to 5 years.
2005-III
46
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
6. Outlook
F
!
6.1. Supply and Demand Factors
" # !
$ !%
! $ # ! " #
! %
&'(" '") )
!
" ! %
! %
!
$ &'(" '") !*
! * 2005-III
47
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
!*
!
+
# ! *
!+
! + !
6.2. Cost Factors
]UYUˆUGj–””–‹› Gw™ŠŒš
+# ! , ! * -! *
! + !
" .! ! " - /0 ! " -"!-
1
/0 !
2005-III
48
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
+
&'("2)&'("
'") !+
! *
!3
1
!
]UYU‰UG~ˆŽŒšG
,#
! + !
+ .!4 1! %
// // !)
! "
1!
6.3. Exogenous Factors Affecting Inflation
+ !*
3('5)6
1!"
#!+
+%3
7 8 2 ( #
1
# ! ) 2005-III
49
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
!
+ " !"
!+
!+
!
6.4. Monetary and Fiscal Discipline
" & ' 1! + +%3
1!
3
! 6 ! "
& ' ! + ! * & ' !+
& ' !
+ & ' 2005-III
50
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
7!*
! +
&'
! "
&
'!+
& '9 ! 6 & ' ! + & ' !
+ ! + !
%
! *
!+
!
2005-III
51
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
GRAPHS
2.
INFLATION DEVELOPMENTS
3
4
5
6
7
Graph 2.1. CPI and Special CPI Aggregates (F and G)
Graph 2.2. CPI and Selected CPI Sub-groups
Graph 2.3. Selected Sub-Groups Containing Services (CPI)
Graph 2.4. Energy and Other Administered Prices
Graph 2.5. Manufacturing Industry and Non-Oil Manufacturing Industry Prices
3.
SUPPLY and DEMAND DEVELOPMENTS
Graph 3.1.1. Annual GNP Growth Rate Expectations in the CBRT Expectations Survey
Graph 3.1.2. Total Investment and Total Final Domestic Demand
Graph 3.1.3 Domestic Sales of White Goods and Motor Vehicles
Graph 3.1.4 . Private Consumption and CBRTPCI
Graph 3.1.5. CBRT BTS Expectation of TL Credit Interest Rate and Investment Expenditure Tendency
Graph 3.1.6. Output Gap/ Potential GDP
Graph 3.2.1. Current Account Balance / GNP
Graph 3.3.1. Private Manufacturing Industry Unit Real Wage Index
Box 3.1.Graph 1. The Share of Private Sector Construction-Housing Investments and Value Added of Construction in GDP
Box 3.1.Graph 2. Construction Permits of Private Sector and Value Added of Construction
Box 3.1.Graph 3. Developments in Sectors Providing Intermediate Input to Construction Sector
Box 3.1.Graph.4. The Share of Construction Sector in Total Employment
4.
DEVELOPMENTS in FINANCIAL MARKETS and MONETARY POLICY
27
29
29
31
33
36
36
36
36
36
37
Graph 4.1.1. Interest Rates Developments
Graph 4.1.2. Treasury Auctions Real Interest Rate and Risk Premium
Graph 4.1.3. Yield Curves
Graph 4.2.1. Exchange Rate Developments
Graph 4.3.1. Credits Extended to Real Sector/GNP
Box 4.1 Graph 1. Degree of Asset Dollarization (Jul.96-Nov.05)
Box 4.1 Graph 2. Degree of Liability Dollarization, y* (nominal, percent)
Box 4.1 Graph 3. External Debt Stock/GDP (nominal, percent)
Box 4.1 Graph 4. FX Credits/Total Credits (nominal, percent)
Box 4.1 Graph 5. FX Denominated and FX Indexed Domestic Debt Stock/Total Domestic Debt Stock
Box 4.1 Graph 6. Composite Dollarization Index
5.
8
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
20
21
22
22
PUBLIC FINANCE
42
44
Graph 5.1.1. Maturity of Cash Borrowing and Structure of Cash Domestic Debt Stock
Graph 5.1.2. Public Sector Debt Stock Aggregates
2005-III
52
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
TABLES
2.
INFLATION DEVELOPMENTS
6
Table 2.1. Effects of Oil Prices on Goods and Services
3.
SUPPLY and DEMAND DEVELOPMENTS
10
17
19
21
Table 3.1.1. GDP Developments by Expenditure Side
Table 3.3.1. Employment, Real Wage and Productivity Developments in Manufacturing Industry
Table 3.3.2. Indicators of Production Costs
Box 3.1 Table 1. Housing Production by Years
4.
DEVELOPMENTS in FINANCIAL MARKETS and MONETARY POLICY
Table 4.1.1. Performance Criteria, Indicative Values and Their Realizations
Table 4.3.1. Development of Consumer Loans and Claims from Credit Cards
Table 4.3.2. Distribution of Consumer Loans According to Bank Groups
5.
24
32
33
PUBLIC FINANCE
38
41
43
45
46
Table 5.1. Consolidated Budget Aggregates
Table 5.1.1. January-September 2005 Period, Consolidated Budget Financing
Table 5.1.2. Consolidated Budget Debt Stock – FX, Interest and Maturity Structure
Box 5.1.Table 1. Privatization Operations belonging to the 1986 - 2005 Period ( Million USD)
Box 5.1.Table 2. 1986-2004 Period Privatization Administration Resources-Expenditure Table (Millon USD)
2005-III
53
CBRT
MONETARY POLICY REPORT
ABBREVIATIONS
AMA
Automotive Manufacturers Association
CBRT
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
CBRTBTS
CBRT Business Tendency Survey
CBRTPCI
CBRT Private Consumption Index
CPI
Consumer Price Index
DOE
Derivatives and Options Exchange
ERDEMİR
Eregli Iron and Steel Enterprises
EU
European Union
FX
Foreign Exchange
FXD
FX Deposit
GDBS
Government Domestic Borrowing Securities
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
GNAT
Grand National Assembly of Turkey
GNP
Gross National Product
IFS
International Financial Statistics
IMF
International Monetary Fund
ISE
Istanbul Stock Exchange
PPI
Producer Price Index
SCA
Special CPI Aggregates
SDIF
Saving Deposit Insurance Fund
SEE
State Economic Enterprises
SFH
Special Finance Houses
SIS
State Institute of Statistics
SPO
State Planning Organization
TEA
Turkish Exporters Assembly
TL
Turkish Lira
TÜPRAŞ
Turkish Oil Refineries Company
Türk Telekom
TurkTelecommunications Inc.
USA
United States of America
YTL
New Turkish Lira
2005-III
54