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A Tale of Two Faux Crises: Italy, Spain and the Euro Money and Development Seminar Series 29 February 2012 John Weeks Professor Emeritus, SOAS http://jweeks.org Background: Two non-technical articles: "Democracy in Europe and the Italian Crisis" In Insight http://www.insightweb.it/web/ "Catastrophe Now: The Euro Runs its Course" In the Social Europe Journal http://www.social-europe.eu/ Both linked on http://jweeks.org Statistical Sources: 1. OECD www.oecd.org (click on "statistics") 2. Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europe.eu/portal/ Especially Supplementary Tables on the Financial Crisis Definitions 1. Debt: gross and net OECD definition of the net debt is liabilities minus liquid assets. Examples: In 2011, Norway's gross debt was just below the infamous Maastricht criterion at 56% of GDP. Its net debt was minus 160 percent of GDP. For the UK the numbers were 90% and 64%. 2. Deficits Total fiscal balance is revenues minus expenditures. The primary balance is net of interest, which the IMF uses for its test of fiscal stability. For no obvious reason, the Maastricht criteria refer to the gross debt and total fiscal balance. Simple algebra of deficits: Define: B = fiscal balance = revenue - expenditure B* = primary fiscal balance = revenue - non-interest expenditure = zY - (Ē - eY) z is the tax rate (average = marginal) Y is national income Ē is discretionary expenditure e is automatic counter-cyclical expenditure B* = Y - [Ē - eY] DB* = [zDY + YDz] - [eDY - YDe] d' = DB/Y = [z + e]g If Dz = De = 0 g = DY/Y, GDP growth rate, d' = first difference of the primary fiscal deficit, The Italian Story: High borrowing rates in the 1990s and German trade policy in the 2000s Yield on long term public bonds and interest payments as share of GDP, 1993-2011 [Interest rates now lower than for 1993-2002] 14 12 interest on debt (% of GDP) 10 8 Long term yield on public bonds (% ) 6 4 2 0 2011 2009 2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 1997 1995 1993 Italy: Total and primary deficits, 1993-2011 [Lowest primary deficit in the euro zone and recent decline recession-generated] 12 Interest on debt 10 Global recession 8 6 4 Primary deficit 2 0 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 -10 Overall deficit 2002 -8 2001 -6 2000 -4 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 -2 Italy: Changes in the public sector balance has been GDP driven,1993-2011 (share of GDP) 6.0 GDP Growth 4.0 lnD[FsDf/GDP] = -.01 + .47ln[GDP grw] F = 9.9 (R2 = .38), DF = 16 2.0 .0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 -2.0 -4.0 -6.0 Change in PrimaryDeficit 4.0 Italy: The public debt "burden" has declined, 1993-2011 [real value of net debt in 2011 same as 1997] 2500 Public debt prices of 2011 bns of euros 250 2047 bn gross 2000 200 1597 bn net 1500 1000 150 100 gross net 500 50 Debt burden 2011 prices, interest rate adjusted bns of euros 0 0 2011 2009 2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 1997 1995 1993 Fiscal balance in surplus, net debt steady, what is the problem? [Not real wage inflation as suggested by Krugman] Ratio of Italian to German private sector real wages 1994-2009 8 6 4 2 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 -4 1995 -2 1994 0 ` German trade policy is the problem: Italian-German trade balance & unit labour costs, 1994-2009 10 ULC Germany/Italy, 1998=0 10 5 Trade balance Italy-Germany, € bns 5 0 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 0 -5 -5 -10 -10 ` -15 -15 -20 -20 -25 -25 -30 [Falling German unit costs result of relatively faster productivity increases and export subsidies] Inflexible labour market in Italy? Not according to the OECD 10 1.6 OECD employment protection index, Italy/Germany 5 1.4 0 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 -5 1.2 1.0 -10 .8 -15 .6 -20 Italy's trade balance with Germany .4 -25 .2 -30 .0 The Italian story summarized Italy has not had does not have an excessive fiscal deficit. On the contrary, for the last twenty years it has had the best primary fiscal balance in the European Union. In the 1990s it suffered from unwise borrowing at high interest rates. That problem is over. Present "unsustainable" interest rates are well below the level of the 1990s. Italy's public debt is no larger in real terms than it was twenty years ago. Its interest-adjusted "burden" is far lower. Italy has a serious trade deficit with Germany, that results in great part from implicit and explicit export subsidies. The most important of these are: 1) suppression of domestic demand 2) VAT and pay roll tax relief on export commodities The Spanish Story: No good deed goes unpunished. Fiscal surpluses in Spain, 1993-2011 6.0 4.0 2.0 .0 Primary Deficit/GDP -10.0 -12.0 2011 -8.0 2010 Total Deficit/GDP 2009 -6.0 2008 -4.0 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 -2.0 Even in Spain recession causes deficits GDP and the total deficit, 1993-2011 20 3.0 1.0 10 -1.0 0 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 -3.0 -10 -5.0 -20 -7.0 -30 GDP (2004 = 0) Total Deficit -40 -50 -9.0 -11.0 -13.0 And growth reduces the deficit Spain: GDP growth and the first difference in the primary balance, 1993-2011 5.0 lnD[FsDf/GDP] = -.02 + .68ln[GDP grw] F = 8.1 (R2 = .35), DF = 15 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 Change in primary Deficit/GDP .0 -5.0 -3.0 -1.0 -1.0 1.0 -2.0 -3.0 -4.0 -5.0 GDP Growth -7.0 3.0 Spain & the euro During 1990-2007 property speculation resulted in an asset bubble in Spain as or more extreme than in North America. The speculation included large exposures of Spanish banks in the US sub-prime market. When the bubble burst, the Spanish government embarked on a bank recapitalization ("bailout") that generated an annual average primary deficit of minus 7% of GDP. In the absence of the bailout the primary fiscal balance was minus 2% of GDP. Spain: Public sector balance, 2001-2010 4.0 2.0 0.0 -6.0 -8.0 -10.0 -12.0 Total deficit/GDP 2010 Less bank bailout 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 -4.0 2001 -2.0 The Spanish story summarized: [technical term is "chutzpah"] To save the financial sector from collapse, the Spanish government [social democrat!] bailed it out. The bailout more than tripled the fiscal deficit. The rescued Spanish financial institutions used the bailout funds to speculate on government bonds, thus creating the fiction that public finances were unsustainable. What to do in the euro zone Comment on Krugman & devaluation German expansion Deficit country export subsidies The Great Euro Scam Along side the Tulip Mania of the 1630s, the South Sea Bubble (1720s) and other ponzi schemes will go the Great Euro Scam of the 2000s, characterized by both tragedy and farce. The farce: Central Bank of Europe leaning to banks at 2-3%, so the banks could buy Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish bonds paying 7-15%. The tragedy: The political purpose of the "crisis", the end of social democracy and weakening of representative government, is succeeding.