* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Download Monetary Policy in the US & Exchange Rate Management:The
Survey
Document related concepts
Transcript
Monetary Policy in the US and Exchange Rate Management: The Chilean Experience and More José De Gregorio Vice Governor Central Bank of Chile May 18, 2007 I. High Correlation of Monetary Policy Stance: Do emerging markets follow US monetary Policy? • In the context of inflation targeting monetary policy should be geared by inflation perspectives rather than developments in world monetary policy. • Movements in world monetary policies affect emerging markets via growth prospects in the world and exchange rate fluctuations, but effects appear to be small given recent magnitude of interest rate changes. • The high correlation is the result of correlation in inflation developments rather than follower-strategy. • The case of Chile-US. Currently, the policy rate in Chile is below than that of the US. 2 May-07 Jan-07 Sep-06 May-06 Jan-06 Sep-05 May-05 Jan-05 Chile Sep-04 May-04 5.0 Jan-04 Sep-03 May-03 Jan-03 Sep-02 May-02 Jan-02 Sep-01 May-01 Jan-01 Sep-00 May-00 Jan-00 % 9.0 Monetary Policy Interest Rate Chile - U.S. 8.0 7.0 6.0 U.S. 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 3 GDP Quarterly Growth, Chile - U.S. (y-o-y) 9.0 8.0 7.0 Chile 6.0 U.S. % 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 00 III. 01 III. 02 III. 03 III. 04 III. 05 III. 06 III. 07 4 Jan-07 Sep-06 May-06 Jan-06 Sep-05 May-05 Jan-05 Sep-04 May-04 Jan-04 Sep-03 May-03 Jan-03 Sep-02 CPI (Chile) May-02 Jan-02 Sep-01 May-01 Jan-01 Sep-00 May-00 Jan-00 % Inflation Chile - U.S. 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 PCE (US) 0.0 -1.0 5 1.0 Jan-00 Apr-00 Jul-00 Oct-00 Jan-01 Apr-01 Jul-01 Oct-01 Jan-02 Apr-02 Jul-02 Oct-02 Jan-03 Apr-03 Jul-03 Oct-03 Jan-04 Apr-04 Jul-04 Oct-04 Jan-05 Apr-05 Jul-05 Oct-05 Jan-06 Apr-06 Jul-06 Oct-06 Jan-07 Apr-07 % Core Inflation, Chile - U.S. 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 IPC Core (Chile) PCE Core (US) 0.5 0.0 6 II. Exchange Rate Policies: Leaning Against the Wind and Floating? • Is it possible to lean against the wind? Why Chile, a floater, has been one of the countries with the smallest appreciation and the largest terms of trade gain? • Leaning against the wind may induce further capital inflows an pressures on the exchange rates. Non-credible interventions encourage inflows and loopholes on capital inflows generate large benefits to “loopholers” • Interpretation of Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007). Fear of revaluation (temporary) reduces real interest rate in dollars, it drives up capital inflows, relaxes liquidity constraints and generates a boom, not in export but in investment and perhaps mostly in non-tradables. But, what next? • Openness - Terms of trade – real exchange rate – export performance and concentration. Which are the causal relationship? 7 RER (index, left) 2006p 2004 2002 2000 1998 1996 1994 1992 1990 1988 1986 1984 1982 1980 1978 1976 1974 1972 1970 1968 1966 1964 1962 1960 1986 = 100 130 3.5 110 3.0 90 2.5 70 2.0 50 1.5 30 1.0 10 0.5 US$2005/lb Real Exchange Rate and Price of Copper Copper price (right) 8 2006:1 2005:1 2004:1 2003:1 2002:1 2001:1 2000:1 1999:1 1998:1 1997:1 1996:1 1995:1 1994:1 1993:1 1992:1 Total 1991:1 1990:1 150 1989:1 1988:1 1987:1 1986:1 2002 = 100 Terms of Trade 200 Copper excluded 100 50 9 Real exchange rate 1987-2007 700 700 650 650 600 600 550 550 500 500 450 450 400 400 87 89 91 Nominal equivalent 93 95 97 99 Average 1987-2006 01 03 05 07 Average 1992-2006 Fuente: Banco Central de Chile. 10 Exchange Rate Regime and International Borrowing Table 4: Dependent variable: Change in the Debt to GDP ratio 1991-1997 (1) Classification de jure (2) (3) Classification de Facto (6) (7) (4) (5) 0.170** 0.166*** 0.148** (0.068) (0.065) (0.071) 0.095* (0.059) 0.181** (0.074) 0.169 (0.067) 0.184** (0.074) 0.135** (0.063) Exchange rate Volatility 0.111 (0.391) 0.216 (0.389) 0.255 (0.417) -0.268 (0.39) -0.206 (0.382) -0.350 (0.405) -0.074 (0.413) Capital controls 0.035 (0.032) -0.029 (0.028) 0.05 (0.033) 0.052* (0.029) Growth forecast 1990-1995 0.553 (1.413) Fixed and managed exchange rate 0.05 (0.412) 1.011 (1.391) 0.445 (1.443) (8) (9) -0.018 (0.039) 0.028 (0.033) 0.965 (1.479) 0.995 (1.442) External debt/GDP -0.029*** -0.474*** -0.36*** -0.595*** -0.385*** -0.521*** -0.39*** -0.617*** -0.356*** 1990 (0.087) (0.076) (0.116) (0.059) (0.09) (0.069) (0.122) (0.39) (0.109) R2 0.49 0.58 0.42 0.84 0.49 0.61 0.47 0.86 0.38 No. Of obs 27 37 29 56 26 34 27 47 31 Notes: *, **, and ***, significant at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. All regressions estimated with OLS. Source: Cowan and De Gregorio (2005) 11 • Policies that provide partial insurance on forex fluctuations inhibit foreign exchange market developments (hedges). • The importance of the fiscal contribution. Although marginal effects may be limited (as those reported by Calderón and Perry), the existence of a fiscal framework may contain exchange rate pressures. • Causality on concentration and real exchange rate: improvement in terms of trade rises value of current exportable goods (concentrated perhaps) and we will see a positive correlation between real exchange rate and concentration. Is the desirable a depreciation as result of a trems of trade decline? 12 Forex Derivatives Market (turnover) and Exchange Rate Regime 2001 Veces PIB/COMEX 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Peg Mix DER/PIB Floating DER/COMEX Source: De Gregorio and Tokman (2004) 13 Fiscal Balance and Price of Copper 10 3.5 0 2.0 -5 1.5 -10 1.0 Structural balance (left) Global balance (left) 2005 2002 1999 1996 1993 1990 1987 1984 1981 1978 1975 1972 1969 1966 0.5 1963 -15 1960 % GDP 2.5 US$2005/lb 3.0 5 Copper price (right) 14 Copper Exports (% of total exports) 90 80 70 60 50 40 Nominal Source: Central Bank of Chile 2005 2003 2001 1999 1997 1995 1993 1991 1989 1987 1985 1983 1981 1979 1977 1975 1973 1971 1969 1967 1965 30 Real (65-06 avg) 15 III. Concluding Remarks • Lesson for policy: Latin American economies should try to move to floating in order to adjust to variable condition in the world. • Lesson for interpretation of the evidence: growing with forex intervention is not necessarily sustainable not necessarily good. • Lesson for research: perhaps we should move to case studies and ask under what conditions the transition from managed exchange rate to floating has been made. 16