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Chapter 1: History by Richard Baldwin © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Early Post War Period • A Climate for Radical Change: – Facts: Death toll Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland UK 525,000 82,750 4,250 79,000 505,750 6,363,000 355,500 250,000 10,250 0 0 325,000 The Economic Set-Back: Prewar year when GDP equalled that of 1945 1886 1924 1936 1938 1891 1908 1909 1912 1937 GDP grew during WWII GDP grew during WWII GDP grew during WWII • – Images: © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Imagine this happening again Berlin Cathedral, 1945 Unter der Linden, 1945 Berlin Cathedral, 1997 Brandenburg Gate Unter der Linden, 1997 Reichstag, 1945 Frankfurter Allee, 1945 Sudetenland 1938 © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Rotterdam, 1940 East London, 1940 Verona 1945 London 1940 London 1940 © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration The prime question in 1945 • “How can Europe avoid another war?” – What caused the war? 3 answers • Blame the loser • Capitalism • Destructive nationalism – These implied 3 post-war solutions • ‘Neuter’ Germany , Morgenthau Plan, 1944 • Adopt communism • Pursue European integration • European integration ultimately prevailed, but this was far from clear in the late 1940s. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Emergence of a divided Europe • Cold War begins. – – – – USSR pushes communism in the East. UK, French and US zones merged by 1948 Moves towards creation of West German government. Berlin blockade, 1948. – “Neuter Germany” solution abandoned for strong West Germany + European integration. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Imagine a re-divided Europe East German Guard Towers Checkpoint Charlie, 1961 © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration First Steps • First Steps: the OEEC and EPU – OEEC and EPU set up in conjunction with Marshal Plan, 1948. – OEEC coordinated aid distribution and prompted trade liberalisation. – EPU facilitated payments and fostered trade liberalisation. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Need for deeper European integration • As Cold War got more war-like, West Germany rearmament became necessary. – 1949, Fed’l Rep. of Germany established. – But strong and independent Germany was a scary thought to many , including many Germans. – Wide-spread feeling: best to embed an economically and militarily strong W. Germany in European superstructure. – Problem: OEEC was too loose to avoid future war among Western European powers. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Two strands of European integration • Federalism and intergovernmentalism – Immediate disagreement about depth of European integration • Federalism – supranational institutions • Intergovernmentalism – nations retain all sovereignty • Intergovernmental initiatives • OEEC (1948), Council of Europe (1949), EFTA (1960) • Federal initiative • ECSC (1951), EEC (1958) © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration 1960-1973, two non-overlapping circles IS EFTA-7 NL D B F L N I GR DK UK EEC-6 IR L E FIN S A P CH West European Trade Arrangements:in 1960s The EFTA-7 and the EEC-6 form two non-overlapping circles. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Evolution to Two Concentric Circles • Preferential liberalisation in EEC and EFTA proceeded – (EEC’s customs union and EFTA’s FTAs completed by 1968) • Discriminatory effects emerge, leading to new political pressures for EFTAs to join EEC – Trade diversion creates force for inclusion – As EEC enlarges, force for inclusion strengthens • When UK decides to apply for EEC (1961), 3 other EFTAns also change their minds. – De Gaulle’s ‘non’ (twice) © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Evolution to Two Concentric Circles • First enlargement, 1973 • UK, Denmark, Ireland & Norway admitted (Norwegians say no in referendum) • Enlargement of EEC reinforces ‘force for inclusion’ on remaining EFTAs – Remaining EFTAs sign FTA agreements with EEC-9 – Why weren’t the FTA’s signed before? • Domino-like affect of lowering barriers • 1st within EEC6 → enlargement → EEC-EFTA FTAs © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Two concentric circles West Europe's Trade Arrangement in mid-1970s : IS FIN N DK IRL NL UK B F S D L I EEC-9 A CH EFTA-7 P E GR © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Euro-pessimism, 1975-1986 • Political shocks: – ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ (1966) + enlargement leads to decision-making jam. • Economic shocks: – Bretton Woods falls apart, 1971-1973. • Failed monetary integration schemes (except within DM bloc). – 1973 and 1979 oil shocks with stagflation. – Failure of Deeper Trade Integration. – Growing cost of Common Agricultural Policy creates frictions over budget. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Bright spots • Democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece • Greece joins in 1981 • Spain and Portugal join in 1986 after long a difficult accession talks • EMS set up in 1979 works well • Budget Treaties • 1979 Cassis de Dijon decision built on 1974 Dassonville ruling – Challenged validity of national rules that introduce non-tariff barriers to trade. – Mutual Recognition Principle introduced. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Deeper circles: single market programme • Mutual recognition as threat to national regulatory control; race to bottom? • How to put member gov’t back in charge? • Delors launches completion of the internal market with Single European Act – create "an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured". • Important institutional changes, especially move to majority voting on Single Market issues. – Mutual recognition is disciplined by minimum harmonisation – More efficient decision making procedures allow agreement on min. standards “New Approach” Directives. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Single Market Programme, EC92 • Basic elements – Goods Trade Liberalisation • • • • Streamlining or elimination of border formalities, Harmonisation of VAT rates within wide bands Liberalisation of government procurement Harmonisation and mutual recognition of technical standards in production, packaging and marketing – Factor Trade Liberalisation • Removal of all capital controls (!!!), and deeper capital market integration • Liberalisation of cross-border market-entry policies, © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Domino effect, part II • Deeper integration in EC-12 strengthened the ‘force for inclusion’ in remaining EFTAns. • End of Cold War loosened EFTAns’ resistance to EC membership. • Result of ‘force for inclusion’ – EEA – initiative to extend single market to EFTAs. – Membership applications by all EFTAns except Iceland. • Concentric circles, but both deeper. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Fourth enlargement • 1994, Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden admitted (Norwegians again vote no). 1994 1973 2004 1958 Cyprus 1973 1981 Malta © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Communism’s creeping failure and spectacular collapse • By the 1980s, Western European system clearly superior due to the creeping failure of planned economies. • Up to 1980s, Soviets thwarted reform efforts (economic & military pressure). • Changes in USSR due to inadequacy economic system. – timid pro-market reforms (perestroika). – openness (glasnost). © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Velvet revolutions in CEECs – June 1989 Polish labour movement ‘Solidarity’ forced free parliamentary elections & communists lost • Moscow accepted new Polish government. – Moscow’s hands-off approach to the Polish election triggered a chain of events. • Reformist in Hungarian communist party pressed for democracy & Hungary opened its border with Austria, 1000s East Germans moved to West Germany via Hungary and Austria. • Mass protests in East Germany; Wall falls 9th November 1989. • End of 1989: democracy in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany (unification in 1990). © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration USSR collapses • 1990, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – declared their independence from the USSR. • End of 1991, the Soviet Union itself breaks up. • Cold War ends without a shot. • Military division of Europe ended. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration EU reacts • The European Union reacted swiftly to this geopolitical earthquake by providing emergency aid and loans to the fledgling democracies. • Signing of ‘Europe Agreements’ with newly free nations in Central and Eastern Europe – These are free trade agreements with promises of deeper integration and some aid © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration From Copenhagen to Copenhagen • EU says CEECs can join the EU (June 1993). – Set out famous Copenhagen criteria for membership. • • • • stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. • Copenhagen summit December 2002 says 10 CEECs can join in 2004. • 5th enlargement in May 2004 © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration German unification and Maastricht • Pending 1990 unification of Germany opens door to a ‘grand bargain’ (Mitterrand, Kohl). – Germany gives up DM for European Monetary Union & East Germany joins the EU without negotiation. • Jacques Delors proposes 2nd radical increase in European economic integration. – the formation of a monetary union. – Idea championed by French President Francois Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. • Maastricht Treaty, signed 1992 – a monetary union by 1999, single currency by 2002. – Also, sets up EU’s ‘three pillar’ structure to reduce EU’s ‘competency creep;’ • ERM exchange rate crises, 1992-1994. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Preparing for Eastern Enlargement • Impending enlargement required EU to reform its institutions • Four tries: – Amsterdam Treaty, 1997 – Nice treaty, 2000 – draft Constitutional Treaty, 2003 • Reconsidered by IGC 2003 – Constitutional Treaty, June 2004. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Amsterdam Treaty • Failed to reform main institutions • Tidied up of the Maastricht Treaty – More social policy, Parliament powers modestly boosted, – flexible integration, ‘closer cooperation introduced • Amsterdam leftovers – voting rules in the Council of Ministers, – number of Commissioners, – Extension of issue covered by majority voting © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Nice Treaty • Reforms of main institutions agreed, but poorly done – Council voting rules highly complex and reduce EU’s ability to act with more members – No important extension of majority voting – Make shift solution for Commissioners – No reform of decision making in ECB • Generally viewed as a failure • Main changes re-visited in draft Constitutional Treaty, 2003 © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration Constitutional Treaty • Improved decision-making rules for Council of Ministers and slightly more majority voting. • Inclusion of Charter of Fundamental Rights. • Other things where CT not strictly required: – Many ‘gestures’ and tidying up. – Moves towards more coherent foreign policy decision making. – Many de facto points turned into de jure. © Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration