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“Hot” Money Flows into China
• China “bashing” to appreciate the RMB
• Near –Zero Interest rates in the United States
Bilateral Trade Balances of Japan and China versus the United States
(percentage of U.S. GDP, 1985-2012)
3.0%
2.5%
Japan Bashing
China Bashing
China
Japan
2.0%
China + Japan
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
1985
1988
Source: Census Bureau, IMF
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
Thesis
• For a creditor country with a current account surplus such as
China, exchange appreciation need not reduce it. Investment is
too sensitive to exchange rate changes
• As with Japan’s earlier experience, exchange rate appreciation,
or the threat thereof , caused macroeconomic distress without
having any obvious effect on its trade surplus.
• If the country is an immature creditor and its trade surplus is
large , even floating is infeasible. Because of currency
mismatches, the private sector cannot risk financing the
surplus.
Exchange Rate and the Trade Balance
X − M = S − I = Trade (Saving) Surplus
X is exports and M is imports broadly defined,
S and I are gross domestic saving and investment
Two theoretical Approaches:
(1) Microeconomic focus on X − M : the elasticities
approach to the trade balance; and
(2) Macroeconomic focus on S − I : the absorption
approach to the trade balance.
Effect of Appreciating the Renmimbi ?
• Elasticities Approach:
X ↓ M↑ and trade surplus declines
• Absorption Approach:
S ↕ I↓ and trade surplus ?
But if I is sensitive to the exchange rate and slumps, trade surplus increases.
Investment in China’s open economy, with multinational firms, is huge: more
than 40% of GDP.
• Japan’s experience with ever-higher yen, 1971 – 95: Investment eventually
slumped with general deflation, followed by “lost” decades, but the trade
surplus remained.
Figure 1: US Interest Rates
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
Source: FRED
USD Libor
10 Year Treasury
Figure 2. Emerging Markets and China, Foreign Exchange Reserves (Billion USD)
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Jan-06
Jan-07
Total Emerging Markets
Jan-08
Jan-09
China
Jan-10
Jan-11
Jan-12
Jan-13
Expected Appreciation of RMB and Wide Interest
Rate Differential with the United States
• “Hot” money flows into China
- sharper build up of official exchange reserves
- threatened loss of monetary control as base money expands
from foreign exchange intervention
-sterilization disrupts normal flow of bank credit
- domestic interest rates bid down with possible bubbles in
asset markets such as real estate.
• No natural capital outflow to finance China’s huge trade (net saving)
surplus
• Peoples Bank of China should
(1) stabilize the yuan/dollar exchange rate
(2) maintain exchange controls on financial inflows to prevent Chinese
interest rates from being driven toward zero.