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Transcript
The EU-assistance policy for
the post-socialist Europe in transition
Evolution of the efficiency
premises of the EU-assistance
policy for the transition societies
in Europe from 1989 to the
present.
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Question:
How can be explained the reduced efficiency of
the EU assistance policy in the post-socialist
Europe?
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Assumptions of the theory:
1.
2.
Transformationsforschung (Alfred Kraft, Stefan Mair, Franz
Nuscheler) based on the Modernization Theory: The efficiency of
assistance depends primarly on the transformation capacity of the
concerned countries&societies.
Europäisierungsforschung (Grabbe, Emerson) based on the
Integration Theory: The EU is a special donor for the post-socialist
societies in Europe and the efficiency of its assistance policy
depends primarly on the evolution of political relations between the
EU and the concerned countries.
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Structure:

Part one: Distinction between transition and
transformation. Implications for an efficient cooperation on the recipient side

Part two: Opportunities and restrictions of the
European Union in designing and implementing its
assistance policy for the post-socialist Europe

Part three: Case study - EU assistance for the
Republic of Moldova
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Part one: Distinction between
transition and transformation
Holm Sundhausen (1995):
Transition means changes, evolutions without clear limitations in
time.

Transformation means changes with a clear goal. Transformation
has a start and a finish. The progression of transformation
depends on the evolution of modernization processes in the
related country.
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Premises for successful
transformation

Actors: clear goals and consensus among the political elite;

Resources: no collisions between the vital needs of the
population and the costs of transformation processes;

Tempo: the tempo of the catch up learning processes should
correspond to the absorption capacity of the society;

Institutions: necessary background

Competence level of the population
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Transformation and assistance tools

Before the start of transformation processes one can’t speak about a
clear and feasible strategy concerning democracy, market economy
and consolidation of new states.

Without a clear strategy on the recipient side assistance priorities can
not be tailored to the particular needs of the respective society and the
respective sources are mainly used for financial re-organization
(Haushaltssanierung) or for ad-hoc measures in particular fields of the
economy or society development.

Without a clear strategy of transformation no assistance for
transformation can work.
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Part two: Opportunities and restrictions of the European Union
in designing and implementing its assistance policy for the
post-socialist Europe

Opportunities
-
Amount of assistance: The EU is the most generous donor of ODA (the EU
member states allocate yearly 0,3 % of the GDP (starting with 2007 – 0,7% of
GDP) for development and transformation assistance. USA allocates 0,1 % of
GDP. The European Commission manages 1/5 of the assistance resources of
the EU. This corresponds to 10% of the global foreign aid (KOM (2003) 527)
-
Political significance in the post-socialist Europe: The EU is the only donor that
can offer the incentive of finalité politique. This is being associated by the
political elite of the concerned countries with a transformation goal. Thus the
conditionality of the EU assistance tools is being relatively easily accepted by
the European post-socialist societies and associated with a norm transfer.
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Part two: Opportunities and restrictions of the European Union
in designing and implementing its assistance policy for the
post-socialist Europe

Restrictions
-
Lack of consensus among the EU member states concerning the role and the
goal of the EU assistance policy generally and particularly for the post-socialist
Europe: primarily (i) instrument of diplomacy or (ii) part of the global
development framework.
-
First years after 1989: lack of an EU strategy for the case of collapse of the
communist-regime in Europe
-
Until 2003: Lack of strategy for post-socialist European countries without
accession perspective.
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Consequences for the development of the EU –
assistance policy for post-socialist Europe.
The lack of consensus among the member states and the lack of necessary
strategies towards these countries lead to a compromise solution: automatic
adoption of the principles of the global development framework (IMF, WB,
OECD):
1.
Until 2001 – Washington Consensus (focus on neo-liberal reforms,
withdrawal of the state from the economy, no focus on institutions, civil
society). The influence of the principles of Washington Consensus on the EUassistance policy lead to the ignorance of a very important aspect of
transformation of these countries: state building and consolidation. This
affected first of all the programs for countries without an accession
perspective, that faced the biggest problems in their state and nation building
processes. Recent research contributions (Klaus Esser, 2003) show two
consequences of applying the principles of Washington Consensus in this
category of countries: state weakness and poverty.
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Consequences for the development of the EU –
assistance policy for post-socialist Europe.
1.
Starting with 2001-2002 – Monterrey Consensus (focus on good
governance and ownership of reforms, institutional development and poverty
reduction).
The recognition of the role of state instead “Let the market rule!” Unclear how to
deal with weak states?
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Part three: The EU assistance for the Republic of
Moldova.
Transition or transformation

Late start of transformation (1999-2000). Before 1999 –no
strategy of reforms, no clear goals of economic and political
transformation, deep economic crisis and state weakness.

Serious problems in all the three fields of transformation: state
building, market economy and democracy.
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Part three
Problems and needs of the country
State building:
-
-
Fragmentation immediately after the declaration of
independence (Transdniestria)
Problematic institutions
Weak political elite
Underdeveloped civil society
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Part three
Problems and needs of the country

Market economy:
-
Reform strategy
Ownership of reforms (role of political elite)
Conversion of the economy (from defense to microelectronic)
Reforms of the agrarian sector (about 30% of employment) and
safeguard of markets
Accompanying social measures
-
-
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Part three
Problems and needs of the country

Democracy
-
Justice reform
Corruption
Civil society
Free media
-
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Part three
EU in the context of the international donor
community in the Republic of Moldova.

The most important donors: USA (40 – 53 %), EU and the EU
member states (the Netherlands, Germany, UK, France, etc.)

The EU is the second important donor in terms of amount of
assistance an the only donor that has as a goal to assist the
country in its entire transformation process. All the other donors
focus on some particular fields: USA – agriculture, Germanyjustice reform, France – cultural ties, etc..
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Part three:
The impact of the EU assistance programs on the
transformation of the Republic of Moldova

State building:

Focus on regions and not on the state
No institutional support until 2001, excepting capacity building for
implementing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EU
expertise costs – up to 75 %)
Until 2001 – no projects for supporting institution building, civil society
development, no support for the settlement of Transdniestria conflict
Starting with 2001 – focus on institutional development, state as a
partner, focus on development of civil society, etc.



Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Part three:
The impact of the EU assistance programs on the
transformation of the Republic of Moldova

Market economy
-
Focus on restrictive monetary policy, privatization and private
sector development (regardless the social consequences, the
lack of ownership of reforms, the lack of a strategy of the Mold.
Government, the lack of feasibility studies for macroeeconomic
reforms, etc.)
-
Generous support for reforms in the field of agriculture, but no
strategy and no continuity.
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Part three:
The impact of the EU assistance programs on the
transformation of the Republic of Moldova

Democracy
-
Delay (until 2001) in supporting development of free media, civil
society
-
Focus on regional projects (i) in supporting justice reform and
(ii) Southeastern Europe in combating corruption.
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Part three
Conclusions
The EU assistance couldn’t be tailored on the state of political and
economic development and transformation of the Republic of
Moldova and as a result could only marginally achieve its goal to
support the country in its threefold transformation: state building and
consolidation, market economy and democracy.
Reasons:
1.
On the recipient side - late start of the transformation process : no
clear goal, no strategy of reforms, no ownership of reforms,
problematic institutions, weak political elite, etc.
2.
On the donor side – big amounts, but problematic priorities (no
consensus among the member states and lack of EU expertise for
specifics of transformation processes in the post-socialist Europe),
high administrative costs (overhead and expertise – up to 75 %).

Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Future prospects
Better premises and important learning processes on both sides:
-
Start of the transformation processes on the recipient side
Reforms of the EU assistance policy. Placement of the assistance policy for the
post-socialist Europe in the field of the EU Common Foreign and Security
Policy (GASP).
More EU – expertise in this field is needed.
More empirical research in this field, as well as theoretical contributions
concerning the specifics of the thresfold transformation in the post-socialist
Europe, as well as the specification of some terms (weak state, poverty, etc.)
related to Europe, is needed.
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig
Thank you for your attention!
Victoria Reinhardt, University of
Leipzig