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LOS PAÍSES ANDINOS LOS PAÍSES ANDINOS Ecuador at a glance: 2013-17 OVERVIEW Ecuador is currently enjoying a period of relative political stabiilty. After five years in office, the president, Rafael Correa, remains far more popular than his recent predecessors. A survey carried out in September by polling firm Opinión Pública gave Mr Correa a clear lead on voting intentions, with 44% support. The next-closest candidate was former banker Guillermo Lasso of Creando Oportunidades (CREO), on just 9%. In view of this, the Economist Intelligence Unit feels that Mr Correa is best placed to win another term. Despite some spending contraints as a result of lower oil prices, we expect the Correa administration to maintain its expansive policy stance ahead of the 2013 elections (and thereafter), keeping the public finances in deficit. The government will continue to encourage private investment, and it is hoped that development of the mining sector will increase levels of foreign direct investment. However, persistent intervention by the government will act as a deterrent, as will the unpredictable policy environment. We expect the current account to remain in deficit during the forecast period. Fuente: EIU September 4th 2012 Peru at a glance: 2012-16 OVERVIEW Having gained the support of the urban middle classes, the president, Ollanta Humala, will implement pragmatic and centrist policies. Opposition from the left, in the legislature and at the local level, will intensify. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects macroeconomic policy management to remain broadly prudent under the Humala government, in the context of a relatively weak global outlook and the persistent risk of a financial crisis originating in the euro zone. After growing by 6.9% in 2011, the economy will slow to 5.6% in 2012, supported by still-strong private investment. Assuming that global conditions improve, GDP growth will pick up to an annual average of 5.8% in 2013-16. A fiscal surplus of 1.9% of GDP in 2011 will shrink to an annual average of 0.9% in 2012-16 (in line with the fiscal balance rule), owing to spending on public works and social programmes, and a small stimulus package in 2012. We expect the monetary authority to hold its policy rate in 2012, amid weakening global conditions. If global conditions worsen significantly, the Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (BCRP, the Central Bank) will have room to loosen policy. Barring a sharp rise in risk aversion stemming from an external shock (such as a financial crisis originating in the euro zone), the currency's appreciation will continue in 2012-13, leading the nuevo sol to reach Ns2.6:US$1 by end-2013. The current-account deficit will widen, to 3.1% of GDP in 2016, driven by a widening income deficit and a narrower trade surplus. Fuente: EIU KEY: Perú http://serviciodeestudios.bbva.com/KETD/fbin/mult/sp1t14_e_presentacion_tc m346-425988.pdf?ts=432014 http://semanaeconomica.com/el-nuevo-sol/2013/11/08/mi-entrevista-enperu21-sobre-las-perspectivas-economicas-para-2014/ Callao http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixy_lqbVD7g&feature=related TURISMO: Puerto Maldonado (Provincia Madre de Dios) Partes 1-4: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZM4Czyo3ws http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&v=HjOsbTeCHAs&feature=endscreen http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&v=RG53TBm-t58&feature=endscreen http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&v=HnHNU28nmuY&feature=endscreen October 1st 2012 Bolivia at a glance: 2013-17 OVERVIEW The inability of the left-wing president, Evo Morales, to satisfy the rising demands of diverse social groups will fuel public discontent, but political instability will be contained by continued high social spending. Stringent rules on foreign ownership and profit repatriation, widespread corruption and a weak judicial system will impair the business environment and limit foreign and domestic private-sector participation. Assuming that there will be no prolonged or sharp fall in gas and oil prices, Bolivia's non-financial public sector (NFPS) will remain in surplus throughout the forecast period, even as public expenditure remains high. After an estimated expansion of 5% in 2012, GDP growth will moderate, but at an average of 4.5% in 2013-17 it will remain strong, supported by continued growth in domestic demand and rising natural gas production. After easing to an estimated average of 4.7% in 2012, inflation will rise in 2013-14, as high public spending puts upward pressure on prices. However, continued fuel subsidies will contain price expectations in the medium term. The Banco Central de Bolivia (BCB, the Central Bank) has kept the currency fixed in 2012, but it will resume its policy of appreciation in the medium term, bringing the boliviano to Bs6.58:US$1 by end2017. Fuente: EIU BOLIVIA Political outlook Despite slow progress on his reform agenda, Mr Morales is likely to win a new five-year term in December 2014, aided by an expanding economy and the lack of a strong challenger. Economic policy outlook The state's lack of experience in industrial management and a weak institutional framework will lead to inefficiencies and delays in 2013-17. This will be aggravated by Mr Morales's heterodox policies and continued threat of strikes and protests that will distort public investment. Fuente: EIU Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/2/53392/EEE2014-Ecuador.pdf http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/2/53392/EEE2014-Peru.pdf http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/2/53392/EEE2014-Bolivia.pdf http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/2/53392/PresentacionEEE2014.pdf http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/1/53391/PresentationEEI2014.pdf http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/1/53391/EEI2014_PartI_ChapterI.pdf http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/2/53392/EEE2014_ParteICapI.pdf