Download The Nationalization of the Suez Canal: A Waterway to A New World

The Nationalization of the Suez Canal: A Waterway to a New World Order
By Gabriel Klapholz
Historical Paper
Junior Division
“What…am I doing here?” thought Sandy Cavenagh, a British medical officer, as
he prepared to parachute into Port Said, Egypt (Cavenagh 15). Concurrently, merely 70
miles away, Shlomo Barer, part of an Israeli supply convoy in the Sinai Desert, felt as “a
man unknown to myself” (Barer 15). Fouad Ajami, a Lebanese-born scholar of Middle
Eastern affairs, later described this moment in history as “open-ended for [a] generation
of Arabs…[it was a time when] change was in the offing” (Ajami 117-118). All three
experienced the 1956 Suez-Sinai War in very different ways. For Britain and France, it
was the end of an era, but for the infant Israelis and the infuriated Arabs a new political
chapter was emerging (Woollacott 1-3). The nationalization of the Suez Canal was a
turning point in history.
Historical Setting
The Suez Canal, built by Ferdinand de Lesseps and completed in 1869, was a
crucially important engineering project as it greatly reduced travel distance from Europe
to Asia and the Pacific (Appendix Figure 1). Connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the
Indian Ocean, the canal, which from a distance fostered the illusion that ships were
sailing on sand, became “a symbol both of exotic convenience and of European imperial
might” (Winchester 1-2). The celebration of its inauguration included a performance in
Cairo of Verdi‟s Aida, specially written for the occasion (Karabell 252).
On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser declared the Suez
Canal Company property of the state. He was reacting to the United States, Britain, and
France‟s refusal to finance Egypt‟s plan to construct the Aswan Dam, thereby beginning
a process of industrialization (“Egypt Nationalizes Suez” 1). Thousands gathered in al-
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Manshiya Square in Alexandria to receive the news (Mar‟i 361). Also concerned were
the canal‟s non-Egyptian shareholders, mostly British and French, who had been
receiving annual income from the canal (Shaw 9).
An explosive debate ensued. At issue was an 1888 accord signed by nine
European countries that had guaranteed “at all times and for all Powers the free use of the
Suez Maritime Canal.” Would Nasser abide by this decades-old agreement and continue
to allow passage through the canal of 118 million tons of cargo per year, including half of
the oil used by Western Europe? Or would he hold the world hostage and use the canal
for political gain? Twenty-two nations, all canal users, met for diplomatic talks but
Nasser refused to accept any of the terms they proposed (“The Gathering Crisis” E1).
On October 24, Britain and France finalized “Operation Musketeer,” a secret plan
with Israel to invade Egypt (Ignatius 2; Kyle 125; Bar-On 145). On October 29 at 1700
hours, the Israeli Defense Forces parachuted into the Sinai Peninsula, began to eradicate
Egyptian resistance, and, on November 5, reached the canal. Soon after, the British and
French militaries landed on the canal‟s beaches, claiming that they were assisting their
ally. However, with victory in reach, they all succumbed to international pressure and
accepted the terms of a cease-fire with the canal remaining in Egyptian hands (Herzog 812). But the details of this military encounter are far less critical than the impact that the
nationalization of the Suez Canal had on the countries involved (Dessouki 31).
A New Egypt: The Rise of Arab Nationalism
Nasser‟s decision to nationalize the canal challenged the balance of power in the
Middle East, where colonial authority had predominated. “It was as though Egypt was
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exacting an old revenge that had accumulated over the previous 70 years and the time had
finally come to settle it,” remarked government minister Sayyid Mar‟i (Mar‟i 361). In
1955, Nasser had published The Philosophy of the Revolution, a treatise in which he
argued that Egypt could not “look stupidly at a map of the world” and fail to realize the
role bequeathed to her by her geography (Dessouki 31-32) as the “crossroads of the
world” (Nasser 61). Taking ownership of the canal was a strong step forward in the
development of an ideology in which national independence and Arab unity were central
(Nasser 39-42, 85-92; Dessouki 31-32). As Mar‟i described the fervor of the Egyptian
people in July 1956:
We were overcome by a feeling of honor and self-sacrifice, the kind of
feeling that affects every nation when destiny puts its patriotism…to a
decisive test. The people‟s attitude suddenly changed from fear to honor,
from hesitation to enthusiasm, from suspicion to solidarity, and from
doubt to pride. (Mar‟i 361)
Nasser harnessed this popularity as a political weapon, riling up not only his base
but the Arab world at large to embrace self-determination (Caruthers, “Egypt Declares
Battle” 8; “Egypt Gets Rest” 33). He was idolized by the masses, his name was on “Arab
lips from Casablanca to Damascus” (“The Gathering Crisis” E1; Caruthers, “What Drives
Gamal” 52), and a nine-nation Arab league pledged him its full backing (Caruthers,
“Arab States Back Egypt” 2; Brewer 206). Nasser supported a growing rebel movement
in Algeria to secure freedom from French colonialism and the British were losing sway in
Sudan, just South of Egypt, which Nasser sought to annex. Both feared Nasser‟s
nationalist influences (Louis 409-410, 412). Furthermore, the Palestinians, with their
refugee status following the 1948 Israeli War of Independence, were likewise inspired.
Salah Kalaf, one of the six founders of Fatah (originally an anti-Israel terrorist group)
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wrote, “We believed that Palestinians could rely only on themselves” (Woollacott 7-8).
By 1957, King Hussein of Jordan requested American support, fearing that a Palestinian
element was plotting with Egypt to overthrow his government in order to form a proNasser republic (Schulzinger 256).
In November 1956, it was irrelevant that Nasser‟s army, referred to by the
American press as “a fly facing an elephant gun,” stood no chance against two world
powers and Israel (Baldwin, “Nasser Leads Egypt” 193; Appendix Figure 2). The crisis
had transformed the Egyptians. Nasser was their “Mr. Egypt,” the symbol of
modernization (Baldwin, “Nasser Leads Egypt” 193). Following the cease-fire, he had
full intention to rebuild his army and to expel any remaining colonialist forces. He
praised his soldiers for their heroism and urged his people to continue to exact revenge
for their past subjugation (Caruthers, “Egypt Building Up” 1). “We are now free,” he
exclaimed “and will remain free.” Suez established Nasser as the pre-eminent Arab
leader and Arab nationalism as the central Arab ideology for decades to come (Khalidi
377-378). The world would have to contend with Nasser‟s growing power.
Britain and France Decline as the United States Rises
The Suez crisis demonstrated that, following a century of domination, the Middle
East was finally breaking free from its European shackles. “The seizure of the canal,”
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden remarked, “was part of the struggle for the mastery
of the Middle East” (Woollacott 38). The canal had been one of Britain and France‟s last
spheres of influence in the region (“Egypt Nationalizes Suez” 1) and its nationalization
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threatened their oil supply and trade with Asia, Africa and the Oceania (“Some Economic
Effects” 19; “Oil Thirsty Europe” 213; Appendix Figure 3).
But the decision to go to war was about far more than control of the canal: Britain
and France wanted to topple Nasser. At first, they dropped pamphlets from the air that
they hoped would incite the Egyptians to aid them in overthrowing him (Baldwin, “A
Confused Invasion” 4). On the eve of the invasion, French Prime Minister Guy Mollet
addressed his people, stressing the importance of thwarting Nasser‟s “expansionist aims,”
including his interference in Algeria. Mollet made it clear that France had adopted a new
pro-Zionist stance that would protect Israel from being annihilated (Callender, “French
Assembly” 1-2). Fear led Eden and Mollet to perceive Nasser‟s ideology as a form of
fascist totalitarianism similar to Nazism and to consider his aforementioned treatise
parallel to Hitler‟s Mein Kampf because of its ultra-nationalist and anti-Jewish rhetoric
(Nasser 99-103; Schmidt E3; Woollacott 42). Leading British newspapers, The Express,
The Mail and The Times, also equated Nasser with Hitler (Negrine 975-983). As the
Suez crisis unfolded, this belief fueled the preference for military intervention as opposed
to diplomatic negotiation.
On a global scale, Europe had to claim her hegemony in a changing world to
bring to fruition Winston Churchill‟s dream of reestablishing its dominance (Dietl 261262, 274). Britain and France were concerned about their position as world powers.
In the wake of World War II, they saw the United States as dwarfing Europe‟s status and,
in a surprising political turn, they were prepared to risk their relationship with their longterm ally by invading Egypt without prior notification (Middleton, “Anger at Dulles” 12). In fact, the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Roger Makins, conveyed his
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suspicions that “the Americans [were]…out to take our place in the Middle East” (Louis
396). Thus, the British and French did not want to stand idly by as the United States
solved the Suez crisis through diplomacy, despite the fact that their actions also meant
ignoring commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Dietl 275;
Callender, “Western Rift” 2). In the words of Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgium Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the events of the Suez Canal “had shattered many illusions” of what
defined a military alliance (“Report of the Committee”).
Instead of prevailing as strong colonial powers, Britain and France met with
strong resistance from the United States, which wanted to distance itself from the
colonialist image that had once defined its foreign policy (Bowie 200-201; Louis 399,
409; Ignatius 2). America favored a diplomatic solution to the crisis and even legitimized
Nasser‟s actions as the canal ran exclusively through Egyptian territory (Bowie 209;
Khadduri 147-152). The U.S. wanted the canal to be internationalized, not privately
controlled by European shareholders (Bowie 200-201; Louis 409). When Britain and
France chose to take military action against Nasser, President Dwight D. Eisenhower was
irate and refused to support them (Ignatius 2). The Americans believed that by invading
Egypt the British and French were “poisoning the atmosphere of the…Middle East”
(Louis 410). Secretary of State John Foster Dulles took the lead in proposing a peaceful
solution, arguing at the United Nations General Assembly in the midst of the crisis, that
“we had [already] seen perhaps the worst in war, that our task was to prevent a recurrent
of what had been” (“Remarks in the United Nations” 6).
The Suez crisis solidified the Unites States‟ position as the major western power
broker in the Middle East for years to come (Schulzinger 251). Britain and France‟s
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compliance with the cease-fire marked the end of their centuries-old colonialist ideology
and their hopes for a resurging Europe. They emerged from the Suez crisis far weaker,
realizing that they could no longer act independently in world affairs (Whalen E8).
Israeli Ascendancy
For Israel, the Suez crisis marked a positive political turning point. During the
months leading up to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Nasser had been stockpiling
armaments that he received from the Soviet Union (and its satellite Czechoslovakia),
which was seeking power in the Middle East (Herzog 4; Troen 181; Zeevy 60). In
addition, Nasser denied Israel access to the canal and also blockaded the Straits of Tiran,
rendering her southern port of Eilat ineffectual (Herzog 5; Zeevy 62). Egypt had also
been endorsing militant fedayeen gangs to terrorize Israel along their mutual border.
Israel, therefore, conspired with Britain and France and invaded Egypt (Herzog 7;
Zeevy 61). Marking a new assertive political philosophy, she launched a surprise preemptive attack and captured the Sinai Peninsula on October 29 (Ben-Gurion 309-313;
Troen 181, 186-187; Zeevy 62). National pride swelled and Israel felt invincible. Two
world powers had relied on her to complete a mission crucial to their status in world
politics (Troen 186-187; Brilliant 217). Moreover, this military success stood in the
shadow of a profound nation-making experience (Woollacott 2). In conquering Sinai, the
Jewish people, in the words of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, had returned “to the
place where the Law was given” (Hourani 393).
The Suez crisis also jumpstarted Israel‟s nuclear capability. The agreement to
join Britain and France had resulted from a promise by French Defense Minister Maurice
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Bourges-Maunoury to give Israel an atomic reactor to be used for peaceful purposes; yet,
would likely become a military deterrent against Israel‟s enemies (Richelson 238-239;
Dietl 272). Despite having to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, the war solidified
Israel‟s power and enhanced her image in the world. She experienced ten years of
relative security on her southern border (Troen 183) and her successful military tactics
influenced battle strategies used in the wars that followed (Zeevy 72).
The Soviet Union: A New Power Broker in the Middle East
While the nationalization of the canal helped Israel and America foster a strong
political relationship, Egypt grew closer to the Soviet Union (Brewer 206; “Threat by
Soviets” 8). After the death of Josef Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Union began to seek a
foothold in Egypt in the hope of pushing western countries out of Middle East politics
(Golan 277, 285; Appendix Figure 4). While the U.S.S.R. was not directly involved in
the Suez crisis at its onset and refused to aid Egypt militarily against Israel or the West,
on November 5, 1956 Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev threatened a nuclear attack
against Britain and France if they did not withdraw from Suez. The Soviets gave the
United Nations Security Council a twelve-hour deadline to end hostilities and even
requested that America join them in assembling a joint force to stop the crisis (Golan
278-279). Thus, it was the Soviet Union that brought the crisis to a sudden end (Golan
283). For the Soviets, brinkmanship with the West linked to their nuclear strength
emerged from this point on as their tactical approach to Middle East crises (Golan 285).
Indeed, following her successful contribution to ending the Suez crisis as Egypt‟s
patron, the Soviet Union intensified both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War. Any
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confrontation in the Middle East could now more easily result in a nuclear conflict
between the Soviet Union and Israel‟s patron the United States (Golan 284-285;
Richelson 105-136). Additionally, following reports that the Soviet Union was
continuing to build up Nasser‟s army, the United States became concerned that the
U.S.S.R. wanted to spread communism beyond Eastern Europe and China (Middleton,
“Cairo Said to Ask” 5; Campbell 235-243). In an important address to Congress on
American policy in the Middle East in January 1957, President Eisenhower reported:
“The large attack by Israel in October intensified the basic differences between that
nation and its Arab nations. All this instability had been heightened and…manipulated
by International Communism” (Schulzinger 252). Therefore, America supported anticommunist governments in the region with monetary and military aid and went so far as
to invade Lebanon in 1958 to prevent a suspected communist takeover (Schulzinger 252256). While American anxiety may have been exaggerated, from 1956 onward the role
of the Soviet Union in the Middle East far outweighed that of Britain and France and
many in the Arab world aligned themselves with the Soviet Union rather than America
(Campbell 252-253).
Conclusion
Perhaps the most profound outcome of the Suez crisis is that it hastened the
deterioration of colonialism. International decolonization was likely to occur over a long
span of time, yet the nationalization of the Suez Canal lit the fuse that ignited a decline in
world colonies (Louis 418). With Britain and France exiting their colonial primes of the
early 1900s, it was time for them to step down from their ruling pedestal and make way
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for two giants whose might was being built off of a bitter rivalry. The Suez crisis sealed
the fate of the United States and the Soviet Union as the masters of world affairs. The
crisis also gave definition to a new form of nationalism that extended thousands of miles
beyond the streets of Alexandria. This nationalist ideology, fueled by Nasser, was a key
catalyst for the dream of Arab unity and intensified the Arab-Israeli conflict.
But what about the Suez Canal itself? There was a time when the canal changed
the world, but the modern world has changed it. New maritime technology has lessened
its importance as the canal is now too narrow for today‟s large tankers which can skirt the
Cape of Good Hope in less time. Nevertheless, it still accounts for a significant 8% of
world trade. The canal remains a potential political power-keg. The unrest in Egypt
today raises a renewed possibility of a closure (“How Important is the Suez Canal?”).
And so, the Suez Canal is a reminder of the ability of a 101-mile-long waterway to
change world order.
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Appendix
Figure 1. "The Suez Canal Opens in 1869 and Saves Thousands of Miles on Sea Voyages
to the Far East."
Figure 2. Benson, Timothy S., and Anthony Gorst. "Suezcide."
11
Figure 3. Behrendt, Fritz. “Der Mann Am Hahnen.” (“The Man at the Tap”)
Figure 4. Behrendt, Fritz. “Weg Met Het Kolonialisme!” (“Farewell to Colonialism!”)
12
Works Cited
Primary Sources
Baldwin, Hanson W. "A Confused Invasion." New York Times 10 Dec. 1956: 4. Print.
This article contains information about British propaganda aimed at the Egyptian
people to diminish support for Nasser. It also highlights British interests in
overthrowing Nasser.
Baldwin, Hanson W. "Nasser Leads Egypt in Hopeless Struggle." New York Times 4
Nov. 1956: 193. Print.
Baldwin enabled me to see how weak Nasser‟s army was in 1956, but how strong
Egyptian support was for Nasser. He was seen as the symbol of modern Egypt.
Barer, Shlomo. The Weekend War. Tel Aviv: Karni, 1959. Print.
Shlomo Barer offered an autobiographical account of the Israeli experience
entering Sinai in 1956.
Behrendt, Fritz. "Der Mann Am Hahnen." Cartoon. Spaß Beiseite. Rorschach:
Nebelspalter Verlag, 1957. Print. Figure 3.
13
This cartoon‟s title is in German. It means “The Man at the Tap.” The “man” is
Nasser and he is sitting at the left with the world‟s oil behind him, waiting to
travel to various countries. Yet, he only lets out mere drips of oil for Britain. The
world feared that Nasser would cut off its oil supply by not letting ships through
the Suez Canal. This sway over international oil gave Nasser much recognition
and pushed the British and French to invade Egypt.
Behrendt, Fritz. "Weg Met Het Kolonialisme." Cartoon. Kijken Verboden. Amsterdam:
Nijgh & Van Ditmar, 1961. Print. Figure 4.
This cartoon‟s title is in Dutch. It means “Farewell to Colonialism!” This
statement is only partially true according to the cartoon. Britain is disengaging
from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, as depicted by the various people bidding
goodbye to a British officer. Yet the Soviets, on the right side of the cartoon, are
sneaking into the ruling position and are gradually acquiring influence. One of the
Soviet men holds a book with the word “Stalin” on it. Even though Joseph Stalin
had died, his communist ideals live on.
Ben-Gurion, David. "Ben-Gurion's Diary: The Suez-Sinai Campaign." In The SuezSinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal. Eds. Selwyn Ilan Troen and
Moshe Shemesh. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 289-332. Print.
14
Ben-Gurion‟s diary narrated the events leading up to the attack on Egypt and
informed me about the meeting on October 24 in Sèvres, France, between the
French, the British and the Israelis. It was evidence that these three nations
colluded with one another in an effort to wipe out Nasser.
Brewer, Sam Pope. "Nasser Emerges Stronger as Leader of Arab States." New York
Times 18 Nov. 1956: 206. Print.
This article discusses the realignment of the Arabs with Moscow instead of
Washington, London and Paris. This helped me to understand the shifting of
alliances at the time of the Suez crisis.
Brilliant, Moshe. "Israelis Feel Stronger Despite Loss of Friends." New York Times 25
Nov. 1956: 217. Print.
Brilliant described how the Israelis felt in the aftermath of invading the Sinai
Peninsula. Despite the fact that they were pressured to return what they had
conquered, the Israelis acquired great military confidence. After destroying a third
of Nasser‟s army, they felt that they had acquired a sense of security on their
southern border.
Callender, Harold. "French Assembly Backs Suez Move." New York Times 31 Oct. 1956:
1, 2. Print.
15
This source highlights the reasons for France‟s decision to solve the Suez crisis
militarily. It contains the arguments made by Prime Minister Guy Mollet in his
effort to sway the French National Assembly to support a British-French military
occupation of the Suez Canal zone. After a vote of 368 in favor and 182 against,
France joined Britain in invading Egypt.
Callender, Harold. "Western Rift Over Suez." New York Times 2 Nov. 1956: 2. Print.
This article helped me to understand the challenge that Britain and France posed
to NATO and how NATO itself was changed.
Caruthers, Osgood. "Arab States Back Egypt Over Suez Canal." New York Times 19 Oct.
1956: 2. Print.
This article led me to understand the extent of the support that Nasser received
from the Arab world after his nationalization of the Suez Canal. Jordan, Syria,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya backed Nasser and hoped
that there would be a peaceful end to the dispute favoring Egypt.
Caruthers, Osgood. "Egypt Building Up Her Forces to Fight Unless Suez Is Cleared."
New York Times 28 Nov. 28 1956: 1. Print.
16
This article helped me to understand the growing power of Egypt following the
Suez-Sinai War. Caruthers stressed that in response to the fact that the British and
French were slow to remove their troops from Egypt following the cease-fire,
Nasser was prepared “to expel them by force.” According to Wing Commander
Ali Sabry, chief of Nasser‟s political bureau, Egypt pledged to build up its
military defenses out of a profound distrust of the British and French.
Caruthers, Osgood. "Egypt Declares Battle Goes On." New York Times 6 Nov. 1956: 8.
Print.
Caruthers reported that Nasser refused to back down and encouraged his people to
continue its fight against the West.
Caruthers, Osgood. "Egypt Gets Rest From Air Attacks." New York Times 7 Nov. 1956:
33-34. Print.
This article was written after the cease-fire was accepted by Britain and France. It
describes Nasser‟s reaction to what would have been utter defeat had the invasion
continued, highlighting his words to the Egyptian people that the fight for
freedom from European subjugation had not ended.
Caruthers, Osgood. "What Drives Gamal Abdel Nasser." New York Times 19
Aug.
1956: 7; 52-54. Print.
17
In this magazine article, Caruthers helped me to understand Nasser‟s ambitions
for the future and his dreams of constructing a new Arab world under his own
leadership.
Cavenagh, Sandy. Airborne to Suez. London: William Kimber, 1965. Print.
Sandy Cavenagh, a medical officer in the British army, offered an
autobiographical account of the British invasion of Egypt.
"Egypt Nationalizes Suez Canal Company: Will Use Revenues to Build Aswan Dam."
New York Times 26 July 1956: 1-2. Print.
This article was written the day that Nasser nationalized the canal and connects
the West‟s refusal to finance the Aswan dam with Nasser‟s actions.
"The Gathering Crisis." New York Times 16 Sept. 1956: E1. Print
The role that the Convention of 1888 played in the deliberations over Nasser‟s
nationalization of the canal came to light through this article. In fact, Nasser
raised doubts among world powers regarding his promise to keep the canal open
and to honor the terms of the document signed by nine nations in Constantinople
decades earlier, securing the world‟s rights to passage through the canal. While
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the West was most concerned about trade and oil, they were also aware that
Nasser had closed the canal to Israel.
“How Important is the Suez Canal to the US and Egypt?” Maritime Sun.
<http://www.maritimesun.com/news/how-important-is-the-suez-canal-to-the-usand-europe>. Web. 10 Feb 2013.
This website article raises the possibility that instability in Egypt might have led
to the canal‟s closure.
Ignatius, David. "What the Suez Crisis Can Remind Us about U.S. Power."
Washington Post [Washington DC] 26 Jan. 2013: 2. Elibrary. Bigchalk.com.
Web. <http://elibrary.bigchalk.com/elibweb/elib/>.
In the wake of considerations to nominate Chuck Hagel as the new defense
secretary, this column describes Hagel‟s decision to encourage President Barak
Obama to follow Dwight D. Eisenhower‟s strategy toward the Middle East in the
wake of the Suez crisis. While making reference to the “Eisenhower Doctrine” of
1957, which was a strategy for U.S.-led security in the Middle East, Ignatius
described Hagel as stressing the importance of avoiding military action. This was
an important column because it emphasized the change in American foreign
policy in 1956, which favored diplomacy rather than military intervention.
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Mar‟i, Sayyid. "Sayyid Mar'i's Political Papers." In The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956:
Retrospective and Reappraisal. Eds. Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shemesh.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 357-372. Print.
Sayyid Mar‟i was a minister in Nasser‟s government in 1956 and he provided me
with an account of what occurred when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. He
described the excitement of the people, the nationalist fervor, and his fears about
the future of Egypt in the world arena.
Middleton, Drew. "Anger at Dulles." New York Times 10 Oct. 1956: 1-2. Print.
Middleton wrote about the fact that the relationship between Britain and the
United States was faltering in the wake of the Suez crisis.
Middleton, Drew. "Cairo Said to Ask More Red Arms." New York Times 21 Nov. 1956:
5. Print.
Middleton highlighted concerns on the part of the West regarding negotiations
between the Soviet Union and Egypt in the weeks immediately after the ceasefire. Such negotiations suggested that they were becoming closer allies.
Nasser, Gamal Abdul. The Philosophy of the Revolution. Washington DC: Public Affairs,
1955. Print.
20
In this book Nasser marked himself as a revolutionary leader and outlined his
plans for the future of the Arab world led by Egypt. He also stressed the strategic
importance of Egypt and prided himself on the fact that Egypt had been
conquered by foreigners very often due to her immense geographical value.
"Oil Thirsty Europe." New York Times 25 Nov. 1956: 213. Print.
This author of this article discussed the oil crisis that resulted from the Suez-Sinai
War. It explained the European gas rationing, unemployment and struggles with
the elongated travel distance around the Cape of Good Hope that resulted from
Nasser‟s refusal to allow British ships through the canal during November of
1956. The author referred to the new route around South Africa as reversing time
by almost a hundred years.
"Remarks in the United Nations General Assembly Debate on the Invasion of Egypt."
New York Times 2 Nov. 1956: 6. Print.
From this transcript of the discussion that ensued on November 2 following the
invasion of Egypt, I gleaned that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,
representing President Eisenhower, promoted an anti-war foreign policy in the
wake of the Suez-Sinai War.
21
"Report of the Committee of Three." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Web. 10 Feb.
2013. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_65237.htm>.
This website provided information about how NATO was affected by the Suez
crisis.
"Threat by Soviets Deepens Problem." New York Times 12 Nov. 1956: 8. Print.
This article describes the Soviet pledge of support for Nasser in the aftermath of
the crisis and describes the entry of the Soviet Union more forcefully into MiddleEast affairs. The author expressed concerns over whether Nasser would negotiate
with the United States, Britain and France regarding the canal given the support
offered to him by the Soviet Union.
Schmidt, Dana Adams. "U.S. Role in Middle East--The Dulles Strategy." New York
Times 2 Sept. 1956: E3. Print.
While Schmidt focused mainly on Dulles‟s reaction to the nationalization of the
Suez Canal, he made reference to the British and French equation of Hitler with
Nasser.
"Some Economic Effects of Suez." London Times 12 Nov. 1956: 19. Print.
22
This article helped me to understand the strain that the nationalization caused on
the British economy. I learned that Britain had to rely on the United States for oil,
even though the two countries were on opposite sides in terms of their approach to
the crisis.
Whalen, Robert G. "The Year in Review: Trends of Change in World Power Struggle."
New York Times 30 Dec. 1956: E8. Print.
Whalen stressed the emergence of the United States as a more prominent voice in
international affairs following the Suez crisis and the weakening of Anthony
Eden‟s government in Britain.
Zeevy, Rechavam. "Military Lessons of the Sinai Campaign: The Israeli Perspective." In
The Suez-Sinai Crisis: Retrospective and Reappraisal. Eds. Selwyn Ilan Troen
and Moshe Shemesh. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 60-73. Print.
At the time of the Suez-Sinai War, Zeevy was the Chief-of-Staff of the Southern
Command of the Israeli army. He offered me a clear account of the invasion of
Suez, an analysis of Israel‟s reasons for attacking Egypt, and a list of Israel‟s
achievements following the war.
23
Secondary Sources
Ajami, Fouad. The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey. New York:
Pantheon, 1998. Print.
Fouad Ajami reflected in this book about the feelings of excitement among Arabs
throughout the Middle East following the Suez-Sinai war.
Bar-On, Mordechai. "David Ben-Gurion and the Sèvres Collusion." In Suez 1956: The
Crisis and Its Consequences. Eds.Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989. 145-60. Print.
Bar-On gave me an in-depth view of the relationship that developed between
Israel and the French and British in the days before Israel‟s invasion of Sinai.
Benson, Timothy S., and Anthony Gorst. "Suezcide." Cartoon. Suezcide: A Cartoon
History of the 1956 Suez Crisis. Political Cartoon Society, 2006. Book Cover.
Print. Figure 2.
This cartoon shows the complete hopelessness of Nasser‟s army in comparison
with that of Britain. The Suez crisis forms a small crack in the massive giant of
Great Britain, yet the crack would grow to cause Britain‟s colonial empire to
crumble.
24
Bowie, Robert R. "Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis." In Suez 1956: The Crisis
and Its Consequences. Eds. Wm. Roger Louis. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. 189214. Print.
Bowie explained the motivations of the United States in regard to their diplomatic
reaction to the nationalization of the Suez Canal.
Campbell, John C. "The Soviet Union, the United States, and the Twin Crises of Hungary
and Suez." In Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences. Eds. Wm. Roger
Louis and Roger Owen. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. 233-56. Print.
Campbell explored the fact that the invasion of Egypt and the invasion of
Hungary by the Soviet Union occurred within the same time period in 1956. I
used this article to examine the extent to which the Soviets wished to spread
communism and the efforts made by the United States, Britain and France to
contain them.
Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal. "Nasser and the Struggle for Independence." In Suez 1956: The
Crisis and Its Consequences. Eds. Wm. Roger Louis. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989. 31-42. Print.
25
Dessouki described how the nationalization of the Suez Canal put an end to the
military, political and economic control of Europe in the Arab world. He
highlighted the differences in the political approach to the crisis embraced by
Britain and France and the United States, one opting for military intervention and
the other for peaceful negotiations.
Dietl, Ralph. "A European Intervention?" Journal of Contemporary History 43.2 (2008):
259-78. Print.
Ralph Dietl clarified the role that the Suez Canal crisis played in the desire of
Britain and France to fight for the place of Europe in the world. He raised
questions about NATO and the decision made by Britain and France to defy this
alliance. He also brought up the connection between this crisis and concerns about
growing nuclear capability throughout the world.
Herzog, Chaim. "The Suez-Sinai Campaign: Background." In The Suez-Sinai Crisis
1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal. Eds. Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe
Shemesh. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 3-16. Print.
Chaim Herzog, the president of Israel from 1983-1993, wrote the background
essay in this edited collection of articles on the Suez crisis. He not only described
Israel‟s military offensive, but the reasons why Israel felt it necessary to attack
Egypt in 1956. Although he was in Israeli intelligence in the 1950s, he did not
26
serve during the Suez-Sinai War, and I, therefore, classified this essay as a
secondary source.
Golan, Galia. "The Soviet Union and the Suez Crisis." In The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956:
Retrospective and Reappraisel. Eds. Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shemesh.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 274-87. Print.
Galia Golan explored the role that the Soviet Union played during the Suez crisis,
describing how the Soviets emerged as prominent players in Middle East affairs
with this event.
Hourani, Albert. "Conclusion." In Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences. Eds.
Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen. 393-410. Print.
Hourani described the ways in which the Suez crisis served as an international
turning point and changed the power dynamics between Britain and the United
States. The fact that Britain realigned itself with America following Prime
Minister Eden‟s resignation in January of 1957 showed that Britain understood
that without the United States its position in the world would be sorely weakened.
Britain could no longer act independently.
Karabell, Zachary. Parting the Desert: The Creation of the Suez Canal. New York: A.A.
Knopf, 2003. Print.
27
This book outlines the history of the construction of the Suez Canal and explains
how Britain and France came to play a major role in its history.
Khadduri, Majid. "Closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli Shipping." Law and
Contemporary Problems 33.1 (1968): 147-57. Print.
Khadduri discussed whether Nasser had the right to close the Suez Canal to Israel.
He gave evidence that the nationalization of the Suez Canal was in fact a legal
course of action.
Khalidi, Rashid. "Consequences of the Suez Crisis in the Arab World." In Suez 1956: The
Crisis and Its Consequences. Eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1989. 377-92. Print.
This article enabled me to see the extent of Nasser‟s power as a rising Arab leader
and a proponent of Arab nationalism.
Kyle, Keith. "Britain and the Crisis, 1955-1956." In Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its
Consequences. Eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989. 103-30. Print.
28
Kyle described Britain‟s decline as a result of the nationalization. He also referred
to the Czech arms deal that upset the balance of military power in the region.
Until this point, the flow of arms to Israel and Egypt was completely controlled
by the United States, Britain and France.
Louis, William Roger. "American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British
Empire." International Affairs 61.3 (1985): 395-420. Print.
Louis described the anti-colonial foreign policy adopted by the United States at
the time of the Suez crisis and the weakening of the British Empire.
Negrine, Ralph. "The Press and the Suez Crisis: A Myth Reexamined." The Historical
Journal 25.4 (1982): 975-983. Print.
Negrine enabled me to understand the attitudes of the British press during the
Suez crisis and how important it was to influence public opinion in favor of the
position of the British government.
Richelson, Jeffrey. Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi
Germany to Iran and North Korea. New York: Norton, 2006. Print.
29
In a book about an American-led effort to spy on every nation with nuclear
interests beginning with the Cold War years, Richelson helped me to understand
how Israel acquired nuclear capability in the wake of the Suez crisis.
Schulzinger, Robert D. "The Impact of Suez on the United States Middle East Policy,
1957-1958." In The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal. Eds.
Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shemesh. New York: Columbia University Press,
1990. 251-65. Print.
Schulzinger informed me of the change in American foreign policy that occurred
with respect to the Middle East following the Suez crisis. The United States
emerged at this juncture to replace Britain and France as the power broker in the
Middle East. America was and remained “omnipotent” in the years following
1956. And yet, this power never produced a desired peace. Schulzinger also
pointed out that following the Suez crisis it became clear that the Soviet Union
was a major rival in the Middle East with whom the United States had to contend.
This led to the creation of the “Eisenhower Doctrine” in 1957.
Shaw, Tony. Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the
Suez Crisis. London: I.B. Tauris, 2009. Print.
Shaw provided me with the details of the British and French role in the Suez
Canal Company at the time of Nasser‟s nationalization of the canal.
30
"The Suez Canal Opens in 1869 and Saves Thousands of Miles on Sea Voyages to the
Far East." Map. Penn State University, Web. <http://www.eeducation.psu.edu/egee120/node/258>. Figure 1.
This map depicts how travel between Europe and Asia was significantly reduced
when the Suez Canal was built. Before the construction of the canal ships had to
travel around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. The canal saves ships
thousands of miles and much time.
Troen, Selwyn Ilan. "The Sinai Campaign as a „War of No Alternative‟: Ben-Gurion's
View of the Israel-Egyptian Conflict." In The Sues-Sinai Crisis 1956:
Retrospective and Reappraisal. Eds. Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shemesh.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 180-95. Print.
Troen helped me to understand why Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion supported
a pre-emptive attack on Nasser and introduced me to the idea that many debated
Israel‟s justification for such actions. Ben-Gurion was convinced of its necessity
and prepared his country for a justifiable war for its political safety and economic
security in the region.
Troen, S. Ilan, and Moshe Shemesh. The Suez-Sinai Crisis, 1956: Retrospective and
Reappraisal. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Print.
31
This edited collection of articles on the Suez crisis presents it as a turning point in
international affairs and influenced my decision to choose this topic for History
Day. I have cited the primary and secondary sources that I used from this book
separately and they appear in this bibliography.
Winchester, Simon. "'Parting the Desert : A Man, a Plan, a Canal." Review of Zachary
Karabell, Parting the Desert: The Creation of the Suez Canal. New York Times.
20 July 2003, Arts sec.: 1-2. Print.
Winchester provided important background on the history of the construction of
the canal.
Woollacott, Martin. After Suez: Adrift in the American Century. London: I.B. Tauris,
2006. Print.
Woollacott helped me to understand the various mindsets of the participants in the
Suez crisis. He indicated how vital the seizure of the canal was on the part of
Britain and France in their desire to be dominant powers in the Middle East.
32