Download The Suez Canal Crisis: End of the British Empire

The Suez Canal Crisis: End of the British Empire in the Middle East
by
Hunter Simmons
History 4024
Fall 2007
France and Great Britain, the old imperial powers of Europe, both lay in ruins
when World War II ended. The war severely weakened both empires. Britain lost is
“Crown Jewel,” India in 1947. By the 1950s, it was undeniable that both empires were in
decline, but neither wished to admit their new role as a secondary power in the Cold-War
era. American involvement in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis brought the British Empire to a
clear end in the Middle East.
In 1869, the French finally completed the Suez Canal through the Sinai Peninsula,
connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, providing an alternate sea route to
India. The Suez Canal eliminated roughly half of the distance to India compared with
sailing around Africa. British merchants used the canal as a shortcut to India to further
British economic growth.1 British mercantile interests in India depended on access to the
Suez Canal. In 1875, under Prime Minister Disraeli, the British government bought a
44% stake in the Suez Canal Company from the nearly bankrupt Egyptian government.
To further secure access through the Suez, the British began occupation of Egypt in 1882,
taking it from the declining Ottoman Empire.2 The British took Egypt and the Suez to
benefit the “Crown Jewel” of their empire, India. They didn’t immediately recognize how
valuable the canal and Egypt would become as “the great strategic crossroads of the
world.” In the next eighty years, the canal would help the British consolidate power
around the Indian Ocean and Africa, win two world wars, and transport countless barrels
of petroleum from the newly-discovered Persian Gulf oil fields.3
1
Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-2004, 4th ed. (London:
Pearson Longman, 2004), 91
2
Porter, The Lion’s Share, 4th ed., 97-8
3
Sir William Jackson, The Pomp of Yesterday: The Defence of India and the Suez Canal 1798-1918
(London: Brassey’s, 1995), 121
1
The Sinai Peninsula has long been an area of conflict, even prior to the
construction of the Suez Canal. Upon completion on the canal, the region became more
important to the Imperial Powers. Great Britain soon determined that Egypt was strategic
to its Empire. Following the 1882 British occupation of Egypt, British investors and the
government spent a lot of money, making considerable improvements in infrastructure
and agricultural production. This helped justify Britain’s occupation.4 During this time,
the British developed an attitude where they saw the Mediterranean as being as British
and England itself.5
The Suez region remained loosely a part of the Ottoman Empire until 18
December 1914 when the British declared Egypt a protectorate. During WWI, Egypt
became the hub of the Entente forces in the Middle East. These forces were dependant on
rapid travel through the Suez Canal to reach the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian
Gulf.6 Easy access to the Persian Gulf enabled the British armed forces to defeat the
Ottoman Empire in Iraq.7 As a result of the British occupation, strong nationalistic
feelings and desires for independence spread throughout the Middle East. These feelings
were especially prevalent in Egypt.8 The years following WWI did not lead to true
independence for most Middle Eastern counties as they increasingly fell under the
League of Nations Mandate System.
In the Twentieth Century, oil became a significant issue in Middle Eastern
history. In 1908, major Iranian oil production began. Thirty years later, massive oil
4
William Ochsenwald and Sydney Nettleton Fisher,The Middle East, A History, 6th ed. (Boston: McGraw
Hill, 2004), 336-7
5
Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 14, in The Suez Crisis, ed. Anthony Gorst and
Lewis Johnson (London: Routledge, 1997), 1
6
Ochsenwald and Fisher, The Middle East, 371
7
Ochsenwald and Fisher, The Middle East, 374
8
Ochsenwald and Fisher, The Middle East, 376
2
reserves were discovered in Saudi Arabia.9 Access to Middle Eastern oil became of
strategic importance to Great Britain following Churchill’s orders to convent the coal
fleet of the Royal Navy to oil during the WWI years.10 National security soon depended
on Persian (Iranian) oil; the Suez canal delivered Iranian oil, vital for national defense
and prestige
Great Britain and the other Allies faced many threats from the Axis during WWII.
One of the main threats was securing oil supplies from invading German armies. While
the British were able to protect the canal from Axis military forces, they never suspected
that they close ally, the United States, would attempt to remove them from the Middle
East. The United States government didn’t intend to become a power in the Middle East,
but Americans serving in the Middle East learned of the oil reserves and saw the potential
for profits. Slowly, American economic investment displaced British investment and the
United States became a power in the Middle East.11
Middle Eastern oil reserves promoted the downward trend in the price of oil
which promoted both Americans and Europeans to replace coal with oil. World energy
consumption increased dramatically in the post-WWII years, largely because of increased
oil consumption.12 The Great Britain, coal consumption declined because of shortages,
labor unrest, and policies aimed against extreme air pollution. Meanwhile, the cost of oil
fell as its abundance rose.13 Most of the Middle Eastern oil was shipped on tankers
thought the Suez Canal. The Canal that once united the British Empire, by 1955
9
Ochsenwald and Fisher, The Middle East, 748-9
Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1991), 12
11
Jackson, Britain’s Triumph and Decline in the Middle East, 108
12
Yergin, The Prize, 541
13
Yergin, The Prize, 544-5
10
3
transported two-thirds of European-bound oil.14 The British justified continued presence
in the Canal Zone by arguing that their presence was in their vital national interest. The
new Egyptian leader, Abdel Nassar, thought otherwise and attempted to bring the Canal
Zone under Egyptian control.
During the early years of the Arab-Israeli dispute and Nasser’s reign, Great
Britain faced increasing internal debate over decolonization. Imperialism was long the
dominant view of Parliament. Despite decolonization, Imperialists still wanted to
maintain an identity and economic bloc of English-speaking states, the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth produced an identity of Greater Britain. The Conservatives were
generally imperialists who looked to the nineteenth century Prime Minister Benjamin
Disraeli for inspiration.15
Opposing the Imperialists were the anti-Imperialists, often Liberals or British
Socialists. Anti-imperialists generally supported looser economic union with former
colonies, but opposed using force. They argued that while the Empire provided economic
benefits, it was also expensive to maintain. Free trade could provide the same benefits
with far less costs. In addition, forcefully occupying foreign countries hurt the notion of
democratic government at home. The anti-imperialists held updated views that the
imperial objective of self-sufficiency was outdated. WWI was fought on the basis of
land-snatching. Like the imperialists, anti-imperialists also believed that Britain was the
leader of the world, but the anti-imperialists believed that “moral leadership” was more
important than outright control. Taken together, the costs of Empire were greater than
14
15
Yergin, The Prize, 480
Leon D. Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964),19-20
4
the rewards.16 Internal British politics played a role in the increasing political turmoil and
anti-Western feelings present in the Middle East.
An anti-western feeling of nationalism swept the Middle East following the 1948
establishment of Israel. In the first Arab-Israeli War, fought in 1948, Egypt was badly
defeated, stirring additional anti-Western feelings. The Arab-Israeli Dispute played a
major role in American, British, and Egyptian relations through the Suez Canal Crisis of
1956. American leaders also became increasingly concerned with the Soviet Union as the
Cold War progressed.
In 1950, largely because of increasing tensions in Korea, the United States began
a build up of military power. With the buildup of power, Americans expressed a general
willingness and desire to be responsible for Western security. The United States would
actively cooperate with the British to maintain Western presence in Egypt. The United
States would also fight to prevent a Soviet take-over of the greater Middle East.17
Western occupation of Egypt would provide air bases to attack the Soviet Union if the
need were to arise.18
The increased American interest in the Middle East became clearer when
Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee made plans for American dominance of the
Middle East. These plans came about in response to the wave of nationalism that swept
Egypt following the First Arab-Israeli War. He wanted to reduce Egyptian nationalism
and consolidate power to safeguard the free world’s strategic interests. McGhee
supported creating some type of Middle Eastern Command for the purpose of advancing
16
Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis, 26-8
Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the
Early Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 93
18
Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 95
17
5
American interests. His idea had an audience. Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S.
Vandenberg thought that an American air base at Abu Sueir “might be more palatable to
the Egyptians” than British occupation.19 According to McGhee, the United States
needed to keep the Soviets from filling the Middle Eastern power vacuum.20
Egypt did not cooperate with the Western powers. Following the first Arab-Israeli
war, Egypt closed the canal to the British refinery at Haifa in the name of “national
security.” The financial impact on Great Britain was substantial, so much so that in 1951,
Conservative Deputy Prime Minister Anthony Eden suggested the British Royal Navy be
used to escort tankers though the canal, an action likely to provoke an international
response. This was the first time that the British threatened to forcefully violate Egyptian
regulations in the Canal Zone. Americans strongly opposed using force, despite
supporting an end to the restrictions.21
American opposition to Egyptian restrictions on canal traffic caused great
difficulty in Egyptian-American relations. It also provoked another wave of Egyptian
nationalism that would lead to regime change.22 Americans discovered that Cold War
defensive needs were difficult to mesh with self-determination.23 At the same time,
Americans showed their superpower muscle against the British when they censured the
oil embargo against Egypt.24 This would not be the last time that Americans stood up for
Egypt against Great Britain.
19
Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 109
Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 110 and 113
21
Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 116-7
22
Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 121-2
23
Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 129
24
Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 134-5
20
6
Abdel Nasser took advantage of Egyptian nationalism, seizing power in 1952 and
declaring the Egyptian Republic in 1953. He hoped to end British involvement in Egypt
for the first time since 1882.25 Nasser came to power during the same time that Britain’s
economic weakness threatened its strength in the Middle East. Great Britain knew that
they would have a difficult time maintaining power alone and even desired American
assistance in maintaining Middle Eastern security.26 Great Britain agreed to leave Egypt
in 1954, but maintained the right to return for defensive reasons. The agreement stated
that the canal must remain open to all ships, commercial or military from all states.27 It
did not take the British long to stretch the meaning of “defensive”.
On 26 July 1956, Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, announced that he
was nationalizing the Suez Canal Company. He delivered a two and a half hour speech
stating that Egyptians labored and died building the canal and that the Egyptian
government deserved its revenue. The passage fees were to finance construction of the
Aswan High Dam to modernize Egypt. The Egyptian government would pay
stockholders the full value of shares in the Suez Canal Company. Regardless, Europeans
were quite irritated and began plans for an invasion.28
Imperialists in both France and Great Britain had rejuvenated imperial spirit when
Nasser nationalized the canal. They viewed nationalization as an opportunity to reassert
25
Ochsenwald and Fisher, The Middle East, 582
U.K Colonial Overseas Defence Committee, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
18 June 1952 (London: Public Record Office, Cabneiet Office Files, 1952) in The Suez Crisis, ed. Anthony
Gorst and Lewis Johnson (London: Routledge, 1997), 28-30
27
Parlimentary Papers, The Suez Canal Base Agreement, 19 October 1954 (9586, 1954) in The Suez Crisis,
ed. Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnson (London: Routledge, 1997), 32-3
28
“1956: Egypt seizes Suez Canal.” n.d.,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/26/newsid_2701000/2701603.stm> (28 November
2007)
26
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control of their own affairs and ignore what the United States thought.29 British
imperialists viewed Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal as the last opportunity for
Britain to revive its status as world leader by reoccupying the Canal Zone and the greater
Middle East. They opposed seeking United Nations’ approval for military action because
the UN was international in nature and supported self-determination, which was not on
the imperialists’ agenda.30 The British also aimed to achieve energy independence from
the United States. At the time, the United States was a net exporter of oil to Europe. The
United States used oil as a means of political manipulation. European control of the Suez
meant energy security for Europe.31
Israeli forces started the war on 29 October 1956 when they invaded the Sinai.
American intelligence suggested that Britain and France supported the invasion and
would soon join the war because conflict would cut off oil pipelines to the
Mediterranean. The United States did not want to the Soviets to come out of the conflict
looking like the hero, so they immediately took a stand against the war.32 It was not
enough to prevent Europeans from going to war.
On 5 November 2007, the old Imperial Powers, France and Great Britain, invaded
Egypt after months of preparations. Only 44% of British polled in the week prior to the
war thought that it was wrong to take military action against Egypt.33 Not surprisingly,
they quickly overwhelmed the Egyptians. Several towns surrendered the day the invasion
began. Despite prospects of a rapid military victory, Prime Minister Eden faced a
troublesome decision, call a cease-fire or continue until military results were achieved.
29
Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis, 45
Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis, 48
31
Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis, 49
32
Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 229-31
33
Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis, 142
30
8
The international community, led by the United States and the Soviet Union supported a
cease-fire while, the imperial military establishment wanted to continue fighting.34 The
decision was not entirely Eden’s to make.
Eden was forced to call a cease-fire because of international conditions. Prior to
and during the invasion, there was a run on the Pound that seriously threatened its
stability. The United States refused to loan the British a billion dollars to prop up the
Pound unless they agreed to a cease fire. In addition, the United States held back on
shipments of oil to Europe.35
The Soviet Union also became involved in the Crisis. The Soviets issued stern
warnings to the involved parties calling for UN military assistance to Egypt, unless the
“aggressors” ended military action and withdrew. The threat Soviet troops fighting for
the defense of Egypt against the British and French prompted a cease-fire at Midnight on
7 November 1956.36 While the military battles were easy wins for the Europeans,
diplomatic victories were not to be found.
President Eisenhower refused to ship oil to Europe or to bail out the Pound
because the Europeans were in violation of United Nations’ Resolutions by continued
occupation of the Canal Zone. When both the British and French agreed to leave on 23
December 1956, oil shipments resumed.37
The Suez Canal Crisis had a profound effect of the British Imperialists. They saw
nationalization of the Suez as their last opportunity to restore dominance and autonomy
in the Middle East. The new superpowers together crushed their dream. Imperials had a
34
Chester L. Cooper, The Lion’s Last Roar: Suez, 1956 (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 190
Cooper, The Lion’s Last Roar, 191-2
36
Cooper, The Lion’s Last Roar, 193-5
37
Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 235
35
9
hard time justifying any new imperial activities since Great Britain was clearly a
secondary power, in the shadow of the United States. The French faced similar questions
and chose to integrate with other European countries in the European Unification
Movement. Imperialists in Parliament held Britain back from joining the movement,
instead pursuing a “special relationship” with the United States.38
The Suez Crisis had profound effects on Prime Minister Eden. The stress of the
Crisis wore down Eden’s already poor health. On 11 January 1956, Eden resigned from
office. Despite heading up a foreign policy blunder of the ages, the country mourned his
resignation. Eden was in a very difficult position with multiple factions and events taking
place simultaneously. While the Crisis ended in disaster for British foreign policy, it was
not Eden’s fault; rather it was the declining Empire’s.39
Egypt emerged victorious in the war, which raised Nasser’s popularity across the
Middle East as a leader who stood up to the West and won. Nasser became the leader of
the pan-Arab cause. The war wasn’t cheap for Nasser; he increasingly became pro-Soviet
as Soviet economic and military aid flowed to Egypt.40
The Soviet Union became increasingly involved in the Middle East. Americans
became more involved to counter the Soviets. Rapidly increasing Middle Eastern oil
production in the third quarter of the twentieth century further increased American
involvement in the region.41 Involvement in the Middle East and dependence on its oil
proved to be dangerous for the United States in the 1973 Arab oil embargo. During this
period, the United States has attempted to maintain strong foreign relations with some
38
Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis, 58
Cooper, The Lion’s Last Roar, 240
40
Cooper, The Lion’s Last Roar, 256
41
Yergin, The Prize, 500
39
10
Middle Eastern nations, but has nearly always had conflicts with some over America’s
unconditional support of Israel. The current war in Iraq is the most recent conflict in fiftyone years of American involvement in the Middle East following the Suez Crisis.
American involvement in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis brought a clear end to the
British Empire in the Middle East. Americans became involved for a variety of reasons:
the idea of self-determination, oil, international prestige, to flex muscle in the Cold War,
etc. Fifty-one years later, the United States is the foreign hegemonic power in the Middle
East and faces many of the same issues that the British faced. American’s who are antiwar are asking some of the same questions British anti-Imperialists asked over a half
century ago: “Why are we here and what are we trying to do?” In both cases, the answer
is to maintain the energy supply. Americans deposed Great Britain in 1956 and now play
nearly the same role.
11
Bibliography
Secondary Sources
1956: Egypt seizes Suez Canal.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/26/newsid_2701000/2701603.s
tm.
Cooper, Chester L. The Lion’s Last Roar: Suez 1956. New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1978.
Epstein, Leon D. British Politics in the Suez Crisis. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois
Press, 1964.
Hahn, Peter L. The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and
Diplomacy in the Early Cold War. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1991.
Jackson, William. Britain’s Triumph & Decline in the Middle East. London: Brassey's,
1996
Jackson, William. The Pomp of Yesterday: The Defence of India and the Suez Canal,
1798-1918. London: Brassey's, 1995.
Kyle, Keith. “From Suez.” In The Suez Crisis, edited by Anthony Gorst and Lewis
Johnson, 1. London: Routledge, 1997.
Ochsenwald, William and Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East, A History. 6th ed.
Boston: McGraw Hill, 2004.
Porter, Bernard, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-2004. 4th
ed. London: Pearson Longman, 2004.
Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power. New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1991.
Primary Sources
Colonial Overseas Defence Committee “From Memorandum by the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, 18 June 1952.” In The Suez Crisis, edited by Anthony Gorst and
Lewis Johnson, 28-30 London: Routledge, 1997.
12