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Gross Deutschland Panzer:
An Analysis of Hitler’s Elite
By Roger Mason
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Origins & Combat History
I
n general, in the early and mid1930s the German military was
divided into two groups. The first
was a false front of units that represented the forces allowed post World
War I treaties. The second group was
made up of the ever more powerful and
numerous sea, air and ground forces
being developed behind the scenes.
More particularly, Berlin was a center
of international attention as Hitler
gained and consolidated power, and
the face of the German Army there was
the Wachtruppe Berlin (Berlin Guard
Troop). Drawn from regiments across
the country on a rotating basis, that
unit provided ceremonial and military
security in the capital city. Starting
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Home
with the arrival of Hitler, the unit was
continually expanded throughout the
rest of the decade. By January 1939 it
was renamed Infantry Regiment Gross
Deutschland (Greater Germany). It
was by then a stand-alone regiment
with a full complement of support and
administrative units. The soldiers of the
regiment were allowed to wear green
and silver cuff and shoulder tabs bearing
their unit’s name and initials as evidence
of their elite status. The unit was also
unique in that, even as it expanded,
it was allowed to continue to draw
from the pick of recruits from all over
Germany, while the other formations in
the army were territorially recruited.
7
An officer of the II Panzer Regiment
“Grossdeutschland” sporting the
Grossdeutschland cuff title.
France & the Balkans
Though the regiment didn’t take part
in the 1939 Polish campaign, by the next
year the high command determined it
was ready for more than ceremonial and
security duties. Hitler was also interested
in seeing his favorite units received a
mixture of combat and parade ground
experience. The regiment was therefore
attached to Panzer Group Kleist.
That larger formation spearheaded
the invasion of the West and crossed
the Meuse River to participate in the
decisive flanking maneuver beyond
the north end of the Maginot Line.
After the surrender of France the
regiment prepared to take part in the
invasion of England. When that operation was cancelled, it was transferred
to a camp at Le Valdahon on the Swiss
border. There the mission was to train
for Operation Felix, a projected attack
on Gibraltar. That was cancelled when
Hitler decided to invade the Balkans.
In early April 1941 the regiment
was moved by rail first to Vienna, then
to Budapest, and then to Szegedin in
Romania. On 11 April it participated in
the invasion of Yugoslavia. Resistance
was light and Gross Deutschland moved
quickly, seizing the town of Pancevo
on the Danube. Its battalions were
detailed to provide security during
the initial occupation of Belgrade.
On 15 June the regiment was moved
to Warsaw. There it was assigned to
the reserve of 2nd Panzer Army.
Barbarossa
On 27 June 1941 the regiment
crossed into Russia as part of Army
Group Center. After heavy fighting
around Minsk the unit crossed the
upper Dnepr River, advancing as far
as the town of Yelnya, where a largescale Soviet counterattack stymied
further German movement east toward
Moscow. Fighting continued through the
summer, including a deflection to the
south to take part in the Kiev encirclement. The regiment was then ordered
Men of the panzer regiment check their equipment.
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back north to take part in the renewed
drive on Moscow. By mid-October it
had reached the city of Tula, south of
Moscow. Tula was an important rail and
road junction, and its capture was critical to the final assault on Moscow. The
regiment took part in repeated attempts
to capture the city, but the overall
offensive ground to a halt with the onset
of winter weather and Tula remained
in Soviet hands. That period was
significant because it marked the first
time a major portion of the unit had to
be replaced due to deaths and injuries.
1942
Fighting continued with the regiment
on the defensive, which further reduced
its strength until, by the end of February,
it was spent. The 2nd Battalion was
disbanded and the two remaining battalions were reformed into a single unit.
By the end of that month the last assault
gun in the regiment had been destroyed.
The regiment was then pulled
out of the line and reorganized, and
a decision was made to upgrade it to
divisional strength. Tanks, artillery,
flak, engineers and support staff were
added. It was redesignated Motorized
Infantry Division Gross Deutschland.
The various new components were
brought together, and in the first week
of June the division joined XXIV Panzer
Corps as part of Army Group South.
By the end of June the division was
in pursuit of the Soviet units retreating
into Voronezh, while much of the rest
of Army Group South moved across the
Donets River and then toward Stalingrad
and the Caucasus. During August the
division was withdrawn and sent north
to Rzhev to reinforce Army Group Center.
The Soviets began putting pressure
on Rzhev to prevent the establishment
of a German base for a new assault
on Moscow. In that sector the division
became part of XXVII Army (Infantry)
Corps. After a month of inconclusive
fighting, the division was again pulled
back to rest and refit. Parts of it were sent
to reinforce several infantry divisions
that had been mauled in the fighting.
In November the Soviets launched
a major offensive in which the 86th
Infantry Division was crushed. The
only unit close enough to intervene
was 2nd Battalion of the Grenadier
Regiment of Gross Deutschland. Bitter
fighting occurred in the Lutchessa
River valley, lasting nearly a month,
with the panzer grenadiers suffering
serious losses. The division was
withdrawn once again to rest and refit.
1943
The division moved to Smolensk and
then railed to Volchansk, near Belgorod.
By February the Gross Deutschland was
back on the attack between Belgorod
and Kharkov. At that time the division
received its first Tiger tanks and an
additional artillery battalion, just in time
for the new German offensive to retake
Belgorod and Kharkov. The Germans
recaptured those places, thereby achieving their last major victory in Russia.
From mid-March to the end of June
the division was refitted and reinforced,
with the infantry given greater numbers
of halftracks to improve cross-country
mobility. The Gross Deutschland was
also redesignated Panzer Grenadier
Division Gross Deutschland, and
it was moved to positions north
of Tomarovka in preparation for
Operation Citadel. The panzer regiment
received new Mark V Panther tanks.
Operation Citadel was intended
to reduce the Kursk salient, which
posed a threat along the boundary
line between Army Groups Center
and South. The plan for the offensive
was to pinch off the salient from the
north and south, thereby destroying
the forces the Soviets would need
for their next winter offensive.
The Gross Deutschland was
selected as the spearhead of the
southern attack. The division moved
GD grenadiers moving cross-country on foot.
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Organization & Equipment
of the Panzer Grenadiers
The purpose of the panzer grenadier divisions was to provide a mobile combined-arms
force that could fight in concert with armored
divisions as well as on their own. Army planners originally intended those divisions would
be fully equipped with mechanized infantry
transport as well as tanks; however, in 1939 the
mechanization process remained far from complete. The Polish campaign included everything
from fully mechanized divisions to others exclusively using horses pulling wagons for their
transport. For average units that kind of mix
didn’t change throughout the course of the war.
Panzer grenadier divisions were intended
to provide a force that could operate at the
same speed as tanks; so elite divisions such
as Gross Deutschland were well equipped
with the vehicles needed to make possible
that type of rapid movement. In 1943 the
division was composed of four regiments: the
panzer regiment, the grenadier regiment, the
fusilier regiment and the artillery regiment.
The panzer regiment was equipped
with Mark IV, V and VI tanks. The Mark
IVs were armed with excellent long-barrel
75mm cannon. The Mark V was known as
the “Panther,” weighed 44 tons and had
better sloped armor than its predecessors.
In May 1943 the first Tigers were delivered
to the Gross Deutschland Division.
The Mark VI Tiger was a heavy tank
weighing 62 tons and armed with an 88mm
cannon. The division’s panzer regiment had
four companies of Mark IVs and Vs and two
companies of Mark VIs. Tigers assigned
directly to a division were rare, because most
of them were deployed in separate battalions
that were kept under direct control of army or
army group commanders (for commitment at
decisive times and places within larger battles).
The grenadier regiment had its troops
mounted in SdKfz. 251 Hanomag halftracks.
Those vehicles were lightly armored and could
carry 12 infantrymen. The grenadier units were
also supplied with trucks and other prime
movers. The prime mover was the SdKfz. 9
Famo heavy halftrack. They could pull artillery,
supply wagons or even tow disabled tanks.
Unlike the Hanomag, it had no side armor and
was equipped with three open bench seats for
its crew. Flatbed Famo could mount a light flak
gun, a crane for vehicle repair and engineering
tasks, or serve as a tank recovery vehicle.
The fusilier regiment had more troops
in Hanomags, a full flak section and an
anti-tank battalion. They also had a variety
of trucks, both German and captured enemy
models. The flak section had more Famo
with towed 88mm multi-purpose (antiarmor/anti-aircraft) guns along with smaller
caliber rapid-fire weapons on flatbeds.
The anti-tank battalion was equipped
with towed anti-tank guns and the
Jagdpanzer SdKfz.139 Hetzer. The Hetzer
was a small tank destroyer, based on
captured Czech chasses, which was also used
successfully as an infantry-support assault
gun. The Hetzer carried a 76mm gun.
The artillery regiment was equipped with
both towed and self-propelled artillery (SPA).
The regiment had two batteries of SdKfz
124 Wespes and one battery of SdKfz 165
Hummels. The Wespe was based on a Mark II
Panzer chassis and armed with a 105mm howitzer. The Hummel was based on both Mark III
and IV chassis and carried a 150mm howitzer.
The Hummels were often accompanied by
Munitionstrager, which were gunless models
used to carry extra ammunition. Those ammunition carriers could be converted by giving
them guns retrieved from disabled Hummels.
The division was further strengthened
by an assault gun brigade comprised of three
batteries of Sturmgeschutz IIIs. They were
based on the Panzer Mark III chassis, with first
a short-barrel and then a long-barrel 75mm gun.
The low silhouette made it difficult to target
and an effective tank killer. For Kursk the regiment had 35 of those guns with long-barrel 75s.
The table of organization was rounded
out by an engineer battalion that had one
Hanomag-mounted and three truck-mounted
companies. The rest of the division was comprised of miscellaneous support troops. Some
of the most important were the vehicle recovery
crews with mobile workshops that returned
damaged tanks and vehicles to the fight. ★
Hummel
Wespe
The famous Hanomag transport.
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» continued from page 9
off on the morning of 4 July, but the
effort literally bogged down when
the new Panthers became trapped
by muddy conditions and previously
undetected minefields. In eight days
of fierce fighting the division suffered
heavy casualties and was pulled back.
After a short rest the division was
sent north to Karachev to stabilize
the front in that area. From there the
division fought a continuous rearguard
action back to the Dnepr River. That
included heavy fighting during August
at Akhtyka. The division covered
the withdrawal to the Kremenchug
bridgehead, then south through
continuous fighting to Mischurin Rog.
The year ended with German retreats
along the entire front, during which the
division gained the nickname the “Fire
Brigade” for its repeated deployment
to the points of greatest threat.
1944
In January the division moved
south toward the Crimea to slow the
advance there of 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian
Fronts. The division was relieved and
sent to Hungary in March. Next they
participated in heavy defensive fighting
in the Carpathian Mountains at Targul
Frumos, where some of its formations
were entirely wiped out. The remnants
of the division were pulled back for
refitting and regrouping. By summer the
Gross Deutschland had moved back to
the front and took part in the defense
of East Prussia. In October the division
fought in the Memel bridgehead. In
November the unit was redesignated
a panzer corps, combining the Gross
Deutschland and Brandenburg Divisions.
1945
By March the division was down to
4,500 men and a handful of vehicles,
with most finally surrendering to the
Soviets at Pillau; however, approximately
800 escaped west and surrendered to
the British. Those who surrendered to
the Soviets remained in various gulags
until the mid-1950s. Only a handful of
survivors returned to Germany. ✪
SELECTED SOURCES
Erickson, J. (1983). The Road to Berlin. London, UK: Cassell
Books.
Hastings, M. (2005). Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,
1944-45. New York, NY: Random House.
Hoffmann, P. (2000). Hitler’s Personal Security. New York,
NY: De Capo Press.
Lucas, J. (1982). War on the Eastern Front: 1941-1945, The
German Soldier in Russia. New York, NY: Bonanza
Books.
Sajer, G. (2000). The Forgotten Soldier. Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books.
Scheibert, H. (1987). Panzer Grenadier Division Gross
Deutschland. Carrollton, Tx: Squadron Publications
Inc.
Schneider, W. (2005). Panzer Tactics: German Small Unit
Armor Tactics in World War Two. Mechanicsburg, PA:
Stackpole Books.
US War Department (1990). Handbook on German Military
Forces. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Univ. Press.
Williamson, G. (2002). German Army Elite Units, 1939-45.
Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing.
Bull, S. (2005). World War Two Infantry Tactics: Company
and Battalion. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing.
Glantz, D. & House, J. (1999). The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence,
KA: Univ. of Kansas Press.
The stalled advance toward Kursk.
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13
Hitler’s Other Favorites
Gross Deutschland was one of a group
of German Army and Air Force units that
came to be considered elite by Hitler and the
high command. They were often connected
directly to Hitler in some way, and their (often
officially declared) elite status indicated an
elevated sense of personal loyalty to him.
Hitler’s favorites were thus bestowed with
unique uniform items that helped distinguish
them from the soldiers of other units. They
also received a steady stream of the best
equipment available. At the same time, though,
they were committed to relentless combat
that often decimated their ranks. In cycles of
near-destruction and regrouping that ran to
the end of the war, Hitler always found the
resources and personnel to rebuild them.
As regular units shrank from combat losses,
the elites grew in relative combat power and
battlefield significance. While a regular army
panzer division might be reduced to two-dozen
tanks and assault guns, an elite unit would
be kept much nearer to full strength. Because
of Hitler’s confidence in their abilities, they
were routinely sent to emergencies that
developed on every front. That practice in
turn often resulted in heavy losses to the
units, which would then restart the cycle of
rebuilding and emergency recommitment.
Feldherrnhalle Division
The Feldherrnhalle (Commanders’ Hall) was
originally a ceremonial pavilion on the main
plaza in Munich, Bavaria. The location became
the flashpoint of a bloody confrontation during
the failed 1923 Munich “Beer Hall” Putsch.
Later, Hitler made it into a Nazi shrine commemorating the storm troopers killed in the incident.
Hitler had earlier planted the seed of
this division when he established a special
Sturm Abteilung (SA or Assault Detachment)
guard unit to protect the offices of the Nazi
Party. They were soon unofficially called
the “Brownshirts,” due to their distinctive
uniforms. With the start of the war the SA
was folded into the regular German Army.
Many of the members of the original guard
unit were then formed into the 271st Infantry
Regiment, which was in turn attached to the 60th
Infantry Division. That regiment was given the
honorary title of the Feldherrnhalle Regiment.
After the 1940 fighting in France, the regiment was bounced from division to division and
served on the Russian front. In 1943 it returned
to the 60th Division, which was then being
reorganized as a panzer grenadier unit. That
entire reorganized formation received the title
Feldherrnhalle, along with a unique brown cuff
band with the name inscribed in silver thread.
In 1944 the division was absorbed into
the 13th Panzer Division, which then took on
the honorific title. Additional panzer units
were added, and the division was broken
14
with the word “Stalingrad” on it was worn
on the soldiers’ shoulder straps and garrison
caps. The division spent much of 1943 and
1944 fighting in Italy before being transferred
to Hungary, where it remained until retreating
west and surrendering to the US Army in 1945.
Offensive Operations
Infantry Regiment “List”
into two new panzer divisions and upgraded
again to a panzer corps. In May 1945 the
corps surrendered in Czechoslovakia.
Hitler wanted to commemorate his World
War I unit, the 16th Bavarian Reserve Regiment
“List” (named for its founding colonel). Though
disbanded in 1919, by 1939 the unit had been
reactivated and incorporated into the 57th
Infantry Division, and it fought in the invasion
of France. It participated in the invasion
of Russia and fought at Kursk in 1943. The
entire division was awarded a dark green cuff
band with its name in silver embroidery.
In February 1944 the division was trapped
in the Cherkassy Pocket and only escaped after
suffering heavy casualties. It was trapped again
at Minsk with nearly a total loss of personnel.
It was reconstituted and sent back to Russia,
where it barely escaped destruction during
the follow-on Soviet offensive. The remnants
of the division continued fighting until 8 May
1945, when they surrendered to the Soviets.
Hoch und Deutschmeister
Division
The Hoch and Deutschmeister (Infantry)
Division traced its roots to elite units of the
Austrian Army formed in the 18th century to combat the Turks, and which were fully incorporated
into the German Army at the time of the 1938
Anschluss. (The name is probably best translated
as the “Supreme and German Master Infantry
Division.”) The division participated in the invasion of Poland and France, and was eventually
transferred to the eastern front where it was
assigned to 6th Army for the drive on Stalingrad.
There it was cited for bravery while attempting
to prevent the encirclement of 6th Army. That
sacrifice was favorably noted by Hitler.
The division was therefore reconstituted
after Stalingrad and reorganized under the
title Reich Grenadier Division Hoch and
Deutschmeister, and was awarded a black cuff
band bearing that name. A blue Maltese cross
Men of Infantry Regiment List.
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Hermann Goering Parachute
Panzer Division
In 1933 Hermann Goering became the head
of all police in Prussia, which included Berlin.
He raised a battalion for special assignments
and to serve as his personal guard unit. In 1934
that unit was enlarged and given full military
training. It was then called Landespolizeigruppe
General Goering (National Police Group
General Goering). When Goring took over the
Luftwaffe, the unit went with him. It became
a full regiment that included paratroops and
HG Division in Italy.
heavy flak units. Those flak formations were
detailed to provide anti-aircraft protection for
Hitler when he was in Berlin, on his train, or
at his mountaintop retreat at Obersalzburg.
The regiment fought in France and the early
stages of the Russian campaign. They wore a
standard German army uniform with Luftwaffe
wings on the breast and a blue cuff band with
“Hermann Goering” sewn on it. The heavy flak
units were attached to panzer units in Army
Group South during 1941, until they were
withdrawn to transition into a brigade. Goering
then decided he rated an entire division named
after him. So various miscellaneous units were
collected and supplemented by experienced
armored crew from the army. Thus the Hermann
Goering Parachute Panzer Division was born.
In early 1943 components of the division
were sent to North Africa, where they were
captured when Axis forces surrendered in
Tunisia. The division was then sent with new
Tiger I tanks to Sicily, where it fought stubbornly
against the Allied invasion. The division successfully retreated to mainland Italy, where it
fought at Salerno and Anzio. It was withdrawn
from Italy and rebuilt in time to defend
Warsaw against the Soviet offensive there.
In late 1944 the division was divided
into separate panzer and panzer grenadier
divisions and was redesignated Panzerkorps
Hermann Goering. During the final weeks of
the war it fought a delaying action back to
Dresden, where it was finally surrounded by
the Soviets. The survivors were shipped to
Siberia, where most perished in the gulags. ★
The Germans gave great thought to the development of their offensive doctrine
during the prewar years. The foundation of it was Auftragstaktik (mission-oriented
tactics), a system originally devised by the Prussian Army in the mid-19th century. That
meant orders to small units provided the overall objective and the intention of the
higher-level commander, but the small-unit commanders were in turn left free to develop
a solution based on the situation as they saw it evolving during combat.
Because Gross Deutschland was a panzer grenadier (mechanized
infantry) unit, its particular offensive doctrine became a mixture of armor and
infantry solutions. The mid-war addition of armored transport vehicles for
the infantry allowed them to cooperate more closely with the tanks.
All offensive planning began with the identification of a Schwerpunkt (main point of
concentration). Within and near that Schwerpunkt, units were assigned specific avenues
of advance to decrease confusion and the possibility of friendly fire situations.
Armored offensive tactics were in turn based on the idea of continual movement. Three specific forms of attack were: meeting engagement, hasty attack
and deliberate attack. The meeting engagement was intended to allow lead
units to quickly transition, upon first contact with a moving enemy, to offensive
operations before the surprised enemy could organize his response.
The doctrine further dictated that, in fluid tactical environments, battalion
commanders must be prepared to attack even when their units weren’t at optimal
strength or properly concentrated. German armor units therefore conducted
extensive training in transition from march columns to hasty attack formations.
Deliberate attack was used when facing an enemy in a prepared defense. Different
parts of the overall attacking formation would then be assigned individual Schwerpunkt,
based on the exact type of defensive position each one would be facing.
That general approach in turn led to the development of the Kampfgruppe (KG or battlegroup) concept. In theory it involved carefully selecting units, equipment and personnel from
as wide an overall spectrum as possible in order to optimally customize a force for the mission
at hand. By 1944, however, KG had generally deteriorated in practice into hastily collecting
any survivors and vehicles and throwing them back into battle as ad hoc reinforcements. ★
Final preparations for an attack.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
15
the soldiers. The better they understood the
situation, the more they were likely to hang on.
If the encircled force was relying on
outside forces for their rescue, an airfield
generally had to be maintained. Resupply
was prioritized as ammunition then food. Any
planes that landed always left with whatever
wounded could be carried. Aerial resupply
proved successful in smaller pockets, but was
unsuccessful for large pockets like Stalingrad.
The Germans developed three defensive
strategies for breaking encirclements. The
first was a hedgehog defense, where troops
dug in to await relief from outside forces That
was used when holding a position deemed
critical or when trapped units were too
weak to conduct their own breakout.
If the position was critical, the problem
became determining when the defenders
had become too weak to assist in, or conduct
on their own, a break out. Indecision
in that regard ultimately determined
the fate of 6th Army at Stalingrad.
Defensive Operations
While Hitler had envisioned staying on
the strategic offensive until final victory, by
the winter of 1941-42 the issue of large-scale
defensive operations was current and
contentious. Hitler generally insisted ground
once taken must be held at all costs. His commanders preferred the ebb and flow of elastic
defense, which offered greater opportunities
for preserving personnel and equipment while
generating chances for eventual counterattack.
For the Gross Deutschland Division, defensive
tactics became the key to survival.
From the German doctrinal perspective the
ultimate goal of defensive operations was the
deployment of available forces in such a way
as to create the opportunity to counterattack.
Defenders were to fight from blocking positions
with the coordination of personnel, equipment
and resources coming from “coordination points”
(Anschlusspunkt). Those coordination points
were the flipside of the offensive Schwerpunkt.
The primary mission of the coordination
point was to maintain the cohesion of the
overall defense. It maintained contact with
neighboring units and shared local intelligence.
That was especially important in regard to
observed changes that might impact neighboring
units, such as enemy forces redeploying.
Whenever possible, that reporting was
facilitated by hardwire communication lines.
Forward blocking positions were hardened
sites sometimes supported by tanks. “Hardened”
on the eastern front, however, was a far cry from
Atlantic Wall type fortifications. They were usually just dug in positions that made use of local
terrain advantages. The mission of the blocking
positions was to break up the overall momentum
of the enemy attack and channel it into smaller
areas that counterattacks could then destroy
piecemeal. Blocking positions might use tanks,
assault guns or towed guns for support.
Once the enemy got past the forward
blocking positions, they hit the main defensive
area. That was ideally to be set up as a defense
in depth with three lines: the forward security
position, the main battle line and the rear area.
The forward security area was usually
only lightly held. The German goal within that
area was to further harass the enemy
forces that had already been broken up and
channelized by the blocking positions.
The overall depth of a properly constructed
German defensive position meant attackers
were never to be sure when they would hit
the main battle line. That initial contact was
intended to be a severe shock to them.
The rear areas were organized to
resupply the forward defense positions and
provide staging areas for further counterattacks. The access routes were chosen to
provide the greatest protection for troops
and equipment moving between them.
The second type of encirclement defense
involved conducting active operations to
break the enemy line and thus regain freedom
of movement. Initially all disabled vehicles
were cannibalized to provide maximum fuel
and spare parts for the others. The point
of greatest weakness in the enemy line
was determined, and the breakout was
coordinated with the nearest friendly force.
The third strategy was the mobile pocket.
That approach was selected when the nearest
friendly forces weren’t strong enough to attack
toward the pocket, or if the distance that had
to be covered in order to escape was too great
for a single thrust from inside the pocket. As
the pocket moved, battlegroups were sent out
to shield it from the direct impact of an attack
and conceal the intent of the movement.
As the war progressed, training and
equipment were developed to deal with
the realities of defensive operations. Gross
Deutschland recruit training included extensive
practice in preparing hasty defensive positions
and the use of the panzerfaust man-carried
anti-tank weapon. The panzerfaust was a 13
lb. disposable steel tube with an explosive
shaped-charge on its end. When fired, a rocket
charge propelled the explosive head up to 200
feet and, when well handled, it was capable
of defeating any tank armor of the day.
The problem with German defensive
techniques was they required time to effectively
prepare. As the pace of Soviet offensives accelerated in late 1943, there was less and less time
to do that. In practice, then, when attacked, the
strongest surviving units were hastily collected
in groups and rushed to locations where breakthroughs were occurring. That usually meant a
handful of tanks or assault guns were rapidly
shifted from crisis to crisis as the defenders
tried to slow the enemy offensive. Defensive
operations based on strategy and training
were thus replaced by hasty improvisation. The
strength of the Soviet offensives, combined
with the diminishing resources of the defenders,
resulted in the defeat of the German Army. ★
In the main defensive line, tanks were used
in three types of positions: open, hull down and
concealed. Open was never the best option
because of the obvious threat to survivability.
Hull down offered the best protection for tanks
and assault guns, because full concealment
(which restricted mobility) was only good
until the shooting started. Tanks hull down
on the edge of towns or in tree lines were
sometimes able to get off the first shot during
enemy attacks and then get away before heavy
return fire could be brought against them.
Counterattacks came in two forms: planned
and hasty. Planned counterattacks often
coincided with favorable terrain features that
allowed the defenders opportunities to try
to stop their retreat and retake the initiative.
Decisions were made ahead of time establishing
what the limits of such counterattacks would be.
Hasty counterattacks were based on local conditions and opportunistic timing. Commanders
were expected to seize unanticipated opportunities to attack and thereby regain the initiative.
As the war progressed the issue of fighting
from encirclements also grew in importance.
When encircled the first step was the preservation of morale and the prevention of “encirclement fever” (Kesselfieber). It was found that the
knowledge among the soldiers their unit was
cut off could easily result in panic that greatly
diminished their survival potential. The key was
providing as much information as possible to
Oberst Karl Lorenz, commander of the Grossdeutschland Panzer Regiment, meeting with the crew of a Panther in south Russia.
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WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
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GROSS DEUTSCHLAND PANZER
The Famous Divisions Series, featuring Gross Deutschland
Panzer (FDGDP) in its first installment, is a new evolution in design
that brings tactics to operational simulations. Recreating four
battles from the eastern front in 1943-44, it includes: Lutchessa
Valley, Kursk, Akhtyrka and Mischurin Rog. Each is played on its
own detailed and historically accurate map. It was designed by John
Schettler and has been developed by Eric Harvey and Ty Bomba.
Combat is governed by 140 Event Chits. They introduce the
element of chaos. Certain chits may be nullified by the play other
chits; so you never know how an attack will be resolved based on
odds and terrain. The number of chits a given side may hold and
draw also serves as a measure of its elite or non-elite status.
Each hex represents 550 yards from side to opposite side. Each
turn represents six hours, but they’re not divided into friendly and
enemy player turns. Rather, each is made up of numerous headquarters activations. All HQ activation chits are placed in a cup, and
they’re drawn one at a time to activate (movement and combat) a
particular headquarters and its associated units. When that activation
is finished, a new HQ is drawn and its activation takes place.
Command & Control
Elite units like the Gross Deutschland
were prized by the high command for their
ability to move rapidly while engaging in a
variety of operational and tactical situations.
Efficient command and control was critical
to those high-tempo operations. When the
Germans used mission-oriented tactics,
battalion commanders had great latitude in
how their operations were conducted. To
accomplish that, a standard headquarters
organization for the battalion was developed.
Each battalion had its headquarters
company. The headquarters company had four
platoons: signals, armored reconnaissance,
engineer, and air defense. Later in the war
the signals platoon was sometimes placed
directly within the command group.
In an armored unit the battalion commander
had three tanks: the command tank in which he
rode, the secondary tank with the battalion adjutant, and a third reserve tank commanded by a
senior non-commissioned officer. While leading
the battalion from a tank seemed initially attractive, many commanders came to find halftracks
allowed them more space and the ability to
better access radios and maps during a battle.
When a command post was established,
the senior officer of the headquarters company
was in charge there and reported directly to the
battalion commander. Radio communication was
maintained in the command tank or halftrack
with the aid of a radio truck. There were two frequencies: the battalion frequency allowed company commanders to communicate with battalion headquarters; the other frequency connected
the battalion commander to higher authority.
The range of German battlefield wireless
communications varied with conditions. If a unit
was unable to maintain radio communications, a
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secondary unit was placed midway to relay messages. That became more and more important
on the eastern front, where subordinate units
were often spread over large frontages.
One problem with the battalion
radio net came from the fact over
a dozen sub-units and their personnel had
access to it. That included everyone from
company commanders to forward air controllers.
Combat situations demanded strict radio
discipline, and radio silence while on the
move often also needed to be maintained.
Units might be ordered to set their sets only
to receive; however, that stricture could
be broken if a unit discovered the enemy
was moving forward to make contact.
Besides radios, command and control was
also conducted using hand signals, flags and
lights. Hand signals were common among
smaller units. Flag signaling was eventually
discarded due to the difficulty of manipulating
them while vehicles were moving and during
combat. Lights (red, green and white) were
most often used at night. Individual units often
developed their own light shields from discarded
cans and boxes to try to ensure their signals
wouldn’t be easily spotted by the enemy.
When a battalion from the Gross
Deutschland was on the move, the platoon
or company commanders had the authority
to open fire and attack. They were expected
to immediately report the following by radio:
enemy strength and location, the current position and course of action of their own units, and
any recommendations of the reporting officer.
At battalion headquarters a signals
officer would filter the incoming data to
provide the commander a summary of
vital information. That prevented the commander from becoming overwhelmed with
confusing and overlapping reports.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
FDGDP is a “special edition” game that includes two counter-sheets
(560 counters) and four maps (on two 34x22” sheets) of the various
battlefields where the highlighted battles were fought. Combat units
(iconic) are individual companies featuring distinct vehicles and weapons.
Play is tactical: units have individual ranges, different movement
capabilities depending on type (wheeled, tracked or leg), and rules
cover such things as demolishing bridges, pontoon bridges, weather,
overrun, supply, infantry riding tanks, direct and ranged fire, artillery
barrage, opportunity fire, night, bunkers, trenches, mines, dragons teeth,
engineers, armor recovery vehicles, airpower and anti-aircraft artillery.
$50 US Customers
$56 Canadian Customers
$58 Overseas Customers
All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping.
CA residents add $3.19 sales tax.
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When advancing, the company commanders would lead in their vehicles. If
reconnaissance platoons located the enemy,
the company command vehicles would move
to the location providing the greatest visual
access. The rest of the company would move
forward and past them to the attack.
Good reconnaissance was an important
part of command and control. Armor and
panzer grenadier units conducted two types of
reconnaissance. Combat reconnaissance was
always focused on providing the commander
knowledge of the whereabouts and strength
of the enemy. Terrain reconnaissance
identified the roads and paths the follow-on
units should take. That included the location
of river fords, the quality of the roads, and
terrain suitable for blocking positions if the
advance turned into a defensive operation.
When transitioning to hasty attack, the battalion commander had to rely on the platoon and
company commanders who were closest to the
action. A main objective was quickly identified,
and follow-on units were given instructions
on their line of approach to it. A decision was
necessary whether to eliminate or bypass
any enemy position that was encountered.
If bypassed, the battalion commander had
to identify it as an enemy strongpoint and
select the follow on force to destroy it.
In the end the German troops on the
eastern front were defeated by a less
sophisticated enemy. The Soviets who faced
the Gross Deutschland Division had few of the
advantages of flexible command and control
supported by modern communication technology.
Their overwhelming numbers, constant resupply
from an ever-larger Soviet and Allied economic
base, and their willingness to accept frightful
levels of casualties proved decisive. ★
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
Decision Games
ATTN: WaW Game Offer
PO Box 21598
Bakersfield, CA 93390
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