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World Development, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 191-198.1997 Copyright 0 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved Pergamon 0305-750x/97 $17.00 + 0.00 SO305750X(96)00104-0 Carbon Intensity and Economic Development 1962-9 1: A Brief Exploration of the Environmental Kuznets Curve J. TIMMONS ROBERTS Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA. and PETER E. GRIMES * Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, USA. Summary. - The relationship between national carbon dioxide emissions intensity (CO, emitted per unit of Gross Domestic Product) and level of economic development has changed from essentially linear in 1962 to strongly curvilinear in 1991. The inverted-U curve reached statistical significance briefly in the early 1970s and increasingly since 1982. This is the result not of groups of countries passing through stages of development, but of efficiency improvements in a small number of wealthy countries combined with worse performance in poor and middle-income countries. The curvilinear relation is deepening and is likely to persist due to constraints on poorer countries in the world economy. 0 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Key words - carbon dioxide, development, environment, 1. INTRODUCTION greenhouse effect, cross-national This phenomenon has been dubbed the “Environmental Kuznets Curve,” after a similar upside-down “U’‘-curve observed by Simon Kuznets when comparing level of income inequality in countries by the size of their economy in GDP per capita. The issue of whether pollutants increase and then decrease as countries develop economically has critical policy implications. If the “Kuznets” curve is supported by the evidence, it suggests that current development policies are capable of being environmentally benign over the long term (see e.g., Beckerman, 1992). The problem would then be how best to accelerate those processes and policies so that all countries could experience production and living conditions found now only in the wealthy countries. If The decades-old debate over the relationship between economic development and environmental conditions has assumed renewed urgency in the wake of growing concern about global warming. A central question in the debate has been whether effluents produced by industrial processes increase monotonically with economic development, or if countries reach a “turning point” at which emissions begin to drop because they can afford more efficient infrastructure and more stringent pollution controls. Some crossnational, cross-sectional studies have found such an inverted U-curve in the relation between level of development and certain pollutants such as particulates, sulphur dioxide, toxic chemicals and a series of water pollutants (Beckerman, 1992; Hettife, Lucas and Wheeler, 1992; Reed, 1992; World Bank, 1992; UNEPIWHO, 1992, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1993, 1995; Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 1995; Selden and Song, 1995). One study recently claimed that this turning point for several pollutants tended to occur before countries reach a gross domestic product of US$8,000 per capita (Grossman and Krueger, 1995).’ *The authors wish to thank Charlie Brody, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Tammy Greer, Jodie Manale, and anonymous reviewers for comments and assistance. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation Sociology Program and Human Dimensions of Global Change #SES9223304 and by the Sociology Department of Tulane University. Neither organization bears any responsibility for the work herein. Final revision accepted: September 9,1996. 191 192 WORLD DEVELOPMEN’I the curve trend is in error or misinterpreted and the most polluting technologies cannot be expected to disappear without explicit intervention, then policies promoting only accelerated economic growth might be a course for disaster (see Arrow et al., 1995). In this report we examine for the 30 years during 1962-91 how many kilos of carbon dioxide countries emitted per unit of their gross domestic product (what we call National Carbon Intensity NCI). We test whether there has been an inverted U-curve relationship for CO, emissions per unit of Gross Domestic Product across these 30 years, and track the changes in NC1 of low, middle and high-income countries over the period. Carbon dioxide emissions intensity provides an important test of the “turning point” or environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis for four reasons. First, carbon dioxide is now understood to account for over half of the effect of greenhouse warming (Houghton, Jenkins and Ephraums, 1990; Stern, Young and Drackman, 1992). Second,until very recently CO, was considered a harmless by-product of clean and efficient combustion (Houghton and Skole, 1990; Arrow et al., 1995). Therefore unlike pollutants which irritate humans directly (such as urban smog-producing compounds and water pollutants), efforts to control CO, emissions have come only in the last few years and have been limited to a few European countries. The existence of an inverted U-curve for CO, emissions intensity would suggest that pollution reduction might be expected to occur as a natural by-product of economic development improving efficiency, especially in the use of energy. Third, there is apparently no thermodynamically necessary level for the amount of CO, a country must emit to have an economy or population of a certain size. Across the world’s countries in 1990, national carbon intensity varied by nearly one hundred fold, while emissions of carbon dioxide per capita varied by over two thousandfold (World Resources Institute, 1992; CDIAC, 1991, 1993). Fourth, estimates of CO, emissions are available for far more countries and years than are measures of other types of pollution. This simple problem of data availability has kept many analysts from understanding how the relation has evolved over time. For all these reasons, the results may help us assess the relative causal importance of abatement policies, improvements in technical production efficiency, and the relocation of energyand pollution-intensive industries to poorer countries in reconfiguring emissions around the world. 2. DATA Data for the current analysis come from the World Bank and from the Carbon Dioxide Information and Analysis Center (CDIAC) at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. World Bank gross domestic product values were adjusted for inflation using the World Bank’s GDP deflator and 1987 exchange rates to calculate constant 1987 US dollars (World Bank, 1993). CDIAC’s estimates of CO, emissions from fossil fuel combustion and other industrial activities by country were converted to kilos of carbon. These fossil fuel CO, emissions figures (what CDIAC calls “Industrial CO,“) are calculated as the sum of emissions from burning fuels in solid, liquid, and gas forms, from waste gas flaring, and from cement manufacturing (Marland and Rotty, 1984; Marland et al., 1989; CDIAC, 1991). The latter two categories account for only about 3% of what they call “industrial CO2 emissions” (Marland and Rotty, 1984; Marland et&., 1989; CDIAC, 1991; Stem,Young and 1992). Commercial and residential Druckman, sources are included, but emissions from changes in land-use [mostly deforestation, which accounts for about an additional 25% of carbon releases (WRI, 1992; Stem, Young and Druckman, 1992)] are not included, since time-series data are lacking (WRI, 1992; Houghton et al., 1987; Houghton, Jenkins and Ephraums , 1990; Rude1 and Roper, 1996) .2 In raw volume, both carbon dioxide emissions and energy consumption are closely correlated with the size of a country’s economy (Cook, 197 1; Humphrey and Buttel, 1984; Bollen and Appold, 1993; Goldemberg, 1995; Goldemberg et al., 1985). This relation has been weakening somewhat since 1960, but carbon emissions are still essentially linearly related to national product per capita (1960: r-squared = 0.914, n = 105; 1991: r-squared = 0.734, n = 134). To examine the socially determined aspect of this relationship, we calculated a quotient of CO2 emitted (in kilos of carbon) divided by gross domestic product (GDP, in constant US dollars). This index was logarithmically transformed because of skewness.3 Setting aside a very few countries which have developed noncarbon-based energy sources,“ we believe that In(CO,/GDP) is a valuable indicator of national carbon intensity (Grimes, Roberts and Manale, 1993). For the time-series we compare NC1 with GDP per capita, a commonly used proxy measure for level of economic development. While we believe that several indicators of “development” deserve exploration and comparison, we opt for GDP per capita based on exchange rates here rather than purchasing-powerparity (Summers and Heston 1984, 1988), partly because of their availability over cases and years. It can also be argued that exchange rate GDP better captures a country’s control over the world product and its power in trade networks (Arrighi and Drangel, 1986; Korzeniewicz and Martin, 1994).5 3. FINDINGS Figure 1 shows that the relationship between CARBON INTENSITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 193 . . . . . .. . . . . . . .-& . 4 . .. . . . . . . .. :,_ .$C . . . ;y’- 2, l :&*- -y-. :.-?z : .y ..& l . . . . . l . -0 ‘8 s-8 . 2... . ? 1965 1970 . . . 1 . . 0t . . -0 . ..&a.;= . mm-. . . . . . . . -Ii . . . l 0%. . . l . . . . . . . ..* . . *.. . 8 . . . .. . . . .. *. . -mⅈ -, . . ” . . l ... . . . _ r...‘• . . . . f . . . . ..- ..rh... ,..” l Z!--C--X y-4 4, % . . Njg-- . . ” . “-8 . . l 9-f . 5’ . . .a. . .. . . 1985 11 . l. . “A . . . . “. 2. a . . .4.. . “8 .z.. . ..H . .. . . ..% . : .B . . . . . . . . . c . . . ..‘---_--0.. L. -8 ‘. . . . e..,8-.J . . N . : mm.4 : . . .. 7 9 1990 11 w 7 9 11 Natural Log GDP per Capita Figure 1. National carbon intensi@ (in@ciency) [in(COJGDP)] 1965-90. by natural log Gross Domestic Product per capita, WORLD DEVELOPMENT 194 Table 1. OLS curvilinear regression results (standardized coefficients) examining linear (natural log of GDP per capita) and (GDPper capita squared) effects of level of economic development on carbon dioxide emissions intensity (natural log of CO, emissions per unit of GDP) Overall adj 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 0.3 19* 0.311* O-318* 0.326* 0.299* 0.355* 0.327* 0.336* 0.343* O-297* 0.345* 0.322* 0.329* 0.263* 0.284* 0.218* 0.201* 0.154* 0.148% 0.117* 0.142* 0.160* 0.168* 0.186* 0.191* 0.138* 0.167* 0.172* 0.140* 0.115* r* In(GDP/cap) (GDP/cap)* N 0.660* 0.631* 0.561* 0.596* 0.613* 0.785* 0.733* 0.721* 0.656* 0.694* 0.802* 0.808’ 0.839* 0.648* 0.614* 0.562* 0.568* o-505* 0.482* 0.432* 0.494* 0.546* 0.567* 0.612* 0.649* 0.555* 0.556* 0.547* 0.464* 0.418* -0.122 4.088 0.014 a.20 AI.077 4).304* -0.226 a.194 4.089 4.205 4.3251_ JX362t x).417* 4.2141. 4.166 a.185 4.212$ a.207 4.188 a.179 Xl.2847 x).327? 4.360* X).387* Al.418* 4).463* 4.544* Al.556* 4.529* X).488* 98 100 103 107 108 111 111 115 116 115 121 121 122 123 125 126 126 126 126 125 134 135 135 139 140 142 142 144 140 135 *p < 0.001 tp<o.o1 & < 0.05 National Carbon Intensity development has changed and level of economic from essentially linear in 1965 to strongly curvilinear in 1990. This is confirmed by the rise to statistical significance and finally parity of the quadratic (GDP/cap)Z term (which expresses the downward sloping side of the curve) to the log term ln(GDP/cap) (which expresses the upward slope, see Table 1). The quadratic term reached statistical significance briefly in the early 1970s and then again since 1982. Why did the inverted U-curve in national carbon intensity emerge? Are countries reaching and surpassing the “turning point” in income and therefore reversing direction toward improved carbon efficiency? While individual countries may differ, Figure 2 shows average carbon intensity (NCI) in groups of countries categorized in 1970 as low, medium, and high-income by the World Bank. The only group showing a net improvement in CO, inten- sity over the period were the high-income countries. The figure shows also that downturns for NC1 in the high-income countries’ averages began just before the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 (Moomaw and Tullis, 1994; Grubler, 1994). As a group, low-income countries have become steadily less efficient in carbon terms over the period (apparently crossing paths with the rich nations in 1990). The middle-income countries have worsened in carbon intensity over the period but less severely than the poor nations, with periods of increasing and decreasing efficiency. Overall, Figure 2 confirms that the appearance of the significant curvilinear relationship in CO,/GDP since 1982 is due to both efficiency improvements in the rich countries and worse performance in poor and middle-income nations. Apart from these trends, all three series reflect the results of global cycles of recession and recovery (see Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995). CARBON INTENSITY AVERAGE CARBON AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 195 PER GDP [In(C02/GDP)I -03 -1 -I,5 -2 -2,5 I -3 I I 1985 I I I I I 1970 I I I I I I I 1975 I I I 1980 I I I I I I 1985 I I I I 1990 YEAR - LOW-INCOME --&- MIDDLE-INCOME Figure 2. National carbon intensity [ln(CO,lGDP)] 1962-91 f or constant groups of countries which in 1970 had income classed by the World Bank as high, middle and low levels of Gross Domestic Productper capita. 196 WORLD DEVELOPMEN’I 4. DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION These findings strongly suggest that the emergence of an inverted U-curve (the “Environmental Kuznets Curve,” Figure I) for carbon dioxide emissions intensity is the result not of individual countries passing through stages of development, but of a relatively small number of wealthy ones becoming more efficient since 1970 while the average for the rest of the world worsens (Figure 2). Second, the steady decrease in the r-squared term (Table I) shows that scatter is increasing in these regressions. This suggests that other social and political factors are increasingly important in determining which countries institute efficiency measures, an important area for research (Goldemberg, 1995; Goldemberg et al., 1985; Grimes, Roberts and Manale, 1993; KrebillPrather and Rosa, 1994; Mazur and Rosa. 1974; Rosa and Krebill-Prather, 1993). All of the above indicates that the relationship between economic growth and environmental protection should not be seen as necessary or stage-based. Rather than countries passing through stages and eventually reducing their pollution through economic development (Beckerman, 1992; World Bank, 1992; Grossman and Krueger, 1995), we would argue that the history of the world economy suggests that only a few countries have ever successfully moved up substantially in the global hierarchy of income stratification (see,e.g., Wallerstein, 1979; Chase-Dunn, 1989). Empirical world-system analyses have supported the observation that most countries are structurally limited from ever ascending due to their colonial history as hinterlands for exploitation, the continuing low prices of their exports, a history of unfavorable links with foreign corporations and banks, and their lack of geopolitical power (e.g., Smith and White, 1992; Korzeniewicz and Martin, 1994; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Gereffi and Wyman, 1990; Grimes, 1996). Most poorer countries will not repeat the history of European and North American development, partly because those world powers already exist. Conventional theories involving stages of national development remain unfalsifiable and inconsistent with the historical record. The current study confirms for the case of CO, emissions intensity that to deduce stages from present cross-sectional snapshots could be disastrous. There is no reason to believe that most countries will ever reach the hypothesized “turning point” of carbon intensity, whether it be US$8,000 GDP per capita or especially if it is higher. Rather, the curvilinear relation of national carbon intensity established over the last decade is deepening and probably will persist, as wealthy countries increasingly specialize in services while energyintensive industries such as the production of intermediate semi-processed goods tend to concentrate in some middle-income countries (Frobel. Heinrichs and Kreye, 1981; Hettige, Lucas and Wheeler, 1992; Dicken, 1992: Moomaw and Tullis, 1994). Further, industrial relocations even of relatively clean “assembly plants” do not necessarily mean upward economic mobility toward the hypothesized turning point for nonwealthy countries. Many industries move production facilities out of the wealthy countries only in later stages of the product cycle, and therefore competition between producers is much greater and profit margins are low (Dicken, 1992; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994). Industries in developing countries also often remain limited by subcontracting links to marketing and design firms in the wealthy countries, who in turn gamer most of the profits. The future worsening of an inverted U-curve is also supported by some observations that higher-polluting industries are moving to the Third World to avoid tougher regulations in the wealthy countries. This “pollution-haven hypothesis” (see, e.g., Covello and Frey, 1990), is supported by anecdotal evidence, however, macroeconomic tests of the phenomenon have been equivocal and some contrary evidence can be cited (e.g., Leonard, 1988; Low and Yeats, 1992; Pearson, 1987; Tobey, 1990; Roberts, 1996a). Regardless of the evidence on the pollution-haven hypothesis, middle and lower income countries are usually less able to enforce environmental regulations effectively, and may even see good reasons not to (Grimes, Roberts and Manale, 1993; Roberts, 1996b). Further, even identical industries operating in nonwealthy countries face obstacles making them less efficient in energy and carbon terms. such as poor roads, inefficient energy sources, and local shortages of well-educated high-tech workers, suppliers and contractors (Grimes, Roberts and Manale. 1993). Extending tax holidays to attract firms, and garnering only low wages from those that do relocate, make it difficult for developing countries to substantially upgrade infrastructure and human resources. The overall picture over the past 30 years that emerges from this analysis is that some wealthy countries are improving their carbon dioxide intensity while most of the rest of the world’s are worsening. This suggests that if massive increases in carbon emissions in rapidly growing nations are to be avoided, a proactive and explicit approach to environmental quality is needed. This need not occur at the expense of solid economic growth, but sustainability must be earnestly addressed at all “levels” of development. Firms and countries around the world are discovering that it is far easier and cheaper to avoid environmental devastation than it is to clean it up later (see, e.g., Sayre, 1996). These firms and countries need a level playing field however, so that short-term advantages will not accrue to noncompliers. Therefore we believe that consensually arranged and effective international environmental standards and enforcement mechanisms are indicated. CARBON INTENSITY AND ECONOMIC 197 DEVELOPMENT NOTES 1. Using other outcomes and techniques, other researchers have found turning points only at much higher economic levels (Hettige, Lucas and Wheeler, 1992; HoltzEakin and Selden, 1995). In both 1979 and 1989,47 countries (mostly in Africa 2. and Asia) met over half of their total fuel requirements with what the World Resources Institute calls “traditional fuels,” i.e., nonfossil sources such as firewood and dung (World Resources Institute, 1992, pp. 316317). Virtually no timeseries data are available for fuelwood CO, emissions; the only estimates available are for land-use change, and those again only for a few, recent years (See also Grimes, Roberts and Manale, 1993). 3. Countries are given equal weight in the analysis, since we are attempting to explain national patterns of carbon intensity. 4. Notably note 2. France, Iceland and those mentioned 5. We acknowledge that GDP per capita necessarily reflect a country’s political power conditions, and are currently developing nuanced index for the position of countries in stratification system (Grimes, 1996, see also 1992). in does not or social a more the global Terlouw. 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