Download Compare and Contrast Sociological Theories of Religion

Compare and Contrast Sociological
Theories of Religion
This essay is going to compare and contrast the six main sociological
theories of religion as well as examining the way in which these theories
are formed/based.
The main point Marx makes concerning religion is its function to control
the proletariat. In capitalist society, the wealth of the bourgeoisie
depends upon exploiting the proletariat. However, to prevent any
rebellion the bourgeoisie need to impose two forms of control, violence,
or the threat of violence, and values. Violence is the less satisfactory
from of control, as it is difficult in the long term to maintain order solely
through this. Furthermore, the use of violence lays bare any claim to
legitimacy by the ruling class. Violence is used, where necessary, by the
police and, in extreme situations, by the army. Those who are the
recipients of violence are likely to be the marginalised that have the
smallest stake in society. Control of the proletariat via values is the most
efficient mode of control. By gaining control of the very values of
society, what benefits the bourgeoisie is regarded as benefiting all of
society. Religion was so powerful up to this century, when with the
advent of modernism formal education and the mass media effectively
took over, because there was no way to disprove the values of religion.
God punished the disobedient after death. Marx believed that religion
was useful to capitalism in that it acted as a form of consolation to
people, keeping them happy in their positions, the opiate of the people.
The contents of religion justified the status quo by suggesting that God
created the social world. Those in power, for example, were in some
way meant to be there by the will of God. Religions, most of which
originated from the poor and oppressed according to Marx, often
stressed the virtue of poverty and deprivation. Therefore demands for
more material goods could be criticised as greed rather than desire for
social justice, and that justice and rewards would be given in the
afterlife, so the status quo need not be disturbed.
For Marxists, religion is more a force of stability than change, existing to
support the status quo in capitalist society. Although religion is seen as
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emerging from the oppressed to comfort them, it is quickly taken over by
the bourgeoisie themselves. Religion is a form of false consciousness, and
cannot lead to useful change. However, the Marxist approach fails to
account for the way in which religion can stand for the oppressed
and defend them: of r example, the fundamentalist Islamic groups in the
Middle East. Marx was aware, however, that religions generally
developed from the oppressed, as a means of coping with their situation.
Thompson studied the development of Methodism in England and found
that, although it was initially supported and promoted by the bourgeoisie
because of its stress on hard work, it was gradually taken over by the
poor and became a means of organising and promoting the interests of
the working class. This is a very different interpretation from that given by
Marxists to the role of religion.
Marx stressed that the dominant motor of social change was economics.
The nature of the productive process largely determined the social
relations of society, which included the ideas and values current at any
one time. However, Weber strongly disagreed with this economic
determinism and thought that there was no automatic priority of
economics over ideas. Instead, he argued that ideas could bring about
economic change. Weber set out to prove the importance of ideas by
analysing the start of capitalism in Britain.
The key, according to Weber, was a strict version of the Protestant faith
called Calvinism where, Weber believed, the origins of capitalism lay. The
result of hard work and no pleasure was that Calvinists became very well
off and amassed considerable amounts of wealth. Yet they had nothing to
do with this money. They tended to be merchants and so were not
interested in land, and they certainly did not want grandiose houses,
jewels or clothes, so their wealth lay idle. What inventors and would-be
manufacturers and industrialists needed most to develop their inventions
and industries was capital for investment. The Puritans had this and were
inclined to lend their money for interest. They were prepared to do so
because the new industries were not frivolous but would lead people to
work hard. Industry flourished because of this injection of capital and so
the Industrial Revolution began. Other world religions, such as Catholicism
in Europe or Buddhism in Asia, did not create the correct conditions for
entrepreneurial capitalism, and so industrialisation did not occur.
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Catholicism, for example, stresses that people can commit the worst
crimes and lead the most debauched lives and still enter heaven as long as
there is genuine remorse before death. The religion stresses the forgiving,
loving nature of God and that there is no certainty of anyone being saved
or condemned.
Weber has been criticised by Samuelson, who points out that Britain was
not the only country in which Calvinism developed, so why did Calvinism
lead to industrialisation in Britain? Secondly, Weber’s thesis ignores the
enormous amounts of wealth brought to Britain by colonialism, piracy and
international trade. This too was available to investors; although Spain and
Portugal also had this wealth and did not develop industry in the same
way, it could be argued in defence of Weber. Robinson has criticised
Weber’s portrayal of the Hindu religion, which in fact did promote trade,
a market economy, money and the division of labour. Robinson suggests
that it was not religion alone that initiated or prevented the development
of industrialisation, but other factors, such as war and colonialism.
The essential feature of Durkheim’s analysis of religion is its function to
promote cohesion and stability. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,
Durkheim argues that religion divides objects into the sacred and the
profane. The sacred objects are set apart from the normal world and
treated with special respect. Durkheim argues that these sacred objects
represent the society itself. Worshipping the totem, as the aborigines do,
means worshipping society. Religion, therefore, really consists of
reverence for the central values of any society. Every time a religious
ceremony takes place, the group affirms its belief in the central values.
Religion clearly involves a spiritual dimension, and the individual in
ceremonies feels him/herself in contact with supernatural forces. In
reality, Durkheim argues, this is the expression of the power of the
collectivity of society over the individual. Religion also marks the rites of
passage of any society. Key status changes into adulthood; marriage,
death, etc are all marked by religious ceremonies, which publicly state the
individual’s new status. Finally, Durkheim stresses that religion directs the
ways in which individuals see the world and actually think about it,
providing explanations for the nature of the physical world.
Durkheim’s analysis is primarily on the cohesion functions of religion, and
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he sees religion as a conservative force. Therefore there is little awareness
of religion as an agency that brings about change. Durkheim does not
see religion as having a dynamic, innovating role, but rather one that
reflects social values. When it comes to social change, therefore, he
accepts that religion will change, indeed he foresaw its decline, but as a
response to wider social changes. Crucially, Durkheim differs from Marx in
that he sees religion as a beneficial force, whereas for Marx, religion is a
means of oppression. Following on from Durkheim, Parsons examines the
positive aspects of religion for society. He suggests that the functions of
religious beliefs provide the guidelines for action and that life consists of
uncertainties and anxieties concerning unforeseen events. Religion helps
to explain these random events, and provide an explanation, it gives
meaning to life, and religion also creates and reinforces values to help
provide harmony in society. The functionalist perspective emphasizes the
positive contributions of religion to society and tends to ignore its more
dysfunctional aspects. With its preoccupation with harmony, integration
and solidarity, functionalism neglects the many instances where religion
can be seen as a divisive and disruptive force. It bypasses the frequent
examples of internal divisions within a community over questions of
religious dogma and worship, divisions that can lead to open conflict. It
gives little consideration to hostility between different religious groups
within the same society, such as Catholics and Protestant in Northern
Ireland of Hindus and Muslims in India. In such cases religion can be
seen as a direct threat to social order. The Marxist perspective on religion
provides an interesting contrast to functionalist views.
Unlike Durkheim, the American sociologists Stark and Bainbridge see
religion as meeting the needs of individuals rather than those of society as
a whole. Unlike Marx, they see religion as meeting universal human
needs rather than those that stem from class inequality and exploitation.
Furthermore they reject the view, shared by the classic sociologists of
religion that the development of industrial capitalist societies would, one
way or another, ultimately undermine religion. Stark and Bainbridge
claim that religion helps to meet universal human needs. As such, changes
in society cannot diminish its appeal. They start with the basic premise
that people do what they believe will be good for them. This provides
quite a straightforward basis for human decision-making but individuals
may still face problems.
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Stark and Bainbridge recognise that religion might not actually provide
people with eternal life, but what it does offer is a ‘compensator’. A
compensator is the belief that a reward will be obtained in the distant
future or in some other context that cannot be verified. They are a type of
IOU – if individuals act in particular way they will eventually be rewarded.
In the absence of immediate rewards people are liable to turn to
compensators. Some political activists would like society to be
transformed. If there is little evidence that the transformation is likely,
they may develop the belief in a future revolution as a compensator.
Similarly a compensator is exchanged for a reward when a parent
persuades a child that working hard now will eventually lead to future
fame and riches. Some compensators are quite specific, for example the
promise of a cured wart; others are more general. The promise of eternal
life is an example of a general compensator. Stark and Bainbridge have
provided the most recent comprehensive attempt to develop a
sociological perspective on religion. Their work has provided a number of
insights into religious organisations and religious change. However, Roy
Wallis and Steve Bruce argue that the available evidence contradicts their
theory. New religious movements have not gained sufficient recruits to
replace those lost from more established religions. Wallis and Bruce also
criticize Stark and Bainbridge for ignoring social and cultural influences on
the questions that individuals ask and the rewards they seek. It is by no
means inevitable that people seek the kinds of reward for which religion
offers compensators. Society, culture and socialization might create the
need for religion rather than universal human desires. By reducing their
explanation of religion to supposedly universal needs Stark and Bainbridge
neglect the social factors that help to create and sustain religion.
The work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann is an important
development in the sociology of religion. They have put forward a
phenomenological view of religion: members of society subjectively
interpreting and giving meaning to the physical and social world produce
religion. They see the sociology of religion as part of a larger field – the
sociology of knowledge – that is concerned with the meanings, and
definitions of reality held by members of a society. Every society has its
own body of knowledge: for example, traditional Eskimo society has a
shared knowledge of life and the world that differs from other societies.
This universe of meaning, as Berger and Luckmann term it, is socially
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derived; it is a product of society and in turn feeds back and helps produce
society. Religion provides ultimate answers that cannot be questioned by
those who believe. For instance, people observe that the sun rises every
morning and, in some societies, this is confirmed and explained by the
idea that the sun is controlled by supernatural powers. Religion also
legitimates social institutions by locating them within a sacred and cosmic
frame of reference. In this sense law is located in religion when a legal
offence becomes a sin against God; authority is located in religion when
kings speak for gods or become gods as in the case of the Pharaohs of
ancient Egypt. In other words religion legitimates, and so supports, social
institutions.
Each universe of meaning is grounded in a social base. This social base is
called its plausibility structure. If his plausibility structure is destroyed, so
is the universe of meaning.
Neither can exist without the other. When the Spaniards destroyed the
Inca Empire, the social base of Inca religion was shattered. Without its
plausibility structure, Inca religion died. Berger and Luckmann argued
that all certainty is basically uncertain; it has a very precarious foundation.
Things are real because people believe they are real. Life is meaningful
because of the meaning people give to it. Things make sense because
they are defined in terms of common sense. However, this reality, these
meanings, this sense are arbitrary. There is no universal standard or
yardstick against which they can be measured and shown to be true. The
universe of meaning is a social construction of reality. One society’s reality
is another’s pretence; things are defined as meaningful in one society are
meaningless in another; common sense in one society is nonsense in
another. Because of the arbitrary nature of the universe of meaning, it is
precarious, insecure and easily shattered. It therefore requires constant
legitimation. Berger and Luckmann argue that religion is probably the
most effective mechanism for the legitimation of universes of meaning.
Unlike other sources of legitimation, only religion links meaning with
ultimate reality. However, Berger and Luckmann’s views on religion are
open to a number of criticisms. Rather like functionalists, they tend to
assume that religion unites society and they neglect examples of societies
where religion is divisive or causes conflict. Furthermore, they tend to
think that religious beliefs are widely held, and they fail to account for the
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continued existence of societies where many members are indifferent to
religion.
Religion can be a source of change. Despite the examples that can be
used to support the functionalist and Marxist view that religion promotes
stability, other examples contradict their claims. There are a number of
cases where religion has undermined stability or promoted change, such
as in Northern Ireland where Roman Catholicism has long been associated
with Irish Republicanism, or in South Africa Archbishop Tutu was a
prominent opponent of apartheid. Examples such as these lead to the
conclusion that far from encouraging people to accept their place, religion
can spearhead resistance and revolution. In many cases when religion
has been a force for change in society, the society that results may be
strongly influenced by that religion. Despite the considerable effort
devoted to discussing Weber’s theory by historians and socialists alike,
no argument has been reached about its accuracy. Nevertheless,
whatever the merits of this particular study, I believe that Weber does
successfully highlight the theoretical point that ideas, in this case religious
ideas, can conceivably lead to economic change.
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