Download The United States Naval Response to the Imperial Japanese Navy

The United States Naval Response to the Imperial Japanese Navy
during the Interwar Period (1918–1941)
Submitted By
Brian Gerald Martin
Student ID # 01169130
For Partial Fulfillment for the requirements of
MASTER OF ARTS IN DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY STUDIES
at Hawaii Pacific University
June 16, 2009
We, the undersigned, have reviewed this Professional Paper and recommend it to the faculty for
the fulfillment of all requirements for the MASTER OF ARTS IN DIPLOMACY AND
MILITARY STUDIES at Hawaii Pacific University.
Approved: Dr. William Zanella
Primary Reader 6/16/09
Approved: Dr. Jon Thares Davidann
Secondary Reader 6/16/09
1
ABSTRACT
This paper presents an analysis of the degrees of preparedness (or lack of) on the part of the
United States and its naval forces in reaction to and in anticipation of actions by the Imperial
Japanese Navy (IJN) primarily during the interwar period (1918-1941), with analysis of relevant
earlier developments. Primary and secondary sources from both the interwar period and post
war (post 1945) are utilized. While sources mentioning the unpreparedness of the U.S. in a naval
war with Japan are used, sources that dismissed the danger of such a conflict are also utilized to
offer the necessary contrast. While there is a wealth of information on the interwar period,
World War II, and the Japanese Navy that is easily accessible, the main problem in conducting
research was the contrast in detail, events, and exact dates written by each author. Additionally,
since only English sources were used, further research making use of Japanese sources is
necessary to shed more light on the subject. It was found that the U.S. was not prepared for a
naval engagement with Japan. While U.S. president, Franklin D. Roosevelt supported the
building of a superior U.S. naval fleet, naval appropriations issued by the U.S. Congress were
insufficient. Moreover, to make its case for increased funding, the U.S. Navy used naval
information relating to Japan that was inaccurate and little more than rumor. As Japan continued
its conquest of China and French Indochina, the U.S. issued embargoes but did not militarily
intervene until Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. To understand naval
affairs in the Asian and Pacific region today, it is necessary to comprehend U.S. naval policy
toward the IJN during the interwar period. No other event has influenced Asian and Pacific
affairs during this period as significantly as the Pacific War. The complete breakdown of
2
communications between the U.S. and Japan and the resulting naval war offer valuable lessons
for policy makers of today.
Table of Contents
Signature Sheet
1
Abstract
2
Table of Contents
3
Acknowledgments
4
Introduction
5
Chapter 1: Background
10
Chapter 2: Treaties
30
Chapter 3: Toward War
67
Conclusion
101
Bibliography
105
3
Acknowledgments
In writing this thesis, I am grateful for the guidance, expert opinions, and extreme patience of my
professional readers, Dr. Jon Thares Davidann and Dr. William Zanella, and to my family and
friends who have given me nothing but love and support.
4
Introduction
The diplomatic relations of Japan and the United States during the interwar period (19181941) are often described as confused and turbulent. The same can be said of U.S. naval policy
toward the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) during this time. Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan
and noted historian Edwin O. Reischauer claimed that as relations deteriorated between the two
nations, “Our reaction was basically emotional rather than rational. Instead of facing our
problems realistically, we were almost like a primitive people attempting to vanquish their foes
by sympathetic magic.”1 After World War I, the allies believed that in order to avoid the
outbreak of future naval conflicts, the armament and total tonnage allocated for navies of any
major nation had to be regulated by international jurisdiction. Only in this way, they believed
could the prevention of war become a reality by avoiding a naval arms buildup. This was
achieved through a series of conferences namely, the Washington Naval Conference (19211922) and the London Naval Conference (1930). However, with many of the nations affected by
World War I, some with devastating consequences, isolationism reigned.
The most significant conference that came about immediately after World War I was the
Washington Conference (1921-1922). While the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 primarily dealt
with European affairs at the end of World War I, the Washington Conference dealt with naval
arms control and the stabilization of East Asia and the Pacific. Representatives of the world’s
leading powers cooperated over a period of three months to limit their navies in an attempt to
avoid a naval conflict in the Pacific. Besides averting a naval arms buildup, the delegates also
1
Edwin O. Reischauer. The United States and Japan. The Viking Press: New York, 1965, p. 25.
5
agreed to work out unsettled security problems in the Far East. 2 Recognizing that much was to
be gained during a time when the world powers were looking to cut back on territorial
expansion, Japan seized the initiative at the Washington Conference and requested the maximum
tonnage possible for its navy. Although not permitted to build and maintain a fleet equal to those
of Great Britain or the U.S., the 5-5-3 ratio in reality allowed Japan to build up to its total
tonnage permitted while the two great powers (Great Britain and the U.S.) had to scrap ships to
meet their requirements.
Before the Pacific War began, Japan possessed the most powerful navy in the South
Pacific. While Japan gained island territories and a larger navy, the U.S. was fully aware of the
threat Japan and the IJN posed to its Pacific interests during this period. Both the American
government and naval officials determined that the greatest threat to the U.S. in the Pacific was a
possible naval conflict with Japan. Evidence can be found in detailed naval war plans that were
created for such an engagement. This included the Naval War College’s study of a Japanese
American (Orange-Blue) War plan in 1927 and the decision to place the U.S. Pacific Fleet at
Pearl Harbor as a deterrent mechanism to Japan’s naval expansion in the Pacific. Japan was
code-named Orange, the United States, Blue. With the consciousness of an impending naval
threat posed by Japan during the interwar period, how could the outbreak of war in the Pacific
catch the U.S. completely by surprise in its preparedness of a naval conflict? This surprise
suffered at the hands of the U.S. government occurred when the “Orange” enemy was
determined to be its greatest naval threat and the most likely nation that Japan would go to war
with in the Pacific during the interwar period.
2
Erik Goldstein and John Maurer (ed.) The Washington Conference, 1921-1922: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability
and the Road to Pearl Harbor. Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.: Portland, 1994, p. 1.
6
This thesis is written to determine precisely what the naval strategy of the U.S. was
regarding the IJN through the interwar period in an effort to assess how the U.S. Navy prepared
for an emerging navy at its door step, the Pacific Ocean. It attempts to dissect exactly how the
U.S. reacted to one of the greatest navies in the world and what it did in response during this
time. Conferences, treaties, as well as Congressional hearings and speeches of key U.S.
government and military officials are analyzed to show U.S. response to the IJN. Additionally,
sources from influential civilian writers during this time are assessed. Secondary sources are
also used to provide as much in depth historical background as possible. Most importantly,
sources produced by naval organizations or key naval officials who spoke out against the U.S.
government’s policy on the Japanese Navy and Empire during this period are assessed.
However, while sources are examined that offer clear warning signs of an impending Pacific
conflict, sources that determined such a war extremely unlikely are also presented to offer the
necessary contrast. Like many of the protests from military officials today regarding the war in
Iraq, most of the naval officials who protested the U.S. government’s lack of preparedness
throughout the interwar period were retired and thus had a greater ability to do so. What is most
interesting to note during this period was that the warning signs of future conflict between Japan
and the U.S. were clearly evident. However, these signs often fell upon the deaf ears of U.S.
Congressional officials who were wary of upsetting the American political order of restraint and
isolationism. While assessing the U.S. naval policy of the IJN, the above mentioned sources are
presented to contrast their views with that of the U.S. government’s policy of isolationism.
This isolationism was magnified by the events leading up to World War I. As Europe
tore itself apart, the U.S. did not want to become involved in the war across the Atlantic. At
war’s end, although the U.S. saw its world power dramatically increase, it remained hesitant to
7
become involved in any war, especially those far and away from the North American continent.
Most Americans believed any hostilities outside the Western Hemisphere could not affect their
security. “The quarrels of distant bellicose societies” were what the American public sought to
distance itself from.3 During the interwar period, the U.S. government did everything it could to
remain neutral in both the Pacific and European theaters. It was the attack on Pearl Harbor by
Japan which finally convinced every isolationist supporter on Capitol Hill to throw away their
hesitations of becoming involved in another world war.4
To give an idea of the remarkable achievement of the IJN and what exactly the U.S. Navy
faced before and during the Pacific War, it is worth quoting from IJN expert Stephen Howarth in
detail:
There has never been a navy like the Imperial Navy of Japan, and there never will
be again. It is the only world-class navy in history which had a definite beginning
and an equally definite end – at points, moreover, which can be established fairly
easily and without too much argument…down to nearly-exact minutes. The
Imperial Japanese Navy began life as a fighting force very shortly before 8 a.m.
on 25 July 1894; its fighting life ended at 2.23 p.m. on 7 April 1945 – a span, in
other words, of just under fifty-one years, or very much less than a single average
lifetime. And, despite its brief life, this was no tin-pot collection of second-hand
battleships; the Imperial Japanese Navy rapidly achieved the status of the world’s
third greatest navy, and in its last years almost won an even higher position – but
instead, in the final contest, lost everything.5
This rapidly built and powerful navy is what the U.S. government and Navy had to analyze. It
was a time when the U.S. did not yet comprehend how to face a world class navy, let alone
understand its position in the world. It was a time when isolation reigned, when nations looked
inward on themselves instead of internationally, even if their interests were at risk abroad.
3
Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks: New York, 1994, p.372.
Ibid., pp. 369-372.
5
Stephen Howarth. The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun: The Drama of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1895-1945.
Atheneum: New York, 1983, p. 1.
4
8
The results of the Pacific War in Asian and world affairs continue to be felt in the 21st
century. In just three short days, the IJN grabbed 6,000 miles of ocean which stretched in an
unbroken line, a quarter of the Earth’s circumference through Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and the
Western Pacific islands.6 The impact of these rapid conquests and subsequent defeat of the IJN
has allowed America to possess the world’s most powerful navy. In the next 10 years, American
dominance of the seas is assured. However, in the distant future, America will have to contest
with more powerful navies. What is seen today is the slow modernization and build up of navies
throughout the Pacific. China now possesses the third largest navy behind the U.S. and Russia.
Taiwan and South Korea also possess moderately sized navies. Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and many other nations are slowly modernizing their small navies. Although today’s navies will
most likely not have to defend against world class navies threatening their national borders, the
impact of the IJN and the rapid conquests of numerous Asian and Pacific nations by Japan are
still felt over 60 years later.
In 1996, a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) strategist claimed
…in the last 109 years, imperialists have repeatedly invaded China from the
sea…470 times, …84 of these being serious invasions. The ocean has become an
avenue for the aggressors to bring in their troops and haul away our wealth….The
ocean is not only the basic space for human survival, but also an important theater
for international political struggle….The better people can control the sea, the
greater they have the sea territorial rights [that have] become inseparable from a
country’s sovereignty.7
Although the PLAN strategist referred to many nations, the major one was Japan and the use of
the IJN on sovereign Chinese territory. This statement could surely be agreed upon by other
Asian and Pacific nations that have suffered the same fate during the Pacific War. What we see
today as a result are Asian and Pacific nations taking greater steps to defend themselves against
6
Ibid.
Bernard D. Cole. The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century. Naval Institute Press:
Annapolis, 2001, p. 9.
7
9
possible external aggression. China has led in this defense. With its array of cruisers,
destroyers, frigates, submarines, and support vessels, the PLAN is also in the research and
development phase of aircraft carrier design.8
It is unlikely that any nation will ever again produce and lose such a powerful navy as
rapidly as Japan, in little less than 51 years. There may never be a conventional arms race such
as what was seen during the interwar period or the Cold War. However, certain areas in the
Pacific such as the Spratly and Parcel Islands in the South China Sea, rich in oil, and claimed by
six countries, remain kegs of dynamite that could become major wars.
In studying naval affairs in the Asian and the Pacific regions today, it is imperative to
understand U.S. naval policy towards the IJN during the interwar period. In a meager 24 years,
Japan and the U.S. went from wary allies to bitter enemies. It is in between these two extremes,
the gradual and then total breakdown of communication between Japan and the U.S. that has to
be better understood by today’s policy makers. Only with this understanding can one truly
comprehend the national policies and disputes of present day Asia and the Pacific. No other
event has shaped the navies of East Asia more in the 20th century than the Pacific War.
Although total war like that seen in the Pacific may never occur again, the U.S. naval policy of
the IJN leading up to the surprise attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor may offer valuable lessons to
avoid future naval conflicts no matter what their size and scope.
Chapter 1: Background
An important moment in history that serves as the starting point for Japan’s expansion
across Asia and the South Pacific was Japan’s surprise attack upon the Russian Pacific fleet at
8
Ronald O’Rourke, (2005 November 18). China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities –
Background and Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress.
10
Port Arthur in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War.9 Japan won the war making it the first time
in history an Asian nation was victorious against a European power. More importantly, Japan
was recognized by the western world as an imperial power and as possessing a powerful navy.
Although Port Arthur was a strategically important port, it was not the main reason Japan
launched a surprise attack on the Russian Pacific fleet. Japan’s intrusion into Korea in the late
19th century had run afoul of Russian interests in the region. Both nations had great commercial
and industrial interests in Manchuria and Korea; this included the lucrative timber industry in the
Yalu River Valley. Japan accounted for three quarters of Korea’s foreign trade. Port Arthur, a
valuable ice-free port in the East was claimed by Russia and coveted by Japan. Both nations
began lengthy negotiations to resolve their differences. However, as tensions escalated, the
Japanese Ambassador, Shinichiro Kurino severed any attempts at conciliation on January 24,
1904. The breakdown of negotiations between Russia and Japan were similar to the events
leading up to the Pacific War.
While Russia was torn with whether or not to go to war with Japan, on the evening of
January 26th, Vice-Admiral Heiharchiro Togo, commander of the Japanese fleet of ten fast
cruisers, headed at full speed north by northwest. Admiral Togo was on his way to starting the
Russo-Japanese War with a surprise attack against the Imperial Russian Pacific Fleet anchored in
Port Arthur located on the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula.
While Togo’s fleet steamed to Port Arthur, the Russians were appallingly unprepared.
None of the guns on their battleships were loaded or manned and Port Arthur’s shore batteries
9
David M. Kennedy. Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945. Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 1999, p. 41.
11
were heavily greased to protect them from the frigid winter, making them completely immobile.
Additionally, torpedo nets were not installed around the ships for precautionary measures.10
The blatant vulnerability of the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur in 1904 had striking
similarities to the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, almost 38 years later. The initial Japanese
moves in the Russo-Japanese War and the attack on Pearl Harbor caught both Russia and the
United States by surprise. In both events, Japan declared war after the attacks. However, what
was even more amazing was that the Japanese fleet was able to completely surprise the Russian
fleet at much closer quarters instead of using airplanes launched from carriers many miles away
as at Pearl Harbor. Togo’s cruisers merely steamed alongside the Russian fleet, fired their
torpedoes and turned away at top speed. The results were clearly evident; the battleships
Retvizan and Tsarevich and several smaller ships suffered direct hits. After the first attack, Togo
ordered a blockade around the remaining Russian ships, putting them out of commission. With
this surprise attack, Japan had gained naval supremacy of the waters in the Far East. Japan was
then able to occupy all of Korea, its troops heading north on the road to Manchuria.11
While the Japanese defeated the Russian Army in every subsequent engagement, the
Russian Navy continued to suffer severe losses. During the first two months of the war, many
Russian battleships and destroyers were sunk. Port Arthur finally fell to Japan’s relentless siege
after a bombardment which lasted 156 days. The loss was considered a great shame to Russian
officials as there was considerable evidence that the Russian commander, General Anatolii
Stoessel, still possessed adequate manpower, food, and supplies to continue the fight. However,
against a superior enemy, the struggle was futile. With Port Arthur in Japanese hands, Russia’s
most humiliating defeat was yet to come.
10
11
W. Bruce Lincoln. Romanovs: Autocrats of All the Russias. Anchor Books, Doubleday: New York 1981, p. 636.
Ibid., pp. 636-638.
12
With great hesitancy, Emperor Nicholas II decided to send Russia’s Baltic fleet to the Far
East; however; many of its ships were obsolete and its crews and officers were poorly trained.
Nevertheless, the Baltic Fleet embarked for Port Arthur. As it continued on its journey, it was
denied the use of the Suez Canal and all British-held ports along the way because of the AngloJapanese Alliance signed in 1902. This added thousands of extra miles and many weeks to the
voyage to Port Arthur.
On May 14, 1905, after many months, the Baltic fleet sailed into the Tsushima Straits to
take on Togo’s fleet. Although the Baltic fleet headed by Admiral Zinovii Rozhdestvenskii had
more ships and heavy guns than the Japanese fleet, the exhaustive voyage and the crews’ lack of
proper training proved to be its downfall. In just a matter of hours, Rozhdestvenskii lost eight
battleships, three cruisers, five minelayers, and four other ships. Togo’s losses were only three
torpedo boats. The loss of the Baltic fleet was the final nail in the coffin for the Russians during
the war.12
Although the war had ended with Japan as the victor, it was a war that Japan could not
have sustained much longer had it continued. Japan’s government and military officials fully
understood that as their resources were being stretched to the verge of collapse, it could not
possibly hold out against the sheer number of Russian forces slowly being amassed in the Far
East.13 Both sides worked out a resolution to end the war in the summer of 1905 when they
accepted President Theodore Roosevelt’s invitation to meet at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
Both sides came to terms regarding their East Asian interests. However, even with Japan’s
victory, Russia still remained a great Pacific power, keeping all its Far Eastern possessions with
a few exceptions. Japan, in its victory gained the Liaotung Peninsula (including Port Arthur), the
12
13
Ibid., p. 643.
Ibid.
13
South Manchurian Railway, and the southern half of Sakhalin Island. Although the Russian
empire recovered, Nicholas was deeply affected by the result of being the first European ruler to
lose a major war to Asians.14
Japan’s victory shocked the world because it demonstrated that an Asian nation could go
toe to toe with a European power and be victorious. Additionally, the Russian Navy was the
only naval power at that time that posed a direct threat to the security of Japan. This victory not
only made Japan a legitimate world power, but also caught the attention of the U.S. which then
looked upon the nation as a potential threat in the Pacific region. It was in that same, year 1905,
that Theodore Roosevelt strengthened the American fleet based in the Philippines as a buffer
against Japan, should conflict between the two nations in the Pacific occur.15
At the same time, the worst fear of IJN officials was of a sustained war against the U.S.
Navy. Both nations had great economic and territorial interests in China as well as the South
Pacific. With both countries possessing the two most powerful navies in the Pacific, Japanese
war planners believed it was only a matter of time before they would go to war with one another.
They understood that the U.S. like Russia had a vast supply of natural resources. The Japanese
realized it could not survive in a sustained war, and hoped for quick and successful battles for the
IJN. The IJN would then set up a defensive perimeter. Once the perimeter was established, only
then could the Japanese pursue peace. Having done this in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan
hoped it could do it again with the U.S.
Ultimately, Japan’s naval victory at Port Arthur served as a wakeup call to American and
Japanese war planners alike. As both nations had economic and territorial interests in Asia and
the Pacific, it was only natural that they would plan for a future naval war with one another. As
14
Ibid., p. 644.
Jon Thares Davidann. Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941. Palgrave Macmillan: New
York 2007, p. 12.
15
14
early as 1907, the Japanese Navy acknowledged the U.S. as its “budgetary enemy.”16 In the
same year, the U.S. Navy began working on its Orange Plan which consisted of the possible
scenario of engaging the IJN to liberate the Philippines from a hostile Japan. Although Japan
and the U.S. became allies during World War I, both Japanese and American war planners
focused on a Pacific naval war with the other “potential” enemy.17
In assessing any great navy of the early 20th century, key technological innovations were
very important factors in its effectiveness. Such an innovation was the use of submarines for
naval reconnaissance and warfare. The use of the submarine by large navies in the early 20th
century marked the beginning of a drastic change of classical Mahanian naval strategy. The
Mahanian strategy created by U.S. Navy officer and strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, required a
navy to meet the opposing navy’s main force in only a small number of major engagements. The
use of the submarine in the early 20th century challenged this strategy. Unconventional strategies
such as attrition were used. In a war of attrition, major naval engagements are avoided. The
naval fleet is harassed and made to take precautionary measures. Merchant shipping is also
attacked to weaken the flow of supplies. Instead of engaging an opposing navy’s main force,
submarines were better suited for attacking an enemy’s naval and merchant shipping. If used
correctly, submarines were devastating to an opponent’s navy by tying it down in order to avoid
major and decisive battles. Instead of going after the most threatening targets, Karl
Lautenschlager stated, “Attrition was a way of wearing the enemy down by attacking weak
points.”18 By attacking an enemy’s shipping, naval warships were tied down defending coasts
and escorting merchant shipping.
16
Globalsecurity.org. (2007) IJN Imperial Japanese Navy (Nihon Kaigun) para. 14.
Ibid.
18
Karl Lautenschlager. (1986-1987 Winter). The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001. International Security,
11, 3 The MIT Press p. 100.
17
15
The IJN soon realized the asymmetrical potential of the submarine and began acquiring
them from other nations. The U.S. answered the call by selling the Japanese five submarines.
While both nations were wary of the other’s interests in the Pacific, Japan continued to acquire
valuable resources such as scrap iron and oil from the early 1900s until the late 1930s from the
U.S. This also included military technology. Although the use of the submarine in a war of
attrition ran counter to Mahan’s great battle strategy for which the IJN studied and followed with
great detail, the submarine proved that alternatives to this strategy could be made successfully.
The IJN would go on to develop its own with superior improvements. By 1941, Japan’s Pacific
fleet of 65 submarines was a far superior force to the U.S. Pacific fleet of 23.19 Although Japan
purchased and seized submarine technology from many nations such as Germany after World
War I, the possession of submarines from the U.S. as early as 1905 gives testament to the
camaraderie that had existed at that time between the IJN and the U.S. Navy.
Japan’s ability to construct one of the largest navies in the world was done so in the face
of considerable odds. Japan is geographically similar in size to the United Kingdom and both
contain little in the way of natural resources. Additionally, the Japanese government began to
build its navy in the late 19th century; it did not yet possess a vast empire to draw upon for
natural resources like that of Great Britain during this time period. Even after Japan acquired
Korea and Manchuria in later years, it was still dependent upon the United States for oil and
steel.
It was during World War I that the motivation for naval development took off. By
participating on the side of the allies, Japan received the international prestige that it so coveted.
It was also the perfect opportunity to seize German territories legitimately and for such seizures
to be recognized by Great Britain and the U.S. While Japan had a perfect opportunity in its
19
Globalsecurity.org. (2007) IJN Imperial Japanese Navy (Nihon Kaigun) para. 9.
16
hands, it did not at first volunteer to take part. The excuse for participation came from Britain’s
request in agreement with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.20
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance which protected Japan in its early conquests was signed
February 1902 between Great Britain and Japan to counter Russian interests in China and Korea.
The Alliance acknowledged both Great Britain’s and Japan’s special interests within the region,
while at the same time, recognizing the independence of China and Korea. As Japan already had
a foothold on the Korean peninsula and sought to control Manchuria, the recognition of China
and Korea’s independence essentially meant that these nations were hands-off to any other
nation except Japan and Great Britain.21 The two partners mutually agreed to remain neutral if
the other were engaged in war with another power regarding their interests in China or Korea.
However, if involved in war with two or more powers, the other partner would provide armed
support. The second part of the alliance was set to deter the creation of other alliances such as
France intervening on behalf of Russia against Japan.22 Due to Russia’s defeat by Japan in 1904
and the changed international conditions, the alliance was renewed in 1905.23 The AngloJapanese Alliance was strategically important for Japan because it recognized the East Asian
nation as an equal to one of the most powerful western nations.
Since the British Navy was already strained in the Atlantic, the objective of the IJN was
to attack and seize German interests in the Pacific. The IJN played a major role in the capture of
the German fortress located at Tsingtao on the Shantung Peninsula (China) and German island
possessions in the Pacific. The victory at Tsingtao gave Japan a necessary foothold in China to
further her economic interests in Manchuria. The seizure of German-held Marianas, Caroline,
20
Mikiso Hane. Japan: A Historical Survey. Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York, 1972, pp. 394-395.
Stephen King-Hall. (1924). The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: Western Civilization and the Far East. London. p. 1.
22
James L. Richardson. Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth Century. Cambridge
University Press: New York, 1994, p. 108; p. 117.
23
Stephen King-Hall. p. 1.
21
17
and Marshall Archipelagoes also gave Japan holdings in the South Pacific which stretched for
more than two thousand miles north of the equator. Japan later was officially given these islands
as a League of Nations Mandate at Versailles for her role defeating the Germans in the Pacific.
With these islands now in her possession, Japan came thousands of miles closer to U.S. interests,
a fact that did not sit well with the U.S. Navy.24
During the war, the presence of the IJN was felt far closer to American interests than
many historians have previously thought. The Pacific theater of WWI was an event which lasted
from October 17, 1914 until April 6, 1917 and is little documented. Facing hostile Pacific
waters, the German cruiser SMS Geier sought refuge at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on October 17,
1914. Shortly after her arrival, two Japanese cruisers, the Hizen and Asama arrived and patrolled
three miles off the harbor awaiting the departure of the ship.25 With the SMS Geier’s repairs
complete, the commander of the ship had two options, “to run the gauntlet of the two Japanese
cruisers lying outside the harbor, or apply to the port authorities to have his ship interned until
the end of the war.”26 With the inevitable destruction of his ship had it left harbor, the
commander of the SMS Geier, decided to have her interned by the U.S. Navy on November 8,
1914. The ship was seized by the U.S. Navy on April 6, 1917 and commissioned as USS Schurz.
27
While no shots were fired during the event, the ability to hold hostage a German cruiser, gives
testament to the IJN in its ability to engage in war with an enemy thousands of miles from home.
However, Japan’s greatest prize during the war was the German territories in China.
With its foothold on China, Japan presented its Twenty-one Demands to the nation on
January 18, 1915. The demands were precise in their size and scope. Envisioning the
24
Edwin O. Reischauer. p. 23.
Michael W. Pocock and MaritimeQuest.com (2006 December 18). SMS Geier/USS Shurz.
26
The New York Times (November 3, 1914) May Run Gauntlet of Japanese Ships: German Cruiser Geier Must
Now Face Two Foes or be Interned at Honolulu.
27
Michael W. Pocock and Maritime Quest.com.
25
18
subordination of China to Japan, they were divided into five groups. China had to acknowledge
Japan’s gain of Shantung; Japan’s citizens were to gain special privileges and concessions within
the region; the major mining and metallurgical companies in the middle-Yangtze valley were to
be under joint Sino-Japanese control; “a commitment of nonalienation to another power of any
harbor, bay, or island on the coast of China;” finally, the fifth group stated Japanese were to gain
railway concessions, Japanese advisors were to be employed in "financial, political, military, and
police matters”, and “a virtual veto power over the use of non Japanese foreign capital for mines
and other works in Fukien Province.”28 The President of the Republic of China, Yuan Shih-k’ai
agreed to all the Demands except those of the fifth group, signing the agreement on May 25th.
Engaged in war, the European powers did not have the ability to intervene. Although not
directly involved in the Great War yet, the U.S. was also preoccupied with the events in Europe.
However, Japan’s Demands deeply disturbed the U.S. but recognized little it could do. While
the Twenty-one Demands challenged America’s Open Door Policy with China, Secretary of
State William Jennings Bryan only pronounced the “nonrecognition doctrine.” Japan continued
with the proceedings of its demands recognizing the American doctrine had “no teeth in it.”29
The Twenty-one Demands demonstrated Japan’s resolve of not only enforcing its ties to Great
Britain (the Anglo-Japanese Alliance) but of its determination to gain access to China militarily,
politically, and economically. Similar demands by Japan are later seen in its advance south and
the occupation of other nations.
Due to the fact Great Britain’s fleet was strained in the North Sea and the Mediterranean,
the IJN took up the role of patrolling the Indian Ocean and Australian waters for German cruiser
activity. Its most important task was the protection of over 500,000 Australian and New Zealand
28
29
Edmund Clubb. 20th Century China. Columbia University Press: New York, 1978, p. 52.
Ibid., pp. 52-53.
19
Army Corps. (ANZAC) forces and 1,000,000 Indian troops serving as a convoy or escort against
German cruisers that were active in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. For its service, Great Britain
in a secret Anglo-Japanese accord of 1915 recognized Japan’s claim to the German islands.
Additionally, in 1917, the British government asked Japan for a destroyer flotilla to operate in
the Mediterranean when the German submarine campaign was at its most destructive. Japan
complied and offered the necessary protection for allied shipping and troop transport. For the
IJN’s service in the Mediterranean, it asked for a pledge of support from not only Great Britain
but from France, Italy, and Russia, to honor Japan’s claims to the Shantung peninsula and the
seized German islands at the upcoming Peace Conference at Versailles.30
Although only playing a limited part in the war, the IJN gained necessary naval
experience. Furthermore, Japan’s capture of the Shantung Peninsula and German island
possessions served as the blueprint for Japan’s expansion onto the Asian mainland and South
Pacific. The territories gained by force were recognized by the allies (grudgingly) which served
as a major victory to Japan’s dream of establishing a Pacific empire. Moreover, the use of
Japanese warships to escort ANZAC troopships and to patrol the Mediterranean gave Japan the
international prestige the nation so desired. While Japan and the U.S. were allies during World
War I, many of Japan’s admirals argued at the time that Japan needed a strong navy in order to
properly protect its empire and to defend itself against the danger of a growing U.S. Navy.31
Japan’s ability to produce a strong navy in such a short period of time is truly amazing.
Although Japan’s involvement in the Treaty of Versailles is described in the next section, a short
summary of the disabilities of the IJN during the interwar period is required. As early as 1920,
30
Merze Tate and Fidele Foy. (1959 December). More Light on the Abrogation for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
Political Science Quarterly, 74, 4 p. 533.
31
J. Charles Schencking. Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy,
1868-1922. Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2005, p. 202.
20
Tokyo possessed the third largest fleet in the world. Japan achieved this feat with an industrial
output far inferior to the U.S., and with an economy approximately one-ninth the size. Unlike
the U.S., Japan did not have a vast reserve of natural resources and was dependent on the import
of vital raw materials. With Japan’s economy and industrial output handicapped by this, the IJN
still had adequate capacity to face the U.S. Navy in the Pacific by 1941.32 Moving away from
the exploitation it had suffered from the U.S. during the 19th century, Japan in this moment
thrived, building the necessary diplomatic and military preparations to establish itself as a great
Pacific Power.
In Japan’s establishment of a great Pacific Power, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 is
a fitting place to start. With the defeat of Germany in World War I, the victors met in Paris for
six months between January and June in 1919. The peacemakers gathered to argue, debate, and
quarrel. In this exchange, new countries and organizations were created.33 “On January 25, the
peace conference formally approved the setting up of a commission on the League of Nations.”34
While the conference went on until 1920, the first six months were the most critical.
During the Great War, Europe tore itself apart in the most devastating war the world had
yet seen. It involved all the great powers such as Japan and many of the smaller ones. All had
different historical experiences. While European leaders wanted to restore a familiar system of
power based on balance and dominated primarily by the continent of Europe, the Americans
looked upon this system as inflexible, terribly flawed, and the major cause of the Great War.35
The Paris Peace Conference received a great deal of international attention. As the war involved
many nations and peoples, all had their own demands. These demands included the indemnities
32
Globalsecurity.org. (2007) IJN Imperial Japanese Navy (Nihon Kaigun) para. 3.
Margaret MacMillan. Paris 1919 Random House Trade Paperbacks: New York, 2003, pp. xxv-xxvi.
34
Ibid., p. 83.
35
Henry Kissinger. p. 19.
33
21
Germany had to pay, growing voices for nationalism by many ethnic groups, the reestablishment
of countries wiped clean by past wars and treaties, and the fate of Russia in the international
arena.36
In the first six months of the conference much was achieved. This included a peace
treaty with Germany known as the Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, the creation of
the International Labour Organization, and the League of Nations. Additionally, peace treaties
with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Ottoman Turkey were nearly complete.37 However, it can
be argued that these achievements would also sow the seeds of a second world war twenty years
later as many unanswered questions still existed. As the conference came to a close in 1920, one
of the enigmas that remained was the intentions of Japan in East Asia and the Pacific.
The conference gave Japan a great opportunity to establish its claim to the German
Pacific territories it had seized during World War I. What seemed a legitimate claim worried
many nations with interests in the South Pacific, particularly the U.S. The island territories such
as Micronesia were strategically significant to those that held them since they lay directly in the
way of U.S. strategy in the region. Japan’s claim to these territories denied the U.S. important
ports, refueling stations, and military outposts. Most importantly, it brought Japan much closer
to Hawaii and the United States. On January 30, 1919, President Wilson expressed his concern
over Japan’s seizure of German territories to a conference member when he said “These islands
lie…athwart the path from Hawaii to the Philippines and …could be fortified and be made naval
bases by Japan.”38
Wilson’s words rang with clarity for the U.S. Navy during the Pacific War.
36
Margaret MacMillan. p. xxvii.
Ibid., p. 485.
38
Henry P. Frei. Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth Century to World War II.
University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu 1991, p. 100.
37
22
On December 1920, Article 22 was issued by conference members, which gave Japan possession
of all former German Pacific island possessions north of the Equator.
With this, Japan gained an important victory in its advance southward which had then
become recognized by the great powers. Although Chinese officials hastily expressed their
outrage of Japan’s new territories since it was right in their backyard and conflicted with their
sovereign territory, U.S. officials only expressed mild reluctance.39 This was because the deal
had already officially been agreed upon by Great Britain and Japan in an Anglo-Japanese accord
of 1915 for the IJN’s assistance in World War I. This accord between Great Britain and Japan
recognized Great Britain’s claim of German island territories to the south of the equator and
Japan’s claim to German island territories to the north of the equator.40 The accord between two
out of three of the most powerful nations at the time was something the U.S. had to accept
grudgingly. Additionally, if the U.S. protested Japan’s claim to these Pacific islands, the seizure
of the Philippines and Guam in 1898 by the U.S. at the end of the Spanish-American War might
also come into question.41 Japan had come thousands of miles closer to the U.S. with its new
island territories. However, the U.S. had done the same to Japan twenty years earlier.
While Japan was the most powerful nation in East Asia and possessed the third largest
navy at the time, Japan’s role at the Peace Conference was limited. Though not playing an active
role, “…it had certain goals in Paris, but not much interest in anything else.”42 While Japan for
the most part got what it wanted at Versailles, it did fail in its proposal of a racial equality clause.
39
Merze Tate and Fidele Foy. p. 544.
Ibid., p. 533.
41
Margaret MacMillan. pp. 313-314.
42
Ibid., p. 307.
40
23
The effort “was blocked by the Western powers” who did not want to allow such rights to be
granted to the peoples within their territories.
43
While the navy found it necessary to expand to protect the interests and borders of the
United States, the U.S. government immediately after World War I looked to cut down military
expenditures. The 1920s would mark a time when the U.S. Navy was doing all it could to stay
afloat due to a hostile government looking to slash its military expenditure. This hostility began
with Warren G. Harding’s presidential inauguration in March 1921, also known as the starting
point of the Republican New Era. The era would continue with the Coolidge and Hoover
administrations. The Republicans were in favor of international arms control which chiefly
meant naval arms limitations.44
While the Paris Peace Conference primarily involved European nations, the troubles of
Eastern Asia during this period were addressed in Washington. In mid-July 1921, President
Harding invited nine nations to an arms limitation conference that also dealt with Far Eastern
problems. The conference, known as the International Conference on Naval Limitation, was also
known as the Washington Conference. Harding, as well as other government officials, felt that
the Paris Peace Conference lacked proper arms limitation measures.45 The nations invited were
Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, China, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal.46
Before the Conference began, a study was conducted to assess the U.S. Navy’s guidelines
and procedures. The General Board was given the task. With instruction to the General Board,
Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who was then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, approved of a study to
43
Mikiso Hane. Modern Japan: A Historical Survey. Westview Press: Oxford, 2001, p. 216.
William M. McBride. Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945. The Johns Hopkins
University Press: Baltimore, 2000, p. 140.
45
William Braisted. On the General Board of the Navy, Admiral Hilary Jones, and Naval Arms Limitation, 19211931. The Dwight D. Eisenhower Lectures in War and Peace a biennial series. No. 4 Kansas State University:
Manhattan, KS 1991, p. 2.
46
Mikiso Hane. p. 403.
44
24
be conducted to evaluate American Naval Policy on July 27, 1921 in light of the upcoming
conference.47 The General Board was originally created by Secretary of the Navy John Davis
Long in 1900 as an advising tool to the questions of Secretary of the Navy, the key source of
naval arms limitations for the Navy Department; it consisted of senior naval officers.48 During
the Wilson administration, the General Board’s work was often disregarded. After World War I,
the agency was revitalized by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels and Secretary of War
Newton D. Baker. However, when the Secretary of the Navy sought the advice of the Board
regarding naval arms limitation, the information was at times followed and sometimes ignored
all together.49 This later proved to be extremely frustrating to General Board members. As a
result, too little of their information would be taken seriously concerning the IJN in upcoming
years.
In his orders to the General Board, Roosevelt essentially sought a naval evaluation of the
powers that were attending the conference. In addition, the study was also used to evaluate the
minimum size navy that was required to carry out the exterior policies of the U.S. The five
powers that were assessed in this study were Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and
Italy. He gave five standards on American diplomatic practice to the General Board as reference
while conducting the study:
1.
2.
3.
4.
The sovereign power of the U.S. will not be constrained.
The Monroe Doctrine will continue to be maintained by the U.S.
The U.S. will not agree to the limitation of its Navy in any way should it
jeopardize its territory or citizens.
An adequate force must be maintained by the U.S. at all times to assure
the safety of lanes of communication for its commerce.
47
Gerald E. Wheeler. (1957 Summer). The United States Navy and the Japanese “Enemy”: 1919-1931. Military
Affairs, 21, 2 p. 62.
48
William Braisted. p. 2.
49
William Braisted. p. 2.
25
5.
The U.S. must preserve its policies and the rights of its citizens in any
country where they may be put in danger.50
These standards in essence required the building and maintenance of a large fleet capable of
protecting the territorial integrity, policies, and the rights of U.S. citizens abroad. Roosevelt’s
five standards of maintaining a large fleet contrasted with the goal of the Washington
Conference, the limitation of arms. While the General Board advocated a large navy and gave
repeated warning about the IJN, its findings were largely disregarded by the U.S. government.
In early August 1921, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes sought a yardstick to
officially monitor naval arms limitation.51 The yardstick was the term given to originally
measure cruiser equivalencies among the navies of other nations. Factors included “tonnage,
age, and gunpowder.” A variation of this process would later be used in the First London Naval
Conference of 1930.52 The response of the General Board came in numerous reports regarding
the political and naval strengths of Japan. Although these findings reported on September 21,
1921 represented the views of the five main naval powers that attended the Washington
Conference, special emphasis was placed on Japan and the use of its navy.
In examining the recent trends of Japanese foreign policy, the General Board concluded
that Japan sought to establish a vast empire with the eventual aim to dominate the Far East
commercially and politically. Japan would seek this domination through the conquest and
occupation of new territories, involving heavy naval activity in the Yellow Sea, China Sea, Japan
Sea, and the West and South-West Pacific. The Board also claimed that such an expansion
would be maintained through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the mutual understanding that would
50
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 62.
William Braisted. p. 2.
52
John Trost Kuehn. (2007). The Influence of Naval Arms Limitation on U.S. Naval Innovation During the Interwar
Period, 1921-1937. An Abstract of a Dissertation, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy, Department of History College of Arts and Sciences Kansas State University, Manhattan,
Kansas. p. 115.
51
26
be generated as a result between the Western world and Japan, and finally through propaganda
with its domestic newspapers as well as the publication of Japanese newspapers overseas.53
The Board recognized that although Japan lacked natural resources it had a productive economy.
Because of this, it estimated what nations and territories would best serve Japan economically.
The IJN would serve as Japan’s major tool in its territorial campaigns.54
The General Board stated that the Anglo-Japanese alliance served as a buffer protecting
the interests of Japan in East Asia and the Pacific. It was believed that Great Britain would turn
a blind eye to Japan acquiring new territories because of the existing treaty between the two
nations. Evidence of this was seen in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Japan’s annexation of
Korea in 1910, and Japan’s capture of the German occupied Shantung peninsula and Pacific
island territories during World War I with no protest from Great Britain.
To assess Japanese foreign policy and propaganda, the General Board studied its
institutional structure, Japan’s monarchistic government and found that the government was
militaristic with a long feudal history. Overall, it determined that the Japanese government was
aggressive and expansionist in nature. The General Board’s pessimistic approach concluded in
the study that if a future conflict was to occur, it would take place in the Far East and that the
U.S. was not capable at the time of equal naval power with Japan. The General Board
determined that the U.S. should have at least a 2 to 1 ratio in sea power, similar to that of Great
Britain’s former ratio with Japan.55 If the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 remained in effect at
the signing of the Washington Treaty, the Board proposed building a U.S. Navy that would be
equal to the navies of Britain and Japan combined. Not yet realizing the great importance of
aircraft carriers, the Board still looked upon battleships and battle cruisers as the most significant
53
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 62.
Stephen King-Hall. p. 1.
55
Gerald E. Wheeler. pp. 62-63.
54
27
aspects of naval power and suggested that the three powers build these ships on a keel-laid
foundation. This would be done until the American and British battle fleets equaled 1,000,000
tons each and that Japanese battle fleet was 600,000 tons.56 Ever worried of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, the General Board stated
Today no power in the Atlantic save our own balances British sea power. No
power in the Pacific save our own checks Japanese sea power. We are reasonably
certain that Japan will join Great Britain in a war against us Great Britain might
undertake.57
Although allies during World War I, conflict between the two powers (Great Britain and the
U.S.) was still a possibility, although much more remote than previously thought. This was seen
with unease by the U.S. military officials should war with Japan occur.
In the General Board’s conclusions concerning the IJN, the Philippines were of enormous
concern in American Pacific policy. American naval officials realized that if the Japanese were
to attack the Philippines, American naval advance would be greatly endangered due to Japan’s
control of these islands.58 The islands of the Philippines served as necessary bases and refueling
stations for the U.S. military to defend American interests throughout the region. Many key
military officials such as MacArthur believed the Philippines was strategically the best location
for a direct route to Japan if war between the U.S. and Japan occurred; other officials claimed it
was Formosa. With regards to politics, while most of the American public was unaware of the
spread of communism in the Philippines, many government and military officials believed that if
the Philippines fell to Japan, it would most likely “be taken over by Communist leadership” after
the Japanese were defeated, something the U.S. was not going to let stand.59
56
William Braisted. p. 3.
Ibid.
58
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 67.
59
Russell F. Weigley. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. Indiana
University Press: Indianapolis, 1973, p. 291.
57
28
Established in the 1920s, the pro-Soviet Communist Party (PKP) was the major
communist group of the Philippines in the interwar period. Supported by both Soviet and
American communist organizations, the PKP’s Huks, a peasant anti-Japanese guerilla force, later
used guerrilla tactics against the Japanese occupiers. These attacks weakened the Japanese
occupiers before the American forces led by General MacArthur returned. 60
Upon the end of World War I, the Navy Department advocated that Japan relinquish its
control of the Pacific islands it seized from Germany and that they be internationalized.
However, the Navy Department also maintained that the U.S. should still be in possession of
Guam and the Philippines. Additionally, although the Navy Department was quick to denounce
Japan and its possession of German colonies which included the Mariana Islands, it claimed that
the U.S. should be the only power to hold these islands since Japan could easily build submarine
bases on them that would be capable of hitting U.S. naval ships based in Guam and any other
fleet that would come to the relief of the Philippines should it be attacked by the Japanese.
As much as the U.S. wanted Japan to relinquish its possession of the Mariana Islands, the
outcome of the Paris Peace Conference led to its continued holding by the Japanese. In response,
the Navy Department proposed that the U.S. instead attempt to counterbalance Japanese gains.
Admiral Albert Gleaves, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, thought that due to France’s
war debt to the U.S. for World War I, France should cede islands located below the Equator to
the U.S. for payment, in order for American ships to have better access from Panama, to Samoa,
then onto the Philippines. Possible islands included the Marquesas, Tuamotu Islands, and
Tahiti.61 Although Admiral Gleaves’ plan may have served as a possible naval solution, nothing
60
61
Librato S. Ladia. GlobalSecurity.org (1988). A Communist Philippines If…. para. 1-2.
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 67.
29
transpired. When the Washington Naval Conference assembled on November 1921, the
Japanese were already dug into their Pacific holdings and were determined to stay.
Chapter 2: Treaties
From the end of World War I to November 12, 1921, the beginning of the Washington
Naval Conference on the Limitation of Armaments marked much frustration between Japan and
the U.S. After the defeat of Germany, a void was created in the Pacific which Japan was eager to
fill. Germany lost her Pacific holdings to Japan, Great Britain sought the protection of her
Pacific territories already in possession which included Borneo, Fiji, New Guinea, and New
Zealand, and France and Italy had little naval influence in the Far East. The only power Japan
contended with at that time was the U.S. Because the U.S. already had possession of Guam, the
Philippines, and Hawaii, Japan was eager to have a piece of the pie. The conference was chiefly
the idea of Secretary of State Hughes to set in place naval arms reductions, regain political
control of an uncooperative Congress, and to block the restoration of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance.62 At the time, Japanese naval presence was felt far closer to U.S. territories than in
previous years. American Naval planners were anxious due to the presence of Japanese ships in
the sea route between Hawaii and the Philippines. In the western states, it was also the time of
anti-Japanese land (property) legislation and the rise of racial prejudice against Asians. With
American citizens feeling threatened with the increased presence of Japanese immigrants in
western states in the early 20th century, opposition for their success as merchants and farmers
was rampant. In 1913, California became the first state to pass a law which prohibited aliens
from gaining citizenship or purchasing and owning agricultural land. Aimed at Japanese
62
William M. McBride. p. 140.
30
immigrants, the law was extremely discriminating and the first such law Japanese immigrants in
America faced. Idaho also passed a similar law in 1923.63
As both nations were building up their navies, it was not just the threat of approaching
each other’s sea routes and territories, but of open racial hostility. As a result, the State
Department was provoked to conduct a considerable amount of study to determine the likelihood
of conflict between the two nations. The Director of the War Trade Board Intelligence Office
reported that the topic of war with the U.S. was a common subject in Japan discussed among all
social classes. The common reasons were racial hatred of “Oriental peoples” and the limiting of
Japan’s territorial attribution by the U.S. The argumentative stance of the U.S. concerning
Japan’s seizure of German Pacific territories struck a nerve with many Japanese citizens and
government officials alike.64
Besides Japanese public opinion, the State Department also investigated world-wide
purchases by Japan of arms, nitrates, and war materials. The bulk of the information was
gathered by American consuls around the world. Both the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary
of State were deeply concerned with the Japanese-American relations drift that was occurring,
especially with rumors of German naval officers lending critical aid to Japan’s submarine
program and British naval aviators assisting in aircraft carrier procedures.65 The use of German
and British officers in Japan’s Navy alarmed many American officials. It gave further credence
to naval and government officials that the IJN was preparing to acquire new Pacific territories
not through treaties but through the use of force.
63
Roger Daniels, Sandra C. Taylor, and Harry H.L. Kitano (ed.) Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress.
University of Washington Press: Seattle 1991, p. 103.
64
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 68.
65
Ibid.
31
U.S. naval officials saw the Washington Conference as a perfect way to limit the seapower of Japan. While the conference took place, the gathering of evidence by the General
Board on U.S. Naval policy continued. However, no official policy was ever formally recorded
on paper at that point in time, though the issue of naval appropriation was brought up in previous
congressional hearings.67 On March 29, 1922, the Board reported
…that the United States should “build and maintain an efficient well-balanced
fleet in all classes of fighting ships in accordance with the capital ship ratio; to
preserve these ratios by building replacement ships and by disposing of old ships
in accordance with continuing programs.”68
The General Board in its study could assess nothing new that was previously on record at
that point. War exercises conducted by the Naval War College and advice from Japanese
specialists were the primary bulk of its information.
The Washington Conference produced significant results. It was the first time ceilings in
naval armaments were set on such a large scale. For the first time in history, the U.S. was
recognized as having a navy equal to that of Great Britain. Japan was permitted to build a navy
three-fifth the size of the U.S. The U.S. was recognized as being the prevailing power in the
Pacific and Great Britain’s responsibility in the Pacific became secondary.69 Initially seen as a
success by Great Britain and the U.S., the results of the Washington Conference created a
backlash in Japan. Historian Jon Thares Davidann states,
In the end the Japanese probably gave up more than they wanted. The Americans
convinced the Japanese to give back Shantung peninsula to China, with the
reservation of railroad leases. And Japan had to live with a smaller naval ship
tonnage ratio than either the British or Americans.70
67
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 63.
Ibid.
69
Henry Kissinger. p. 373.
70
Jon Thares Davidann. p. 61.
68
32
The Japanese public had a negative perception of the treaty even though Japan had naval
supremacy in East Asia. Without equal naval tonnage, the Japanese believed they had “once
again been placed in inferior status vis-à-vis the Western powers.”71 The limitations set forth in
the Washington Naval Conference and subsequent treaty were easy to approve of with Japanese
criticism put aside but impossible to enforce in later years.
When the Washington Treaty was finalized, the results were not as desirable as the
General Board had expected. The General Board’s hopes of a 2 to 1 ratio in sea power were
dashed when the treaty implemented a 5 to 3 ratio in aircraft carriers and battleships but only
between the U.S. and Japan.72 The five participating powers were also all limited to capital ships
of 35,000 tons with 16” guns, aircraft carriers of 27,000 tons with 8” guns, and cruisers of 10,000
tons with 8”guns.73 Although the U.S. was vastly superior in destroyers and submarines, Japan’s
post-war cruisers were significantly stronger than the cruisers of the U.S.74 This was due to the
superior speed and fire power of these ships.
Though the Washington Five-Power Treaty of 1922 set limits on total tonnage of capital
ships for Japan, 315,000 tons compared to the U.S. (525,000 tons), Japan in several ways won a
great victory since the Japanese were allowed to build up to its limitations while the U.S. had to
reduce its overall size.75 Although Japan took a small loss, having to scrap 48,000 tons’ worth of
battleship, it was not as severe as that suffered by the U.S.76 As described in Article III of the
treaty, the capital ship building programs of the contracting powers were abandoned and the
building of new capital ships was off limits, unless a contracting power sought replacement
71
Ibid.
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 63.
73
William Braisted. p. 3.
74
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 63.
75
Conference on the Limitation of Armament Washington November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922. Article III and
IV.
76
Marston, Daniel (ed.). The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima. Osprey Publishing:
Westminster 2005, p. 31.
72
33
tonnage to maintain treaty navies.77 The U.S. scrapped 15 battleships and cruisers under
construction at the time in which it had invested $300 million. These ships would have been
potential threats to Japan in later years.78 This decision had dire consequences for the U.S. since
it later struggled to maintain an adequate Pacific fleet at the outbreak of war.
Additionally, the non-fortification clause (Article XIX) of the Washington Treaty, which
was agreed upon by all powers, stated that all island fortifications in the Pacific had to remain in
status quo as of February 22, 1922.79 Although the island fortifications of Great Britain and the
U.S. still remained threats to any Pacific expansion by Japan, these powers could no longer
strengthen them as of early 1922. These island fortifications would later be easy targets for the
Japanese military in its advance southward. The powers that signed this treaty underestimated
Japan’s territorial ambitions, especially in light of the German occupied territories it had seized
in China and the Pacific during WWI. Although Article XIX would prove to have grim results
for both Great Britain and the U.S. in the near future, it was initially proposed by U.S. diplomats
in order for Japan to agree to the 5-5-3 ratio.80 The Japanese delegation originally sought a 1010-7 ratio in total tonnage but finally accepted U.S. proposals for a 10-10-6 with the status quo
on island fortifications. Not included in this naval agreement was the limitation of auxiliary
crafts or submarines.81 The battleship mentality of the early 1920s was still apparent as the
potential use of the submarine was overlooked.
The conference results deeply concerned the General Board and American naval officials.
The General Board believed that the amount of tonnage allocated to the U.S. Navy as set forth in
77
Conference on the Limitation of Armament Washington November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922. Article III and
IV.
78
Russell F. Weigley. p. 244.
79
Edward S. Miller. War Plan ORANGE. Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 1991, p. 75.
80
William Braisted. p. 3.
81
Mikiso Hane. p. 404.
34
the Washington Treaty was not enough in the defense of American Far East policies.82 Naval
parity with Great Britain did not mean the same when it came to the capabilities of superior
seapower. The navy’s distinguished expert on naval arms limitation, Rear Admiral Hilary P.
Jones, affirmed that although the U.S. was permitted to have equal ship tonnage to Great Britain,
Great Britain would still be superior with its global organization of naval bases and merchant
marine. Great Britain had five times the amount of large ships capable of being transformed into
cruisers than the U.S.83 Concerning Japan, the U.S. Navy was heavily utilized in both the
Atlantic and Pacific. This meant that the IJN’s 315,000 tons worth of naval ships operating in
the Pacific were close to parity to the total tonnage of naval ships in the U.S. Pacific Fleet at the
time.
While the U.S. had interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific, Japan’s interests only lay in
the Pacific. While it seemed unfair the U.S. allocated that Japan have a smaller navy than its
own, American policy makers did not want to see one navy have complete domination of an
ocean. Through most of the three previous centuries, it was the Royal Navy who controlled the
three oceans a fact that did not sit well with both the U.S. and Japan. The tonnage allocated
assured that each navy “would dominate its own geographic sphere.” While Japan had naval
predominance in the Western Pacific, its inferior tonnage kept it in check due to the “distance
separating the western Pacific from the home bases of the American and British fleets and by the
inability of the Americans and British to strengthen their Pacific ones.”84
It was the first time naval limitations were set on such a scale. However, the failure to
enforce them would prove to be their downfall. Article I of the treaty which set such naval
limitations only stated that if a contracting party violated these terms, all contracting parties
82
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 63.
William Braisted. p. 2.
84
Russell F. Weigley, p. 245.
83
35
would take part in a joint conference, “…to which the whole subject will be referred for
consideration and adjustment.”85 By only calling conferences to debate violations, the
Washington Treaty was doomed to failure.
While naval limitations were set in place by the Washington Treaty, the General Board
however ruled that the U.S. would have the policy of building and maintaining a navy “second to
none.”86 On March 29, 1922, in agreement with the capital ship ratio in the Washington Treaty,
the navy set forth a policy of building and maintaining a capable navy. Old ships were to be
scrapped and new replacement ships were to be built as needed.
Between 1922 and 1927, the Navy Department attempted to carry out the policy of
building and maintaining a navy “second to none” but failed, expending substantial amounts of
energy in the process.87 As the U.S. Navy sought larger budgets from Congress to maintain a
superior navy, its demands often fell upon deaf ears. After the Great War, the American
government sought to return to isolation, far and away from danger, much to the dismay of its
navy. The downsizing of all military branches was a result. During this downsizing, the U.S.
Navy fought to survive as most government officials refused to allocate monies to build new and
expensive warships.
In response to the tensions that had existed between Japan and America regarding the
Pacific during this period, the U.S. Navy began to restructure with its heaviest units focused in
the Pacific instead of the Atlantic. A more capable shore establishment was required to handle
the much larger Pacific Fleet and the navy, as a result, sought additional funds to expand the
85
Treaty Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan, Signed at Washington
December 13, 1921. Article I.
86
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 63.
87
Ibid.
36
Pearl Harbor naval base. However, when the Washington Conference finished in April 1922, the
navy, instead of enlarging to prepare for possible naval warfare, fought to stay afloat.
From the navy’s perception, out of all the treaties that were signed during the Washington
Conference, the most significant was the Five-Power Naval Treaty. Articles IV and XIX were
the most crucial. The 5-5-3-1.67-1.67 capital ship ratios among the U.S., Great Britain, Japan,
France, and Italy were set up in Article IV. Article XIX asserted that all western Pacific naval
bases (west of Hawaii) would remain in status quo as of 1922. This was a heavy blow for the
U.S. as it already had bases established and or under construction in the Aleutians, Guam, and
the Philippines. Out of all the stipulations, the navy believed Article XIX was unnecessary and
that it significantly weakened the navy’s capabilities of protecting American Pacific interests.
These bases under construction would remain as such, unfinished, and unprepared for any naval
attack by the Japanese until the mid-1930s when the Washington Treaty framework was
abandoned.
Moreover, since the creation of the Five-Power Treaty was brought about with the advice
of the Navy Department and by those who participated in the conference, such “active” officials
subsequently could not openly criticize it without fear of being reprimanded. Criticism of the
treaty came from retired officers. Additionally, unofficial naval agencies such as the Army and
Navy Journal, the Naval Institute, and the Naval League also gave criticism.88 A major point of
criticism came from retired naval officer, Captain Dudley W. Knox in his Eclipse of American
Sea Power where he closed with:
Of even greater importance than the loss to us in tonnage strength is the sacrifice
we have made respecting Western Pacific bases,….The difficulties of the long
journey for our fleet to the Orient and of maintaining a large naval force there
operating actively, under the conditions imposed by the treaty, will effectively
reduce our initial strength at home to a decided inferiority in the Western
88
Ibid., p. 69.
37
Pacific…. Both Great Britain and Japan are assured of ample base facilities in the
Orient while we are denied them, and in consequence we no longer possess the
power to defend the Philippines or to support any other American Far Eastern
Policy.89
Throughout the 1920s and 30s, with American bases held to 1922 standards, naval planners of
the Washington Treaty had no confidence that the Philippine Island garrisons could hold out
during a Japanese invasion long enough for the American fleet to arrive with reinforcements.90
The U.S. Naval Institute’s analysis, like Captain Knox’s comments, also attacked the
Five-Power Treaty and Article XIX. The argument was the same, Japan gained in the defense of
its empire at the expense of America. Additionally, Captain (later Rear Admiral) Frank
Schofield remarked:
Had I been a [Japanese] naval strategist, I would have done all I could do to keep
America from fortifying further her naval positions in the Philippines and Guam,
and of operating her naval forces there. I would have tried to consolidate and
strengthen Japan’s hold in the Far East through making it difficult for America to
interfere. I would have seen that America’s weakness in the Far East was Japan’s
strength….91
Schofield’s remarks clarified what many critics believed to be the major shortcomings of the
Washington Conference from an American Navy supporter’s point of view.
In addition, to cause further mistrust of Japan, Hector Bywater’s essay “Japan: A Sequel
to the Washington Conference” from the Atlantic Monthly originally published in May 1923 was
republished by the U.S. Naval Institute. The essay’s reprinting was brought about by the VicePresident of the Navy League. In the article, Bywater claimed Japan hurried to complete its
fortifications on Bonin Island right before the Washington Conference was completed. Such a
move was made deliberately to improve upon Japan’s status quo position on naval fortifications.
The reprinting of the essay had a substantial impact upon the navy, particularly given the fact
89
Ibid., p. 70.
Russell F. Weigley. p. 246.
91
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 70.
90
38
that only active duty and retired armed forces officers had membership, according to Institute
policy.92 Such news concerning Japanese Pacific fortifications greatly alarmed naval officials
and solidified their beliefs that Japan would one day come to blows with the U.S. over both
nation’s interests in the South Pacific.
The Naval War College also looked upon the Five-Power Treaty with deep suspicion.
This criticism can be reflected in the Class of 1923’s paper topic, “Policy – In Its Relation to
War: With Special Reference to U.S. Policy in the Pacific.” The majority of the theses had
pessimistic points of view concerning Article XIX on Pacific naval fortifications. According to
one graduate:
By this the possibility to exert the naval strength [of the United States] promptly
and effectively in the Western Pacific was given up, in fact almost
insurmountable difficulties were placed in the way of conducting a naval
campaign in the Western Pacific.93
Others believed that Japan made great gains with the signing of the Five-Power Treaty,
and therefore it was necessary for the U.S. to hold onto the Philippines in an attempt to halt
Japan’s Western Pacific advance.94 The General Board believed that if the U.S. withdrew from
the region, the “Open Door would slam shut” and Japan would seize the Philippines.95
Although not the traditional form of colonialism brought by European powers to Asia,
America’s Open Door policy was created to exploit China through U.S. private business. While
preserving China’s independence, the U.S. sought to open the nation through “American
business enterprise.”96 America’s policy towards China was seen as the anchor of American
foreign policy in East Asia and the Pacific. If it failed, Japan was waiting to step in. The U.S.
92
Ibid.
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
95
Edward S. Miller. p. 26.
96
Edwin O. Reischauer. p. 22.
93
39
had a small economic foothold in China. The Philippine bases on the other hand represented the
only sizeable American military force in the Pacific. Left at status quo, the American military
force could not defend itself against an advancing Japanese enemy.97. Economic interests of the
U.S. in the Philippines during the interwar period were minimal at best. While private American
corporations were interested in public utilities, sugar, milling, and mining on the Philippines, the
Great Depression severely limited any such activity. 98
The General Board and thus the navy by the spring of 1923 had the general view that
Japan’s naval policy was principally aggressive in the Far East.99 Ironically, at the same time,
the U.S. government was on the brink of approving measures which would limit the American
Navy’s Far East operations.100 Although the administration agreed that America would continue
to hold the Philippines to counter Japanese expansion, the majority of the naval service thought
of the Five-Power Treaty with great disdain. The Due to the fact the U.S. Navy faced strict
regulations regarding its size and role in the Pacific, naval officials believed the only solution to
this was to adequately maintain the ships they had to full strength as allowed by treaty measures.
The navy believed that in order to do this, it would have to gain the support of the American
public in its effort to persuade Congress. In this endeavor, the navy looked to news sources that
were easily available to all U.S. citizens. Such news sources included the Charleston News and
Courier which wrote:
The American people are not jingoes, but they know instinctively that someday
there will be war between this country and Japan unless the Japanese understand
that their prospects of success would be slender. An efficient Navy is therefore
our best guaranty of peace with Japan and our only guarantee of peace.
97
Gerald E. Wheeler. P. 70.
Frank A. Ninkovich. The United States and Imperialism. Wiley-Blackwell: New York, 2001, pp. 66-67.
99
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 70.
100
Ibid.
98
40
The navy used several propaganda tools in its information campaign to the American
public and Congress. However, they found that the majority of the press held unfavorable
positions towards the navy. Although support came from a number of major papers such as the
San Francisco Chronicle, the Herald Tribune was the most vital. In the early 1920s, an author
writing under the pseudonym of “Quarterdeck” wrote a service affairs column for the paper. The
author was one of the most passionate supporters of the navy, Rear Admiral (Retired) William F.
Fullam. However, the least of the navy’s troubles was an insensitive press. A hostile Congress
was the navy’s biggest problem. Congressional hostility toward the navy throughout the 1920s
was apparent. This was due to the fact that the Washington Conference was supported by
Congress and the majority of the public. Congressional representatives detested the navy’s
opposition to the results of the Washington Conference, which they felt were appropriate.
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes’ biographer evaluated the nation’s pre-Conference
attitude, “the revolt against navalism was running stronger here than in any of the major powers.
Many newspapers took up the cause, and the big-navy men encountered a veritable cyclone of
opposition in Congress.”101 Congress and a sizeable portion of the public looked upon the navy
as an organization of warmongers during a time when the desire for a maintainable peace and
status quo was most sought.
During the 1920s, naval secretaries, their assistants, and the naval bureau chiefs attended
numerous hearings, making their requests to the House and Senate Subcommittees of the
Appropriations Committees or before the Naval Affairs Committees to seek larger budgets in
order to keep the navy afloat. However, they met the same legislators year after year.102
Historian and naval expert George W. Baer stated “The political arm of government seemed
101
102
Ibid., p. 71.
Ibid.
41
willfully ignorant of the military dimensions of the country’s Asian commitments.”103 Although
the navy’s position was better than the army’s, naval officials were not satisfied. At these
hearings, the secretaries would routinely report the condition of the navy at the time and then
take questions. The navy frequently used comparative data to demonstrate its setbacks with
Japan and Great Britain. With aircraft carriers, the U.S. was compared with Great Britain; with
cruisers, both Japan and Great Britain; and in submarines, it was Japan. The navy consistently
stated that Japan’s expansionist policy and its Formosa naval bases would remain a threat to the
Philippines. This comparative method was often objected to by Congressional chairmen who
believed the navy only used subjective information to make its case. For example, during one
such hearing, a naval speaker was interrupted by Representative Thomas S. Butler, who stated
You appreciate that what we say in this public hearing will be known rather
widely outside and if we ourselves should read about the Japanese or the English
comparing their fleets with ours talking about getting ready for battle in a couple
of years, we would become nervous; therefore, I think we ought to lay this talk
aside….104
Representative Butler’s statement reflected the attitudes of all congressional representatives at
the time. While the navy used comparative data to make its case, it none the less gave clear
warning of the militarization of Japan to Congressional representatives who refused to accept it.
Regardless of an unsupportive Congress, the U.S. Navy pressed on with its preparation of
a naval engagement with the Japanese. Recognizing the IJN as a future enemy, the U.S. Navy
conducted “fleet problems” in the Caribbean and Pacific. In the Caribbean, islands in this
location were substituted for would be Pacific ones. Other problems were carried out in these
locations such as the defense of the Panama Canal. The American navy carried out twenty-one
of these exercises between 1923 and 1940. Additionally, during the 1920s, the U.S. Navy began
103
George W. Baer. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford University Press:
Stanford ,1994, p. 105.
104
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 72.
42
to look upon communication intelligence (code breaking) as a feasible option to have better
understanding of the activities of the IJN.
In 1924, a radio intelligence organization was set up by the Americans, marking it as an
important year for communication intelligence. The organization was a part of the Navy
Department’s Code and Signal Section. It gathered and examined Japanese naval radio
communications. This was the start of an elaborate program of spying on the Japanese. The
Japanese also used their own communication intelligence on the Americans and later had great
success with military and naval observations by intelligence officers around the Pacific,
including Pearl Harbor.
The U.S. Navy’s development of communication intelligence throughout the 1920s and
30s would later prove extensive. During the interwar period, IJN fleet exercises were frequently
spied upon by American intercept operators. The information acquired was in the form of
Japanese naval message traffic. In this traffic, cryptanalysts interpreted the vast amount of signal
patterns to make sense of Japanese naval tactics. American cryptanalysts were so successful that
by September 1940 they were able to break Japan’s main naval operational code, JN-25. By the
time America entered World War II, the U.S. Navy had a concrete foundation to build on.105
Throughout this period, the statistical data gathered for the Naval Department came from
the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Congressional hearings in the winter of 1924 presented indepth naval intelligence, which exhibited the dangers of both Japan and Great Britain to the U.S.
The naval speakers began with a bombardment of data in the form of oral testaments and printed
tables for the congressmen. At this time, the navy worried about the vetoing of several naval
construction bills. Congressional authorization was necessary for the modernization and
105
Edward J. Drea. (1991, April) Reading Each Other’s Mail: Japanese Communication Intelligence, 1920-1941.
The Journal of Military History, 55, 2 pp.187-188.
43
modification of its fleet and guns. Naval speakers claimed that the U.S. Navy had to be modified
and made larger. One of the reasons the navy had to be modified as claimed by naval speakers
was that British cruisers were shown to be superior to American cruisers. Additionally, they also
claimed Japan’s foreign policy pursued the “domination of the East.” Although the navy sought
favorable results from Congress, the hearings were met with average interest by congressmen
due partly to discordant protests from the Japanese press concerning “the passage of the 1924
Immigration Act with its exclusion clause.”106 Additionally, it would not have set well with the
government of Japan had it known that the Americans were using information obtained by code
breaking.
In spite of code breaking, the Japanese were also finding great success. They were
confident in the size of their ships in comparison to those of the U.S. Navy. Although Japan was
bound to treaty standards, Japanese naval planners understood that whatever the Americans built
had to be capable of passing through the Panama Canal. Even after the dissolution of the
Washington Treaty in later years, the largest ships the Americans could produce were the
45,000-ton Iowa class ships with nine 16-inch guns. Their size already cut it close. The 108-foot
beam of the vessels barely squeezed through the 110-foot wide locks of the canal. The decision
of not building larger battleships to permanently operate from the Pacific or Atlantic was due to
the fact that the U.S. still hung on to “…the legacy of Mahan’s dictum that the fleet must be kept
concentrated or at least capable of rapid concentration through the canal.”107
During these years, the Washington settlements, efforts to expand the treaties, and
pacifist trends were protested against by the Navy Department, the General Board, as well as
influential individuals. These groups were opportunistic, seizing subjective issues and figures
106
107
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 72.
Russell F. Weigley. p. 247.
44
that matched their needs best, particularly for comparative purposes, by using the country that
best exemplified their problems. Some of the naval officers that used this information to press
their case were Bradley A. Fiske, William L. Rodgers, Dudley W. Knox, and Charles P.
Plunkett. By and large, the majority of naval officers that spoke out were retired. However,
these naval officers were not alone. They were joined in their protests by sharp witted and
influential writers such as Hector C. Bywater, William Howard Gardiner, and William B.
Shearer. All argued for a larger fleet.
One of the most influential and popular writers appeared to be Hector C. Bywater, a
Baltimore Sun correspondent who also wrote for a variety of sources, from the Atlantic Monthly
to the Naval Institute Proceedings. Bywater exposed strategic limitations of a possible
American-Japanese war in his Sea Power in the Pacific. He also published a study concerning
the problems America would face in a war with Japan titled The Great Pacific War immediately
after the Japanese Immigration Exclusion Act of was ratified in 1924. Immensely fascinated
with the Japanese Navy, he believed that Japan would face difficulty in maintaining its political
system and would wage a war to protect national unity.108 In one of his book, originally
published in 1925, he predicted the IJN’s attack on the U.S. Pacific fleet and the invasion of the
Philippines and Guam by Japanese troops. He was later shown to be a prophet.
Another professional writer and publicist, Howard Gardiner, was intimately attached to
the Navy League of the U.S. and also had contact with the inner circles of the navy’s
bureaucracy. A proponent of a big navy, he frequently spoke before the General Board, the
Naval War College, and the Foreign Service School of the State Department. Through his
analyses, it was found that due to the outcome of the Washington Conference, the U.S. Navy
108
Gerald E. Wheeler. pp. 72-73.
45
could not adequately engage Japan in combat. The navy frequently used Gardiner’s analyses in
its presentations to Congress during 1924 and 1925.109
Unlike the subtle publicity brought by influential writers, naval officers on the other hand
were more direct with their remarks concerning the topic. Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske
openly spoke of impending Japanese aggression in the Far East during a public speech in 1924;
Rear Admiral William L. Rodger claimed that Japan leaned toward war with America; Secretary
of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur claimed that Japanese aggression could not be disregarded for
“There is nothing so cooling to a hot temper as a piece of cool steel.”110 Yet, even with the belief
of impending war by the navy and influential writers, Congress refused to authorize larger naval
appropriations. Many congressmen during the 1920s held the views of Senator Thomas J.
Walsh, Democrat of Montana, when he stated:
I am not only against a navy greater than is essential for the defense of the U.S.
against the attack of a foreign foe, but I am not disturbed by the idea that we are
going to be attacked next week or next year….
Twenty-two years ago, I was a delegate to the National Convention at Denver and
listened as a member of the Committee on Resolutions to a two hours’ harangue
by Capt. Richmond Pearson Robson, urging an appropriation for a big navy to
meet impending war with Japan.
That war is as remote today as it was then; indeed, since a visit to that country
some five years ago, I am convinced that a war with Japan is about as likely as a
war with Mars.111
This was the attitude of Congress during the interwar years. Additionally, like Walsh, many
influential government officials, who visited Japan during this time and met with their Japanese
counterparts and found that Japan posed no military threat to the U.S. Congress, feared the
pleading of the navy would be translated into warmongering by Japan and have a heavy toll on
Japan-U.S. relations. The U.S. was not prepared to lose a valuable trading partner in the Far East
109
Ibid., p. 73.
Ibid., p. 74.
111
Ibid.
110
46
and a counter to the spread of Communism in the region. Additionally, the U.S. also feared that
such hostility would have further isolated Japan, leaving it with no options but a southern Pacific
expansion. No western nation during the 1920s and 30s was prepared to intervene against Japan.
This was later seen during Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1931.112
Although Congress continued to ignore the General Board’s cry for the rebuilding and
modernization of the U.S. Navy during this time, some success was found in the Board’s
endeavor. When it was apparent that Britain and Japan were building 10,000-ton, eight-inch-gun
cruisers which were approved by Washington Conference standards, Congress finally responded.
This was in the form of the 1924 Cruiser Bill which approved of the construction of eight large
ships. Nevertheless, true to Congress turning a blind eye on such matters, funding for such ships
only trickled in. Congress finally voted on funds for the Pensacola and Salt Lake City – “two
large cruisers” in 1926.113 The U.S. was indeed behind in the cruiser count. By 1926, Great
Britain possessed 63 cruisers to Japan’s 43; the U.S. was behind both nations with 40.114 The
very limited naval appropriations issued to the U.S. Navy were the norm throughout the 1920s.
To set further naval limitations, a second naval conference was held at Geneva in June
1927. A main concern was the limitation of naval vessels that were not addressed or bound by
the Washington Treaty. The General Board once again conducted a study of the foreign policies
of Great Britain, Japan, and the naval needs of America in response to these policies.
In the five years since the Washington Five-Power Treaty of 1922, the General Board’s
concerns over Japanese aggression remained. The Board determined Japan sought to dictate all
112
Henry Kissinger. p. 286.
William F. Trimble. (1979 February). Admiral Hilary P. Jones and the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference. Military
Affairs, 43, 1 p. 2.
114
George W. Baer. p. 109.
113
47
commercial, military, and political activity in the Western Pacific. Its subordinate policies
included:
1. To render the military position of all other powers in the Western Pacific
relatively weak.
2. To exploit China.
3. To extend Japanese political control over areas that are essential or desirable
to supplement Japanese deficiencies in raw materials.
4. To maintain a navy strong enough to successfully combat in the Western
Pacific the navy of any other power.115
These subordinate policies, particularly the exploitation of China identified by the General
Board, clashed with “The Open Door” policy, one of the primary national policies of the U.S.
In regards to the naval policies of the three powers, the General Board declared that Japan
was most likely to request additional limitations on Pacific Ocean naval bases beyond its current
status quo requirements and to a naval ratio more in Japan’s favor than the current cruisers,
destroyers, and submarines ratio of 5 to 3. The General Board expected a 5-5-3.5 ratio request
by Japan. The General Board also noted that the secure sea lines required for communication by
America to China and the Philippines would run into conflict with Japan’s desire of her own sea
lines of communication. The Board felt the naval position of the U.S. had already been
considerably weakened due to the 5 to 3 ratio of the 1922 Washington Treaty and that it would
be further weakened if the ratio were changed yet again in Japan’s favor. This would allow
Japan to have a greater ability to expand her empire by allowing Japan to legitimately build more
war ships. Concerning the further limiting of naval bases, the General Board was unyielding.
The only way it would support the reductions of the naval fortifications in Hawaii would be if
Japan were willing to reduce its fleet size to the point that it would not be able to feasibly attack
and occupy the Philippines. The further limitation of naval bases by the U.S. was not a
reasonable option since the German islands Japan had seized during World War I, followed by
115
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 64.
48
its naval bases in the Bonins and Formosa, made it extremely easy for Japan to control the sea
routes connecting Hawaii to the Far East. With the naval limitations already in place, should
Japan go on the offensive with its navy in the Pacific, there was nothing the U.S. could
immediately do to defend her interests.116
The General Board determined that a future conflict with Japan would occur in Far
Eastern waters and that naval bases were needed in the Pacific. Due to the status quo
requirements (pre-1922) for American naval bases west of Hawaii, the Board looked upon
Singapore, where a British base, completely unlimited by the naval treaties, was under
construction. The Board determined that although Japanese interference in the construction of
the base would be an entirely British matter, British-American relations had similar diplomatic
problems in the Far East. Due to this, the U.S. determined that such British bases may serve U.S.
interests in the future.117 Singapore used as a possible outpost for the U.S. Navy was too
valuable to ignore.
At the same time, the student officers of the Naval War College conducted a logistical
study of a Japanese-American (Orange-Blue) War for the Class of 1927 project. They concluded
that if open hostilities occurred between the two countries, England would also be in conflict
with Japan over Australia. Due to Japan’s expansionist policies, Australia would most likely ally
itself with the U.S. since the two nations were on friendly terms. Many naval officers also came
to the same conclusion in their writings during the 1920s since Great Britain and the U.S. had
similar interests in the Western Pacific and viewed Japan as the utmost threat.
The significance of the study conducted by the General Board in 1927 was the fact that it
identified Japan as a major enemy of the U.S. and a possible threat to Great Britain and
116
117
Ibid., p. 64.
Ibid., pp. 64-65.
49
Australia. The major point of concern was Japan’s expansionist policy in eastern Asia and the
maintenance of the Open Door policy by the U.S. The General Board also distinguished the
similarities in the Far East policies of Great Britain and the U.S. particularly with Japan. The
IJN in competing for its own government funds also declared the U.S. as its “budgetary” and
“hypothetical” enemy.118 Although the Washington Treaty had made the Pacific waters
relatively peaceful during the 1920s, the IJN officials believed that war with the U.S. Navy was
inevitable.119
When the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament of 1927 began, the General
Board firmly believed that Japan would expand its empire at the expense of the Western powers.
Such a prediction was not taken seriously by the U.S. representatives to the conference. They
still abided by the limitations and stipulations set forth in the Washington Treaties of 1922. In
the first session of the Conference held on June 20th, 1927, U.S. Chairman Hugh Gibson stated
that the limitations set forth in 1922 have “stood the test of five years of practical application”
and “that the methods and principles of limitation set forth in the Washington Treaty are both
practical and effective and should be extended to all categories of combatant vessels of the Three
Powers.”120 What U.S. representatives failed to understand was that the principles of limitations
stipulated in the Washington Treaties were truly ahead of their times but unrealistic in scope. If
any major nation such as Japan or Germany ignored such limitations in their ship building, no
other nation or international confederation had the power to bring that nation to justice.
Ultimately, it was the cruiser race which wrecked any hope of successful naval
limitations at the Conference in Geneva. To reach its Washington Treaty limitations, the IJN
118
David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy,
1887-1941. Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 1997, p. 201.
119
Ibid.
120
Records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament Held at Geneva from June 20 th to August 4th,
1927. (June 20th – August 4th, 1927) p. 19.
50
was rapidly building its cruisers to meet treaty levels. This sparked a “cruiser race” with the
British, Japanese, and U.S. navies. While both the Japanese and American navies favored heavy
cruisers over light cruisers, the British Navy preferred light cruisers due to its many overseas
bases and commitments. The Americans sought limitations in aggregate tonnage in ship
categories but were against limitations imposed on individual ships. Great Britain with its many
overseas commitments sought the opposite; it wanted no restrictions applied to the aggregate
tonnage for its cruisers, but limitations on individual ships in its effort to limit heavy cruisers
from both the Japanese and American navies were considered acceptable.121 Although some
progress was made with discussions relating to other classes of auxiliary ships, the cruiser race
proved to be the conference’s undoing. The failure of the conference led Great Britain, Japan,
and the United States to reassess their own ship building programs, creating a potential new arms
race rather than limitation.122 With the controversy concerning unrestricted warship categories
unresolved, high hopes for success were placed upon the upcoming London Naval Conference in
1930.123
The London Naval Conference of 1930, the third out of five total meetings for the intent
of limiting the naval capability of the five largest naval powers, was brought about due to the
unsuccessful naval limitations conference in Geneva in 1927. The five naval powers that had
attended the first two conferences were present. The main endeavor by representatives was to
adjust and expand upon the existing naval limitations set eight years before in Washington.
In preparation for the upcoming London Naval Conference, it was with great irony that
although the General Board conducted a study of the IJN and the foreign policy of Japan, it did
not properly record its direct analysis on American naval policy. This lack of analysis in late
121
David C Evansand Mark R. Peattie. pp. 233-234.
U.S. Department of State (n.d.). The Geneva Naval Conference para. 4 and 5.
123
David C Evansand Mark R. Peattie. pp. 233-234.
122
51
1929 was due to the fact that the Secretary of the Navy did not require the Board to conduct such
a study.124 Although it was logical for the General Board to have set down in writing such a
policy for the upcoming conference, it was not authorized nor had the power to commence
assignments. One of the main reasons was that the General Board’s study on the foreign policies
of Great Britain and Japan conducted in 1927 was thought to be plausible for the next two years.
At the time, the U.S. State Department also conducted its own naval study and perhaps may have
thought of the General Board as only a reference source.125 Without necessary discussion, the
State and Navy Departments worked autonomously in developing their naval arms limitation
policies.126 This autonomy of two departments would later prove to hamper the overall
intelligence gathering of the IJN by the U.S. government. Instead of having one branch
dedicated to information gathering on the IJN, the State and Navy Departments findings were
often different from one another and tended to clash leaving no clear objectives.
In a further constraint on progress, the General Board even found hostility within the
navy. The analysis of the General Board was discouraging to some naval officers. Preparation
for the London Conference by U.S. representatives was bewildering. According to the Office of
Naval Intelligence, there is evidence that by late 1929, the Secretary of the Navy Edward Denby,
and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral C.F. Hughes lost the confidence of President
Hoover. With all the limitations imposed on the General Board, the Navy Department
recognized that the State Department would be in the spot light at the upcoming conference and
the chief source of intelligence for the U.S.
124
Records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament Held at Geneva from June 20th to August 4th,
1927. (June 20th – August 4th, 1927) p. 19.
125
Ibid., p. 66.
126
William Braisted. p. 2.
52
In light of this, the Navy Department in October 1928, revised the 1922 “Naval Policy”
and announced in an official statement concerning the “adequate building and maintenance
policy for cruisers,” that cruiser tonnage would be effectively sustained in adherence to the
Washington Treaty capital ships ratios. Furthermore, the Board also announced that the building
of any new “small cruisers” should not be undertaken by the U.S. and that all new construction
of such ships should be of the 10,000-ton class equipped with eight-inch guns. With this revision
of the 1922 “Naval Policy,” the navy sought to increase its total submarine, destroyer, and
cruiser numbers to treaty ratio strength. To do this, the navy prepared a bill for Congress
proposing to build fifteen cruisers and one aircraft carrier. As Japan sought to increase tonnage
for heavy cruisers from 60.23% of American heavy cruiser force to 70%, the U.S. Navy was in
no mood to allow this and understood that Japan’s current total tonnage had to be held at current
percentage so as to not hamper American Pacific policy.
Not allowing Japan to increase its total tonnage at the London Conference was
understood by both the navy and the State Department. If Japan sought to increase her total ship
tonnage, it would upset the delicate balance in the Western Pacific, particularly with the status
quo order in Pacific island fortifications as set forth in the Washington Conference. The limiting
of Japan’s total tonnage was supported by the State Department and U.S. Navy was also
supported by Great Britain.127 Both Great Britain and the U.S. wanted to check Japanese naval
ambitions in the Western Pacific. A further increase in overall ship tonnage by Japan meant that
Great Britain and the U.S. also had to increase their overall ship tonnage to remain in status quo.
It was evident that “Orange” was the main naval “enemy” of both nations.
The 1920s represented a frustrating decade for the U.S. Navy. The General Board
predicted as early as 1921 that the nation the U.S. would most likely take on in a naval
127
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 66.
53
engagement with would be Japan. To defend American interests in the Far East against possible
Japanese aggression, the Board determined that it needed 2 to 1 ship superiority to that of Japan.
However, despite this demand, Japan’s Navy eventually grew to roughly 69.75% of U.S. Navy
size as was seen in the 1930 London Treaty. This was in part because the US refused to build to
its limits while the Japanese built eagerly up to theirs. Additionally, the U.S. was denied the
ability to improve upon its fortifications in the Pacific west of Hawaii. Due to this, Guam’s
defenses could not be improved upon and the U.S. battleship fleet was unable to be properly
handled in the Philippines.128
Three months before the London Naval Conference began; the Wall Street Crash
occurred, leaving many national governments in deep psychological shock, eager to cut costs.
The Japanese government, led by Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi’s Cabinet, was also deeply
affected. Looking to stabilize Japan’s economy, Hamaguchi sought international naval
limitations to cut overall government spending. However, the Prime Minister also had to find a
middle position to avoid internal disputes with Japanese government and military officials
looking to expand the role of the IJN. During the 1920s and 1930s, the Japanese government
was split between a constitutional system and rising military influence that looked upon
expansion into Asia as necessary for the survival of Japan. Such naval officials with this desire
included the Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral Kato Kanji who looked upon the naval
limitations set forth in the Washington Treaty of 1922 with deep national humiliation. It was this
military faction within the Japanese government that sought naval parity with Britain and the
U.S. Fully understanding that Japan could not keep up with the U.S. in a naval race, Hamaguchi
and then Captain Yamamoto sought 70% parity in the hopes to settle internal discontent and
128
Ibid., p. 74.
54
international fears.129 Their reasoning to Great Britain and the U.S. was that due to the 10:6 ratio
regarding capital ships, Japan’s national security had already been compromised. The American
and British representatives believed that if Japan were granted a 10:7 ratio, it would endanger
their Pacific possessions that were already restricted to 1922 parity as set forth in the Washington
Treaty.130
The first Plenary Session of the London Naval Conference took place on January 21,
1930. Representatives of five nations participated, along with expert advisors, secretaries, and
technical staff. While Japan sought an increase in parity with Great Britain and the U.S. it also
sought overall limitations. “Japan would thus have a larger share of a smaller market.”131
Although Japan had been denied her 70% parity to British and U.S. navies, it was not by
much. Overall, Japan received 69.75% parity. This included equal parity in submarines at
52,700 tons.132 Total tonnage for Japanese cruisers fell from 108,400 tons, 60.23% of the
American heavy cruiser force to 100,450 tons. However, this equaled 70% of the American
heavy cruiser force.133 Although denied the ability to increase its fleet size or Pacific
fortifications, American commitments in the Far East were not diminished during this time.134
While Japan was forced to decrease its fleet size, it had in fact gained an almost 10% increase
over the total tonnage allocated for the U.S. Navy. This was due to the fact that the U.S. also had
to reduce its fleet size by a significant amount. Similar to the Washington Naval Conference of
1922, a variation of the yardstick was used to measure cruiser equivalencies. The yardstick was
129
Stephen Howarth. Morning Glory: The story of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Arrow Books: London, 1985, pp.
168-170.
130
Akira Iriye. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Volume III: The Globalizing of America
1913-1945. Cambridge University Press: New York, 1993, p. 122.
131
Stephen Howarth. pp. 168-170.
132
Ibid., p. 170.
133
Globalsecurity.org. (2007) IJN Imperial Japanese Navy (Nihon Kaigun) para. 10.
134
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 74.
55
used to determine the similarities and differences of each class of cruisers discussed at the
conference in London.135
On the other hand, it is important to understand the effects of the London Naval
Conference upon Japan. In some ways, the results of the conference further increased desire
among Japanese policy makers towards breaking from the binds of international naval limitations
all together. Although the London Naval Conference may have appeared a victory for Japan,
historian Jon Davidann argued that it infuriated Japanese conservatives who were feeling the
constraints of western dominance.136 As a result, Japan’s Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi,
who was seen as too accommodating to Western powers, was shot by a right-wing radical at a
Tokyo Central Railroad station platform. With his death in early 1931, the continued meltdown
of U.S.-Japanese relations continued.137 The death of Prime Minister Hamaguchi was just one of
many political assassinations during this time. As Japanese public opinion increasingly
supported its military, the idea of expansion into Asia and the Pacific increasingly took root.
Opponents of this expansion, such as later Prime Minister Tsuyoshi, Baron Dan Takuma (head of
the Mitsui zaibatsu) and ex-Finance Minister Inouye were assassinated. The murders of key
political figures in Japan marked the decline of party government. From this point on, it was
nonpartisan groups such as the Imperial House and military officials that dominated the Japanese
political system with the diminished power of the parties.138
One must ask how the military could achieve such power in a constitutional form of
government? The main reason was because Japan’s military was semiautonomous of the Diet
and the Cabinet. The head of the General Staff Office, a direct subordinate of the emperor, had
135
John Trost Kuehn. p.115.
Jon Thares Davidann. p. 130.
137
Ibid.
138
Alan J. Levine. The Pacific War: Japan versus the Allies. Praeger: Westport, 1995, p. 10.
136
56
imperial approval to manage and direct the military. This imperial approval therefore nullified
government restrictions. Although it seems the military was beyond the touch of the Diet and
the Cabinet, the Diet ultimately had the final decision of increasing military expenditure.
However, military officials expanded upon their imperial approval to have further influence in
Japanese politics, although the military failed in its attempts to overthrow the politicians. Japan
continued to have a functioning democracy throughout the interwar and wartime periods.139
Nevertheless, during the early 1930s, as military officials sought to advance southward into the
Pacific and South East Asia, there was little the civilian, elected government could do to stem the
tide. For example, the Kwantung Army in China went rogue twice, in 1928 and again in 1931,
creating a provocation in Manchuria and initiating a general invasion, taking its own initiatives
without government approval.140 The rise in military influence within the government of Japan
after its acceptance of the London Naval Treaty was a tragic mistake for Japan for it marked the
end of compromise with the United States and fall into a downward spiral of war.
While it was not unusual for the Navy Department to conduct war preparations with
allied nations that possessed large navies, during the 1920s the Navy Department was utterly
convinced war with Japan was imminent. However, the navy in its warnings to Congress walked
a fine line. Government officials as well as some of the Navy staff feared that if the U.S.
government acted upon the naval preparations of the Navy Department, it would upset JapaneseAmerican relations.141 These concerned officials did not want to be accused of war mongering.
139
Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard (ed.) Showa: The Japan of Hirohito. W.W. Norton & Company: New
York, 1992, p.40.
140
Mikiso Hane. p. 468.
141
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 74.
57
Further evidence of the imminence of war between the U.S. and Japan was seen in China.
In regards to the invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 by Japan, retired Brigadier General
“Billy” Mitchell stated
The performances in Manchuria are exactly what I expected. The Japanese are
just putting it over on an incompetent European world, and this includes
ourselves…Some day we will have an armed conflict with them, as we are the
only great white power whose shores the waters of the Pacific touch.142
Although Mitchell’s statement reflected a strong degree of racism, it was reinforced by Western
culture. Historian David M. Kennedy claimed such an idea caught on when the European world
began to look upon the civilizations it had conquered in the New World, Africa, and Asia as
barbaric. “The long record of Western racialist disdain made it easy to demonize the
Japanese.”143
Mitchell was considered the father of military aviation. During World War I, as a colonel
and the chief of Air Service, he realized the potential of the airplane and became an outspoken
critic of the U.S.’s failure to develop and maintain a separate Air Service that could defend
America’s coasts and attack strategic industrial sights behind enemy lines. He also asserted that
the existing strategy of naval warfare with the battleship as the primary weapon was obsolete
with his believing that that naval ships were “sitting ducks” to bomb and torpedo attacks from
airplanes. This was famously demonstrated when Mitchell’s bombers easily sank obsolete
German and American warships in a series of trials. However, even with this success, the Joint
Board still considered the battleship as the “backbone of the fleet.” Like most prophets of his
time, Mitchell’s advice was not taken seriously by the U.S. government which would go on to
court-martial the general for “insubordination” and “conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon
the military service” in December 1925. The cost of not heeding Mitchell’s advice of developing
142
143
Ibid., p. 61.
David M. Kennedy. p. 811.
58
and maintaining a powerful Air Service would bring severe consequences at the outbreak of
World War I with the attack on Pearl Harbor.144 Ironically, although there is no evidence to
support this claim, it was the Japanese who seemed to have heeded Mitchell’s advice of the
superiority of the airplane in naval warfare from early on.
Although Mitchell was not surprised by Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931,
throughout the 1920s he relentlessly warned of America’s lack of preparedness against Japan’s
naval air power. Two sobering predictions he made upon visiting Japan in 1924 were that due to
Japan’s expansionist policy in the Pacific, the two nations (Japan and the U.S.) would eventually
come to blows. With this, he predicted that an air and sea attack on Ford Island (Oahu, Hawaii)
would occur at roughly 7:30 am, followed by an attack on Clark Field in the Philippines at 10:40
am on the same day. Recognizing the strategic importance of these military facilities to the U.S.,
Mitchell was adamant that these attacks would occur on the same day and without warning.
Mitchell’s predictions were correct. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 at
7:55am, only 25 minutes off from Mitchell’s prediction and Clark Field in the Philippines at
12:35 pm, less than two hours off.145
On the night of September 18, 1931, an explosion heavily damaged a Japanese controlled
railroad in Northern Manchuria. The Japanese military overran the entire province in a rapid,
retaliatory method. The swiftness of the Japanese military to react suggested the work of
Japanese agent provocateurs who staged the explosion in a perfect opportunity to snatch
Manchuria. By February 1932, Japan installed the puppet government Manchukuo in Manchuria
and colonized the province with Japanese settlers.148
144
Bernard Ryan, Jr. (2008) Billy Mitchell Court-Martial: 1925. Law Library-American Law and Legal
Information. pp. 1-3.
145
Medalofhonor.com (2007). Billy Mitchell. The Official Site of the Medal of Honor. pp. 1-2.
148
David M. Kennedy. p. 93.
59
Japan’s actions were immediately condemned by the U.S. While, it refused to participate
in collective enforcement through the League of Nations, it did sanction Japan. Kissinger stated
the sanctioning “…at the time seemed like an evasion but which, a decade later, would, in
Roosevelt’s hands, turn into a weapon for forcing a showdown with Japan.”149 Originated by
Secretary of State Stimson in 1932, the Stimson Doctrine refused “…to recognize territorial
changes brought about by force.”150 In reaction to Japan’s seizure of Manchuria, the role of the
American Battle Force in the Pacific was reevaluated by the U.S. government.
Japan’s occupation of Manchuria was complete by 1932. The government of Japan
announced that Manchuria was established as a new state, naming it “Manchukuo.” Manchukuo
was not an independent nation but a puppet state of Japan. After this, Japanese forces moved
swiftly south, seizing the Chinese province of Jehol. The “Manchurian Incident” as it came to be
known, “…marked the beginning of an unprecedented period of aggression and expansion in
Japanese history.”151 Japan was eventually condemned by the League of Nations. Japan
responded by isolating itself further away from the U.S. and its allies. The League was strongly
against Japan’s takeover of Manchuria and on February 1933, with a vote of 42 to 1 (Japan
opposing) passed a resolution condemning Japan’s actions. The Japanese delegation promptly
marched out of the hall in protest.152 On March 27, Japan announced its withdrawal from the
League of Nations. In an Imperial Rescript with the emperor’s Privy Seal and countersigned by
Japan’s top government and military officials, it was announced that Japan had cooperated with
the League since it was created 13 years ago. However, with the founding of Manchukuo, the
149
Henry Kissinger. p. 377.
Ibid.
151
David Rees. The Defeat of Japan. Praeger: Westport, 1997, p. 14.
152
Saburo Ienaga. The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931-1945. Pantheon Books: New York,
1978, p. 66.
150
60
Empire (Japan) deemed it necessary to respect the new State’s independence and development.
The reasons were vaguely stated.
Unhappily, there exists between Our Empire and the League of Nations a wide
divergence of view in this regard and it has developed upon us to cause Our
Government to take, upon mature deliberation, the necessary steps for the
withdrawal of Our Empire from the League.
Although Japan would withdraw from the League and heed its own course, the Imperial Rescript
announced that the Empire still desired peace and did not wish to isolate itself from the
“fraternity of nations.”153 The problem lay in Japan’s claim that the new state’s independence
had to be respected when its independence was given with the use of force at China’s expense.
Such an attack caused Japan to become further isolated from the international community it so
sought to share kinship with. The withdrawal from the League was seen with great favor by
some within the Japanese government and public who looked upon Manchukuo as a necessary
source of raw materials and a market for Japanese goods.154 The Washington Naval
Disarmament Treaty was the next hope of naval limitations to be put on the chopping block by
Japan; it was abrogated by Japan in 1934.155 With the abrogation of the Washington Treaty, the
Wilsonian ideals of the outlawing of war were dashed. Japan was free now, not bound by any
treaty limitations to build and maintain the type of navy it so desired.
During the month of Roosevelt’s presidential inaugural in 1933, Japan officially left the
League of Nations. With this, Roosevelt’s ambassador to Tokyo sternly told the president that
“this step indicates the complete supremacy of the military.”156 While Japan did not yet
officially repudiate all naval limitation agreements set in place after World War I, the nation’s
153
The Imperial Rescript Relating to Withdrawal from the League of Nations Proclaimed on March 27, 1933. para.
1-3.
154
David Rees. p. 14.
155
James William Morley, (ed.) Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR 1935-1940. Columbia
University Press: New York, 1976, p. 17.
156
David M. Kennedy. p. 158.
61
withdrawal from the League was a drastic sign of things to come. After Japan left the League of
Nations, the IJN was nearly unstoppable in its advance across the South Pacific. This was
apparent with Tokyo’s fortitude to move ahead with the building of a massive and new battle
fleet.157 Japanese officials understood that the member nations of the League were too weak to
act upon its withdrawal and that the same thing would occur if Japan pulled out from the
upcoming London Disarmament Conference of 1935. With this withdrawal, Japan
“…abandoned the naval tonnage limits of the Washington and London Conferences. Japan
embarked on a shipbuilding program thereafter, marking further alienation from the West.”158
With Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations and its repudiation of the
Washington Treaty, the IJN began to build and modernize its war ships at an alarming rate. The
highlight of this program was the goal of the IJN’s to produce the largest battleships in the
world; the Yamato and her sister ship the Musashi. Construction began in 1935; the ships were
armed with huge 18.1-inch guns that had already been successfully tested. These naval guns
were the largest in the world. Admiral Yamamoto, who advocated a big carrier force, could not
stop the big gun mentality of the naval construction program. He deeply opposed the building of
these ships, claiming that the tide of naval warfare had turned to the air. Like Billy Mitchell,
Yamamoto recognized the future of naval warfare as belonging to the airplane. Yamamoto
understood with new aircraft being built, such battleships were sitting ducks and easily sunk.
Nevertheless, with no proof from Yamamoto, many of the “battleship Admirals” of the IJN
sharply disagreed. With internal disagreement in the IJN, Yamamoto continued to argue for a
157
158
Ibid., p. 233.
Jon Thares Davidann. p. 163.
62
big carrier force and in the fall of 1935, was appointed chief of the Aeronautics Department of
the IJN.159
Now that Yamamoto was appointed, a Japanese delegation prepared for the second
London Disarmament Conference. Having already withdrawn from the League of Nations, there
was little hope of successful mediation for Great Britain and the U.S. regarding any compliance
by Japan on naval limitations.
Beginning in December 1935, the Japanese delegation was at immediate odds with Great
Britain and the U.S. regarding the “continuation of the quantitative limitations of the ratio
system.”160 Japan supported Great Britain’s request to build above a “common upper [tonnage]
limit” due to its global commitments. However, recognizing the U.S. as the greatest naval threat,
Japan was unrelenting in its demands of equal parity with the U.S. By January 1936, seeing no
future success, the Japanese delegation proposed cutting naval armaments of all involved
nations. This included battleships, aircraft carriers, and cruisers. This demand was rejected by
Great Britain and the U.S. who both believed compliance would relinquish Asia to Japan and
threaten Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. With no accomplishments gained from
negotiations, the head of the delegation, Admiral Nagano Osami proclaimed “…Japan could no
longer pursue negotiations based upon quantitative inferiority.”161
By 1936, Japan officially withdrew from the London Disarmament Conference. Despite
Japan’s withdrawal, the Second London Naval Treaty was signed by the United States, Britain,
and France on March 25, 1936. It was to last from March 1937 through 1942.
In a statement before the committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Hearings
on the London Naval Treaty on May 13, 1936, Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the United States
159
Edwin P. Hoyt. Japan’s War: The Great Pacific Conflict 1853-1952. Da Capo Press: 1986, p. 116.
William M. McBride. p. 175.
161
Ibid.
160
63
Delegation to the London Disarmament Conference, expressed his opinion of the Conference
while it was up for ratification.162 Davis stated his deepest support for the treaty but claimed it
was regrettable that Japan had not yet signed it. He also voiced his concern that there were no
provisions for the continuance of total tonnage reduction or for the principle of quantitative
limitation. Both of these provisions were instituted by the previous two treaties (The
Washington Treaty: 1922 and First London Conference: 1930). Davis claimed the reason for
this was that with the exception of Great Britain and the U.S., all other powers, including Japan
refused to sign a treaty with such provisions. Davis further stated
In fact, Japan left the Conference a few weeks after it began because the other
powers were unable to accept as a basis for negotiation the Japanese proposal for
a so-called common upper limit which, in effect was to scrap the present system
of naval limitation and, without regard to relative needs and security, to change
the present ratio of 5-5-3 to 3-3-3 or 5-5-5. While recognizing Japan’s right to
equal security, which we believe was achieved under the Washington and London
Treaties, it was obviously impossible to accept the Japanese proposal because,
owing to the difference in relative needs and vulnerability, naval parity would be
given to Japan naval superiority.163
Though Japan withdrew from the Conference, Davis believed it would have been a
chaotic situation had the existing treaties been terminated by all signatory parties without
anything to take their place. He, like many other delegates, believed the treaty was
indispensable, even without the support from a major naval power. According to Davis,
although the treaties lacked many necessary components, the U.S. delegation thought they were
not unfair to any other naval powers. It was ironic that although Japan did not sign the treaty,
Davis still firmly believed that the nation would still adhere to its stipulations.
With the other treaties being so “rigid” when it came to naval limitation, Davis asserted
that the current treaty’s lack of “rigidity” was a blessing since it may have proved more enduring
162
Statement by the Honorable Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the United States Delegation, London Naval
Conference, May 13, 1936 [29], [Extracts].
163
Ibid.
64
as a result. In his last words, Davis claimed “At any rate, we have nothing to lose in trying it out,
and possibly much to gain.164 The lack of rigidity concerning treaty standards displayed the lack
of support by key nations such as Japan and Italy. If treaties were only supported but not
enforced, nothing successful would come of them.
At the time, rumors concerning Japanese naval ships were common to the U.S. Navy and
press. In the same month of Davis’ statement (May 1936), Arnold Toynbee, editor of the Survey
of International Affairs, reported descriptions of a “55,000-ton Japanese battleship.”165 While
this claim was more valid than most, later rumors were filled with more deceptive information.
Upon Japan’s withdrawal from the Conference in January 1936, the Roosevelt
administration continued its battleship construction. While U.S. Congress only supported the
bare minimum for naval appropriations, the navy was Franklin D. Roosevelt’s favored
instrument “…for projecting American power…” However, after 1933, his enthusiasm was
restrained due to financial and legal restrictions. To construct a modern fleet, but only up to the
naval limitations as set forth at Washington in 1922 and London in 1930, Roosevelt could not
turn to Congress. Instead, he directed some money from public works appropriations.166 It was
the redirecting of money by Roosevelt that kept the navy afloat.
Five years before the attacks on Pearl Harbor, intelligence gathering by the U.S. on
Japanese naval rear armament was minimal at best. This was ironic given the fact that as early
as 1936, the U.S. acknowledged Japan as its greatest naval threat in the Pacific and its
contingency plans for a war with Japan (Code Orange) called for the U.S. Navy to meet the IJN
in a showdown in the Western Pacific. Any solid evidence by the U.S. regarding Japan’s naval
164
Ibid.
Malcolm Muir, Jr. (1990 October). Rearming in a Vacuum: United States Navy Intelligence and the Japanese
Capital Ship Threat, 1936-1945. The Journal of Military History, 54, 4 p. 477.
166
David M. Kennedy. p. 389.
165
65
construction plans did not come about until Japan put its most powerful battleship, the “Yamato
class” into commission in December 1941 just over a week after Japan declared war on the
U.S.167 The building of these ships began in 1935. The U.S. had no idea of the existence of
these ships until six years later. The Yamato class consisted of two battleships, the Yamato and
the Musashi. The Musashi “sister” battleship was commissioned in August 1942. They were the
largest battleships ever built, weighing 72,000 tons each. Armament included nine 18.1 inch
main battery guns, the largest ever at sea. These guns fired armor piercing shells weighing in at
3,200 pounds.168
However, even though Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, the Japanese Navy minister at the
London Disarmament Conference, denied his country sought to build ships that were larger than
treaty standards the IJN was well on its way constructing the largest battleships in the world.169
Such ambiguous answers were the norm from Japanese officials to the outside world at this time.
It was this secrecy to the outside world the IJN sought to maintain.
The year 1936 was a crucial year in Japanese-American relations. Leaving behind its
naval limitations by withdrawing from the London Disarmament Conference, Japan would
further isolate itself from the U.S. by joining with Germany and Italy. In November 1936, an
anti-Comintern pact was signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan. The pact contained a clause that
stated “the signatories pledged to come to each other’s aid should one of them become involved
in a war against the Soviet Union.” What is unique about this pact was that for the first time, the
three most powerful totalitarian states on the right were united against the dictatorship of the
left.170 The west could only look on with this development. The allies demonstrated a cautious
167
Malcolm Muir, Jr. p. 473.
Globalsecurity.org. (2008) IJN Yamato Class Battleship para. 1 and 10.
169
Malcolm Muir, Jr. p. 476.
170
Akira Iriye. p. 149.
168
66
approach to the anti-Comintern pact in the Far East. While Great Britain and the U.S. did not
favor the expansionist approach of Japan, the nation at the same time indirectly protected British
and American interests “…against the spread of communism.”171
Chapter 3: Toward War
With Japanese forces moving down the east coast of China in the early months of the
Sino-Japanese War, it was only a matter of time before open hostilities would occur between
Japan and the U.S. Both nations had economic and diplomatic interests in China. On December
12 1937, an attack by Japanese aircraft on a U.S. gunboat came dangerously close to igniting a
war between the two countries.
On this day, the U.S. gunboat Panay and three American steamers belonging to the
Standard Oil Company were sunk in Chinese waters by Japanese pilots during an assault on
Nanking. The bombing occurred in broad daylight as the Panay lay anchored in the Yangtze
channel. While Americans claimed the event occurred in broad daylight, the Japanese claimed
they were in pursuit of escaping Chinese soldiers who boarded steamers heading upriver and that
visibility was poor.172 The Panay was not evacuating Chinese soldiers but embassy personnel
and refugees from Nanking to Shanghai.173 Secretary of State Hull stated the American vessels
had an uncontested right to be in the Yangtze River and at the moment of attack were carrying
American official and private personnel away from danger, frequently changing their positions
while moving upriver to avoid attack.174 Although two eighteen-by-fourteen foot American flags
were draped on the Panay’s top deck, the Japanese pilots claimed they were too high to identify
171
H. Th. De Booy. (1935 March). The Naval Arms of Diplomacy in the Pacific. Pacific Affairs 8, 1, p. 11.
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State [Telegram], TOKYO, December 14, 1937-6 p.m.,
[Received December 14-10 a.m.].
173
Akira Iriye. p. 158.
174
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) on the Sinking of the USS Panay, [Telegram],
WASHINGTON, December 13, 1937-8 p.m.
172
67
them. Incongruously, the event was captured on film by a Universal Newsreel cameraman who
was aboard the Panay at the time. The footage captured on film had proven differently,
capturing the Japanese planes continuously strafing escaping survivors. Two people were killed
and thirty wounded.175
What is interesting to note was that this was not a sporadic attack by only a few Japanese
planes but a concentrated effort. According to a Japanese naval officer who reported the event to
the Commander-in-Chief of the American Asiatic Fleet, the Panay and the American steamers
suffered attacks by “three Japanese bombing planes, six Japanese fighting planes, six Japanese
bombing planes, and two Japanese bombing planes, in sequence”176 The sinking of the Panay
occurred while Japanese forces were aware that foreign vessels were in the area. Ironically,
Japanese officials had given assurances that American nationals and property would not be
attacked.177
The attack on the Panay so outraged Roosevelt that he sent the chief of the U.S. Navy’s
intelligence division, Captain Royal Ingersoll, to meet with his counterpart in London to devise a
possible joint strategy against Japan. Although this action was secretly kept from the American
public, it demonstrated Roosevelt’s concern with an increasingly aggressive Japan. In this
meeting, a blockade of Japan by U.S. and British warships was contemplated. Initiated by
Ingersoll, the meeting proved to be the first of bi-national discussions on cooperative military
action. While nothing transpired from the first meeting, it demonstrated Roosevelt’s willingness
175
David M. Kennedy. p. 402.
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) on the Sinking of the USS Panay, [Telegram],
WASHINGTON, December 13, 1937-8 p.m.
177
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State [Telegram], TOKYO, December 14, 1937-6 p.m.,
[Received December 14-10 a.m.
176
68
to preserve world order.178 However, the American public and government’s desire for
neutrality prevailed.
The bombing brought about a short-lived crisis but it was immediately and satisfactorily
settled. When the short-lived crisis occurred, it was met with muted response by the American
public at home. While such an act would have sparked an immediate retaliatory response a
generation before, the event occurred when the U.S. sought international neutrality at all costs.
The sinking of the Panay did not bring about such an U.S. outcry as the sinking of the Lusitania
in 1915 or the Maine in 1898 had done earlier. Instead of sparking a war, it produced a cry for
the withdrawal of American presence in China. Japan responded with an official apology and
$2 million.179 The muted response by Congress did not reflect Secretary of State Hull’s outrage
by the attack when he claimed “In the present case, acts of Japanese armed forces have taken
place in complete disregard of American rights, have taken American life, and have destroyed
American property both public and private.”180 With the small compensation by Japan, war
between the two nations was averted and Japan’s conquest of China continued.
The Panay bombing reinforced the pacifists in Congress. An attack on a U.S. naval
vessel was not enough to stir Congress to think differently. Any proposals and or amendments
that gave any hint of retaliatory measures on Japan were quickly defeated by the isolationist bloc
on Capitol Hill, “…even in the wake of an inflammatory act such as the wanton sinking of a U.S.
Navy vessel.”181 However, many American naval officers saw it as a missed opportunity to go to
war with Japan.182 The Panay bombing is truly an important incident in understanding the rift
178
Akira Iriye. pp. 158-159.
David M. Kennedy. p. 402.
180
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) on the Sinking of the USS Panay, [Telegram],
WASHINGTON, December 13, 1937-8 p.m.
181
David M. Kennedy. p. 403.
182
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 61.
179
69
between the U.S. Congress and Navy during the interwar period. While the U.S. Navy was
fighting to secure annual monies from the U.S. government, Congress only issued the bare
necessities. As a result, the U.S. Navy was ill prepared for defending both the shores of the U.S.
and American interests abroad even as U.S. warships were sinking.
Though the decision by U.S. Congress to not go to war due to the sinking of the Panay
may sound utterly ridiculous, the Isolationist bloc on Capitol Hill did have a logical point in their
decision. The Great War was fought by the allies in the belief to create a lasting peace. The
lasting peace did not last. War in Europe and Asia was quickly becoming a reality. The U.S. did
not want to become involved in another devastating conflict. The sinking of the Panay eerily
resembled the attacks on American ships by German U-boats in 1917. These attacks plus “…the
alleged desire to protect American loans had apparently made war inevitable.”183 The U.S. did
not want to make the same mistake twice. Additionally, Japan was an important trading partner
to the U.S. mostly in scrap iron and petroleum products. This trade with a wealthy sea power
was an important asset to the U.S. economy still suffering from the effects of the Great
Depression.184
Any inquiry from the U.S. brought about by the attacks was ignored by Japan. After the
bombing of the Panay by the Japanese, in January 1938, a Japanese diplomat gave a very
contradictory statement in response to American queries regarding the IJN. He claimed that
although Japan was moved by feelings of nonaggression, it was not necessary for the country to
reveal any information regarding her ship building plans since it was not bound by any treaty to
do so. This statement was the opposite of what Admiral Yonai claimed just seven months before
when he stated that his country was not considering building ships larger than treaty size.
183
184
David M. Kennedy, p. 400.
Ibid., p. 403.
70
Imperial Navy spokesmen also denied their service built ships of 40,000-45,000 tons.185
Statements made by the Japanese government would continue to alienate it from the western
world. During the early 1930s, Japanese officials denied that Japan was building ships larger
than treaty standards. By 1938, many of these officials would leave this denial behind and close
their doors altogether to inquiries regarding their ship building plans.
With no solid evidence on the IJN, the Roosevelt administration found it difficult to find
justification of its own battleship building program, in the defense of America’s Pacific interests.
In January 1938, according to Admiral William Leahy, naval intelligence gathered no precise
information concerning new Japanese ships. Additionally, in response to the navy’s requests for
more battleships, one senator commented that it was “a shot in the dark” as there was no direct
evidence to support the navy’s requests.186 During a congressional hearing with Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison, another congressman stated that the U.S. naval program
may have been receiving much of its Japanese information from newspaper reports. Great
disappointment was felt by a special advisory board on battleship design due to the lack of hard
facts on foreign naval buildups. It stated “large expenditures of time, effort and money” were
needed to develop a secret service that would retrieve such information.187 With no hard
evidence concerning the Japanese navy’s ship building processes, the U.S. Navy’s accusations
concerning the Japanese building battleships larger than treaty standards continued for the most
part to be ignored. The “shot in the dark” mentality of the U.S. Navy concerning the IJN would
carry on.
In March 1938, the American naval attaché based in Tokyo was told by his Italian
counterpart that three Japanese battleships of 46,000 tons each were being built. It is not exactly
185
Malcolm Muir, Jr. p. 476.
Ibid., p. 477.
187
Ibid.
186
71
clear why the Italian officer gave this information to his American counterpart. It may have been
a premeditated plant by the Japanese to further elude or intimidate the U.S.188 Lacking any solid
evidence, it was very likely the majority of information the U.S. Navy received during the late
1930s came from misleading information such as the press and rumors.
While the U.S. Navy did not receive the exact amount of appropriations it had requested
to modernize its fleet, Japan’s hostilities in China and its desire to move across the Pacific were
undeniable even to the U.S. government by the late 1930s. The U.S. government looked upon
Japan not as a nation it had great camaraderie with but as a possible threat. Amid the mystery
surrounding the total number and tonnage of Japanese battleships and lack of Japanese
compliance, on January 26, 1939, the U.S. officially announced it had terminated the 1911
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between itself and Japan.189 Notice of the termination of
this treaty is documented in a correspondence from Secretary of State Hull to the Japanese
Ambassador Horinouchi dated July 26, 1939. Japan’s advance into the Pacific region and the
threat it posed to American interests were not mentioned in the correspondence. Hull only
claimed that the termination of the treaty was required to aid in the alteration of American
interests. This was obligatory to safeguard American interests
…as new developments may require, the Government of the United States, acting
in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article XVII of the treaty under
reference, gives notice hereby of its desire that this treaty be terminated, and
having thus given notice, will expect the treaty, together with its accompanying
protocol, to expire six months from this date.190
The suspension of this treaty was a devastating blow to Japan. The treaty consisted of 18
articles and signed by late U.S. Secretary of State Philander C. Knox and Japanese Foreign
188
Ibid., p. 478.
James William Morley, (ed.) Deterrent Diplomacy. p. 203.
190
The Secretary of State (Hull) to the Japanese Ambassador (Horinouchi) Terminating the 1911 Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation between the U.S. and Japan, 26 July 1939.
189
72
MinisterYasuya Uchida, on February 21, 1911. The main points of the treaty included full
liberty of either Japanese or American citizens to
…enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale
and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and
shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and
commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for
trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects, submitting themselves to
the laws and regulations there established.191
Like the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation gave prestige to
Japan as a world power, allowing equal rights to the citizens of both nations when conducting
trade within one another’s territories. It was not the loss of trade that was such a humiliating
experience to Japan but the official stripping away of rights that made it an equal (if only in
trade) to its greatest rival in the Pacific. The abrogation of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation left Japan with very few options except to reinforce its relations to Germany. As a
result, the Japanese government strengthened its ties to the Anti-Comintern Pact it had
established with Berlin in 1936 with the Axis Pact of September 1940.192
As evident by the termination of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation by the
U.S., suspicion of Japan by the U.S. during this time was profound. Japan relied heavily on
American trade; the U.S. began to toy with the idea of economic sanctions at the time. A bill
was brought before Congress which called for the embargo of all Japanese trade. While the bill
did not pass, it was clear what the intentions of the U.S. were, to persuade Japan not to continue
its hostilities in China.193 Such pressure by the U.S. only fueled Japan’s ambitions of occupying
territory in the South Pacific, particularly the oil-rich Dutch East Indies as the cutting off of oil
supply by the U.S. became a possible reality.
191
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. (1911, April).
Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard (ed.). pp. 166-167.
193
James William Morley, (ed.) p 17.
192
73
Faced with the possibility of war on the European continent during the late 1930s, the
U.K. and France began to cut back on their Pacific commitments. The U.S., noticing this
cutback, looked upon itself as the defender of western interests and ideals in the region.194
Noticing the filling of the void by the U.S., Japan began to use the term “New Order” to
legitimate its Pacific claims. On November 3, 1938, on the birthday anniversary of the late
Emperor Meiji, Prime Minister Prince Konoye announced by radio a “New Order in East Asia.”
In this proclamation, Konoye claimed that Japan sought to develop and not ruin China. He
claimed Japan promoted the self-determination of China and that Japan would provide tutelage
in this process. It was only in this way that China and the rest of Asia could protect itself from
communism, colonialism, and Western influence. Konoye also insisted that Japan had claim to
China’s assets through trade, residency, and exploitation of its minerals. Konoye further insulted
the nation by stating that China had to recognize the independence of Manchukuo. The
proclamation by radio was heard by U.S. embassy translators who showed a transcription of the
speech to Ambassador Grew who was shocked by the demands.195 , The U.S. held a negative
view of Japan’s “New Order” rejecting it on December 31, 1938 in an official communication to
the Japanese government. This rejection of Japan’s “New Order” came seventeen months after
Sino-Japanese hostilities were renewed.196
The 1937 Sino-Japanese War began during the night of July 7, 1938 at the Marco Polo
Bridge near Peiping between Japanese forces and Chinese troops of General Sung Che-yuan.
The situation was settled fast and a cease-fire concluded on July 11. On July 25 and July 26,
skirmishes broke out again when General Sung’s army ceased withdrawing from Paoting as
194
Ibid., p. 231.
Robert Smith Thompson. Empires on the Pacific: World War II and the Struggle for the Mastery of Asia. Basic
Books: New York, 2001, pp. 70-71.
196
Robert W. Barnett. (1941, December 22) America’s Conversations with Japan. Eastern Survey, 10, 24 Institute
of Pacific Relations pp. 281-284.
195
74
agreed upon by the cease-fire. On July 28th, the militia in Tungchow “…attacked and killed 260
Japanese soldiers and civilians in retaliation for an accidental bombing of the Chinese barracks
by a Kwantung Army plane. Japanese forces assembled in the north, central, and southern China
by August 13. The situation at the Marco Polo Bridge soon escalated to a general war.197
In the midst of Japan’s “New Order,” the Office of Naval Intelligence believed it had an
approximate estimate of the size of Japanese battleships. However, flawed estimations were
used. The Office looked upon the required amount of vessels to counter the IJN from a monetary
viewpoint. According to the costs of Japanese warships and the amount of money the Diet
appropriated for the Imperial Navy in April 1939, the naval attaché in Tokyo determined that
eight battleships of about 40,000 tons were under construction. This was reported by Admiral
Harold to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee as “reasonably certain.” As a result, the Office of
Naval Intelligence reported to the General Board that Japan had eight battleships with a
conservative figure of twelve 16-inch guns. This estimate was reported with a claimed “small
margin of error.”198 The U.S. Navy looked to counter the IJN using only estimates and
assumptions to determine the size of guns the IJN was fitting on its battleships.
With these numbers, the IJN was determined to be less threatening to the Naval War
College. Consequently, in June 1940, officers at New Port only featured four modern ORANGE
battleships carrying nine 16-inch guns on the game board.199 The U.S. Navy felt confident in
these numbers no matter how flawed the estimates were. The actual size of the IJN fleet would
be shrouded in secrecy until well after the attacks at Pearl Harbor.
Although the Washington and London Naval treaties had expired, U.S. battleships were
still designed in accordance to treaty standards. The expiration of treaty standards came about
197
Mikiso Hane. pp. 487-490.
Malcolm Muir, Jr. p. 478.
199
Ibid.
198
75
with naval armament buildups and improvement in naval technology and ship design. While the
U.S. Navy considered the IJN its main naval threat in the Pacific, American ships were built to
fight navies of countries it would most likely never go to war with, with the exception of
Germany. For example, the “North Carolina,” “South Dakota”, and “Iowa” classes were
conventionally built, all held nine 16-inch guns, and none had the protective armor to stand up to
anything heavier than the 16-inch projectile. The largest naval gun Great Britain possessed at the
time was 16-inches. According to Dr. Malcolm Muir Jr. who formerly held the Secretary of the
Navy’s Research Chair in Naval History, “Even the armor of the super-heavy battleships of the
“Montana” class, halted in May 1942 after the Coral Sea battle would not have been proof
against the 18.1-inch shells of the Yamato.”200 The U.S. Navy was preparing its ships to fight
almost all ships except those of Japan. This was evident with the Montana class battleships, six
months after the U.S. officially declared war on Japan.
The Montana class battleships would have been the largest of the U.S. Navy. Cancelled
before the first keel had been laid, five were originally to be built. These ships although smaller
than Japan’s Yamato class were to have a standard displacement of 60,500 tons, making them
almost a third larger than the Iowa class. Armor would have included twelve 16”/50 guns and
greater protection against shellfire and underwater weapons. As a result, the speed of such ships
was intended to be much slower than other battleships. It would not have been able to pass
through the Panama Canal, having a beam too wide. The five Montana class battleships would
have given the U.S. Navy an advantage over any other navy. Though not possessing guns as big
as the Yamato class, the five Montanan ships designated to be built would have been numerically
superior to the Yamato’s two. However, the beginning of World War II marked an important
change in naval warfare from the supremacy of big guns to the dominance of the airplane.
200
Malcolm Muir, Jr. p. 480.
76
Realizing the battleship was no longer the foremost weapon of naval warfare, the Montana class
was cancelled to make way for the building of more aircraft carriers.201The majority of American
naval officers during the interwar period did not clearly understand Japan’s motives in the
Pacific and repeatedly underestimated its naval potential. Some analysts blindly believed Japan
did not have the capabilities to build large warships and as a result would not want to start a
naval arms race with other western nations. Much of Japan’s technological innovations, such as
the successful mounting of the 18-inch gun, the Long Lance torpedo, and the Zero were
downplayed time after time. A naval intelligence spokesman claimed that up to fall 1938, any
Japanese or U.S. ship under construction at that time was incapable of mounting any gun larger
than 16 inches. This claim came in light of the fact that 18-inch guns had already been mounted
successfully on the HMS Furious and two monitors in WWI, over 20 years before. Additionally,
in written messages to Roosevelt, both Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson and Chief of
Naval Operations William D. Puleston claimed that Japan only possessed 16-inches in its
arsenal.202
The greatest example of ignorance by U.S. officials was their complete surprise with the
Japanese fighter plane Mitsubishi A6M Zero-Sen which went on to become superior naval
fighter aircraft at the outbreak of the Pacific War. This surprise was alarming since American
pilots had faced the Zero in direct combat as early as 1937 fighting for the Chinese. In that same
year, Claire Chennault, who wrote The Role of Defensive Pursuit, gave clear warning of the
superiority of Japanese airpower to the USAAF. During Japan’s conquest of China during the
1930s, Chennault led the Flying Tigers, a group of American “volunteer” pilots who faced the
Zero in aerial combat. Recognizing the superior maneuverability of the Zero, he stressed to his
201
202
Globalsecurity.org. (2008) BB-67 Montana Class para. 1 and 8.
Malcolm Muir, Jr. pp. 478-479.
77
pilots, “Never try to turn with a Zero. Always get above the enemy and try to hit him with the
first pass.”203 It was with grave misfortune that the U.S. military did not heed the same advice
until well into the war. The idea that Japan was leading in aviation and naval innovation was not
accepted by the majority of U.S. government and naval officials.
While Japanese naval potential was frequently underestimated by the majority of
American naval officers, these same officers were worried about the overall speed of their own
naval ships. As a result of the London Treaty of 1930, U.S. officials were fully aware the IJN’s
Kongo class battle cruisers were reduced to three and that the superior high speed of these
cruisers could potentially be used as a detached wing to maneuver in advance of the navy’s battle
line and divide it or “cross its “T.” By crossing the T, a single warship or line of warships
crosses in front of the line of its target ships, allowing all its guns to fire broadside. This allows
more guns to be affectively used while only receiving fire from the forward guns of the target
ships. With the later use of the aircraft and missiles in naval warfare, the tactic becomes
obsolete.
To counter the advanced speed of the Kongo class cruisers, the U.S. Navy sought to make
a detached wing of its own consisting of one or more battleships. However, it was a dangerous
solution since the detached wing would be considerably slower than the Kongo class cruisers and
divide an already inferior fleet. Accordingly, the navy looked upon the reverse action as the best
answer to the IJN’s detached wing. Due to the relatively slow speed of U.S. ships, the reverse
action was considered a radical solution. If the IJN’s detached wing deployed first, the U.S.
203
Larry Dwyer. (2003, June 25) Mitsubishi A6M Zero-Sen – Japan. The Aviation History On-Line Museum.
para. 1.
78
Navy’s detached wing could gain the advantage by being deployed in the opposite direction.204
The General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy, 1940 pp.14-10 – 14-15 stated
This is because it would place the enemy’s light forces opposite our rear in a
position from which they cannot make a successful attack, and a reversal of
course by the enemy fleet will not improve the situation for the enemy unless a
redistribution of light forces could be made.205
By using the reverse action, it would limit the efficiency of a faster cruiser force that the IJN was
expected to utilize at the head of its battle line.206
While such American naval officers during this time did not clearly understood Japan’s
naval motives, the IJN was always considered a potential threat. Throughout the 1930s, the U.S.
Asiatic Fleet conducted naval exercises off Hawaii with simulated problems. Besides the
necessary training of the fleet, such naval exercises also served to intimidate and possibly
restrain the advancement of the IJN. The IJN was fully aware of the exercises carried out by the
U.S. Navy. Japanese documents which used intercepted American messages give example of a
22 September 1939 message from the chief of naval operations to the commander, U.S. Fleet.
The naval exercises off Hawaii were mentioned in detail. Japanese naval officials looked upon
such correspondence as direct evidence that the U.S. meant to restrain Japanese ambitions in the
Pacific.207
Additionally, on May 23, 1940 in anticipation of the occupation of France by Germany,
U.S. senior political and military affairs officials discussed their strategic policies with particular
reference to Japan. In his notes of the meeting, General George Marshall wrote, “we must not
become involved with Japan, that we must not concern ourselves beyond the 180th meridian, and
204
Trent Hone. (2003, October) The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941. The
Journal of Military History, 67, 4 p. 1120.
205
Ibid.
206
Ibid.
207
Edward J. Drea. pp. 201-202.
79
that we must concentrate on the South American situation.”208 As the U.S. became further
attached to the situation in Europe, the U.S. government feared a potential threat in the Pacific
and relied on the Pacific fleet to deter the Japanese.
The U.S. administration wanted Japan to believe it would intervene in any southern
expansion. Consequently, the U.S. fleet was ordered to remain at Pearl Harbor on May 1940 as a
deterrent mechanism instead of returning to its bases along the West Coast. When Admiral
James O. Richardson asked why the Pacific fleet remained in the Hawaiian area, Admiral Harold
Stark answered:
You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence
may have on the Japs going into the East Indies…
…Suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? My answer to that is, I don’t
know, and I think there is nobody on God’s green earth who can tell you.
I would point out one thing, and that is even if the decision here were for
the U.S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch
East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely
nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the
Japs don’t know what we are going to do, and so long as they don’t know, they
may hesitate or be deterred.209
The Pacific fleet was to remain as a deterrent mechanism to a possible enemy with unclear
motives.
During the interwar period, the U.S. Navy knew full well that although the stationing of
the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor served as a deterrent to a Japanese advance in the South Pacific,
the thousands of miles of open ocean from Hawaii to the Far East posed a strategic problem.
Naval officials determined that the IJN only had to elude the U.S. Pacific fleet until it ran out of
fuel and supplies. A Pacific base was necessary for post-battle repairs and refueling. Acquiring
and defending Pacific bases was necessary for the U.S. Pacific fleet to survive. Although the
208
Scott D. Sagan. (1988 Spring). The Origins of the Pacific War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18, 4 p.
898.
209
Ibid., p. 899.
80
U.S. Navy first determined the Philippines was adequate to meet its demands, due to the 1922
Washington Limitation imposed on all U.S. Pacific bases west of Pearl Harbor, the Philippines
would be an easy target to a rapidly advancing IJN. Due to this, a stepwise advance from base to
base across the Pacific was necessary. The maintenance of permanent garrisons on each
acquired base was a waste of valuable resources. Instead, the U.S. Navy looked to temporary
fleet bases composed of repair ships, tenders, ammunition ships, oilers, and floating (towable)
dry docks to adequately maintain the Pacific battleships and carriers.210 This outline of attack
was recorded in the various Orange Plans for war with Japan, by the General Board and the
Naval War College during the 1920s and 1930s.211
Both the U.S. Army and Navy developed a deterrent strategy to prevent Japan from
moving south. The General Board determined as early as 1935 that the Philippines would be
taken during a swift Japanese invasion, the navy still proposed basing bombers in the Philippines
to keep Japan from taking Singapore and the Indies. If the IJN traveled near the islands they
would fall prey to the U.S. bombers, if they traveled too far east, they would encounter the
American Fleet at Pearl Harbor. These same officials believed the Japanese would not be able to
take the Philippines because so many of its troops were tied down in China and that the islands
would be reinforced with not just bombers but additional soldiers and other defenses.
The main error was that both Army and Navy officials believed Japan would attack the
Philippines only after the 100 bombers were in place and that the B-17 Flying Fortress and B-24
Super Flying Fortress were adequate enough to curtail a Japanese invasion.212 It was ironic that
the army and navy as well as the Roosevelt administration looked on the Philippines as a
210
Norman Friedman. pp. 174-175.
Ronald H. Spector. At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century. Penguin Books: New
York, 2002, p. 185.
212
Jonathan G. Utley. Going to War with Japan: 1937-1941. The University of Tennessee Press: Knoxville, 1985,
p.158.
211
81
deterrent even though the General Board had previously stated the Philippines would fall to a
first strike by the Japanese. The successful defense of the Philippines was a false belief that later
proved disastrous for the U.S.213 However, at the same time, Great Britain desperately sought
the military aid of the U.S. against Nazi aggression. Ignoring the advice of military advisors,
Roosevelt made the decision to extend full military assistance to Great Britain in June 1940. The
same military advisors who were against Roosevelt’s decision believed that such a commitment
would inhibit America’s own rearmament and limit its commitments elsewhere, mainly in the
Pacific.214 The commitment of military aid to Great Britain also included the concentration of
U.S. naval forces in the Atlantic. This came at the expense of the U.S. Pacific fleet. Although
Roosevelt was gravely concerned with Japanese aggression, he deemed Nazi Germany the more
immediate threat.
Ever worried of Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia, the Roosevelt administration
sought to influence Japan through the threat of an oil embargo and military intervention. U.S.
policy makers quickly realized they could use American oil as an unorthodox hostage in their
attempts to curb Japan’s southern advances. However, in July 1940, the oil embargo proposal
was scratched because the Roosevelt administration believed if implemented, the embargo would
have provoked Japan to attack the Dutch East Indies to gain its oil fields. The seizure of these oil
fields by Japan would also cut off the U.S. from valuable supplies of rubber and tin that was in
the region. Additionally, the President believed Great Britain would be cut from valuable food
commodities provided by Australia which included meat, wheat, and corn. This lifeline was
213
Ibid.
William Emerson. (1958-1959). Franklin Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief In World War II. Military Affairs,
Society for Military History 22, 4 p. 188.
214
82
essential for the survival of Great Britain in its war against Germany.215 The oil rich Dutch East
Indies remained a potent and valuable prize to Japan which relied on the majority of its oil
imports from the U.S. Nonetheless, such an embargo by the U.S. came a year later.
Realizing the danger an oil embargo may cause, the American government instead made
it mandatory for any U.S. corporation to seek government approval before certain items were
traded with Japan. Such items included scrap iron and oil. However, on August 31, an embargo
was finally placed on aviation gasoline, a resource necessary to the IJN.216 Japan in both its land
and sea campaigns utilized the airplane arguably more than any other nation in the 1930s and
early 1940s. Like Germany with its Luftwaffe during the European Blitzkrieg, Japan was quick
to utilize aviation to conduct war. However, unlike the Germans who fought primarily land
campaigns on the European continent, the Japanese faced thousands of square miles of ocean.
The airplane provided a necessary and quick solution to Japan’s offensive capabilities. The
embargo placed on aviation gasoline by the U.S. was a serious blow to Japan.
The Japanese were left with few options. To continue their invasion of China, the
Japanese needed oil but knew they it could no longer rely on the U.S. Additionally, the Dutch
East Indies were valuable to the U.S. as well since it depended on the territory for rubber and
tin.217 The Dutch East Indies was significantly important to the economic prosperity of Holland,
a large trade partner with the U.S, and a major factor in the international trade of the world. For
example, as of 1932, the Dutch East Indies provided one-third the rubber, 90 percent of the
quinine, and 70 percent of the pepper for the world. The territory also generated large quantities
of petroleum, coffee, tea, sugar, and other products. Approximately 10 percent of its foreign
215
Informal Remarks of President Roosevelt to the Volunteer Participation Committee on Why Oil Exports
Continued to Japan, Washington , July 24, 1941.
216
James William Morley. (ed.) Deterrent Diplomacy. p. 231.
217
James William Morley. (ed.) The Fateful Choice: Japan’s Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941. Columbia
University Press: New York, 1980, p. 131.
83
trade was with the United States.218 Seizure of the Dutch East Indies by the Japanese would not
only be the gain of a strategically important island chain but the capture of a major portion of
valuable commodities to the world.
Feeling further restrained by both Great Britain and the U.S., Japan began its conquest of
South East Asia. With consent to land forces in French Indochina from the French Vichy
government in June 1940, Japanese Prime Minister Matsuoka Yosuke declared the plan to
initiate the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to the U.S. in August 1940.219 Yosuke
declared the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as
The construction of a new order in East Asia means the construction of a new
order under which Japan establishes the relationship of common existence and
mutual prosperity with the peoples of each and every land in Greater East Asia,
that is East Asia including the South Seas. In a position of equality with every
other country, Japan may freely carry on enterprises, trade, and emigration in and
to each and every land in Greater East Asia, and thereby be enabled to solve its
population problem.220
In reality, the common existence between the peoples of East Asia claimed by Yosuke did not
exist. Japan merely attempted to replace western colonialism with its own using force.
With this guiding principle to free Asia of western exploitation, northern parts of French
Indochina were occupied by Japanese troops by September 1940.221 U.S. opposition to Japan’s
military presence in French Indochina was voiced over a year before.222 The Japanese
government sought the Tonkin Province in its war against China, as the location served as the
perfect staging point for Japanese troops and use of its airfields. Ever wary of its oil supply
being taken away by the U.S., IJN officials permitted intervention of North French Indochina by
218
John A. Fairlie. (1932 August). The Dutch East Indies. The American Political Science Review 26, 4. American
Political Science Association. p. 711.
219
Globalsecurity.org. (2007) IJN Imperial Japanese Navy (Nihon Kaigun) para. 15.
220
Charles A. Fisher. (1950, April-June) The Expansion of Japan: A Study in Oriental Geopolitics: Part II. The
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Geographical Journal 115,4/6 p. 179.
221
Globalsecurity.org. (2007) IJN Imperial Japanese Navy (Nihon Kaigun) para. 15.
222
James William Morley. (ed.) Deterrent Diplomacy. p. 231.
84
the Japanese military, calling it a limited engagement. They believed the U.S. would not have
likely placed an oil embargo on Japan as a result. However, they believed an oil embargo would
have been placed by the U.S., had all of French Indochina been occupied by Japanese troops.223
The occupation of North French Indochina was complete by September 23, 1940.224
The occupation by Japanese troops alarmed President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
administration. It responded by imposing an embargo on U.S. steel and scrap iron to Japan. The
embargo was seen as an “unfriendly act” by Japan.225
While Japanese troops landed in French Indochina, on September 7, 1940, secret
negotiations occurred between the Japanese foreign minister, Matsuoka Yosuke and the personal
emissary of Joachim von Ribbentrop, General Heinrich Stahmer, to create a Tripartite Pact with
Imperial Japan, the Nazi, and Italian Fascist regimes. The importance of the Pact was that its
parties would go to war against any nation that attacked a member of the agreement.226 The
Japanese looked to further restrain the Soviet Union and saw the Tripartite Pact as a way to
further strengthen ties with Germany which included the gain of advanced military
technology.227 Most importantly, with Germany’s rapid victory in Europe, Japanese officials
were concerned with the future of French and Dutch Pacific colonies. They believed Germany
would claim the territories for itself. With French and Dutch territories in jeopardy, Japan
looked to British territories as more likely prizes. In doing so, Japan still upheld its duty to the
Tripartite Pact by applying pressure on British interests in the Far East.
The chief support for the Tripartite Pact came from the Prime Minister and army.
Japanese Naval officials, while supporting the advance of the Japanese Empire looked upon the
223
Scott D. Sagan. pp. 899-900.
Mikiso Hane, p. 508.
225
Globalsecurity.org. (2007) IJN Imperial Japanese Navy (Nihon Kaigun) para. 15.
226
Scott D. Sagan. p. 900.
227
Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard (ed.). p. 167.
224
85
Alliance with concern. A large number of senior naval officers which included the Navy
Minister, Admiral Yoshida Zengo, worried that such a Pact guaranteed war with the U.S.
However, there was deep division in the IJN itself with many lower-ranking naval officers in
command of the bureaus and divisions of the Navy Ministry and Navy General Staff, who
favored Matsuoka, the chief architect of the alliance. Yoshida, suffering from a considerable
amount of stress with this division, became ill, and resigned from his position. Admiral Oikawa
Koshiro succeeded him on September 5, 1940. This division within the IJN reflected the
indecision of its top commanders who were caught in between the crossfire of a nation hungry
for expansion at the expense of the destruction of peace and those that sought to maintain it.
While the army fully supported the alliance, so too did the navy but asserted that every feasible
measure be taken to avoid war with the U.S.228
The planning and division of support of the Tripartite Pact on behalf of Japan was known
to some degree by both Great Britain and the U.S a year before the Pact was formulated. In a
confidential Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State, dated February 6, 1939,
the British Charge d’ Affairs, V.A.L. Mallet, claimed the Japanese government was not prepared
to accept the new form of alliance proposed by Germany and Italy and that it was instead
devising counter-proposals of an alliance solely against the Soviets. The British government
believed Japan agonized about losing her access of raw materials from the U.S., should she
accept the alliance.229
With the Tripartite Pact, Imperial Japan moved further away from the U.S. Although the
forming of the alliance posed a severe threat to the U.S., American policy makers faced a
228
Nobutaka Ike. Japan’s Decision For War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences. Stanford University Press:
Stanford, 1967, pp. 3-4.
229
Department of State Memorandum of Conversation (Confidential) (1939 February 6). The British Charge d’
Affairs, Mr. V.A.L. Mallet.
86
number of restraints in their attempts to react. First, a possible war with Japan did not sit well
with the American public. Second, the U.S. government feared that if American policy
continued to discourage Japanese expansion, it would backfire and provoke rather than restrain
aggression. Finally, tensions existed between the civilian and military authorities regarding
America’s response to Japan. The military leadership believed that taking only minor diplomatic
actions such as stationing the fleet at Pearl Harbor would diminish combat effectiveness.
Although the public was outraged, it did not yet support war against Japan.230
Roosevelt had to react and understood the U.S. had a powerful weapon against Japan in
the form of American sources of supply. “He also knew that it was a dangerous weapon to
use.”231 Having already declared an embargo on premium grades of scrap iron and steel and
high-octane aviation gasoline to “…restrain Japanese pressure on the European colonial
possessions in Southeast Asia…” on July 26, 1940, Roosevelt toyed with the idea of an all out
embargo when the invasion of North French Indochina occurred. However, Japan at the time
received 80 percent of its oil from the U.S. If the embargo were implemented Roosevelt believed
war would occur between Japan and the U.S.232 It took the occupation of all of French Indochina
by Japanese forces a year later for Roosevelt to implement an all out embargo on Japan.
To control the Pacific Ocean, Japanese naval planners regarded their war ships as their
most powerful weapons. Although the U.S. Navy was aware of Japan’s Pacific intentions,
particularly through the interception of Japanese ciphers and codes after 1940, it was still unable
to locate any hard information on the technical attributes of such ships.233 It was this veil of
230
Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard (ed.) p. 901.
David M. Kennedy, p. 505.
232
Ibid.
233
Malcolm Muir, Jr. p. 473.
231
87
secrecy that imperial naval officers relied on in their attempts to build technologically superior
ships to match the quantity of ships that the U.S. could produce.
In this veil of secrecy, it was not until 1942 that a western diplomat visited the ship yards
where such vessels were being constructed at Kure and Yokosuka, well after Japan’s surprise
attack at Pearl Harbor. This was a German attaché who visited the Yamato in October 1942.234
The Japanese took great detail in hiding their ships from Western eyes. “The building docks
themselves were screened by immense curtains of sisal rope (causing a temporary sisal shortage
and complaints from fishermen).”235 The technical specifications of these ships were on a “need
to know” basis. During postwar interrogation, even Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, a top Japanese
officer who once flew his flag onboard the Yamato, claimed that he was not sure of the
maximum speed of the vessels and the exact caliber of the main battery pieces. In the Japan
Navy College, a Navy gunnery officer stated, “…we were not permitted to talk about these ships.
The guns were listed as ’40 Special.’ I think that they were 46cm (about 18 inches).”236 These
statements demonstrated that if such secrets were kept from Imperial Navy officers, the
Americans had very little luck in retrieving such technical information on Japanese naval ships.
While American naval intelligence was handicapped by the lack of hard evidence
concerning Japanese naval ships, it was not totally left in the dark. Through the interception and
analysis of radio traffic analysis, American naval intelligence gained some knowledge on
Japanese secrecy. Radio traffic analysis is the method of intercepting and analyzing radio
messages with the intention of gaining information from patterns in communication. Although it
gave a lot of information concerning the movements of Japanese ships, very little was retrieved
concerning Japanese planning and new construction. Before 1941, U.S. naval intelligence
234
Ibid., p. 476.
Ibid.
236
Ibid.
235
88
occasionally got lucky in retrieving detailed information concerning Japanese operating
practices. However, the precious technical matters that U.S. naval intelligence sought was
dismal at best, particularly with the Long Lance torpedo and other weapons. Americans who
lived in Japan, such as the American attaché in Tokyo were forbidden to visit Kure (the building
location of the battleship Yamato) and other naval hot spots.237
Additionally, in 1941, according to former head of the Office of Naval Intelligence,
Captain William D. Puleston, due to the vast amount of work required in designing new naval
ships, the Technical Division of the Imperial Navy most likely did not have the capability before
1939 to build two conventional battleships of 35,000 tons.238 He was wrong in his estimate since
construction on the Yamato class (72,000 tons) began as early as 1935. Japan during the 1930s
was at the forefront of naval warship design.
Due to the lack of hard evidence on Japanese ship construction, the navy relied on other
threats to report to Congress on while defending its own capital ship plans. Such an example
was seen when Assistant Secretary Charles Edison asserted that the naval buildup of other
countries should not have mattered, since defending the U.S. was considered a local problem.
He also claimed that battleships were necessary for the defense of the U.S. because there were
other countries building them besides Japan. Edison stated:
The program is not based on what Japan alone is doing, because, under the treaty,
or the agreement of 1936, we have information about England and France, and we
know something about what Germany is doing. Japan is the one that we do not
have full information about.239
The claims by U.S. Navy officials in support for the appropriation of funds to build more
battleships were filled with many gaps. In its failure to recognize Japan as its greatest naval
237
Ibid., p. 477.
Ibid., p. 479.
239
Ibid.
238
89
threat, the navy instead labeled Germany as a very distant naval threat, France not a naval threat,
and although they claimed Great Britain’s Navy was powerful, war between England and the
U.S. was impossible. However, because the Royal Navy was the only navy the U.S. had full
intelligence on, it was often used as a “standard of comparison.”240 Concerning the IJN, the U.S.
Navy could not produce detailed estimates on how to counter it because the U.S. Navy simply
did not have the information to do so.
Months away from the attacks on Pearl Harbor, Japan continued its advance well into
French Indochina. In July 1941, Japan occupied more Indochinese bases, utilizing large numbers
of its naval, land, and air forces in its campaign.241 The U.S. along with Great Britain and the
Netherlands responded by freezing Japanese assets and placing an all-out embargo on Japan.242
In building an ocean empire, steel, scrap iron, and oil are the most important material
requirements. The embargos of these items by the U.S. was seen as a direct threat to the empire
of Japan.243
A steady supply of steel was vital to a growing navy such as the IJN. To give example of
the IJN’s demand of a steady flow of steel, during a Liaison Conference on October 2, 1941, the
Vice Minister of the Navy stated the 1941 level of steel was inadequate. According to the Vice
Minister, “The proposed plan for building new warships calls for 180,000 tons in 1942, 250,000
tons in 1943, 270,000 tons in 1944, 300,000 tons in 1945, 370,000 tons in 1946, 340,000 tons in
1947, 330,000 tons in 1948.”244
Out of all the embargoes the Roosevelt administration could have placed, its embargo on
oil was the most devastating for it threatened the very existence of Imperial Japan. Many in
240
Ibid., pp. 479-480.
Robert W. Barnett. p. 285.
242
Globalsecurity.org. (2007) IJN Imperial Japanese Navy (Nihon Kaigun) para. 15.
243
Ibid., para. 18.
244
Nobutaka Ike. p. 192.
241
90
Washington knew full well the possible dangers such an embargo would bring. Roosevelt’s
decision went against the advice of many of his government and military advisors who feared the
embargo would spark a war.245 Additionally, Roosevelt continued to demand Japanese forces
withdraw from China. If Japan responded to this demand, it may have been looked upon by
Roosevelt as a great success. However, this response by the Japanese military would have
possibly caused a backlash. If the Japanese Army and Navy were not preoccupied with China,
their forces would be freed up to advance south. Although Roosevelt’s decision to make this last
demand is questionable, evidence suggests that it was made after the U.S. viewed its demands for
a Japanese withdrawal from French Indochina as hopeless.246 Japan initially reacted by barring
commercial shipping to the U.S. and freezing U.S. finances.247 Japan became further isolated
from its former allies which included the U.S., Great Britain, and the Netherlands with its own
economic blockades and felt ever more the need to use force against them. The final oil embargo
was the last straw for Japan. According to Norman Friedman,
At an imperial conference, the delegates heard that U.S. industrial potential was
crushing, and that Japan had only eighteen months of oil left. The choice, as they
saw it, was to live like slaves or die like men; they chose to die.248
With Japan’s naval arms buildup, the majority of the U.S. public and government sought
some form of action against Japan short of an all out war. However, the focus was in Europe.
American policy makers saw eventual intervention in both the European and Asian theaters but
saw Europe as their primary focus. With the tumult in Europe, Congress was locked in a nearly
catastrophic struggle regarding whether to extend the Selective Service Act.249 Under this act,
245
William Emerson. p. 189.
Norman Friedman. Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests. Naval Institute Press: Annapolis,
2001, p. 173.
247
Robert W. Barnett. p. 281.
248
Norman Friedman. pp. 189-190.
249
Curtis W Tarr. (1967 Summer). The General Board Joint Staff Proposal of 1941. Military Affairs, 31, p. 86.
246
91
the Selective Service System would register, classify, and select men to become necessary
manpower for the American military forces. Lewis B. Hershey of the New York Times stated
that the main point of the act would be to procure men “without unnecessarily disturbing vital
industry and other agencies and facilities which contribute materially to the stability of our
national life…”250 The act was finally passed on August 12, 1941, in the House of
Representatives by a vote of 203 to 202. This near stalemate reflected the nation’s negative
attitude on the possibility of waging war or defending American interests abroad.251
As Japanese-American relations worsened during the late 1930s, the IJN expected
Washington to significantly reduce or eliminate oil exports to Japan all together. This would
have a devastating blow on Japan since the U.S. was its major petroleum supplier. As a result,
Japan looked upon the Netherlands East Indies as its only feasible option as the oil supply from
the Soviet Union was unreliable. However, Japanese war planners knew that the takeover of
East Indies’ oil fields would entangle Japan in a conflict with the U.S. Torn with their decision,
the Japanese naval leadership fell prey to circular reasoning.252 Japan needed the East Indies for
its survival as an empire, yet it knew that it would bring about war with the U.S. if it occupied
the territory.
Reflecting the attitude of many American policy makers regarding Japan, in an address at
Providence on Armistice Day, November 11, 1941, the Secretary of Navy William Franklin
Knox gave his thoughts on the likelihood of war between Japan and the U.S. Recognizing the
outbreak of war in the Far East, Knox claimed the goal of the Axis powers (Japan, Italy, and
250
Elias Huzar. (1942 May). Selective Service Policy 1940-1942. The Journal of Politics, 4, 2 Cambridge
University Press p. 201.
251
Curtis W. Tarr. p. 86.
252
Globalsecurity.org. (2007) IJN Imperial Japanese Navy (Nihon Kaigun) para. 18.
92
Germany) was world-wide domination.253 Appointed by Roosevelt in 1940, “Knox was a
onetime Rough Rider, a well-known Chicago newspaper editor, the Republican vice-presidential
nominee in 1936, and a vociferous internationalist.”254 Most importantly, Knox supported U.S.
military aid to Great Britain while the U.S. was still officially neutral. Most experts believe this
was the real reason why Roosevelt appointed him as Secretary of the Navy.
Knox acknowledged that the Axis powers not only wanted to control huge territories of
land but also the high seas. While stating the threat of German submarines in the Atlantic was a
reality at the time, the U.S. was faced with “grim possibilities” in the Pacific and that the U.S.
had to be prepared for “instant readiness of defense.”255 Like in Europe, Knox acknowledged the
national security of the U.S. was threatened in the Pacific.
In Japan-U.S. relations, Knox asserted that while the U.S. had attempted to maintain
cordial relations with Japan, these relations had suffered. Due to the circumstances, Knox called
upon the U.S. to have absolute patience in dealing with Japan. Knox claimed that while the
rights of the U.S. had been violated, it continued to cooperate with “every liberal and peaceloving element in Japan.” He pointed out that the U.S. continued to authorize the approval of
supplies that were sent to Japan when it could have kept them for its own defense. However, the
lack of maintaining cordial relations by the Japanese led Knox to state,
…there comes a time in the life of every man, and every nation, when principles
cannot be sacrificed, and when vital and essential rights can no longer be ignored;
a time when to go further would mean that our liberty and forbearance would be
misunderstood. We are moved and actuated in the Pacific, no less than in the
Atlantic, solely by consideration of self-defense.256
253
Address Delivery by the Secretary of the Navy (Knox) at Providence, November 11, 1941.
David M. Kennedy. pp. 457-458.
255
Address Delivery by the Secretary of the Navy (Knox) at Providence, November 11, 1941.
256
Ibid.
254
93
Knox understood a naval confrontation with Japan would occur before long and that the U.S. had
to be prepared. He also spoke of a new world order which would have to be established after the
war in which the U.S. would play a prominent role.257 Knox gave full warning of the possible
dangers brought about by a powerful nation in the Pacific and the threat it posed to the U.S.
particularly with its navy at a time.
Having failed gathering any hard evidence on the IJN, it was not until 1941 that the U.S.
Navy gathered some dubious details of Japanese battleships. The first piece of information
concerned merely the names of these ships and “the fact that they had entered service.”258 It was
the lack of information regarding the IJN that caught the U.S. completely by surprise. While
most of the navy realized the potential threat of the IJN, the U.S. Congress in most cases thought
it unspeakable that Japan would secretly ignore previous and outdated treaties of naval
limitation. Consequently, they assumed that if the U.S. went to war with Japan, it would match
the IJN according to treaty standards. As historian Malcolm Muir Jr. stated, “Mirror-imaging
without an adequate intelligence base can be a dangerous proposition.”259 What was seen
throughout the interwar period was the idealistic belief by Congressional officials that Japan
would play by the rules in a naval engagement, equipping its ships according to treaty standards
and abiding by naval limitations. However, this was not the case.
In understanding the lack of information gathered by U.S. intelligence concerning the
IJN, the necessary contrast concerning Japanese intelligence is vital. The Japanese did not have
dubious details on battleships like the Americans but hard evidence on the size and capability of
the U.S. Pacific fleet. This truly demonstrates how far ahead the Japanese were in comparison to
the Americans in understanding potential enemies. Details concerning Japanese espionage is
257
Ibid.
Malcolm Muir, Jr. p. 480.
259
Ibid., p. 485.
258
94
presented to demonstrate how poorly prepared the Americans were in understanding the most
powerful navy in the Western Pacific during the interwar period. Besides code breaking, the
Japanese used intelligence officers that gave eye witness accounts of key military and naval sites
throughout the Pacific. The Japanese achieved much in espionage, masking it through
diplomatic and consular offices. By December 1941, days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the
Japanese found great success in reporting on the U.S. Pacific fleet. Nagao Kita, the Japanese
Consul-General in Honolulu, reported to Japanese officials on December 5 that “eight
battleships, three light cruisers, and sixteen destroyers” were in port at Pearl Harbor.
Additionally, he claimed torpedo nets were not installed to protect the battleships and balloon
barrages were not in place. The next day, December 6, one day before the attack, he altered this
figure reporting
…nine battleships, three light cruisers, three submarine tenders and seventeen
destroyers were in port; four light cruisers and two destroyers were in dock.
Heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers had left. Apparently no fleet air arm
reconnaissance was being carried out.260
This concise and final message was received at 6pm December 6 (Tokyo time; 6:50 am
December 6 Washington time) by the Japanese task force. Such exact data on the U.S. Pacific
fleet was far more accurate than the U.S. Navy’s own. It is interesting to note that Kita’s
message clearly stated the U.S. heavy cruisers and carriers were not in port. If the message was
properly received by the IJN and analyzed before the attacks on Pearl Harbor took place, then
why was it later a surprise to Japanese Zero pilots who took part in the attacks to not find any
carriers present? Without sinking the carriers, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto considered Pearl
Harbor ultimately a failure, knowing that the Japanese empire could not survive a prolonged
naval war with the U.S. where carriers would be the primary tools of destruction. Nonetheless,
260
Louis Allen. (1987 October) Japanese Intelligence Systems. Journal of Contemporary History 22, 4 Intelligence
Services during the Second World War: Part 2, Sage Publications, Ltd. p. 550.
95
espionage conducted on the U.S. Pacific fleet by Japanese diplomatic or naval officials is still
truly miraculous given the precision of detail uncovered.
Due to Hawaii’s large immigrant Japanese population which settled in the Hawaiian
Islands in the early 20th century as pineapple and sugarcane workers, it was very easy for the
Japanese government to extract intelligence on the U.S. Pacific Fleet. In many cases,
information on everything from the morale of U.S. forces to ship activity in Pearl Harbor was
reported by Japanese immigrants who worked around Pearl Harbor in cafes and restaurants with
links to the Japanese government or IJN. Even the panoramic pictures of Pearl Harbor attached
to the cockpits of Japanese planes in the attacks on December 7th, 1941 were actually post cards
purchased at a Honolulu gift shop.261
However, it did not end there. In understanding the habits of the U.S. Pacific fleet, Takeo
Yoshikawa, a Japanese agent, went as far as renting a Piper Cub (type of airplane), flying it over
the Harbor on December 5, 1941, “noting the aircraft on Ford Island and the number of vessels
in harbour.” Yoshikawa also reported “the lack of torpedo nets, of barrage balloons and of naval
aircraft on reconnaissance.” The irony in Yoshikawa’s messages was the fact that most of them
had been intercepted by the Americans. The Japanese diplomatic code had already been cracked
by September 1940. However, these messages were not “decoded, translated, assessed and
distributed” in time. If they were, it would have given the U.S. military some time to prepare for
the attack.262
Regarding espionage conducted by the U.S. on the IJN during the interwar period, few
sources exist that offer any details other than code breaking. There are no remarkable accounts
of U.S. intelligence officers spying on Japanese shipyards or naval exercises. Throughout most
261
262
Ibid., pp. 550-551.
Ibid., p. 551.
96
of its history, the islands of Japan have been one of the most ethnically isolated land masses in
the world. This was still true during the interwar period. Any American or European would
have been extremely noticeable, unlike in the American territory of Hawaii which had a large
Japanese population. Any American who lived in Japan during this time was almost always
attached to the U.S. diplomatic and consular offices. As the possibility of war between Japan
and the U.S. became a reality, the Japanese government intensified its efforts to hide its naval
activity from American personnel. They were restricted in their movements and any military
installation or naval base was strictly off limits. The only Europeans that had access to such
information were German and Italian officials.
President Roosevelt clearly understood the growing threats of Germany and Japan as the
months of 1941 flew by. With a possible outbreak of war, the First Summit at Placentia Bay,
Newfoundland took place on August 9, 1941 between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
and Roosevelt. In this summit, Churchill desperately sought American involvement in the war
against Nazi Germany.263 Although Sumner Wells was an expert on Latin American issues, he
as undersecretary of state played a significant role in Roosevelt’s staff during this summit.264
Welles with the direction of Roosevelt claimed that if Japan continued on its course of
aggression in the South Pacific, the U.S. War and Navy Departments determined war with Japan
had to be avoided at all costs. If war did break out between the two nations, it would tie up the
majority of the American fleet when it should be concentrated in the Atlantic.265 Roosevelt’s
decision was influenced by Churchill who desperately sought American military aid in its fight
263
Theodore A. Wilson. The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay 1941. Houghton Mifflin
Company: Boston, 1969, p. 90.
264
The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers. Sumner Welles (1892-1961) Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic Site, Hyde
Park, New York (2003).
265
Theodore A. Wilson. p. 90.
97
against Germany. Regarding Japan, Churchill feared that due to U.S. sanctions on Japan, to
which Britain fully supported, it would nonetheless compel Japan to attack Britain’s Asian
possessions, while the U.S. would stand back and do nothing. To prevent this, Churchill
persuaded Roosevelt to declare that further expansion by Japan may result in conflict with the
U.S.266
The summit was concluded with the Atlantic Charter affirming basic principles “for a
better future for the world.” Echoing Wilsonian ideals, the Atlantic Charter became a call for the
American public to go to war to protect American rights, which included the maintenance of a
peaceful commerce. Additionally, it further reiterated America’s unique role in the world to
protect Democracy. The Atlantic Charter was created to curtail the aggression of both Germany
and Japan. Nevertheless, the commitments proposed by President Roosevelt at Placentia Bay
further committed the U.S. to war.267
While Roosevelt and Churchill sought to contain the Japanese advance in the South
Pacific, the Japanese Cabinet with the Chiefs of Staff met to discuss the growing threat of the
U.S. On September 6, 1941, these officials met in the Imperial Conference Chamber. The
Conference was conducted the Emperor’s spokesman, Privy Council President Yoshimi Hara.
The conference was also attended by Emperor Hirohito himself. During the conference, the
generals and admirals asserted that diplomacy with the U.S. had failed to achieve the objective of
expelling the influence of the western powers from Asia and to establish a New Order in Greater
East Asia.
The military solution was to strike first before the U.S. and Great Britain had time to
react. General Sugiyama forecast that the campaign would last three months. Although it was a
266
Jonathan G. Utley. p. 158.
Joyce P. Kaufman. A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: Lanham,
2006, pp. 62-63.
267
98
gamble, the General believed a lightning takeover of Southeast Asia, its oil and natural
resources, and finally the set up of a defensive perimeter composed of Pacific Island bases could
permit Japanese diplomats to hastily bring the war to an end with the U.S. and Great Britain.268
While setting up the defensive perimeter, Japan would fight a war of attrition. Assuming that the
U.S. Pacific fleet responded by sending its fleet into the South Pacific, the IJN would primarily
attack by submarines and carrier launched aircraft. With the U.S. fleet badly damaged, the IJN
would then attack in a concluding battle at a “location and time most favorable to Japan.”269
However, the swift use of the military in an all-out war alarmed other government officials and
the Emperor alike. Wanting to give diplomacy another try, Prime Minister Konoye was given
until October 15 to achieve positive results with the U.S..270
While negotiations were taking place, American code breakers intercepted detailed
reports of an increase of Japanese troop movements into south Indochina. As Konoye promised
the neutralization of Indochina, the intercepted reports proved to be the shot in the foot at any
promise for diplomatic negotiations. On October 16, 1941, with no resolution in sight, Konoye
resigned from office. The Emperor’s Jushin Council of elder statesmen, with the military’s
backing, “recommended the war minister, General Tojo, to succeed Prince Konoye.” Hirohito
quickly appointed Tojo. With this appointment and the Japanese government’s broadcast pledge
to “go forward with a united nation to accomplish its bold task”, the State Department
determined hard-line militarists were in complete control in Tokyo. That same day, the U.S.
military sent out a war alert to all U.S. Pacific bases: “BEST INTELLIGENCE SUGGESTS
268
John Costello. The Pacific War. Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc.: New York, 1981, pp. 112-113.
Ronald H. Spector. p. 185.
270
John Costello. pp. 112-113.
269
99
JAPS MIGHT ATTACK RUSSIA OR BRITISH AND DUTCH COLONIES IN THE EAST
INDIES.”271
Even with the failure of negotiations and with the alert issued, with an “undeclared war”
in the Atlantic, Roosevelt and his military chiefs did not seek to become entangled in a Pacific
War. The Army and Navy Chiefs stated that Europe was their biggest concern and war in the
Pacific had to be avoided at all costs, “at least until the Spring of 1942” when the War
Department believed an increase in U.S. air and submarine strength would pose a threat to
Japanese advance.272 In Japan, while the army supported going to war with the U.S. after
Konoye’s failure, Navy leaders looked upon the failures of negotiation with deep reluctance.
These Navy officials believed Japan would suffer defeat during a prolonged war with the
industrial might of the U.S.273
Throughout the interwar period, the U.S. Navy was fully aware of a hostile Japan in
Asia and the Pacific. However, the navy’s analysis was filled with many gaps concerning what
information was accurate and what was misleading. Nonetheless, naval officials still held firm in
their prediction that the next great naval war would be with Japan. Nonetheless, the navy’s
argument fell upon deaf ears of the American public and Congress. This was reflected in the
annual naval budget throughout the 1920s and 30s; naval appropriations were not sufficient to
build or maintain a large navy. Due to the lack of support, the navy looked upon any
sympathetic source to aid in modernizing its fleet and shore bases. These sources included the
General Board of the navy, prominent civilians, and powerful pressure groups. In doing this, the
271
Ibid, pp.114-116.
Ibid., p. 116.
273
Nobutaka Ike. p. 181.
272
100
navy hoped Japan would take notice and become less aggressive in its empire building in Asia by
recognizing a potential threat in the Pacific.274
While the U.S. Navy gave warning of an impending war with Japan, the U.S. could only
maintain its isolationist stance for so long, especially in light of its embargos on raw materials it
sent to Japan. The final embargoes placed on oil and steel were seen as direct threats to the
empire of Japan. On November 26, 1941, Roosevelt received intelligence of a Japanese naval
squadron moving into the South China Sea.275 Roosevelt, who firmly believed Japan would use
aggression against the interests of the U.S. and its allies, gave a final direct message to the
emperor of Japan on December 6, 1941. Roosevelt stated
During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military,
naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers
as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing
concentration in Indochina is not defensive in character.
Roosevelt claimed that with such large army and naval concentrations, an attack on the
Philippines, the islands of the East Indies, Malaysia, and Thailand was likely. Finally, the
President demanded that Japanese forces be withdrawn from Indochina and termed the
circumstance “a keg of dynamite.”276 The emperor received the message at 3 a.m. on December
8 (Japanese time) at the very moment the Japanese attack force was flying over Oahu.277
Conclusion
With this final move, the IJN caught the U.S. and the world by surprise. Although a
naval war with Japan was predicted by U.S. naval officials as early as the 1920s, the American
government and public for the most part, continued to ignore the warning signs until it was too
late. The U.S. Navy repeatedly advised the U.S. government of a future war with Japan. It was
274
Gerald E. Wheeler. p. 61.
Scott D. Sagan. p. 919.
276
President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito of Japan .[94], 6 December 1941.
277
Scott D. Sagan. p. 919.
275
101
also fighting to survive, suffering from drastic cuts in naval spending brought about by a weary
nation suffering from the Great Depression. At the same time, the U.S. wanted to remain aloof of
international dangers for as long as possible.
Immediately after World War I, the U.S. government downsized its military branches,
wanting to never fight another devastating war again. As a part of this reduction, Congress
determined it only necessary to maintain an Atlantic and Pacific fleet large enough to defend
American coasts. This decision was ultimately enforced by the U.S. government when war was
quickly approaching.
The Washington Conference and treaties in 1921-22 helped to ease naval rivalry when
Japan accepted a naval ratio of 5-5-3, inferior to those of the American and British navies.
However, the Great Depression brought the short lived success of naval ratios to an end. While
Japan came to a second naval agreement at the London Naval Conference in 1930, it was
extremely unfavorable in Japan. Feeling further restrained, Japan struck at Manchuria a year
later. The land grab by Japan was relatively easy. Japan’s actions were heavily censured by the
League of Nations but nothing more. The General Board saw Japan’s actions as proof the nation
desired to spread its empire further into Asia and the Western Pacific. The General Board of the
U.S. Navy pleaded to Congress for additional funding to modernize and increase the size of the
U.S. Navy. Though the U.S. disapproved of Japan’s actions, Congress repeatedly ignored the
General Board, desiring to retain an isolationist stance in world affairs.
While the relations of Japan and the U.S. deteriorated throughout the 1930s, Americans
continued to turn their heads to Japan’s actions in Asia and the Pacific. The U.S. government’s
response to Japan’s hostile actions in Asia and the Pacific was not in the form of direct
intervention but through the embargoes of high-octane aviation gasoline, steel and scrap iron,
102
and finally oil when Japanese forces occupied all of French Indochina in mid 1941. The U.S.
embargo of oil was the most devastating blow to Japan because 80 percent of its oil came from
the U.S. Japanese officials saw this move as a direct threat to the Japanese empire. With this, a
naval war soon became a reality on December 7th, 1941.
The U.S. naval policy of the IJN during the interwar period represented a fascinating time
in American history. While the General Board gave repeated warning of the dangers of the IJN,
the U.S. government continued to have an ostrich-like attitude. Instead of actively studying the
Japanese government and its military actions, particularly its navy in the West Pacific, the U.S.
government chose to ignore them, refusing to recognize the significance of Japan’s actions to
American interests abroad and the world. Most of the information gained on the IJN during this
period was nothing more than rumor. The U.S. government had no factual reports of the size and
technological innovations of the IJN until well after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Historian
Edwin O. Reischauer gave an excellent example of U.S. ignorance of Japan stating,
More careful study of Japan probably would not have been enough to avoid the
Pacific War, but it might have enabled us to delay it and thereby make its opening
phases less costly to ourselves. We paid a heavy price for letting prejudice blind
us to the necessity of studying our enemies as well as our friends.278
Of course things might have been different if the U.S. government had taken the advice
of the General Board to give sufficient appropriations to the navy to prepare for a naval war with
Japan. The most important lessons policy makers of today should take from the U.S. policy of
the IJN during the interwar period are that the breakdown of communication between militarily
powerful nations can produce devastating consequences. Additionally, conclusions regarding an
opponent’s military cannot be drawn upon if rumors are the major source of information.
278
Edwin O. Reischauer. p. 25.
103
Japan’s rise as a naval power in the early 20th century and subsequent defeat at the end of
World War II have drastically affected the Asian and Pacific region today. Historian Margaret
MacMillan claimed “Countries and peoples, like individuals, have memories and they have
experiences, which shape the ways they act towards each other, shape how they react to the
present and approach the future.”279 The U.S. Navy is the most powerful navy in the world.
However, Russia has the second largest navy followed by China. The gradual and then total
breakdown of communication between Japan and the U.S has to be better understood by today’s
policy makers to truly comprehend the national policies and disputes of present day Asia and the
Pacific. No other event has shaped the navies of East Asia more in the 20th century than the
Pacific War. Although 64 years have passed since the end of the Pacific War, the U.S. naval
policy of the IJN during the interwar period offers valuable lessons to avoid future naval conflict
that should never be forgotten.
279
Margaret MacMillan. (2007 June 8). Lessons from History? The Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Foreign
Affairs and International Trade Canada.
104
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