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The Ottoman Empire in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century and the Fragmentation of Tradition: Relations of the Nationalities (Millets), Guilds (Esnaf) and the Sultan, 1740-1768 Author(s): Robert W. Olson Source: Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Vol. 17, Issue 1/4 (1976 - 1977), pp. 72-77 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1570340 Accessed: 23/02/2009 13:45 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Die Welt des Islams. http://www.jstor.org Die Welt des Islals, XVII, 1-4 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF TRADITION RELATIONS OF THE NATIONALITIES (MILLETS), GUILDS (ESNAF) AND THE SULTAN, 1740-1768 BY ROBERTW. OLSON Ottoman studies in the West other than diplomatic have concentrated on the nineteenth century. Recent studies of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire indicate that the malady which afflicted the "sickman of Europe"predatesthe timethat the "EasternQuestion" preoccupied European diplomatists. Within the Ottoman Empire Istanbul was a microcosm of the complex interplay of Christian (Armenian,Greek, and European),Jewish and Muslim groups during a period of politicaldisorderand decline. During this time of internal rebellion and war these groups attempted to define their identities and priorities-racial, religious, political or financial, while forging new alliances with the Sultanateand ruling groups. I have indicated in previousstudies *that emergingallianceswere not necessarilyalong millet (religio-national)lines. Economic groupings superseded traditional allegiances. In my opinion an understandingof the period under consideration is essential to an understandingof the nationalistic movements of the nineteenth century and the accompanying problemsof modernizationwhichpersisteven today in the MiddleEast. Between the height of the price revolution in the middle sixteenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century monumental changes had taken place in Europe. As Professor Braudel put it, a "new sharp toothed capitalism" had come into being with accompanying manifestationsfrom internalcapitalisticdevelopmentsto the * For detailed references see bibliography in my article and book listed at the end of this article. THE OTTOMANEMPIREIN THE EIGHTEENTHCENTURY 73 expansion of Europe into other lands. This was not true of the Ottoman Empire. When the effects of the price revolution began to abate in Europe around 1650, the shatteredeconomy of the Ottoman Empire could not withstand the onslaught of European capitalism which underminedits abilities to industrialize.The "underdevelopment" of the Ottoman Empire and of the Middle East had begun. In these circumstancesthe silk and spice trade became all the more importantas well as a competitivesource of revenuefor the Ottomans and the Persianswhose economies were increasinglyin the backwater of world trade and commerce.Yet in the first half of the eighteenth centuryboth countrieswere sustaininghuge empires;while the Ottoman Empire had been reduced as a result of treaties with Europe, the PersianEmpirewas experiencingan expansion. The Ottomansand the Persianscould not, however,reconciletheir imperial ambitions with their medieval economies. Because of their inabilityto confront the Europeanssuccessfully,the Ottomansgradually lowered their imperial gaze in Europe, but they did not do so in the east where they sought aggrandizementat the expense of the Persians. Nadir Shah, the emperor of Persia, also pursued a policy of imperialexpansion at great expense to his subjects.The quarterof a centuryof wars (1723-1748)betweenthe Ottomansand the Persians demonstratednot only the inability of the two Muslim Empires to confront the Christianwest but also revealed they could not make war on one another without the fear and apprehensionof raising yet another specter of declining economies and empires-internal rebellion. The threat of rebellion and war caused a realignment of the traditionalOttoman political bases. I think that this realignment of the middle eighteenth century was the source of many major conflicts in the empire and was one of the fundamental reasons for the exacerbation of tension among the Millets or the Christians,Jews and the Muslims as well as among Muslim themselves. The study of the relations of the millets or non-Muslim (Greek, Armenian,Albanianand Jewish)nationalitiesof the Ottoman Empire during the period (1740-1768)on the basis of a comparativestudy of the respective relations of the millets through their representation in the guilds (esnaf) of Istanbul is significant for several reasons. Toward the end of the second decade of the eighteenthcentury and 74 R. W. OLSON especiallyafter the Treaty of Passarowitz(1718) Istanbul experienced an expanding and inflationary economy with all of its attendant advantagesand evils. The stresses on this economy had a parallel effect on the guilds which were organized not only along economic lines but, were political, religious and cultural organizations. The strainson theguildsbecameparticularlyevidentduringthe PatronaHalil rebellionin 1730. During the course of the Patrona rebellion (1730-31) the rebels and some of their supporterssucceededbriefly in achievingsome of the highest offices in the Empire with the backing of elements, especially the ulema, which had formerlysupportedthe Sultan. The rebellion of 1730 in effect caused a realignment of those groups endorsing or opposing the Sultan's policy of increasedcontact with Europe. The major supportof the Sultanateprior to 1730 had come from the military elite and the ulema. After 1730 elements of the military elite which opposed the introduction of European military techniquesand the ulema, who were opposed to the infiltration of European(French) customs and ideas in Ottoman society, began to collaborate with the anti-Sultan forces. In effect, the post 1730-31 alignment was much more volatile than the pre-1730 one, because elementsof the Janissariesand/or the ulemacould changetheirsupport from the Sultan to his opponents dependingupon the circumstances and strength of the Sultan. This new instability was one of the reasons for the centralizationof power in the hands of the Sultan, a policy which began to bear fruit during the reigns of Selim III (1789-1807)and MahmudII (1808-1839). The fluidity of the new alignment is also demonstratedby the actions of the esnaf or "petite bourgeoisie"of artisansand merchants who in 1730were one of the vocal opponentsof the Sultan and Grand Vezir. In the spring of 1731 some of the guilds, in face of a threat to their business by continuing disorder in Istanbul, threw their supportto the new Sultan, MahmudI (1730-1754)and as a result the last supportersof Patrona Halil were executed or imprisoned.Even though Mahmud I promised to rescind the extraordinarycampaign taxes imposed by his predecessor,the newly won allegiance of the esnaf, many of whom were non-Muslim,was to be a mainstayof his reign. This switch of allegiance was one of the most sudden and significantchanges of eighteenthcenturyOttoman history. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 75 During the next decade the new allegiance of the guilds was not an easy one for MahmudI to nurture. The ten years following the Patrona rebellion were among the most trying of the new Sultan's reign. Not only the territorialintegrity of the empire but the very underpinningsof the Caliphate and the sovereignty of the Sultan werethreatenedby the militarysuccessesand the religiouspropaganda of Nadir Shah of Persia. Peace on the eastern front was still in the negotiating stage when war with Russia and Austria commencedin full force in 1736. The Treaty of Belgrade(1739) despite its advantageous articles for the Ottomans quelled the disquiet neither of the people of Istanbulnor the war party at the Porte. The Russo-AustroOttoman war of 1736-39was not without victoriesfor the Ottomans, but the Treaty of Belgradedid not satisfy those at the Porte who wished to pursue a more aggressive policy. Throughout the war with Russia and Austria differencesamong the ulema, Sultan, Grand Vezir, Kizlar Agasi, Janissaries,and the guilds were exacerbatedby the scarcity of provisions. The winter of 1739 was extremelysevere and the mood of the people became more rebellious.Tension in the city mounted as the desperate plight of the people began to find expressionin arson as the winter progressed.It was at this point that rebellionbroke out. The main consequenceof the 1740 rebellionwas that it appearsto confirm the alignmentof 1731 with the astounding addition that the Sultan armed the non-Muslim guilds and they assisted the Sultan in suppressingthe rebellion. EverardFawkener,the British Ambassadorat the Porte, thought that the hatt-i hiimayun(Sultanic Decree) which ordered all shopkeepersto keep their shops open during a rebellionwas a remarkable proclamationin that the shopkeeperswere also commandedto take up arms and to attack the insurgentson threat of being hanged from their own shopdoors. On June 9 there was another flare-up, but before it could gather momentum it was suppressedby the people in the neighborhood (mahalle) where it occurred. The people fell upon the rebels and "knocked on the Head the Mutineers as they were directed" by the hatt-i humayun which had called for the retaliation on the part of the esnaf who had been armed for this purpose.There were those in Istanbulwho were of the opinion that the June 9 outbreak was not for the purpose of a general uprising of the people, but rather only a quarrel among Janissaries.But the 76 R. W. OLSON suppressionof it by the esnaf and people of the neighborhoodcould have given great offense to the Janissaries.According to Fawkener, the retaliationon the part of the esnaf was detested by the Janissaries and it made the hatt-l hiimayunseem ill judged, for now the esnaf -many of whom were Christians and Jews-were called upon to take arms against the Janissaries.Fawkenerwas of the opinion that an interferenceof this type could lead to a "general Massacre of those people (which) may one day very easily be the effect of it, as well as what furtherMischief may be apprehendedfrom the Militia's being got together in arms, & fearing in punishment of it". This, indeed, is a strikingand highly significantpassage. The fact that the arming of the non-Muslims correspondedwith the inaugurationof extensive capitulations to France (1740) which insured even greater advantages to the millets in the subsequent years was to further exacerbate tensions between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities.The alliance of the Sultan and the nonMuslimbourgeoisiewas, however,a double-edged sword. The millets were to prosper in the latter part of the eighteenthcentury but only with the favor of the Sultan. The Sultan, in effect, held the millets, especially after 1740, as captives. In future if the millets did not acquiesce to his policies, the Sultan would be able to turn the discontent of the crowds on them. For unlike the social revolution of Patrona Halil, after 1730 the resentmentof the Muslim masses could be turned more effectively against the millets. The millets, in turn, could only escape from this bind by nationalisticexpressionswhich emergedin due courseduringthe first quarterof the nineteenthcentury. But the alignement of forces which produced rebellion and social upheaval in 1730-31 was not to be resurrected,largely due to the Sultan's policy of 1740. The legacy of 1740 was increased tension between Muslim and non-Muslim which prohibited reform and modernizationin the later eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Aktepe, Miinir, Patrona Isyani (1730), (Istanbul, 1958). Baer, Gabriel, "Monopolies and Restricted Practices of Turkish Guilds", Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Part II (April, 1970), pp. 145165. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 77 Baer, Gabriel, "The Administrative, Economic and Social Functions of Turkish Guilds", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. I, No. 1 (January, 1970), pp. 2850. Barkan, Omer, "XVI. Asrnn Ikinci Yarlsinda Tiirkiye'de Fiyat Hareketleri", Belleten, vol. XXXIV (1970), pp. 557-607. Berkes, Niyasi, The Development of Secularism in Turkevy(Montreal, 1964). Gibb, H.A. R. and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, Part I (Oxford, 1965), pp. 281-313. Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph von, Histoire de l'empire Ottoman, XIV, translated from the German by J. J. Hellert (Paris, 1839), pp. 219-249. Karal, Enver Ziya, "Tanzimattan Evvel GarplilaSma Hareketleri (1718-1839)", in the volume Tanzimat (Istanbul, 1940), pp. 18-30. Mardin, Serif, S., "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" Daedalus, vol. 102, No. I (Winter, 1973). Olson, Robert W., The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718-1743 (Indiana University Press, 1975). Olson, Robert W., "The Esnaf and the Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730: A Realignment in Ottoman Politics?" Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 17 (Winter, 1974), part III, pp. 329-344. Olson, Robert W., "Jews, Janissaries, Esnaf and the Revolution of 1740 in Istanbul: Social Upheaval and Political Realignment in the Ottoman Empire", Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient (forthcoming: Spring, 1977). Sahillioglu, Halil, KuruluStanXVII Asrln SonlarmnaKadar Osmanh Para Tarihi iizerinde hir Deneme (Ph.D., dissertation, University of Istanbul, 1958). French translation and edition in preparation.