Download The Ottoman Empire in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century and the

Survey
yes no Was this document useful for you?
   Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Document related concepts

Late Middle Ages wikipedia , lookup

Transcript
The Ottoman Empire in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century and the Fragmentation of
Tradition: Relations of the Nationalities (Millets), Guilds (Esnaf) and the Sultan, 1740-1768
Author(s): Robert W. Olson
Source: Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Vol. 17, Issue 1/4 (1976 - 1977), pp. 72-77
Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1570340
Accessed: 23/02/2009 13:45
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Die Welt des Islams.
http://www.jstor.org
Die Welt des Islals, XVII, 1-4
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
IN THE MIDDLE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF TRADITION
RELATIONS OF THE NATIONALITIES (MILLETS),
GUILDS (ESNAF) AND THE SULTAN, 1740-1768
BY
ROBERTW. OLSON
Ottoman studies in the West other than diplomatic have concentrated on the nineteenth century. Recent studies of the eighteenth
century Ottoman Empire indicate that the malady which afflicted
the "sickman of Europe"predatesthe timethat the "EasternQuestion"
preoccupied European diplomatists. Within the Ottoman Empire
Istanbul was a microcosm of the complex interplay of Christian
(Armenian,Greek, and European),Jewish and Muslim groups during
a period of politicaldisorderand decline. During this time of internal
rebellion and war these groups attempted to define their identities
and priorities-racial, religious, political or financial, while forging
new alliances with the Sultanateand ruling groups. I have indicated
in previousstudies *that emergingallianceswere not necessarilyalong
millet (religio-national)lines. Economic groupings superseded traditional allegiances. In my opinion an understandingof the period
under consideration is essential to an understandingof the nationalistic movements of the nineteenth century and the accompanying
problemsof modernizationwhichpersisteven today in the MiddleEast.
Between the height of the price revolution in the middle sixteenth
century and the first half of the eighteenth century monumental
changes had taken place in Europe. As Professor Braudel put it, a
"new sharp toothed capitalism" had come into being with accompanying manifestationsfrom internalcapitalisticdevelopmentsto the
* For detailed references see
bibliography in my article and book listed at the
end of this article.
THE OTTOMANEMPIREIN THE EIGHTEENTHCENTURY
73
expansion of Europe into other lands. This was not true of the
Ottoman Empire. When the effects of the price revolution began to
abate in Europe around 1650, the shatteredeconomy of the Ottoman
Empire could not withstand the onslaught of European capitalism
which underminedits abilities to industrialize.The "underdevelopment" of the Ottoman Empire and of the Middle East had begun.
In these circumstancesthe silk and spice trade became all the more
importantas well as a competitivesource of revenuefor the Ottomans
and the Persianswhose economies were increasinglyin the backwater
of world trade and commerce.Yet in the first half of the eighteenth
centuryboth countrieswere sustaininghuge empires;while the Ottoman Empire had been reduced as a result of treaties with Europe,
the PersianEmpirewas experiencingan expansion.
The Ottomansand the Persianscould not, however,reconciletheir
imperial ambitions with their medieval economies. Because of their
inabilityto confront the Europeanssuccessfully,the Ottomansgradually lowered their imperial gaze in Europe, but they did not do so
in the east where they sought aggrandizementat the expense of the
Persians. Nadir Shah, the emperor of Persia, also pursued a policy
of imperialexpansion at great expense to his subjects.The quarterof
a centuryof wars (1723-1748)betweenthe Ottomansand the Persians
demonstratednot only the inability of the two Muslim Empires to
confront the Christianwest but also revealed they could not make
war on one another without the fear and apprehensionof raising
yet another specter of declining economies and empires-internal
rebellion. The threat of rebellion and war caused a realignment
of the traditionalOttoman political bases. I think that this realignment of the middle eighteenth century was the source of many
major conflicts in the empire and was one of the fundamental
reasons for the exacerbation of tension among the Millets or the
Christians,Jews and the Muslims as well as among Muslim themselves.
The study of the relations of the millets or non-Muslim (Greek,
Armenian,Albanianand Jewish)nationalitiesof the Ottoman Empire
during the period (1740-1768)on the basis of a comparativestudy of
the respective relations of the millets through their representation
in the guilds (esnaf) of Istanbul is significant for several reasons.
Toward the end of the second decade of the eighteenthcentury and
74
R. W. OLSON
especiallyafter the Treaty of Passarowitz(1718) Istanbul experienced
an expanding and inflationary economy with all of its attendant
advantagesand evils. The stresses on this economy had a parallel
effect on the guilds which were organized not only along economic
lines but, were political, religious and cultural organizations. The
strainson theguildsbecameparticularlyevidentduringthe PatronaHalil
rebellionin 1730.
During the course of the Patrona rebellion (1730-31) the rebels
and some of their supporterssucceededbriefly in achievingsome of
the highest offices in the Empire with the backing of elements,
especially the ulema, which had formerlysupportedthe Sultan. The
rebellion of 1730 in effect caused a realignment of those groups
endorsing or opposing the Sultan's policy of increasedcontact with
Europe. The major supportof the Sultanateprior to 1730 had come
from the military elite and the ulema. After 1730 elements of the
military elite which opposed the introduction of European military
techniquesand the ulema, who were opposed to the infiltration of
European(French) customs and ideas in Ottoman society, began to
collaborate with the anti-Sultan forces. In effect, the post 1730-31
alignment was much more volatile than the pre-1730 one, because
elementsof the Janissariesand/or the ulemacould changetheirsupport
from the Sultan to his opponents dependingupon the circumstances
and strength of the Sultan. This new instability was one of the
reasons for the centralizationof power in the hands of the Sultan,
a policy which began to bear fruit during the reigns of Selim III
(1789-1807)and MahmudII (1808-1839).
The fluidity of the new alignment is also demonstratedby the
actions of the esnaf or "petite bourgeoisie"of artisansand merchants
who in 1730were one of the vocal opponentsof the Sultan and Grand
Vezir. In the spring of 1731 some of the guilds, in face of a threat
to their business by continuing disorder in Istanbul, threw their
supportto the new Sultan, MahmudI (1730-1754)and as a result the
last supportersof Patrona Halil were executed or imprisoned.Even
though Mahmud I promised to rescind the extraordinarycampaign
taxes imposed by his predecessor,the newly won allegiance of the
esnaf, many of whom were non-Muslim,was to be a mainstayof his
reign. This switch of allegiance was one of the most sudden and
significantchanges of eighteenthcenturyOttoman history.
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
75
During the next decade the new allegiance of the guilds was not
an easy one for MahmudI to nurture. The ten years following the
Patrona rebellion were among the most trying of the new Sultan's
reign. Not only the territorialintegrity of the empire but the very
underpinningsof the Caliphate and the sovereignty of the Sultan
werethreatenedby the militarysuccessesand the religiouspropaganda
of Nadir Shah of Persia. Peace on the eastern front was still in the
negotiating stage when war with Russia and Austria commencedin
full force in 1736. The Treaty of Belgrade(1739) despite its advantageous articles for the Ottomans quelled the disquiet neither of the
people of Istanbulnor the war party at the Porte. The Russo-AustroOttoman war of 1736-39was not without victoriesfor the Ottomans,
but the Treaty of Belgradedid not satisfy those at the Porte who
wished to pursue a more aggressive policy. Throughout the war
with Russia and Austria differencesamong the ulema, Sultan, Grand
Vezir, Kizlar Agasi, Janissaries,and the guilds were exacerbatedby
the scarcity of provisions. The winter of 1739 was extremelysevere
and the mood of the people became more rebellious.Tension in the
city mounted as the desperate plight of the people began to find
expressionin arson as the winter progressed.It was at this point that
rebellionbroke out. The main consequenceof the 1740 rebellionwas
that it appearsto confirm the alignmentof 1731 with the astounding
addition that the Sultan armed the non-Muslim guilds and they
assisted the Sultan in suppressingthe rebellion.
EverardFawkener,the British Ambassadorat the Porte, thought
that the hatt-i hiimayun(Sultanic Decree) which ordered all shopkeepersto keep their shops open during a rebellionwas a remarkable
proclamationin that the shopkeeperswere also commandedto take up
arms and to attack the insurgentson threat of being hanged from
their own shopdoors. On June 9 there was another flare-up, but
before it could gather momentum it was suppressedby the people
in the neighborhood (mahalle) where it occurred. The people fell
upon the rebels and "knocked on the Head the Mutineers as they
were directed" by the hatt-i humayun which had called for the
retaliation on the part of the esnaf who had been armed for this
purpose.There were those in Istanbulwho were of the opinion that
the June 9 outbreak was not for the purpose of a general uprising
of the people, but rather only a quarrel among Janissaries.But the
76
R. W. OLSON
suppressionof it by the esnaf and people of the neighborhoodcould
have given great offense to the Janissaries.According to Fawkener,
the retaliationon the part of the esnaf was detested by the Janissaries
and it made the hatt-l hiimayunseem ill judged, for now the esnaf
-many of whom were Christians and Jews-were called upon to
take arms against the Janissaries.Fawkenerwas of the opinion that
an interferenceof this type could lead to a "general Massacre of
those people (which) may one day very easily be the effect of it, as
well as what furtherMischief may be apprehendedfrom the Militia's
being got together in arms, & fearing in punishment of it". This,
indeed, is a strikingand highly significantpassage.
The fact that the arming of the non-Muslims correspondedwith
the inaugurationof extensive capitulations to France (1740) which
insured even greater advantages to the millets in the subsequent
years was to further exacerbate tensions between the Muslim and
non-Muslim communities.The alliance of the Sultan and the nonMuslimbourgeoisiewas, however,a double-edged sword. The millets
were to prosper in the latter part of the eighteenthcentury but only
with the favor of the Sultan. The Sultan, in effect, held the millets,
especially after 1740, as captives. In future if the millets did not
acquiesce to his policies, the Sultan would be able to turn the discontent of the crowds on them. For unlike the social revolution of
Patrona Halil, after 1730 the resentmentof the Muslim masses could
be turned more effectively against the millets. The millets, in turn,
could only escape from this bind by nationalisticexpressionswhich
emergedin due courseduringthe first quarterof the nineteenthcentury.
But the alignement of forces which produced rebellion and social
upheaval in 1730-31 was not to be resurrected,largely due to the
Sultan's policy of 1740. The legacy of 1740 was increased tension
between Muslim and non-Muslim which prohibited reform and
modernizationin the later eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aktepe, Miinir, Patrona Isyani (1730), (Istanbul, 1958).
Baer, Gabriel, "Monopolies and Restricted Practices of Turkish Guilds", Journal
of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Part II (April, 1970), pp. 145165.
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
77
Baer, Gabriel, "The Administrative, Economic and Social Functions of Turkish Guilds",
International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. I, No. 1 (January, 1970), pp. 2850.
Barkan, Omer, "XVI. Asrnn Ikinci Yarlsinda Tiirkiye'de Fiyat Hareketleri", Belleten,
vol. XXXIV (1970), pp. 557-607.
Berkes, Niyasi, The Development of Secularism in Turkevy(Montreal, 1964).
Gibb, H.A. R. and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, Part I (Oxford,
1965), pp. 281-313.
Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph von, Histoire de l'empire Ottoman, XIV, translated from
the German by J. J. Hellert (Paris, 1839), pp. 219-249.
Karal, Enver Ziya, "Tanzimattan Evvel GarplilaSma Hareketleri (1718-1839)", in the
volume Tanzimat (Istanbul, 1940), pp. 18-30.
Mardin, Serif, S., "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" Daedalus,
vol. 102, No. I (Winter, 1973).
Olson, Robert W., The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718-1743
(Indiana University Press, 1975).
Olson, Robert W., "The Esnaf and the Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730: A Realignment in Ottoman Politics?" Journal of the Economic and Social History of the
Orient, vol. 17 (Winter, 1974), part III, pp. 329-344.
Olson, Robert W., "Jews, Janissaries, Esnaf and the Revolution of 1740 in Istanbul:
Social Upheaval and Political Realignment in the Ottoman Empire", Journal of
Economic and Social History of the Orient (forthcoming: Spring, 1977).
Sahillioglu, Halil, KuruluStanXVII Asrln SonlarmnaKadar Osmanh Para Tarihi iizerinde
hir Deneme (Ph.D., dissertation, University of Istanbul, 1958). French translation
and edition in preparation.