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A Brief Overview of Science Studies (Written with CSUF Liberal Studies Majors in mind) by Craig McConnell June, 2001 If we take science to be the study of nature, what would you call the study of how science is practiced? A century ago, the number of scientists in the world was growing dramatically, but it was almost inconceivable that science would be the object of study. Occasionally, a scientist would write a narrative about the origins of science or the historical development of their particular field of science, but these texts were typically of interest only to other scientists. In the twentieth century, a number of academic disciplines have emerged that have science as their central object of study. Together, these scholars are considered to be engaged in science studies. Since the middle of the twentieth century, some universities have created new departments such as Department of History of Science Department of Philosophy of Science Department of Sociology of Science Program in Science Studies STS (Science, Technology, Society or Science and Technology Studies) Scholars who work in these fields have different approaches to studying science and different questions that they ask about science, but they share a core set of key texts that they all are aware of. The purpose of this brief overview is to quickly familiarize you with the key figures in science studies, their interpretative ideas, and some of the jargon that they use. Many of the readings that I assign will use this jargon and refer to these names and ideas as though they are familiar to you. You need not commit their names or ideas to memory; you may need to refer back to this overview in order to make full sense of some of the readings for the semester. Historical Perspectives Even before the “History of Science” emerged as a discipline, some historians wrote about science. In particular, intellectual historians, concerned as they are with ideas and philosophies, have long been concerned with developments in science. If you read books about science written before the 1970s, they are very likely to take one of the following approaches: • The “Great Scientists” approach (Aristotle, Newton, Darwin, Einstein, etc.) • The “Great Theories” approach (inertia, relativity, evolution, etc.) • The “Great Experiments” approach (Galileo’s falling bodies, Newton’s prism, Young’s double slit experiment, etc.) • The “Great Discoveries” approach (new planets, atoms, etc.) Often, “Great Experiments” are described as “Crucial Experiments” (experiments conducted to settle a dispute between two competing theories). In the 1950s, many historians of science felt that their primary mission was to teach the ideas and discoveries of science to nonscientists. They tried to write for non-technical audiences, and their hope, more than anything, Page 1 of 4 was to present science as rational and admirable. Many historians of this generation emphasized the rigorous application of the scientific method as an example of the rational basis of science. In the 1960s, the history of science community was divided between “internalists” and “externalists.” The internalists believed that the best way to understand the history of science was to follow the technical details of a field, reading lab notebooks and scientific publications. The externalists believed that the best way to understand the history of science was to examine the social and cultural factors that shaped scientific theories. Many historians of science since the 1970s have complained that this way of studying science overlooks too much. They have attempted to widen their perspective, in particular by trying to document both internal and external factors in the development of science, and by paying greater attention to the difference between what scientists do and what they say they do. Philosophical Perspectives Whereas historians are often interested in what scientists did, philosophers tend to be more concerned about how scientists arrive at knowledge about nature. For this reason, philosophers early in the twentieth century paid close attention to the vast differences between the “context of discovery” (how it is that knowledge in science is actually obtained) and the “context of justification” (how scientists explain to their colleagues, students, and the public how they obtained their knowledge). These philosophers showed that in nearly all cases, the context of justification is a sanitized version of the context of discovery, and in some cases the two are nearly impossible to reconcile. Since the 1960s, it has been quite common for historians of science to write as though the ideas of the following philosophers are common knowledge: • Karl Popper. Popper looked at science as a form of knowledge that progresses by way of the falsification of theories. (Falsification is also referred to as refutation). Popper emphasized the epistemological impossibility of ever proving a theory correct, but insisted that the act of proving a theory incorrect contributes to our knowledge of nature. • Thomas Kuhn. Probably the most influential philosopher of science. (Cf. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1963). Kuhn noted that historically, science seems to exist in two modes–periods of “normal science” when scientists use existing knowledge to solve problems and periods of revolution when the existing knowledge itself is called into question. Kuhn used the word “paradigm” to describe the shared knowledge, tools, and concerns of a scientific community. During normal science, scientists use the paradigm to solve problems. Inevitably, anomalies arise–observations that can’t be explained within the paradigm. When there are two many anomalies, a crisis develops which leads to a revolution (which he also referred to as a paradigm shift). During revolutions, the paradigm is attacked and a new, different paradigm emerges. • Imre Lakatos. Lakatos saw science as an inherently social activity. He claimed that theories thrive only when an active research community keeps them in circulation. Good theories can thus fade when their support subsides, and bad theories can be promulgated by the support of enough scientists. Page 2 of 4 • Paul Feyerabend. In response to Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos, Feyerabend claimed that there is no distinct method for science–historical case studies reveal that scientists proceed according to instinct and hunches, and that methodological language is applied after the fact. Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos called themselves Philosophers of Science; Feyerabend called himself an Anarchist of Science. (Cf. Against Method, 1975). Sociological Perspectives Sociologists have also played an active role in the study of science, the scientific community, and the role of science in local and national communities. Historians and philosophers who are particularly interested in the social aspects of science often work collaboratively with sociologists of science. Since the 1960s, it has been quite common for historians of science to write as though the ideas of the following sociologists are common knowledge: • David Bloor. Bloor argued that science is a social construct–that the knowledge of science is a product of a social process. He argued that both social factors and the physical world shape the kind of scientific knowledge we have. (Cf. Knowledge and Social Imagery, 1976). • Bruno Latour and Michel Callon. French sociologists who considered every object in any “scientific network” in symmetric terms. Their fans say they have given added attention to the importance of apparatuses and nature; their detractors say they give microscopes and microbes the same kinds of ambitions and desires as scientists. • Steve Shapin. Shapin drew a lot of fire for his claim that Boyle’s pneumatic theory was so quickly accepted by the scientific community not because of the soundness of the theory but because of his status as a gentleman. Shapin claimed that an implicit code of gentlemanly conduct dictated the outcome. Many scientists got very angry. (Cf. Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 1985; The Scientific Revolution, 1996). Postmodern Perspectives Late in the twentieth century, some scholars of science studies began writing about science as though it were nothing more than a social activity. The fiery debates between scientists and scholars of science studies have been coined The Science Wars (a reference to The Culture Wars, and an indication of how sharply the opposing sides disagree). The most extreme disputants among scientists (typically referred to as “logical positivists”) claim that nature ultimately decides which theories have merit and which don’t, and that the social aspects of science are trivial. The most extreme disputants among scholars of science studies (typically referred to as “social constructivists”) claim that every aspect of science–asking questions, building labs, deciding which problems to tackle, writing textbooks, teaching classes, hiring colleagues–all of these are social negotiations. The logical positivists claim that science is perhaps the only discipline that can actually arrive at truth; the social constructivists claim that Page 3 of 4 reality is epistemologically unknowable, and that scientists merely construct narratives that they themselves then endorse as “true” in a variety of formal and informal social interactions. As is so often the case, these extreme positions are not representative of the majority (of scientists or science studies scholars). In fact, many historians of science consult frequently with practicing scientists, and many scientists admit that much of the world of science is in fact socially constructed. Nonetheless, the Science Wars are far from over. This overview is neither comprehensive nor complete. It would take a lifetime to read all of the material referred to above. It is my hope that this overview will help you master some of the jargon that you will be encountering in the next fifteen weeks, and that it will encourage you to read critically and think critically about science. Page 4 of 4