Download A Brief Overview of Science Studies

A Brief Overview of Science Studies
(Written with CSUF Liberal Studies Majors in mind)
by Craig McConnell
June, 2001
If we take science to be the study of nature, what would you call the study of how science
is practiced? A century ago, the number of scientists in the world was growing dramatically, but
it was almost inconceivable that science would be the object of study. Occasionally, a scientist
would write a narrative about the origins of science or the historical development of their
particular field of science, but these texts were typically of interest only to other scientists.
In the twentieth century, a number of academic disciplines have emerged that have
science as their central object of study. Together, these scholars are considered to be engaged in
science studies. Since the middle of the twentieth century, some universities have created new
departments such as
Department of History of Science
Department of Philosophy of Science
Department of Sociology of Science
Program in Science Studies
STS (Science, Technology, Society or Science and Technology Studies)
Scholars who work in these fields have different approaches to studying science and different
questions that they ask about science, but they share a core set of key texts that they all are aware
of. The purpose of this brief overview is to quickly familiarize you with the key figures in
science studies, their interpretative ideas, and some of the jargon that they use. Many of the
readings that I assign will use this jargon and refer to these names and ideas as though they are
familiar to you. You need not commit their names or ideas to memory; you may need to refer
back to this overview in order to make full sense of some of the readings for the semester.
Historical Perspectives
Even before the “History of Science” emerged as a discipline, some historians wrote
about science. In particular, intellectual historians, concerned as they are with ideas and
philosophies, have long been concerned with developments in science. If you read books about
science written before the 1970s, they are very likely to take one of the following approaches:
• The “Great Scientists” approach (Aristotle, Newton, Darwin, Einstein, etc.)
• The “Great Theories” approach (inertia, relativity, evolution, etc.)
• The “Great Experiments” approach (Galileo’s falling bodies, Newton’s prism,
Young’s double slit experiment, etc.)
• The “Great Discoveries” approach (new planets, atoms, etc.)
Often, “Great Experiments” are described as “Crucial Experiments” (experiments
conducted to settle a dispute between two competing theories). In the 1950s, many historians of
science felt that their primary mission was to teach the ideas and discoveries of science to nonscientists. They tried to write for non-technical audiences, and their hope, more than anything,
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was to present science as rational and admirable. Many historians of this generation emphasized
the rigorous application of the scientific method as an example of the rational basis of science.
In the 1960s, the history of science community was divided between “internalists” and
“externalists.” The internalists believed that the best way to understand the history of science
was to follow the technical details of a field, reading lab notebooks and scientific publications.
The externalists believed that the best way to understand the history of science was to examine
the social and cultural factors that shaped scientific theories. Many historians of science since
the 1970s have complained that this way of studying science overlooks too much. They have
attempted to widen their perspective, in particular by trying to document both internal and
external factors in the development of science, and by paying greater attention to the difference
between what scientists do and what they say they do.
Philosophical Perspectives
Whereas historians are often interested in what scientists did, philosophers tend to be
more concerned about how scientists arrive at knowledge about nature. For this reason,
philosophers early in the twentieth century paid close attention to the vast differences between
the “context of discovery” (how it is that knowledge in science is actually obtained) and the
“context of justification” (how scientists explain to their colleagues, students, and the public how
they obtained their knowledge). These philosophers showed that in nearly all cases, the context
of justification is a sanitized version of the context of discovery, and in some cases the two are
nearly impossible to reconcile. Since the 1960s, it has been quite common for historians of
science to write as though the ideas of the following philosophers are common knowledge:
• Karl Popper. Popper looked at science as a form of knowledge that progresses by way
of the falsification of theories. (Falsification is also referred to as refutation).
Popper emphasized the epistemological impossibility of ever proving a theory
correct, but insisted that the act of proving a theory incorrect contributes to our
knowledge of nature.
• Thomas Kuhn. Probably the most influential philosopher of science. (Cf. The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions, 1963). Kuhn noted that historically, science seems to
exist in two modes–periods of “normal science” when scientists use existing
knowledge to solve problems and periods of revolution when the existing
knowledge itself is called into question. Kuhn used the word “paradigm” to
describe the shared knowledge, tools, and concerns of a scientific community.
During normal science, scientists use the paradigm to solve problems. Inevitably,
anomalies arise–observations that can’t be explained within the paradigm. When
there are two many anomalies, a crisis develops which leads to a revolution
(which he also referred to as a paradigm shift). During revolutions, the paradigm
is attacked and a new, different paradigm emerges.
• Imre Lakatos. Lakatos saw science as an inherently social activity. He claimed that
theories thrive only when an active research community keeps them in circulation.
Good theories can thus fade when their support subsides, and bad theories can be
promulgated by the support of enough scientists.
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• Paul Feyerabend. In response to Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos, Feyerabend claimed that
there is no distinct method for science–historical case studies reveal that scientists
proceed according to instinct and hunches, and that methodological language is
applied after the fact. Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos called themselves Philosophers
of Science; Feyerabend called himself an Anarchist of Science. (Cf. Against
Method, 1975).
Sociological Perspectives
Sociologists have also played an active role in the study of science, the scientific
community, and the role of science in local and national communities. Historians and
philosophers who are particularly interested in the social aspects of science often work
collaboratively with sociologists of science. Since the 1960s, it has been quite common for
historians of science to write as though the ideas of the following sociologists are common
knowledge:
• David Bloor. Bloor argued that science is a social construct–that the knowledge of
science is a product of a social process. He argued that both social factors and the
physical world shape the kind of scientific knowledge we have. (Cf. Knowledge
and Social Imagery, 1976).
• Bruno Latour and Michel Callon. French sociologists who considered every object in
any “scientific network” in symmetric terms. Their fans say they have given
added attention to the importance of apparatuses and nature; their detractors say
they give microscopes and microbes the same kinds of ambitions and desires as
scientists.
• Steve Shapin. Shapin drew a lot of fire for his claim that Boyle’s pneumatic theory was
so quickly accepted by the scientific community not because of the soundness of
the theory but because of his status as a gentleman. Shapin claimed that an
implicit code of gentlemanly conduct dictated the outcome. Many scientists got
very angry. (Cf. Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 1985; The Scientific Revolution,
1996).
Postmodern Perspectives
Late in the twentieth century, some scholars of science studies began writing about
science as though it were nothing more than a social activity. The fiery debates between
scientists and scholars of science studies have been coined The Science Wars (a reference to The
Culture Wars, and an indication of how sharply the opposing sides disagree). The most extreme
disputants among scientists (typically referred to as “logical positivists”) claim that nature
ultimately decides which theories have merit and which don’t, and that the social aspects of
science are trivial. The most extreme disputants among scholars of science studies (typically
referred to as “social constructivists”) claim that every aspect of science–asking questions,
building labs, deciding which problems to tackle, writing textbooks, teaching classes, hiring
colleagues–all of these are social negotiations. The logical positivists claim that science is
perhaps the only discipline that can actually arrive at truth; the social constructivists claim that
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reality is epistemologically unknowable, and that scientists merely construct narratives that they
themselves then endorse as “true” in a variety of formal and informal social interactions.
As is so often the case, these extreme positions are not representative of the majority (of
scientists or science studies scholars). In fact, many historians of science consult frequently with
practicing scientists, and many scientists admit that much of the world of science is in fact
socially constructed. Nonetheless, the Science Wars are far from over.
This overview is neither comprehensive nor complete. It would take a lifetime to read all
of the material referred to above. It is my hope that this overview will help you master some of
the jargon that you will be encountering in the next fifteen weeks, and that it will encourage you
to read critically and think critically about science.
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