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Bas de Boer
Jacob Colyer: Mediating
Between the European
and the Ottoman World
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Foreword
Dear reader,
Over the centuries the history of Serbia and the Netherlands interlink more than
once. Jacob Colyer is one of the historical figures who meant a great deal for both
countries. His importance stems from his skill in brokering peace - as a neutral intermediary - between the powers gathered in the so-called Holy League (the Habsburg
Monarchy, Poland, Venice and Russia) and the Ottoman Empire in 1699 gaining
appreciation and gratitude from both sides. The peace was signed in Sremski
Karlovci, in English known as Karlowitz. The Kapela Mira, erected on the spot where
the Treaty of Karlovic was negotiated, attests to the importance of the event.
After war resumed again in the early 18th century, Colyer was asked to return
to Serbia for a second time in 1718 to broker yet another peace. This second treaty is
known as the peace of Požarevac or Passarowitz in English.
Because of his importance for European and Serbian history, the Embassy organized a competition open to historians for a proposal to write an essay on Jacob
Colyer. Historian Bas de Boer from Nijmegen won the competition. He wrote the
essay on the following pages that I would like to share with you.
Laurent Stokvis
The Netherlands Ambassador
to the Republic of Serbia
Bas de Boer
Jacob Colyer: Mediating Between
the European and the Ottoman World
Published by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Simina 29, Belgrade, Serbia
T +381 11 2023 900
[email protected]
March 2015
Edited by: Thomas Linders and Nikola Ćulafić
Layout: Miroslav Ocokoljić
When I arrived at the steps of the palace of the governor, I got off my horse
that was provided by his excellence for this ceremonial occasion, when two distinguished Agas1 grabbed my arms and brought me to the visitor’s room. When the
vizier noticed my presence, he started embracing and kissing me with signs of hospitality that were usual among the Ottomans, but normally never occurred in interaction with Christians.2
1 ‘Aga’ can best be understood as referring to the most important leader of the local elite.
2 ‘Aen d’eerste trap vant paleis van den gouverneur gecomen wesende, steegh ik vant paerd, dat sijn excellentie
mij tot deze ceremonie toegevoeght had, en werde door twee voorname Agaas onder de armen geleijt, tot voor
d’audientie camer gebracht, als wanneer opgemerkt de vesier mij tot over de helft vande voorste camer quam
incontreeren, embrasseren, ende kussen, met soodanige teekenen van beleeftheden, als de vesiers van den
land onder den anderen gewoon sijn te doen, ende bij mij oijt gesien noch gehoort is ten regarde van Christene
representanten.’ Jacob Colyer to Anthonie Heinsius, Belgrade, 11 February 1699 in National Archives, The Hague,
Anthonie Heinsius, Raadpensionaris van Holland en West-Friestland, entrance 3.01.19, inventory 600.
Introduction
When Jacob Colyer (1657-1725), the Dutch ambassador in Constantinople,
came back to Belgrade after the Treaty of Karlowitz was signed on the 26th of January 1699, the Ottomans extensively expressed their gratitude for Colyer’s work as
mediator between the Ottoman Empire and the Holy League of Alliance (HLOA), an
alliance between the Habsburg Empire, Venice, Poland and the Muscovites. Moreover, Colyer was granted the title ‘Duke of Hungary’ by the Habsburg king Leopold
I (1640-1705)1, which indicates that both the HLOA and the Ottomans were satisfied
with Jacob Colyer’s work during the negotiations culminating into the Treaty of Karlowitz. This treaty marked the end of the Great Turkish War (1683-1699), a violent
conflict between the Ottomans and the HLOA that lasted for roughly sixteen years
and it was the first treaty in which the Ottomans agreed to losing a large part of their
Central European territory.2 Considering the importance of this event, it is puzzling
why no systematic investigation into the life and work of its most important mediator, Jacob Colyer, has yet been conducted. While the first Dutch ambassador in
Constantinople Cornelius Haga (1578-1654)3 and Jacob Colyer’s successor Cornelis
Calkoen (1696-1764)4 have been subject of extensive biographical studies, the contribution of Jacob Colyer has largely been neglected in the historiography of the diplomatic relations between the Dutch Republic and the Ottoman Empire.5 This essay
aims to help filling this historiographical gap by focusing on Jacob Colyer’s role as
mediator in the realization of the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Peace of Passarowitz and
his influence on the diplomatic relations between the Dutch Republic and the Ottoman Empire, with a special focus on the relation between the Dutch Republic and
the city of Belgrade.
Unlike modern day Turkey, the Ottoman Empire controlled large parts of
Central Europe during most of the 17th century. In 1683, the Ottoman sultan Mehmet IV (1642-1693) almost succeeded in capturing the city of Vienna, which indi1 A.J. van der Aa & K.J.R. van Harderwijk, Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden: Derde Deel (Haarlem: J.J.
van Brederode, 1858), 640.
2 Robert van Zuylen van Nijevelt, De Vrede van Carlowitz (Utrecht: J. van Boekhoven, 1883), 49-50.
3 Hans van der Sloot & Ingrid van der Vlis, Cornelis Haga: Diplomaat en Pioneer in Constantinopel (Amsterdam:
Boom, 2012)
4 G.R. Bosscha Erdbrink, The Threshold of Felicity: Ottoman-Dutch Relations During the Embassy of Cornelis
Calkoen at the Sublime Porte, 1726-1744 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1975)
5 With the only exception of: Sander Vergeer, “Het Goede Werck: De Vrede van Carlowitz en de Bemiddelende
Rol van Jacobus Colyer in het Vredesproces tussen de Sultan en Zijn Vijanden,” Ex Tempore: Verleden Tijdschrift
Nijmegen 20:1 (2001), 3-19.
7
cates that a large part of Central Europe was under Ottoman rule. Indeed, during the
17th century, Western Europeans were greatly impressed by the Ottoman army and
feared that the Ottomans would eventually conquer the Western European countries.6 However, after the Ottoman defeat in the battle of Zenta in 1697, it became
clear that the military power of the HLOA greatly exceeded the power of the Ottoman army. The peace conference at Karlowitz starting in November 1698 was the
first occasion in which the Ottomans had to consider the superior military power of
the European countries and had to submit to Christian authority.7 It was during this
remarkable event that Jacob Colyer and his colleague Lord William Paget (1637-1713),
the English ambassador at Constantinople, were appointed as the most important
mediators between the Ottomans and the HLOA. Considering the importance of the
peace conference, it seems that the capacities of Jacob Colyer were held in high regard both by the Ottomans and the members of the HLOA.
The Colyer Family
Jacob Colyer was not the first in his family to hold a diplomatic position in the
Ottoman Empire. Actually, he was the successor of his father Justinus Colyer (16241682) who had become the Dutch ambassador in Constantinople in 1668.8 Justinus
Colyer was only the second official Dutch ambassador in Constantinople because
the Dutch at first hesitated to appoint an official successor when Cornelis Haga
stepped down in 1639. After all, having an ambassador in the Ottoman Empire was
a costly affair. In the period 1639-1668, several Dutch diplomats resided in Constantinople, but none of them were granted the official position of ambassador. While
this may sound as a minor difference, the fact that the Ottomans thought that only
an official ambassador could protect the interests of the Dutch community in Constantinople indicates that this difference is more than a terminological quarrel.9
Thus, when Justinus Colyer was installed as ambassador in 1668, the Dutch States
6 Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 18; Sander Vergeer (2001), 3.
7 Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 87:4
(1967), 499.
8 Contrary to Jonker Roelant’s account of the Colyer’s, the archival sources clearly indicate that it was Jacobus
Colyer, not his father Justinus, who acted as mediator at the Karlowitz peace conference. For Jonker Roelant’s
account, see: Jan Jonker Roelant, “Introductie: 400 Jaar Diplomatieke Betrekkingen,” in Maurits van den Boogaert
& Jan Jonker Roelant (eds.) De Nederlands-Turkse Betrekkingen: Portretten van een 400-jarige Geschiedenis (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2012), 14-15.
9 Febe Liagre, De Diplomatieke Relatie tussen Nederland en het Ottomaanse Rijke in de 17de en 18de Eeuw:
Ambassadeurs in Istanbul. Master’s Thesis, University of Ghent, BE (2012), 68.
8
General (Hooghmogende Heren) were convinced of the need to reinstall an ambassador
in Constantinople that was capable of help fulfilling the interests of the Dutch in the
Ottoman Empire.
Even though ambassadors were occasionally involved in political affairs, the
primary mandate of the Dutch ambassadors in the Levant was to improve the trade
relations between the Dutch Republic and the Ottoman Empire. Contrary to the other European countries, the Ottomans were positive about trading with the Dutch
and the English because these Protestant nations were considered an ally against
the Catholic empires in Central Europe.10 Therefore, the Dutch States General considered it beneficial to have an ambassador in the Ottoman Empire to improve trading opportunities. Initially, Justinus Colyer was struggling with his duties as ambassador. He had failed to communicate to the Sublime Porte11 that he, contrary to the
previous Dutch residents in Constantinople, was granted the title of ambassador,
which seriously undermined his influence at the Sublime Porte.12 However, when
this mistake was settled, Justinus Colyer managed to renew the treaty of friendship,
trade and navy in 1680 that Cornelis Haga had established in 1612.13
When Justinus Colyer felt that his end was near in the fall of 1682, he tried to
ensure the future of his oldest son Jacob and installed him as the secretary and treasurer of the Dutch residence in Constantinople.14 Considering that Justinus Colyer
in the end obtained what he was appointed for and renewed the treaty of friendship
trade and navy ensuring that trade between the Dutch Republic and the Ottoman
Empire remained possible, it is easy to imagine why the Dutch States General supported Justinus’ decision to install his oldest son as his successor. Moreover, shortly
after his father’s death, Jacob Colyer sent a letter to the secretary of the States General Gaspar Fagel (1634-1688) in which he argued that his appointment came with
less financial costs than appointing an entire new ambassador, an argument that
usually convinced the Dutch States General.15 In combination with his command
10 A. de Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: A History of the Early Diplomatic Relations 16101630 (Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archeologisch Instituut, 1978), 90. For an extensive overview of the economic
relation between the Dutch Republic and the Ottoman Empire in this period, see: Mehmet Bulut, Ottoman-Dutch
Relations in the Early Modern Period 1571-1699 (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2001) 11 The ‘Sublime Porte’ was the common reference to the central government of the Ottoman Empire in early
modern times.
12 G.R. Bosscha Erdbrink (1975), 29-30.
13 A.J. van der Aa & K.J.R. van Harderwijk (1858), 638.
14 J.H. Hora Siccama, “De Vrede van Carlowitz en Wat Daaraan Voorafging,” in Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche
Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde: 4e reeks 8e deel (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1910), 43.
15 Jacob Colyer to Gaspar Fagel, 31. January 1684 in National Archives, The Hague, Gaspar Fagel, entrance 3.01.18,
inventory 375.
9
of the Turkish language and the customs at the Sublime Porte, Jacob Colyer indeed
appeared an excellent candidate to succeed his father.16 It seems that this was a rather unusual advantage since all other Western ambassadors were unable to speak
Turkish fluently.17 However, it took until 1688 for Jacob Colyer to become officially
appointed as ambassador and to be able to negotiate at the Sublime Porte on the
same level his father had done.18 In the period 1688-1698, Jacob Colyer won the trust
of the Ottomans who considered him the best candidate to act as mediator between
the Ottomans and the HLOA at the important peace conference at Karlowitz starting
in November 1698.
Colyer’s19 Role in the Peace Negotiations of the
Ottoman Empire: The Treaty of Karlowitz
The history of the Treaty of Karlowitz cannot only consist of the history of the
peace conference at Karlowitz as such, but must also take the failed peace negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and the HLOA in the years before into account.
From 1684 onwards, the neutral nations in this conflict, the sea powers of the Dutch
Republic and England, had pressed the officials at the Sublime Porte to establish
peace with their European enemies.20 Obviously, a violent conflict in Central Europe
was not beneficial for trading opportunities and since the primary role of 17th century ambassadors was to improve the trade relations of their nations, it becomes
immediately clear why they played such an integral part in these peace negotiations.
Whereas the first offers for a Dutch involvement in the Ottoman peace negotiations
were initiated by Stadtholder (Stadhouder) William III (1650-1702), Colyer became the
most important Dutch figure in these negotiations when he was appointed ambassador in 1688.21 An understanding of Colyer’s involvement in the peace negotiations
between the HLOA and the Ottoman Empire in the period prior to 1699 is therefore necessary to understand both his position as mediator and the outcome of the
16 J.H. Hora Siccama (1910), 183.
17 Jonathan I. Israel, “The Dutch Merchant Colonies in the Mediterranean during the Seventeenth Century,”
Renaissance and Modern Studies 30:1 (1986), 104.
18 O. Schutte, Repertorium der Nederlandse Vertegenwoordigers Residerende in het Buitenland 1584-1810
(’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 308.
19 From this moment onwards, ‘Colyer’ will, unless specified, refer to Jacob Colyer.
20 Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Haj (1967), 502; Rifa’at A. Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman Attitudes Toward Peace-Making: The
Karlowitz Case,” Der Islam 50:2 (1974), 132-133.
21 Sander Vergeer (2001), 10.
10
peace conference at Karlowitz. Instead of a day-to-day analysis of the peace negotiations before 169922, the focus will be on Colyer’s influence on the establishment of a
peace between the Ottomans and the European powers in the turbulent end of the
17th century.
The first thing to be acknowledged was that during Colyer’s period as ambassador in Constantinople, the military power of the Ottomans greatly decreased in
comparison with the armies of the European countries. The knowledge of both
weaponry and military organization of the European countries had greatly increased
in the 17th century, while this evolution did not occur in the Ottoman Empire.23 After
the Ottomans failed to conquer Vienna in 1683, the countries of the HLOA invaded
the territories of Hungary and Transylvania and managed to gain control of large
parts of these areas. Given the Ottoman defeat at Vienna, their territorial losses afterwards, and the fact that the members of the HLOA threatened to conquer even
larger parts of the Ottoman Empire, it seemed reasonable for the Ottomans to engage in peace negotiations with the HLOA as soon as possible. Moreover, due to
enormous food shortage, rebellions among Ottoman soldiers were frequent, which
made the military position of the Ottoman army even weaker.24 However, despite
the fact that Colyer and Lord Paget of England repeatedly offered to mediate between the Ottoman Empire and the HLOA it was not until 1699 that such a treaty was
realized.
The first challenge was to convince the Ottomans to accept the principle of uti
possidetis, the idea that all territory and other property would remain with its possessor at the start of the peace negotiations as a binding principle. Since its first
successful application during the negotiations culminating into the Peace of Westphalia (1648), this principle had become one of the cornerstones of 17th century European diplomacy.25 Important to note is that this principle not just emerged during
the first half of the 17th century, but was derived from Roman law. The introduction
of uti possidetis in international relations was part of a larger wave of Roman concepts
that were reintroduced by prominent scholars of law, such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)
22 This analysis can be found in J.H. Hora Siccama (1910).
23 Virginia Aksan, “War and Peace,” in Suraiya N. Faroqhi (ed.), The Cambridge History of Turkey Volume 3: The
Later Ottoman Empire 1603-1839 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 84-85.
24 For a detailed description, see: Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume
I: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1976), 217-219.
25 Laurens Winkel, “The Peace Treaties of Westphalia as an Instance of the Reception of Roman Law,” in Randall
Lesaffer (ed.), Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War
One (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 229.
11
and Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642).26 In Roman law, this principle was applied to
private ownership affairs. For example, if two persons claimed right to the same
property, uti possidetis prescribed that the current owner was granted provisional possession of the property. In other words, the current owner could only be deprived
of its property if it was shown that the property was not rightfully his, e.g. if he had
claimed it with excessive violence.27
The principle of uti possidetis introduced in 17th century European diplomacy
differed remarkably from its Roman predecessor. Instead of granting provisional
possession to the current owner of a certain territory, uti possidetis granted nations
absolute control over an area that was currently in their possession. Even if it was
taken with excessive violence (which was typically the case in 17th century warfare),
uti possidetis ensured that this area would remain in the possession of its current
owner under all circumstances. While this may sound particularly harsh, the idea
behind introducing this principle was to be able to clearly demarcate between war
and peace. Previous disputes about specific areas revolved around the question who
was its rightful owner. With the introduction of the principle of uti possidetis in the
Peace Treaty of Westphalia, this problem was immediately fixed: invading a territory
outside the predefined borders of a nation could now clearly be interpreted as an act
of war on which the defending nation had every right to react upon. In this context,
it would mean that an Ottoman invasion into Central Europe clearly undermined
the sovereignty of the Habsburg Empire. When accepting this principle, the Ottomans thus had to accept the idea that they could no longer claim that Vienna should
be rightfully theirs. Moreover, they had to concede that they were not entitled to
reclaim the territory that was lost to the Habsburgs in the Great Turkish War.
To convince the Ottomans to accept this principle provided enormous difficulties since this principle undermined the Islamic idea that the European lands were
destined to be integrated into a Muslim empire.28 The Ottoman Empire would only
accept these conditions when they felt that no possible way to benefit from this war
would exist. As Colyer states in a letter to his friend Gisbert Cuper (1644-1716): ‘This
nation cannot be dealt with until it goes down in a devastating defeat.’29 This difficult mission
26 Ibid, 237; Kenneth Colegrove, “Diplomatic Procedure Preliminary to the Congress of Westphalia,” The American Journal of International Law 13 (1919), 456.
27 For an extensive discussion of uti possidetis in Roman Law, see: Steven R. Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line: UTI
Possidetis and the Borders of New States,” The American Journal of International Law 90:4 (1996), 592-593.
28 For an extensive discussion of this Ottoman dilemma, see: Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Haj (1967), 503.
29 ‘Enfin, met dit volck is geen land te bezeijlen voor en aleer see een considerabele neerlaegh krijgen.’ Jacob
Colyer to Gisbertus Cuper, Constantinople, 1 January 1697 in National Archives, The Hague, Collectie Cupers,
entrance 1.10.24. inventory 12.
12
was made even more difficult by the constant French diplomatic attempts to reduce the chances of establishing a peace between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs.
However, the devastating defeat Colyer was hoping for occurred in modern day Serbia during the Battle of Zenta on the 11th September of 1697, when the Ottomans lost
30.000 men in a battle with the Habsburg army under command of Prince Eugene
of Savoy (1663-1739). This made Sultan Mustapha II (1664-1704) aware of the Ottoman military weakness and the need to engage in peace negotiations with the HLOA
to avoid further territorial losses.30 From this moment onwards, the Ottomans regained interest in establishing peace with the Habsburgs under mediation of the
Dutch and the English even if it meant to concede their territorial losses. Despite the
fact that the Ottomans expressed their desire for a peace with the Habsburgs already
in December 1697, it took until the beginning of July 1698 for Colyer to be invited to
the Ottoman court and receive a formal invitation to act as a mediator in the peace
negotiations.31 Again, he benefited from his command of the Turkish language and
the customs at the Sublime Porte because the Ottomans saw a lack of knowledge of
their customs as a horrible insult.32
Because all parties accepted the principle of uti possidetis at this point, most
of the important territorial issues were quickly resolved. Already on the 5th of December 1698, Colyer wrote to Anthonie Heinsius (1641-1720), the state secretary of
the Dutch Republic, that he expected that the conference would not last very much
longer because the involved actors were willing to accept all reasonable demands.
All territorial issues between Poland and the Ottoman Empire were already settled
at the time, leaving only a Polish demand for a yearly sum of 40.000 ducats coming
from the Sublime Porte on the table.33 The most important reason that the negotiations were not yet concluded was that the Ottomans refused to support any of its
former enemies financially. As Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Haj suggests, it seems that the Ottomans were willing to accept a peace with its opponents, but emphasized the fact
that this peace would only be temporarily.34 Therefore, any financial injection into
one of the countries of the HLOA would undermine the Ottoman plan to continue
its attempt to spread the Islam to Europe when its military position was strengthened. While Colyer and Paget had thought it was crucial to convince the Ottomans
30 Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Haj (1967), 498.
31 Jacob Colyer to Gisbertus Cuper, Sophia, 24 July 1698 in NL-HaNa, Cuperus, 1.10.24, 12.
32 See for example Colyer’s complaint about the ambassador of Venice who ‘shows few experience in residing
with the Turcks’ (‘weynig experiëntie toont met de Turcken te tracteren’). Jacob Colyer to Anthonie Heinsius,
Karlowitz, 5 december 1698 in NL--HaNa, Raadpensionaris Heinsius, 3.01.19, 551.
33 Jacob Colyer to Anthonie Heinsius, Karlowitz, 5 December 1698 in NL-HaNa, Raadpensionaris Heinsius,
3.01.19, 551.
34 Rifa’at Ali Abou-el-Haj (1974), 136.
13
to accept the principle of uti possidetis, it turned out that the negotiations hampered
as a consequence of financial, instead of territorial concerns. It is therefore unsurprising that the negotiations Venetian Republic, whose primary raison d’être were
first and foremost its financial resources, was the party that eventually prevented
the conclusion of the negotiations in the beginning of December 1698.35
Picture 1: Impression of the conference house at Karlowitz. Theatre de la Paix entres les Chrestiens et les Turcs (The Hague: Anna Beek, 1699)
The struggle to conclude the negotiations was not only evident for the ambassadors attending the conference at Karlowitz, but also the administrators of the
rest of the Ottoman Empire were alarmed by the fact that they were kept in the dark
for over a month. Since Belgrade was the closest city to Karlowitz, it were especially
the people of Belgrade that feared that their city would become the centre of battle
when the peace negotiations would fail. From the 23th of December onwards, the
administration of Belgrade regularly contacted Colyer to ask for a detailed description of the situation at Karlowitz and expressed their fear that the conference would
35 Jacob Colyer to Anthonie Heinsius, Karlowitz, 5 December 1698.
14
not end in success.36 Thus, for the people of Belgrade, Colyer’s reports were the most
important source to the peace negotiations, indicating that a friendly relationship
between Colyer and the administration of Belgrade surely did exist. This situation
lasted for more than a month since it was not until the 26th of January 1699 that the
Treaty of Karlowitz was signed.37 According to Colyer, ‘since the last letter of the 20th, I
have moved the peace negotiations to such an extent’, that ‘a general peace was established under
great festivities.’ 38
While this comment may be exaggerating Colyer’s importance a little, the fact
that he was granted the title ‘Duke of Hungary’ by the Habsburgs emperor Leopold I
and was the centre of festivities in Ottoman Belgrade indicate that he indeed played
a crucial role in the negotiations. When Colyer returned to Belgrade on the 8th of
February 1699, he was met with ‘unusual honor and welcomed with great grandeur.’ As he
describes, ‘the garrison stood in full arms from the Danube until high in the castle, and from
there back to my accommodation.’ Moreover, he was asked to sit on the divan with the
governor of Belgrade who ‘not only offered me a handshake, but asked me to sit in the corner
[of the divan]. In Turkish circles, this privilege was only reserved for the governor of a province
and was usually only presented to the highest vizier of the empire.’39 Thus, Colyer’s role in
the peace negotiations and the fact that he communicated the developments at the
conference to the administration of Belgrade made him an important figure in the
eyes of the administrators of the city of Belgrade. In the future, he remained to be
considered an important figure in the history of Belgrade as will be shown in the
analysis of Colyer’s involvement in the peace of Passarowitz in 1718.
36 Unfortunately, Colyer’s letters to the Turkish ambassador at Belgrade are not yet discovered. For an indication
of the fear of Belgrade that the failed negotiations would eventually lead to a new war, see: Jacob Colyer to Anthonie Heinsius, Karlowitz, 23 December 1698 in NL-HaNa, Raadpensionaris Heinsius, 3.01.19, 551.
37 A detailed analysis of the peace negotiations between December 1698 and January 1699 is beyond the scope of
this essay. This analysis can be found in: J.H. Hora Siccama (1910); Robert van Zuylen van Nijevelt (1883); Rifa’at Ali
Abou-El-Haj (1967).
38 ‘Nae het afgaen van mijn onderdanighste laeste schrijvens vande 20 deses, heb ik bij den pais offendi soo
veel te wege gebracht … mitsgaders de generale vreede, met groote solemniteijten gevolght is.’ Jacob Colyer to
Anthonie Heinsius, Karlowitz, 26 December 1698 in NL-HaNa, Raadpensionaris Heinsius, 3.01.19, 551
39 ‘Met ongemeene eere geincontreert, ende grooten pracht ingehaelt.’; ‘Het garnisoen stond van den Danauw
af, tot hoog int casteel, ende van daer, weder to binnen mijn logement, inde wapenen.’; ‘Als wanneer hij mij wel
de rechter hand gaf, maar selfs de hoeck hield, dat bij de Turcken d’eerste plaets is, ende door een vesier-gouverneur van een provincie aen niemand, als aenden oppersten vesier alleen gecedeert wert.’ Jacob Colyer to Anthonie
Heinsius, Belgrade, 11 February 1699 in NL-HaNa, Raadpensionaris Heinsius, 3.01.19, 600.
15
Belgrade at the Turn of the 17th Century
After the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz, it was decided that Belgrade remained part of the Ottoman Empire, and in practice it functioned as the frontier
city between the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empire. Given the fact that Colyer was
the centre of ceremonial activities when returning from Karlowitz to Belgrade, the
question arises why the rulers of Belgrade were this impressed by Colyer’s involvement in the peace conference of Karlowitz. Since Serbia is currently often associated
with Orthodox Christianity, it seems puzzling that the rulers of Belgrade were satisfied that they remained to be a part of the Muslim Ottoman Empire. However, a
closer look at the structure of 17th century Belgrade and the preferences of its rulers
will shows why they preferred to remain a part of the Ottoman Empire.
The Ottomans captured Belgrade for the first time in 1521, when Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (1494-1566) conquered Belgrade from the Kingdom of Hungary, which marked the moment when entire Serbia became part of the Ottoman
Empire. Moreover, Belgrade formed a connection to Vienna and could function as
an excellent gateway for a further Ottoman expansion into Europe.40 While Belgrade
had initially been a Christian city, the whole population of Belgrade was removed
from the city after the Ottoman capture. Christians thus mainly lived along the Serbian countryside and played no significant part in Serbian urban life under Ottoman
rule. From this moment onwards, the majority of its population was Muslim and
most administrators were Muslims appointed by the Sublime Porte as well. Despite
being a city in the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, Belgrade had become an important trading, military and administrative centre for the Ottomans during the 16th
and 17th century.41 In two centuries, Belgrade had changed from a silent Christian
fortress city under Hungarian rule into a vivid and rich Muslim city in the hands of
the Ottomans.
This situation changed drastically after the failed campaign to Vienna and
the invasion of the HLOA into the territories of Hungary and Transylvania. In 1688,
Belgrade was recaptured by the Habsburgs who stimulated the Christians on the
Balkans to return to urban areas to be of help in the Christian quest against the
40 Daniel Goffman (2004), 99.
41 For an extensive overview, see: David A. Norris, Belgrade: A Cultural History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 24-26.
16
Ottomans.42 The main figure in this revolt was the Serbian archbishop Arsenije III
Čarnojević (1633-1706) who organized the Serbian Christians living on the countryside to take up arms against the Ottomans and recapture their former cities. However, even though the Habsburgs formally ruled the territory of modern day Serbia,
Arsenije III soon found out that they could never permanently control the area in
this period. Rather than engaging in a violent conflict with the Ottomans, he decided to lead the Balkan Christians to Hungary and Croatia where they could live
in relative peace under Habsburg rule.43 Indeed, the Habsburgs only managed to
remain in control of Belgrade until 1690 when the Ottomans recaptured Belgrade
and reinstalled the former Muslim administration. Thus, when Colyer returned to
Belgrade after the Treaty of Karlowitz was signed in 1699, he returned to a city with
a major Muslim population which was ruled by an Islamite administration. It was
this administration that was satisfied with Colyer’s involvement in the peace negotiations because the outcome made sure that Belgrade remained a Muslim City in the
Islamite Ottoman Empire.
Picture 2: Impression of the Siege of Belgrade in 1688. (Jean Le Clerc, 1688)
The signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz marked a change in the population of
Belgrade. Instead of just consisting of Muslims with only a few Jewish and Armenian
42 Charles A. Frazee, Catholics and Sultans: The Church and the Ottoman Empire 1453-1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 153.
43 Ibid. 167.
17
merchants as exceptions, the Serbian Christians started to settle in areas close to Belgrade in Hungarian lands. In these years, the Ottoman influence in Belgrade greatly
decreased since they no longer considered a vital gateway to the rest of Europe. It
had become a town at the northern periphery of the empire, which was no longer
an exemplary bastion of Ottoman culture. Moreover, the Serbs became increasingly
oriented towards Europe in this period as a consequence of the contacts of the Serbs
with the other inhabitants of the Hungarian lands.44 Eventually, these people were
happy to return to Belgrade when the Habsburgs conquered it in 1717, and replaced
the Ottomans as its rulers. It were the Serbs that were oriented towards Europe who
were the major political and cultural force in the development of Belgrade as the
capital of the semi-autonomous Kingdom of Serbia established in 1718. After years
of living in exile in Hungary or the Serbian countryside, the Christian Serbs slowly
started to return to Belgrade from 1699 onwards.
Colyer, the Peace of Passarowitz and the
Establishment of the Kingdom of Serbia in 1718
The Peace of Karlowitz introduced a period of relative peace in which no major
accidents between the Ottomans and the HLOA occurred. However, this situation
changed drastically in 1710 when the Russians gained the upper hand in the Great
Northern War (1700-1721) after winning the Battle of Poltava (1709) in modern day
Ukraine. This substantial victory gave the army of Peter the Great (1672-1725) the
confidence to penetrate deeper into Eastern Europe and attempt to invade Ottoman territory.45 Eventually, the Ottomans crushed the Russian army in modern day
Moldova, which forced the Russians to sign the Treaty of Pruth in 1711. Considering
the slumbering Ottoman ideal of invading larger parts of Europe, it is no surprise
that this military victory blew new life into future campaigns against the European
powers. Indeed, the Ottomans declared war at the Venetian Republic in 1714, aiming
to conquer the parts of Greece they lost in the Great Turkish War. After succeeding
in taking back large parts of Greece, the Ottomans declared war to the Habsburgs in
1715, and eventually to a newly established HLOA in 1717, which included, besides
the states involved in the Great Turkish War, Portugal and Malta.46 Thus, the Treaty
of Karlowitz could not prevent the Ottomans and the European countries from meeting
44 David A. Norris, 26.
45 Stanford J. Shaw (1976), 219-220.
46 Ibid. 231-232.
18
each other in a similar situation only two decades after the peace was signed.
Again, Ottoman defeats in Serbia turned out to be the turning point in the
war between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. When the Habsburgs conquered
Belgrade on the 17th of August in 1717, it became once again clear that the Ottomans
lacked the military capacity to control the territories further away from their capital
city.47 From this moment onwards, despite several military threats from both the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, both parties were working towards a new peace agreement.48 Just as in 1698, the Dutch and the English were asked to act as mediators,
and again Jacob Colyer acted as the Dutch representative.49 Colyer happily accepted
this position because a successful mediation for the Ottomans increased the chances of getting more favorable trade conditions, which was still the most important
task of an 18th century ambassador on foreign soil.50 Almost two decades later, Colyer found himself travelling to Serbia during the winter to help establishing peace
between the Ottomans and the HLOA again.51
Colyer’s involvement during the peace conference at Karlowitz had impressed
the Ottomans to such an extent that they wanted to create a similar situation at Passarowitz as Colyer had proposed in Karlowitz:
The Turkish ministers would prefer that all plenipotentiaries and ambassador-mediators
attending the conference would stay at the same site of the mentioned river [Danube] such
that they reside separately, but not too far from each other, just as was the case during the
peace negotiations at Karlowitz.52
Furthermore, the Ottomans were willing to accept the principle of uti possidetis again, indicating that Colyer’s and Paget’s efforts in the 1690s were still heavily
47 Nikola Samardžić, “The Peace of Passarowitz 1718: An Introduction,” in Charles Ingrao, Nikola Samardžić &
Jovan Pešalj (eds.), The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718 (Purdue University Press, 2011), 15.
48 For an extensive analysis of the advent of the peace conference of Passarowitz, see: Rhoads Murphey, “Twists
and Turns in the Diplomatic Dialogue: the Politics of Peacemaking in the Early Eighteenth Century,” in Charles
Ingrao, Nikola Samardžić & Jovan Pešalj (eds.), The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718 (Purdue University Press, 2011), 78.
49 Nikola Samardžić, (2011), 15.
50 K. Heeringa, Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van de Levantsche Handel: Tweede Deel 1661-1726 (’s-Gravenhage:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1917), 149.
51 Jacob Colyer to Anthonie Heinsius, Sofia, 8 Maart 1718 in NL-HaNa, Raadpensionaris Heinsius, 3.01.19, 2018.
52 ‘Ende ten derden dat desen Turckxe ministers gaarne souden sien, dat alle de ambassadeurs plenipotentiarissen die op het congres staen te verschijnen, met de ambassadeur-mediateurs, aen d’een of andere zijde van de
voorste revier quamen, wel
separatelijk, doch niet verre van den anderen logieerend, gelijk inde vredes handelinge van Carlowitz is geschiet.’
Jacob Colyer to Anthonie Heinsius, Sofia, 14 Maart 1718 in NL-HaNa, Raadpensionaris Heinsius, 3.01.19, 2018.
19
influencing the Ottoman idea of what it meant to engage in peace negotiations with
the European powers. In Colyer’s notes on the negotiations concerning Serbia, the
acceptance of this principle becomes especially visible:
The first mentioned [the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor] have come to determine the limits
and jurisdiction of Belgrade and Smederovo, and proposed that these should be extended
to the territory of the former Kingdom of Serbia. This meant that the cities and fortresses
of Nifta, Wichin, Nova, Bafa and Scopia, just as the other towns and villages in this area
should be handed over to the Emperor. This offer surprised the Ottoman ministers since they
were unfamiliar with the former Kingdom of Serbia. However, they understood that the
principle of uti possidetis forced them to hand over the demanded territory.53
Picture 3: Impression of the peace negotiations at Passarowitz. (Picture Archives of the Austrian National Library, Vienna)
This indicates that Colyer’s efforts in the 1690s to convince the Ottomans to
accept the principle of uti possidetis proved a useful tool in the peace negotiations
53 ‘… Seijden de eerstegenoemde daergekomen te wesen, tot het reguleeren en vaststellen der limiten en jursidictien tot Belgrade en Semendria behoorende, fulmineerde dat de uijtgestrecktheden desselver, als van oudts over
het gantsche coninckrijk van Servien, waerinne de steden en fortressen van Nifta, Wichin, Nova, Bafar, Scopia met
meer andere plecken, dorpen en huchten inbegreepend wesende, overgeven en gecedeert mosten worden, welke
pretentie d’ottomannische ministers heel vreemd te voren sijnde gekomen, antwoorden sij daerop niet te weten
wat Servie te seggen was, maer wel, dat het fundament tot een vreede in ’t uti possidetis bestaende, van haer niet
anders gevergt, nogh gepretendeert konde werden.’ Jacob Colyer to Anthonie Heinsius, Passarowitz, 10 Juni 1718
in NL-HaNa, Raadpensionaris Heinsius, 3.01.19, 2018.
20
again. In a sense, the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Serbia with Belgrade as its
capital as a Habsburg province in 1718 was the consequence of the Ottoman acceptance of the principles of European diplomacy, a situation that was largely realized
through the efforts of Colyer and Paget.
The establishment of the Kingdom of Serbia in 1718 not only marked the reunification of the territory of the former Kingdom, but also gave it a profound Christian
identity. While the administration of Belgrade after the peace of Karlowitz mainly consisted of Ottoman Muslims, the Habsburg forced them to leave the city after
its capture in 1717. Moreover, most of the mosques in Belgrade were destroyed and
almost all of the Muslim inhabitants retreated towards Ottoman territory.54 From
thereon, Belgrade was firmly in the hands of the Christians. The utmost symbol of
this Christian domination is the fact that the Bajrakli Mosque that was built to honor the Ottoman capture of Belgrade in 1690 was converted into a Catholic church.55
Even though it may seem that the Habsburgs simply forced the inhabitants of Serbia to convert to Christianity, the fact that the Serbian Christian population rapidly
returned to Belgrade from Hungarian exile indicates that also the Christian Serbs
themselves were happy to return to their former capital. Just as the Treaty of Karlowitz fitted the needs of the Muslim administration, the Peace of Passarowitz reflected
the interests of the Serbian Christians, which formed the majority of the Belgrade
population. Colyer’s successful attempt to convince the Ottomans to accept the
principle of uti possidetis had proved worthwhile again.
While the Ottomans knew that the principle of uti possidetis forced them to
hand over their territory in modern day Serbia, it were the Habsburgs who initially
refused to respect this principle. The Habsburg plenipotentiaries told Colyer that
‘the desired uti possidetis is no binding rule, but a starting point from which both parties could start
the negotiations and from which all parties could deviate.’56 They not only desired to control the conquered lands in Serbia, but also wanted to add the Ottoman province
of Romelia in modern day Bulgaria to their empire. It is easy to imagine that the
Ottomans saw this violation of what they considered the fundamental basis of European diplomacy as an incredible insult and decided to leave the conference room
to discuss it in their private chambers. This Habsburg demand especially fell on deaf
ears because the Ottomans had sent a large army to Romelia to defend this province
54 Robert M. Hayden, “Religious Structures and Political Dominance in Belgrade,” Ethnologia Balkanica 9
(2005), 216,
55 David Norris (2009), 28.
56 ‘ … dat het gealbegeerde uti possidetis, maer aangesien ongecomplieereert mogte wenden als een voorslagh
off ten besten genomen, als een preliminair poinct waervan partijden ten weders zijnden konden afgaen.’ Jacob
Colyer to Anthonie Heinsius, Passarowitz, 10 Juni 1718 in NL-HaNa, Raadpensionaris Heinsius, 3.01.19, 2018.
21
if the peace negotiations would collapse.57 However, it seems that the Habsburgs
were rather testing the boundaries of the Ottoman willingness to establish peace,
than that they truly felt that the territory of Romelia was rightfully theirs. A week before the Habsburg violation of the uti possidetis, the Dutch envoy at Vienna, J.J. Hamel
Bruynincx (1661-1738), had already written to Colyer that ‘the Prince Eugene of Savoy and
the high ministers were all willing to establish peace, as long as it would not cost too many time
and the Sublime Porte would not be too harsh in the negotiations with the Republic of Venice.’58
Moreover, the treaty signed on the 21th of July proved that the peace between the
Ottomans and the HLOA was indeed fully grounded in the principle of uti possidetis.
Not only had Colyer again managed to play an important part in the establishment of a peace between the two most important powers in Eastern Europe, he
also believed that his involvement would lead to more favorable trading conditions
with the Ottomans. According to him, ‘it would be easy to negotiate an established tax tariff,
such that it no longer will vary from case to case, a thing that would bring many advantages to our
nation.’59 Colyer managed to be both one of the most important actors in the peace
negotiations between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans and to improve the trade
relations with the Ottoman Empire. However, while these trade relations with the
Ottoman Empire had previously been privileged to the Dutch, the English and the
French and were only established after long-lasting negotiations with the Sublime
Porte, the Ottomans decided to invite the other European powers as trading partners after the signing of the Peace of Passarowitz.60 That this changed situation in
no way affected Colyer’s influence at the Sublime Porte is indicated by his involvement in a conflict between the Dutch Republic and Algeria.61 Algerian pirates had
captured several Dutch ships and even had made several of Dutch sailors to slaves.
Even though that a conflict with the local government of Algeria was not in the best
interest of the Ottomans, they guaranteed a sit-down between Colyer and the Algerian government in which the conflict could be solved.62
57 Rhoads Murphey (2011), 78.
58 ‘Schijnen den Keijser den Prins Eugene van Savoijen, en het geheele hoge ministerie in der dage tot de
Vreede volkomen genegen, als maer niet te veel tijd verloren werd, ende het Turcxe Hoff niet all te veel difficulteijten komt te maechen ten opsigte van de Venetiaenen.’ J.J. Hamel Bruijnincx to Jacob Colyer, Wenen, 4 Juni 1718 in
Dutch National Archives, The Hague, Legatie Turkije, entrance 1.02.20, inventory 9.
59 ‘… Dat den tariff wegens de tollen op d’een of andere manier, tot voorcominge van meenigvuldige variatien,
vastgesteld mach werd en soo veel voordelen voor de natie tragten te bedingen, als immers doenlijk sal wesen.’
Jacob Colyer to Anthonie Heinsius, Passarowitz, 23 Juli 1718 in NL-HaNa, Raadpensionaris Heinsius, 3.01.19, 2018.
60 For an extensive analysis of the trade between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans after the Peace of Passarowitz, see: Jovan Pešalj, “Making a Prosperous Peace: Habsburg Diplomacy and Economic Policy at Passarowitz,” in
Charles Ingrao, Nikola Samardžić & Jovan Pešalj (eds.), The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718 (Purdue University Press,
2011), 147-150.
61 At the time, Algeria was a semi-independent province of the Ottoman Empire.
62 Jacob Colyer to Anthonie Heinsius, Passarowitz, 22 August 1718 in NL-HaNa, Raadpensionaris Heinsius,
3.01.19, 2018.
22
Conclusion
In a time when international contacts came not as natural as they currently
do, Jacob Colyer and to a lesser extent his father Justinus played an integral part in
protecting the interests of the Dutch Republic on Ottoman territory. They managed
to successfully extend the treaty of friendship, trade and navy between the Ottoman
Empire and the Dutch Republic established by Cornelis Haga in 1612, an accomplishment that was only privileged to the Dutch and the English, and later also to the
French. All in all, they were both capable of fulfilling the primary task of an early
modern ambassador: improving the trade relations between their home country
and the foreign country of residence. While Justinus Colyer’s influence was restricted to the interests of the Dutch Republic, his son Jacob became an integral figure
in the history of the relations between the European countries and the Ottoman
Empire in the early modern era. As his influence at the Sublime Porte and his title
‘Duke of Hungary’ indicate, Colyer was highly respected both by the Ottomans and
the European powers.
During the 17th century, an Ottoman invasion further into Europe and a
conversion of its inhabitants to the Islam was not unthinkable. Only after the Ottomans failed to conquer Vienna in 1683, it became clear that the military power of the
Ottomans was declining, which made a sustainable peace with them an imaginable
solution for the first time. It were the Dutch and the English, the most influential
foreign powers at the Sublime Porte, who took the lead in the establishment of this
peace at the end of the 17th century. In the last two decades of the 17th century,
they repeatedly tried to convince the Ottomans to accept the principles of European
diplomacy and engage in a peace conference with the members of the HLOA. However, it took until the immense Ottoman defeat at the Battle of Zenta in 1697 for the
Ottomans to understand that a sustainable peace was in their own interest as well.
Under the mediation of Jacob Colyer and the English ambassador Sir William Paget,
negotiations between the Ottomans and the HLOA culminated into the Treaty of
Karlowitz. On the 26th of January 1699, the Ottomans signed a peace with long-lasting potential for the first time.
The establishment of this peace crucially depended on the Ottoman willingness to accept the foundation of early modern European diplomacy: the principle
of uti possidetis. Since it was Colyer who convinced the Ottomans to accept this
principle, his influence on the peace negotiations between the Ottomans and the
HLOA can hardly be overstated. When Colyer returned to Belgrade, his first stop on
23
Ottoman territory, he was the centre of festivities, which indicates that the Ottomans were extremely satisfied with his role in the peace negotiations at Karlowitz.
The administration of Belgrade, the Ottoman frontier city at the Habsburg border,
was satisfied that the city remained part of a Muslim empire. Contrary to the present
situation, the population of Belgrade mainly consisted of Muslims since Arsenije III
Čarnojević retreated with the major part of the Serbian Christians to Habsburg territory. The principle of uti possidetis proved to be a vehicle that made it possible for
Belgrade to remain part of an empire that protected the interests of the inhabitants
of the city.
In the years after the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz, it became clear that the
peace established in 1699 was far from conclusive. Especially when the Ottomans
defeated the Russian army in 1711, the Ottoman idea that all European territory was
rightfully theirs entered a period of revival. Again, they declared war on the Venetian
Republic and the Habsburgs, and prepared for a new invasion into Europe. However,
this campaign was not as impressive as the earlier ones in which the Ottomans almost managed to conquer Vienna, the gate to Western Europe. The Habsburg forced
the Ottomans to retreat far into the Balkans and even got control of Belgrade in 1717.
Just as in 1698, the militaries of the European powers were way better organized
than the Ottoman army. After the loss of Belgrade, the Ottomans were steering towards a new peace conference in which they would acknowledge their losses, but
wanted to avoid losing any more territory. Jacob Colyer, who managed to conclude
the peace conference at Karlowitz, was once again asked to function as a mediator
in the negotiations.
Just as in the earlier negotiations, the Ottoman acceptance of the uti possidetis
was crucial for a successful conclusion. They were willing to hand all the territory
in Serbia over to the Habsburgs, which made it possible to reestablish the former
Kingdom of Serbia as a province of the Habsburg Empire. Eventually, the peace
conference at Passarowitz was concluded on the same conditions as the previous
negotiations in which Colyer acted as a mediator. It was Colyer who convinced the
Ottomans to accept the principle of uti possidetis, and made it possible to speak of a
semi-autonomous Kingdom of Serbia in 1718 after a long period of Ottoman domination. Furthermore, the ministers of the Sublime Porte showed their gratitude
for the successful conclusion by help resolving a Dutch trade conflict with the Algerians. Once again, Colyer proved to be a central figure in protecting the interests of
Dutch trade in the Levant. After 36 years of residing at the Sublime Porte, Jacob Colyer,
the Duke of Hungary, had become an indispensable figure in both representing the
Dutch trade at the Levant and the process of peacekeeping between the Ottomans and
the European powers.
24
About the author
Bas de Boer is a PhD candidate at the University of Twente, specializing in
the philosophy of technology. His further research interests are the Republic of
Letters and the history of cartography, especially during the Age of Discovery.
Email: [email protected]
25
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Table of contents
Introduction7
The Coyler Family8
Coyler’s Role in Peace Negotiations of the Ottoman Empire:
The Treaty of Karlowitz10
Belgrade at the Turn of the 17th Century
15
Coyler, the Peace of Passarowitz and the Establishment
of the Kingdom of Serbia in 1718
18
Conclusion23
About the author25
Bibliography26
29
30
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