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XERXES
The subject peoples
XERXES' INVASION OF
The core of the army consisted of myriads of Persians
GREECE
fighting as infantry. As the empire expanded the army
-vas increased by the addition of other myriads
of
nfantry conscripted from the subject peoples. Each of
these units was commanded by a Persian nobleman
appointed by the king. Valuable archaeological evidence ofthese peoples can be found in the sculptured
reliefs from the palace at Persepolis. Herodotus gives
a detailed roll-call of the dress and weaponry of the
Having dealt with the revolts of Egypt and Babylon,
Xerxes was able to turn his attention to Greece. He
had three main objectives for his Greek offensive:
o to punish the Athenians for their involvement in the
Ionian revolt during the time of Darius and for the
Persian defeat at Marathon in 490 BC
o to extend the Persian Empire into Europe by adding
more than fifty different subject peoples who marched
Greece
in Xerxes'huge army.
o
The cavalry
In studying Xerxes' Greek campaign, you need to
be familiar with some important military terms. These
The cavalry was the most important addition to the
army in the early years of empire building. The
Medes, who were regarded as the finest horsemen in
Asia, formed the cream of the cavalry. After Cyrus
conquered Croesus of Lydia in 546 BC, Lydian cavalry contingents were also added to the Persian army.
Cyrus, esteeming the mobility of cavalry units, formed
contingents of them from among the Persian nobility.
By the time of Xerxes' campaign against Greece the
cavalry included contingents of Bactrians, Sagartians,
Cissians and Indians as well as Libyan chariotry and
Arabian camel units.
I
147
The navy
I
Because Persia was a land-locked nation, it possessed
no navy of its own, but relied on the use of the navies
h of the maritime nations that it conquered. The fleets of
I
t
#
þ the Phoencians, Egyptians and Ionians formed the
core of the Persian navy to which were added smaller
contingents from Eastern Mediter¡anean states such as
Cyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia and Caria, among others.
The crews of these ships were manned by the marines
of the subject-states as well as a number of Persian
sailors. Each state's navy was commanded by its own
naval officers under the overall command of Persian
admirals.
9"t fur/6et
ìnttes /iqa/ìon
Herod,otus' d,escription of the multi-nøtional force that
accompønied, Xerxes on
his Greek campøign is too
lengthy to include h,ere. You a,re encourclged to read it
for yourself in Boolt, VII, 60-98 and make a list of the
followin g: infantry contingents, includ,ing their d.ress
ønd weapons; cauølry units; naaøl units ancJ numbers
f
ships.
to gain personal glory as his predecessors had done
before him.
are:
.
o
o
strategy
logistics
tactics.
Persian strategy
Strategy can be defined as the highlevel overall planning of a war or campaign. This involves making decisions about objectives-generally a prerogative of the
king and his advisers. Herodotus tells us that 'Xerxes
called a conference of the leading men in the country
to find out their attitude towards the war and explain
to them his own wishes.'6
Strategy also involves the methods by which the
aims are to be achieved. This may often involve forming and maintaining alliances with other nations. In
the case of Persia, foreign policy was based on conquest rather than a system of alliances. We know that
Xerxes sent envoys to the Greek states demanding
'earth and water', the traditional tokens of submission.
Athens and Sparta were excluded from this offer,
because they were to be attacked and punished for
previous offences. Many of the Greek states had little
choice but to agree to Persian demands in view of
their own defencelessness and the size of the Persian
force ma¡ching against them.
A vital component of Xerxes' stïategy was the decision to invade Greece by a combined land and sea
attack. It was essential that the navy keep close contact with the army in order to provide it with supplies,
protection and communication. This was a feature of
Persian policy throughout the Greek campaign. Keep
this in mind when we look at the Battle of Salamis, for
the defeat of the Persian fleet at this time had a vital
impact on Xerxes' subsequent strategy.
óHerodotus, op. cit.,
-l
VII,
Ba,
p,443.
I4A
PERSONALITIES
AND
GROUPS
ìnt,es/ìqa/ìon
account Herod'otus giues of Xerxes" meeting wíth his aduisers and the reasorts for his d,ecisiott'
Read the
full
to irwade Greece (Flistories, Book VII, B).
Persian logistics
Logistics refers to the provision, movement and supply
of armed forces. It includes the following:
o mobilisation (recruitment) of forces
o supply of weapons and ammunition
o provision of communications
o organisation of transport
o provision and distribution of stores (food, clothing).
Herodotus gives a very detailed account of the
logistical preparations that Xerxes made in 484-81
BC in planning his Greek campaign. Frames 2 to 6 in
the sequence chart in Figure 5.6 show the various
preparations. Study the chart carefully and discuss the
following questions.
Persian battle tactics relied on the use of vast numbers of soldiers, who were thrown in wave after wave
against the enemy front line. This tactic was more
suitable for the open terrain of Persian lands than the
mountains arld
a
What does the size of Xerxes' army and' nøuy
suggest about the importance of the Greelt'
campøign?
a
What arrangenlents did Xerxes møke to transport
his ørmy across the Hellespon't?
:
Why were strategically located supply dumps
important? What other method's would Xerxes høue
used to proaisíon his troops?
t
Why did Xerxes order the build'ing of a cønal at
Mt Athos? Whøt does Herod'ottts' remark indicate
about his clttitude to Xerxes?
Zclioi/V
triecl to retreat.
Xerxes and his commanders used these tactics with
varying success throughout the campaigns of 480-79
BC. You will need to asses these tactics in the light of
those employed by the Greeks in the defence of their
homeland.
The Greek response
ffir
your ou)n assessrnent of Xerxes'
actions. (Consult the references to Herodotus giuen in
Figure 5.6.)
Persian tactics
Tactics concern ìhe particular methods of fighting
adopted in battle. They include:
o choice of area in which to fight
o decision about when to fight
o
o
were the Greeks doing while Xerxes was prepar-
ing his onslaught? They already knew of his plans
through spies sent to Persia, but were too preoccupied
with domestic concerns to respond. It was not until
481 BC, in the last months of Xerxes' preparations,
that they began to prepare a strategy of their own.
A conference was held at the Isthmus of Corinth' It
was attended by thirty-one states, those that had not
medised. Leadership of the newly formed Hellenic
League was given to Sparta. It was decided that the
best overall strategy to counter the invasion was to
bottle up Persia's army and navy in narrow areas' This
it
impossible for them to deploy their
huge numbers of troops and ships in traditional open
formation. Another important strategy was to prevent
the Persian fleet from carrying out its vital supporting
role of maintaining the extended supply lines to the
would make
army,
Study Figure 5.6. []sing eaclt' box as the basis for a
paragrøph, construct your ou)n a,ccount of Xerxes'
preparations for h'is ínaasion of Greece. Refer to
Herod,otus, ønd,
passes of Greece.
Another feature of traditional Persian tactics was
the use of archers in the initial attack. Kneeling
archers would direct volleys of arrows at the enemy's
front line. The purpose of this was to panic the opposing force and prepare the way for the advance of the
infantry. The cavalry a vital contingent of the arm¡
would support the infantry and archers-its mobility
enabled it to harass any section of the enemy line that
.What
Zot dìr"urrr'on
tarro*
deployment (positioning) of troops before battle
troop manoeuvres during battle.
The first line of defence the Greeks chose to implement this strategy was the narrow mountain pass at
Tempe in Thessaþ This, however, proved impossible
to defend. A viable alternative was the narrow pass
between the mountains and the sea at a place called
Thermopylae. Here, the Greek force of about 7000
men, under the command of King Leonidas of Sparta,
made their stand. In the nearby straits of Artemisium
the Greek navy assembled to support their land forces
and to prevent the advance of the Persian fleet.
The Persian advance
Once Xerxes had completed his logistical preparatior
and the Persian army had safely crossed tl
t
XERXES
149
tã
.
.
stores of proaisions for the army and naay
were established, at key locatiotu along the
coast of Thrace and, Macecl,onia
o for
three years worlcmen dug a canal
through the Mt Athos peninsula to allow the
fleet to pass safely (Darius'preuious inuasion
attem.pt hadfailed when the Persianfleet
'and prouision dumps were being formed for
the troops lest either men or animals should,
go hungry on the march to Greece'
(Herod,otus,
in a storm off the dangerous
naters ofthe peninsula. Xerxes had, learnt
was d,estroyed,
VII,23).
o
¡
.
rememberecl by' (Herod,otus,
the Strymon Riuer in Thrace was bridged' near its mouth, not
.far.from the supply depot at Eion
'cal¡les, some of papyrus, some of white
from preuíous mistakes )
'it was mere osÍ,entcltíon that mad,e Xerxes
haae the canal dug-he wanted to show
his pouer and to leaue something to be
flax, nere being
VII, 23).
FI
preparedfor the brid,ges-a taslt uhich Xerxes entnuted to the
Egyptians and the Phoenicia,ns' (Herod'otus, VII, 23).
.
ffi
a briclge built of boats was
on stn t cte. d acr o s s the.
narrowest pa,rt of the
Hellespont to enable a more
fficient mouement of troops
frorn Asia to Europe
c.
tl¡w
. in 4Bl BC Xerxes sent enaoys
o
throughout Greece, with the
exception of Athens and Sparta,
d,emanding earth and, nater, the
traditional tokens of submíssion
.
¡r¡_l
mo,ny nnrthern and, central skr'tes,
.
Black Sea and at right
æt
aware of their aulnerability,
cornplied with his demands
'this . . . was d,ue to his confid,ent
belief thøt the Greelts who hctd'
preuiously refuseiL to comply with
the d,emand, of Darius woukl now
befríghtened into complying with
angles to the Hellespont'
(Herodotus, VII, 36).
æ
his own' (Herodotus, VII, 30).
'galleys and triremes were
lashed together to support
the bridges. They were
moored, slantwise to the
Hellespont
*
bæ
Aegean Sea
%
æ
Peloponnese
%
#
æ
FI
.
æ: æ
æ#
æ
a
Land t.oops
.¡rr-
0
Fleet
50
#
S
"á
100
Sardis
.
.
combinerl ínfantry and caaalryforce ofouer
200 000 assembleclfrom all satrapies
a l0 ))]-strong elite corps of 'Irnmortals'
afleet of 1200 triremes, comprising the nauies
of Egypt, Phoenicía, Cyprus and, the lonian
Greeks
ê
ææ
r50
@
kilnm¿tres
o
nay)T includ,ed, warships, supply ships
.
'the army uas ind,eedfar greater than any
other in record,ed, history . . . Xerxes, in the
process of assembling his armies, had' eaery
corner of the continent rønsacked,' (Herod,otus,
vII,18).
:IGURE 5.6
Møp and sequence chart of Xerxes' logistical preparatíons
and
horse-transporï,s
for tlrc Greelc campaign
PERSONALITIES
I5O
GROUPS
AND
a
¡:¡TIõIÐU'
/'/a/isn 6uút
Pass
It/a//
/.,^6\
4naVaeaî
'For
'í¡
I
Çreek camp oo
Fefíiûn c(thP aaaa
four days Xerxes waited, in cottstønt expectation
would make good theír escape'
(Herod,ottu, VII, 2 I 0).
thøt the
Greelæ
ET'EE
w^íeit"d with rage and sentforutard the Medes an'd
Cissiaru with ord¿rs to talæ the¡n aliae and bring them
his presence. The Medcs charged, anil in the struggle
which ensued, many fetl; but others took their places, and'
in spite of terrible losses refnsed to be beaten off' They
itþtotn enough to oryonr, and' not least to the king
^od"
himself,'that he haã' ín hß army mo'ny men, ini.eed, but
into
tfs
FFlÉE5¡ft¡(lt¡ti
'Onthefifth [day] when still they hadmade rw-mnae, ' . .
he
few sold,íers' (Herodntw, VII, 210).
TiEÍETF¡:FGüTI¡
EEíETiET4
I
tj
í
/qˡq[J
P
@
IH
-&
. - '1-.--"&.
:'
'Next d.ay thefi.ghting began again, but with tw better
,uccest jo, the Persians, who rencwed, theír omlaught in
the hope that the Greeks, being so few in nwnber,-might
be badly enough d'isabled. by wounds to preuentfurther
resistance . . . But the Greelæ ræuer slaclcencd . , . So when
the Persians found that things were no better for thern
than on the preuious d,ay, they orrce m'ore withdrew'
(Hero ìlottu, VI I, 2 I 2 ).
FTGURE
5.7
Tlte battle of Thernt'opylae
.ê
'but jwt then, a man namcd, Ephialtes, fro-m Malß þe9;rby
Greeh statel camn in hope of a rich reward, to tell the leing
øbout the lrack' which led ouer the hills to Thermnpylaeand, thus he was able to prùue the death of the Greeks who
held the pass' (Herodottu, VII, 212).
XERXES
I5t
rñ
L:,I
'f/
'la
ffi
trå
4
'At last the Pers_ians,
f.nd,ing that their assauhs upon the
.,. .were all tueless, brokc offthe engog"mcit
ond
wündreu. )(erxes was watching the battLe.from
whcre he
sat; and. it is said that in the lourse of the"
a;¡;"k";ir""
"tirnes, in tenorfor his army, he leapí
pT:
'All_d,ay the battle continued;
the Med,es, . . . place uas talren
by Hyd,arncs and his phked,'pur¡"n iioopr_fiËï".r,,
I mmnrtals-who ad.uanre d, .,.
*,
(Herodotus, VII, 212).
ø
h;f;;;
"fhåy,"
ur, o
r"
-. I
t:o:nare,successful than the Med.es
" "g"g"l,'
had beeni
a"tt
o,
oe¡ore, Lhe two arm,ies
fi,ghling in a confined, space, the
ylyrt.er spears than the Greehs'and høuing no
aaaantage Jrom their numbers' (Herod,ottts,
Vn, 2 I 0
iri,
EE¡ÌF-'!FF mfri
:i:::yyr:!
).
zl
EEtrFÍ¡TTã!Eì=I! ECEIEFE-{ÍIÏFIIñIIII
I
n:Tnæ¡!lFl?ß
f:
(
'Xerxes . . . promptly sent off Hydarnes
wírh ùe ffoops under
. .., ßy earþ dawlt tþey were at the
simm,it of
:l^"-?y*"no
spot where the phociam
Greeh tr"ibel
fiocat
:::::"f:,:r:r,the
srood,_on guard, wtth a thousand
mcn . . . ffien the persians
auøcked thernJ . . . the phociaru withdreåt
io'iir"'äin""
point of the mnuntain, where they
;r;dr";o'î;r"
destructnn. But the persiøru . . . paid
^"d*nofuiheränenion
to them and. pas.sed on along the'drr;r"íi"s";;;T"*nn
-'-"o vr*erv w' oU
possible speed'(Herod,ot^,"W[ ZtB¡.
qO
éá\
When Inonid,as saw
that he would soon be surrounded,, he
?way-mosj of the troops who were with him. In the
flghtlng th:alfigllo-wed,, Iconid,as was killed.. The Spartans
wno uere treJl,'wtthdrew into the nanow
ncck of the
up a position in a single
f^j . . . and too,k
they resßted to.the last, with "o,ipo",
their swords if
?i!l ; _.rÍi:re
thern, and d'nnt, with their hands and teeth,
!*!.,n?o
unkl the.Persians coming onfrom. the.front . .
, antl
ctroslng mfiom behind,finally ouerwhàlmed
them with
musúe weapons' ( Herod,otus, VI I, 22 T
).
s:n!
AND
PERSONALITIES
I52
GROUPS
support the army which was advancing
Hellespont over the ingenious bridge of boats built
.p""iuily for the prrrpãt", he began the march on
The states of northern Greece bowed before
him, adding their men and ships to the Persian forces'
The fleet, ãccording to plan, hugged the shore line'
keeping close contact with the army' The first meeting
iur at Therma in Macedonia, from where the
ir"""".
ftuå"
waters of the Euripus Channel' When the storm finally
combined forces headed south, meeting no resistance
until they reached ThermoPYlae'
The battle of Thermopylae
The sequence chart in Figure 5'7 summarises the
main deìelopments of the battle' Study the chart carefully and u.t.*", the questions which follow it'
7ot dt'scusston
Immortals?
a given
Whøt tactics did the Persiøns use in th'eir opening
mønoeuures?
.
:
another summeÍ storm.T
Over the next few days the Persian and Greek fleets
fought three battles:
. in th" first of these, the Persians with their superior
What d,id' Xerxes hope to gain by sending in the
Thermopylae?
a
abated, the Persian fleet took up its position at
Aphetae, while the Greeks occupied a position off
Artemisium. The Persians, in an attempt to encircle
the Greek {leet, sent a squadron of 200 ships to sail
south around Euboea but it was destroyed in yet
numbers and lighter, more manoeuvrable ships'
attempted to surround the Greek {leet in the open
waters between Aphetae and Artemisium' However'
the Greeks useù the defensive tactic called the
'kyklos', in which their smaller force formed a close
circle with their rams pointing outwards, preventing
the enemy ships from disrupting their formation' At
What assumption does Xerxes appea'r to make
about the eipected Greek' response to his rnalch on
ç
on
ThLrmopylae. Off the rocky coast of Magnesia a vioIent storm raged for three days, destroying up to 200
Persian ships. The Greek navy, consisting of 271
triremes, .uil"d north to meet the Persian advance'
With betier knowledge of local weather conditions, the
Greeks were able to iide out the storm in the sheltered
,Líp, h"uã-on, stopping them from adopting either
offãnsive or defensive manoeuvres' Herodotus
(Book VIII, 9) tells us that the Persians lost thirty
Why were the Persians unable to take the pøss by
co
nu
entí
on
o] t actic s ?
:
What critical role d,id th'e Greek traitor, Ephialtes
play in the Persiart' uictorY?
a What d,o the tq'ctics ad,opted, by the Greeks øt
Thermopylae ind,icate about the ffictiaeness of
Xerxes' strategY and tactics?
ships in this encounter.
. O*ing the night, further storm damage to ihe
the
Persiaã ships anchored off Aphetae encouraged
of
part
raid
and
Greeks to sail across the channel
the Persian fleet engaged in repairing their ships'
You sh'ould, req'd, Herod,otus'føscinating narrøtiae
in íts entirety
(Book VII, 176
loolroutfor the Greek bias
Ác/itn/y:
in
ff)'
of
Be on the
his account'
enzP a/67
/as'6
Imagine that you are Xerxes' personal scribe responsithe Greeh cambte fo, læeping a record of the euents of
of the bøttle
&ccoutlt
Persiøn
poígn. Wr*"â" fficiat
'of
øt Susa'
court
the
to
ih"r*opylae to be sent back'
Naval engagement at Artemisium
While the Persian and Greek forces were fighting at
Thermopylae, inconclusive naval encounters took
fh"" inï"
Euboea.
encounter, the Persian ships sailed
across towards the Greek position at Artemisium
and formed an offensive semicircle, which the
Cr""k* attacked head-on' Both sides sustained
o In the final
5o'þ./6e, inoes/ìVa/ion
th.is battle
*igttufth" Greek ships charged the Persian
waters of Cape Artemisium to the north of
The Persian {leet, comprising 1200 ships (accordto
ing to Herodotus), had saiied south from Therma
heavy casualties and the Persians, recognising that
little was to be gained, withdrew'
It was at this polnt that the Greeks received news of
facthe disaster at Thermopylae; realising the danger
ing southern Greece, they retreated down the Euripus
to Athens, the Persian navy in pursuit'
"Lånt"l
While these naval encounters were indecisive'
there were imPortanl outcomes:
o The Greek navy was able, if oniy briefl¡ to prevent
the Persians from assisting their land forces' Thus'
careful in accepting Herodotus'figures
without question. Historians argue that he may have
the size of the Persian fleet and the numbers
?We need to be
"rugg"rut"d
of.tip, destroyed in storms in order to show the Greek
effort to better advantage'
XERXES
*, *
M
Thermopylae
I53
#
&
o
æ
/')
EUBOEA
\F/
^¿J
o Athens
0
25
Phalerum
50
hilometres
X
Battle site
æ
åv Persian shipwreck
*
Route of Persian fleet
FIGURE 5.8
Key sites in the Battle of Artemisium
the naval action at Artemisium interrupted the
Persian strategy of combined naval and military
operations.
o
o
The Persian navy was now significantly reduced in
numbers. This would affect the outcome of the battle of Salamis.
Their lleet reduced, the Persians would be unable
to send naval detachments to attack other parts of
the Greek mainland. The fleer had to be kept
together, as its destruction would mean the end of
the Greek campaign as originally conceived.
From Thermopylae to Salarnis
\fter Thermopylae, the Greeks offered no further
:sistance to the Persian forces, which pillaged and
burnt villages and countryside as they headed southwards. Within a few days Xerxes reached Athens,
which the majority of the citizens had evacuated
shortly before his arrival. Those who remained were
put to death. Temples and buildings were looted and
burnt. A major objective had now been accomplished-Xerxes had taken revenge on Athens for its
interference in Persia's affairs.
The tide turns at Salamis
The Persian fleet sailed south from Artemisium after
the fall of Thermopylae and anchored in the Bay of
Phalerum near Athens, meeting up with its army,
which now occupied the city. The Greek fleet had
withdrawn quickly to the waters of Salamis to help in
PERSONALITIES
I54
AND
GROUPS
The trireme
many more marines than did Greek, for this
The warship used by both the Greek and Persian
navies at this time was the trireme, a ship with
three banks of oars one above the other. We know
that a Greek trireme was manned by about 200
purpose.
men-170 rowers, marines, deckhands, the captain
and a flautist who piped time for the rowers. Our
knowledge of Persian ships is very limited, but we
do know that Phoenician vessels were built with
higher sterns and decks than their Greek equivalents, and that they carried more marines. Because
of their higher decks, the Phoenician ships were
faster than those of the Greeks, but were less stable
and harder to manoeuvre in narrow waters and
gusty weather conditions.
Naval tactics of the Persian Wars
Partly because of the different design of Greek and
Persian ships, the naval tactics of the two sides
varied. The Persian tactic was to maintain close
formation and row alongside the enemy ship, before
crashing into its side. In these close quarters the
Persian marines would rain missiles upon the
enemy crew, leaping aboard the disabled ship to
intensify the combat. Persian ships usually carried
the evacuation of Athenian citizens before the arrival
of the Persian army and to plan a strategy in the face
of the continuing Persian advance.
Xerxes' next obvious objective was to mount a combined land and sea operation against the Peloponnese.
Fearing an imminent attack, the Peloponnesians were
building a wall across the Isthmus to prevent the passage of the Persian army. But in order to attack the
Peloponnese, Xerxes would have to divide his fleet.
He was unable to do this because a large number of
ships had been lost in storms and the naval engagements at Artemisium. He was forced to concentrate
his lleet at Salamis. We do not have reliable figures for
the Persian fleet at this time but it has been estimated
to have numbered perhaps 500 vessels. Herodotus
says that 387 Greek vessels were stationed at
Salamis.B
u. Warry,
in the Classical World,, Salamander
Books, London, 1980, p. 32; P. Connolly, Greece ancl
Rome at W ar, Macd,onald Phoebus, London, I9BL, p. 25;
Herodotus, op. cit., VIII,45, p. 539.
Vy'arfare
Greek naval warfare relied more heavily on a
tactic of ramming the enemy ship. The forward keel
of each Greek trireme was equipped with a bronzeplated ram, situated below the water line. Bffective
use of the ram required considerable skill and
manoeuvrability; consequently, the Greek fleet kept
a relatively open formation. A very effective
manoeuvre-and-ram tactic employed by the Greek
ships at Salamis was the periplus. In adopting the
periplus the Greeks disabled their opponents by
side-swiping them and shearing off their oars. The
rest of the Greek fleet was then in a position to
advance.
At the battle of Salamis the Greek flanking ships
were lying in ambush behind the Cynosura headland. The large Persian fleet was crowded into the
narrow waters of the strait between Cynosura and
the mainland. Because of this the leading ships,
disabled by the ramming tactics of the Greeks,
were forced back onto the ships following closely
behind. The Persian ships ended by ramming each
other and provided an easy target for the Greeks,
who were able to ram them at will.
At Salamis, in what is regarded as the major turning-point of the Persian W'ars, the Greek navy decisively defeated the Persian fleet. The Greek
commanders were bitterly divided about the best tactics to adopt against the Persians. The overall com-
mander of the Greek navy was the Spartan
Eurybiades; the leader of the Athenian contingent was
the brilliant Themistocles. The main events of the battle, which took place on 28 September 480, are set out
in Figure 5.9. Study this figure and consider the following questions.
Zot dtscussion
:
;
Why had the Persianfleet ctnchored, neør Salarnis?
Whøt was the initíal C,reek response to the presence
of the Persianfleet?
:
Whøt role d,id. Thernistocles pløy in the lead up to
the battle?
s
What disaduantages d,id the Persianfleetface at
Salamis?
t
XERXES
:
a
What tectics did the Greeks ad,opt to ouercome the
Persians?
Xerxes has usually been rid,iculed,for h.is
willingness to o,ccept the secret mirsage of
Themistocles atføce aa,lue. How ,night hX d,ecision
be explained, or justffied,
c
In whøt
id,entifu some other factors to be consid,ered,.
Write
your speech, remernbering that you could, Iose your
head, if Xerxes does not like you, âdrirr.
E-
on this occásion?
respects d,o the accounts of Herod,ottu and,
Aeschylu.s (page tST) support eøch other?
Main sources
Herodotus, The Hístoríes
Our chief account of the events surrounding the battle
of Salamis was recorded a generatio., aft"r'the battle
by Herodotus. This, however, is not a flawless account:
some of its detail has been questioned; Herodotus,
moreover, lacked understanding of naval tactics. Tho
additional consideratiorr,
us to treat
"rr"o,,.age
Herodotus with caution: he wrote,
i., hirrdsight, with
with ø proposal. ,My
you not to tøke receit euents too
deeply to heart. What are afew planlcs and, thnbers?
Th,e
d.ecisiae struggle will rwt d.epend, upon them,
but upon
llardonitu
. . . approo.ch,ed. Xerxes
Lard''hc said,,'I
beg
men and, horses . . . I suggest, thcrefore, on im^.eiiate
attoch upon the Peloponncse. Or wait ø while, if you
prefer . . . ,f you haue ma.de up your mind. wt
tå itay
hcre, thcn go homc togethcr with the greater part
of the
army, and I will m,akc it m.y d,uty, 1Ðith J00 000 pickcd
troops, to deliuer Creece to you
HERoDorus,
Th,e
that he actually fought in the battle and therefore
offers an eyewitness account. However, while the
play
does give useful detail ofthe battle itself, its chiefpu._
pose was to entertain, as well as to glorify
the
Athenian role in the victory. Moreover, u"".oL_.rrd_
ffle marine like Aeschylus would not have been party
to the council meetings of the commanders nor
would
he have had any contact with persian sources. Most
importantl¡ he describes the battle from a point of
view with which he corrld not possibly have sympa_
thised-a Persian one! His depiction Lf X"o", u. u
foolish and impetuous hothead is proba-bly pure
dra_
matic invention.
Xerxes' next move
sÉlr¡rqounr,
Artemisia giaes Xerxes thcfollowing ad,aice:,1 think
that
you should yourself quit thís country and leaae
Mard,onitu behind, with thnforce hc aslt"sþr, if that
is
whøt h,e wants, and, if he høs reaily und.ernkån tu
dn as
h,e has sai.d, . . . who cares
f Mard,onius comes to grieJ?
He is only your slante, and th.e Creelæ will hm" bi,¡
o
poor triumph i,f thny hill hím. Asfor yourself, you
witt be
going hgme uith the object of your carnpaign
arcomplkh.ed-for you haue bumt Athens.)
HERoDoTUs,?h.e. Historics, trans. by AuBREv DE
rc
p. 55g
v
With hisfleet routed,, Xerxes could, not supply hk large
army sirrce ít dcpendcd on seaborne supplies whi.ch
could.
rww be intercepted.
J. L. O'NEIL,
dilemma. What should his next move be? Xerxes
con_
Imagine th&t Xerxes has conferred, with Mard,onius
tnd Arternisia, and that he has summoned, you to giae
tim a_final opinion. Read the
o"r, fro^
following
"itthe aduice
{erod,otus, Sources 5.5-6, which sui up
'ey haue just giuen hirn. The mod,ern sources will
SÉl¡¡rqounr,
_
sulted with his general, Mardonius, and his trusted
/as^6
pp.556_Z
td
After the battle of Salamis Xerxes was faced with
a
adviser, Artemisia, Queen of Caria, regarding the
best
course ofaction.
in chairu.,
Historics. trans, by AuBREy DE
an Athenian bias; he viewed the battle as an illustra_
tion of Greek glory.
Aeschylus, The Persùtns
Another account of the battle was recorded bv the
Athenian playwright Aeschylus in The persians, per_
formed in Athens in 472 BC, nine years after the
bat_
tle. The value of Aeschylus, versitn lies in the fact
155
.The
Life of Xerxes,, p. 12
ilIB
The whole
situationwas rww chønged,,
ønd, Xerxes was
in seriotn diffiruhics. Without afl.eet, the peloponræse
could, rnt be conqucred,..Winter was only a
rutith or two
away: and, with thc prospects of unrest afier wth
a
reuerse, hc mtnt return to Sard,is to keep thc
empire
und,er surueillatwe.
But to aband,on
his new Greeh
conquests would, be an admission of dcfeøt and,
to equal hß predccessors in glory . . .
J
. M. cooK
afailure
, The persian Empire, pp.
I2l_2
I56
GROUPS
AND
PERSONALITIES
w
trì¡lT¡füIÉ{iFr¡r
@
pLace
for
'seneiaL
ThemisLocles persuades Eurybiades to caLl another
conference, wih"r, h" makes thelolLowing speech:
'hí, now in you, po*", to saue Creece if you tak'e
mv ad,uice and engage the enem'y's fleel here in
SáLam¡s, instear| olwiLhdrawing to Lhe lst'hmus ' '
if you frght lat thã IsLhmusl, it wiLL haue Lo be in
was hetd' . . . on the most suitable
eigaging the enemyfleet ' The
'A council of
uar
Etrtrtf
"
feelíng of the counciL was inJauour oJ
'saíIing"Lo
rheTsthmus lof CorinLhl andf'ghLing in
rlefenle of the PeLoponnese, and a resolution was
poura Lo¡glrr in åefence ol the lsthmus'
'
(Herodotus, VIII, 49-57 ).
ih" opri tro. and that wilL
be
greatly. t'o our
.
ilisad,uantage, uith our smaller numbers anrJ
slower shipl . . . Fighting in a confi'ned space .
the enemy'
.fauours ui but Lhe open seafaaours
(Herodotus, VIil, 58-60
).
EUBOEÄ.
4
(\,.æ
Isthmus of Corinth
a
Phalerum
Corinth
E-E
rflt
æ
--l:IFfl
The Greek contmand,ers continued, to argue the
íssu,e and' Thernistocles, anxious toforce the
Greeks to stay andfi'ght at Salamis, secretly sent a
messenger ti the Persian camp, who said' to
Xerxesl[Themistocles] has told rne to report to.you
that thi Greeks are aftaid and' planning to sliptLway. OnLy preaent lhomfront slLpping Lhrough
un,ti linn"rt. and' vou lLaue aI Lhis momenl an
ioooíLuãiL, of unparaLLeled, success. They are at
no
å.oggrrt d'íann with each olher, and wiLL
the
see
will
you
contrary,
the
opf,ãsition-on
ffir
pio-Persians among Lhemrtghting Lhe rest'
(Herodotus, VIII,76).
FIGURE
5.9
Àthens
The battle of Salamis
'The Persians belieued' what he had rold thetn and'
ororeeded. to puL ashorc a large force on the islel
'of
Psyttaleia, between SaLam'is and the coasL;
ih"r,- obout midnight, Lhey moued Lheir wes;ern
ninp in on encirc[ing mot)emenl upon Salamis,
whie aL Lhe same Lime their ships ' ' ' adaonced
anrJ blocked, the whole channel as far as
Munychia . . . These tactical manoeur)res uere
out in silence, to preaent the enemy from "arríed,
b,eins aware of whar wai going on; they occupied
the íahote night, so Lhat none of the men had time
for
sleep' (Herod'otus,
VIII, 77).
XERXES
tr
IE7
@
FFTTIII
The Greelt.fleet, hauing learnt of the persian
encírcling mouement, put to sea at dawn and
prepared, to giue battle. Creek squad,rons uere
lying in ambush behincl the promontory of
Cynosura. When the Corinthian squodron hoisted,
its sails and. began to sail north niLh Lhe obiect of
delencling the Megarian ChanneL and. the êreek"
realfom Egyptian attack, Xerxes ordered, his fleet
to follow them by ad,aa,ncing inro the narrou)
waters of the straits.
'.The whole [Greek]
fleet nou) got under wøy, and.
in a moment the Persians were on them . . . The
Athenian squadron found, itself facing the
Phoenicians, who formed Llrc Persiai left wing,
on lhe western, Eleusis, end of Lhe lineithe
Lølæ_daemoníønsfaced the ships of lonia,
which were stationed, on the Piraeui, o,
"ost"rn
end^. . .
greater part of the Persian fleet
_the
sffirecl seaerely in the bo,ttle . . . the ireek fleet
worJrcd together as a whole, while the persíaru
had lost forrnation and, uere no longer fi,ghting
"
on any plan' (Herodotus, VIII, BS-BS): EÌeusis
a
Corinthian
Bay of Eleusis
squadron
æ
Meeara
ATTICA
tt
¡
,r
Athens
Greek fleet
oc>
SALAMIS
ll I
æ
t ,a
ì I
a
t
ìì"
o)l
t ,
0 t I tl tt
a
Persian fleet
Persian encircling movernent
71
$
I
Greek ships
Persian ships
iirilTn¡
',The g-reatest d,estruction took place uhen the ships
which had
beenfi,rst
turned tailjfor those asternfåilfout of
-engaged
them in their attempt to press forward,, (Herodotusi V\il," g2).
'Then charge followed, charge
on cuery side. ALfirsL by its huge ímpelus
O^urfleet withstiod rhim. BuL"soon, in that n(nrow spoce,
Our ships were jammed in hundreds; none could, heút a,nother.
They rammerl each other with their prows of bronzej and, some
Were stripped of euery oar. Meanwhile the enemy
Camc round us in a ring and charged,'
(Aeschylus, The Persians, II, 406:5 I S).
tî-!Gl?n!clr.ll|!ltllã
'Xerxes, nhen he realisecl the extent of the
dßaster, was afraid, that the Greehs, áither on
their own initiatiue or at the suggestion ofthe
Ionians, might sail to the Hellespont anci
break Lhe bridges here. If this happened, he
be cu: off in Europe and [n danger of
ryouLd
destruction' ( Herod,otus, VI I I, g 7).
*
PERSONALITIES
I5A
AND
GROUPS
cavalry-now strengthened by the Thessalian cavalry which used the best horses in Greece
After Salamis: Mardonius in command
After the defeat of the Persian navy at Salamis, Xerxes
returned to Persia, leaving Mardonius to continue the
campaign. The Persian arïny was still undefeated and,
in tñe following spring, Mardonius led his troops
against the combined Greek army at Plataea in central
Greece.
Mardonius skilfully dealt with the problems that the
Persians faced after Salamis. Like Xerxes, he
attempted to exploit weaknesses in the Greek resolve
to resist Persia. He must have been well awa¡e of the
Spartans' reluctance to venture beyond their fortifications at the Isthmus of Corinth' The Peloponnesian
states had built a wall across this narrow land-bridge
to prevent the Persian advance' Mardonius, therefore,
offered attractive inducements to the Athenians and
other Greek states if they would enter into an alliance
with him. Athens refused these offers, but some chose
alliance rather than costly defeat.
The Athenians made several requests to the
Spartans to join them in their defence of Greece' The
Spartans delayed, however, while they completed their
Isthmus wall. It was not until the Athenians had
threatened to go over to the Persians that Sparta
finally led a Peloponnesian force out from behind the
Isthmus wall. Realising that all hope of an Athenian
alliance was gone, Mardonius ordered his army to
sack and burn Athens for a second time. He then
withdrew from Attica to prepa-re for the battle to come'
Zot
dt'scussion
a
What would Mard,onius haue gain'edfrorn an
alliance with Athens?
)
How might Mardoníus interpret the Peloponnesiøn
policy of reliance on th'e Isthmus wall?
;
Wh.y
might the Pelopon'nesians still
be
uulnerable
to Persiøn atto,ck?
:
Consid'ering all of the aboue, how wise was
Mørdonius' strategy?
What went \{rong at Plataea?
Herodotus gives an account of Persian strategy at this
time when he says that Mardonius' plan 'was to retire
on Thebes, where he could fight on good cavalry country and near a friendly town' (Book IX, 13). As at the
battle of Marathon, the Persians enjoyed many intitial
advantages:
o
o
the army was as yet undefeated in this campaign
Mardonius could rely on the Thebans for men and
supplies
o
Mardonius had chosen to meet the Greeks on terrain that was well suited for the deployment of his
o Mardonius himself was an experienced and capable
general, by now very familiar with Greek conditions
and tactics.
Read the detailed account of Plataea in Chapter B.
taking particular note of the significance of the following key developments.
Stage
I
o the role ofthe Persian cavalry
o the impact of the death of Masistius
on the Persian
forces.
Stage 2
o Mardonius'
o
exploitation of the new Greek position
across the Asopus ridge
the poisoning of the Gargaphia spring.
Stage 3
o Mardonius'
order to engage the Greeks as they
changed position
o the impact of the Tegean and Spartan
o
o
phalanx
charge on the Persian front line
the impact of the death of Mardonius
the escape of Artabazus and his force.
The aftermath of Plataea
Once the Tegeans and Spartans had over"whelmed the
Persian troops behind their barricade of wicker
shields, they were joined by the rest of the Greek
force. The combined Greek forces stormed the Persian
stockade, slaughtering all within it. Herodotus tells us
that the Greek losses were relatively light, whereas the
bulk of the Persian army was destroyed (Book IX, 7I)'
Mardonius' second in command, Artabazus, withdrew
with approximately 40 000 cavalry and escaped back
to Persia via the BosPhorus'
The battle of Mycale
Within a short time after the battle of Plataea the
Persians and the Greeks engaged in battle at Mycale
on the lonian coast. A combined Greek force, at the
invitation of leading lonian states, attacked the remnants of the Persian navy, which had returned to
Samos following the battle of Salamis. The Persians
were reinforced by a contingent of 60 000 men, who
had been sent by Xerxes to prevent revolt in lonia'
Unable to lure the Persian {leet into a naval battle, the
Greek forces beached their ships on the headland near
Mycale and attacked the Persians, who had taken up e
position on the beach behind a barricade of shields
When the battle turned against the Persians, th
Ionians and Milesians changed sides and joined
the rout.
XERXES
Herodotus ends his account of the wars at this
point, but the conflict soon moved to a new level
through the initiative of the Athenians. They became
'59
Zc/ìot/ìes
:
the leaders of a maritime league comprising a large
number of Ionian cities and islands dådicated to tùe
The Greek ffinsiue demonstrated. both positiae and.
negatiue aspects of Xerxes, leødership. The
followirug table contains some of the important
actiuities q,nd euents of the campøign, Decid,e
whiclr of the following
of Xerxes,
continued expulsion of the persians from their remain_
ing strongholds in Thrace and lonia.
The Persian perspective
lead,ership
^r"rr^irti
ability bestfi,ts
eøch one. Copy the
tab_le ønd assign the a,ssessments to the àppropriate
columns.
Because our sources for the persian Wars are predom_
inantly Greek, the Greek view of the victory against
the Persians has been emphasised at the expense of a
(i) we of diplomøcy to neutralise opposition
(ä) skill in logisticøl plønning
(äi) lack ofreconnaissance oflocal weather
balanced perspective. No doubt, a persian chronicle
of the same period would have called the conflict ,the
Greek Wars'! Students of history are all too familiar
with traditional propaganda, which presents the vic_
tory of little Greece against the big, bad persians as a
triumph of democracy and freedom over tyranny and
oppression. This simplistic view ignores some impor_
tant facts. Certainly, the Greek victory against signfi_
cant odds,-including internal divisions, was a major
accomplishment. However, it was not seen by the
Persians as a serious humiliation, nor did it heraid the
collapse of Xerxes' empire as the Greek sources liked
to imply. M. A. Dandamaev sums up the persian per_
spective in Source 5.9.
cond,itions
(iu) skill in strategic planning
(u) ability to exploit opportunities
(ui) und,erestimating the opposition
(uii) planning for future outcomes
(aíä) skill in nøual tactics
(ix) being outtnorLoeuared, by superior tactics
(x) ouer-reliønce on superior numbers.
Positive
Actiyities/event
Negative
leadership leadership
qualities
What was the influence of the persian-Greeh wars on
th.e Persians? Accord.ing to a classiral writerfrom
the
fi,rst century AD, Din Chrysostomos, the persinns utrote
in relation to
these wars
that ,Xerxes, haaing undnrtalæn
an expeditinn against the Greelæ, defeated thc
lnked,acmnnians at Thcrmnpylae and, dcstroyed, the city
of Athcns. All who could, ¡nt escape were ensiaued,. After
hauing imposed tribute on the Greelts, Xerxes returned to
Asia.'Thcre is no doubt that the persiarc (in any cose,
in their offæial traditinn), did rwt regard, themselaes as
being dcfeated,, because
th,e
preuinu.sly procløim.ed.
objectiues had, been accomplished: Athens was talæn
twice; the Eretriaw utere talæn culay in coptiuity. The
real objectiae of the war was of course d.íffirenti undcr
the pretext of a punitiue expedition against Athcrc,
thc
Persínn^s wanted to occupy all of Greece. On persian
with dcpirtiotu of the war with the Greeks, who are
armed with shicld"s and, speørs, the Helleræs
[GreelæJ are
usuølly dcpirted as hauing collapsetl to the ground,, or
fallen onto their krces . . . To thc Achanmenid, empire,
with iæ huge extent and, enormoræ resou,rces, the dnfeat
seals
in
Greece had. the chara.cter of
mirnr set-bork. along the
perúphery of its realm.
M. A. DANÞaMAEv, ApolitbalHi^storyof
Achaeme nid, Empire, pp.
the
2254
qualities
o prepara,tions
for Greelt
484481
BC
ffinsiae
o d,emands rnad,e.for
.
'eørth and, uater'
strategy of combined
land
and, sea
ffinsiae
o aictory at Thermopylae
o
loss of ships in storms
off Greek coast
o send,ing squad,ron of
ships to blockad,e
Megarian Channel
before Salamis
o being drawn into the
battle at Salamis
o defeat at Salamis
. return to Persia after
Sølamis
a
Study as thoroughly &s you can Xerxes,
managem,ent of the Greek cømpøign. Can you
thinlt of øny other aspects of the Greek campaign
that d,etnonstrate positiue or negatiaefeotur", o¡
X e rx e s' military
le a d,er ship ?
GROUPS
AND
PERSONALITIES
I6O
LATER FOREIGN POLICY
Erö
On the nid'ence aboue all of Xerxes' [Greek] expedition'
the
Persian preparatiÐn at thís time was fi'rst class from
the
of
an'd'
warfare
political
of
of uiew both
poínt
'mouement
of largeforces by land' an'd' sea' Th'e
weakræss, if we mttst lookfor o/tß' lro's in the higher
command'. The king ha'd little experien'ce of war' The
lesson of Marathon hød rwt been learnt' Too greatfaith
was placed' in the ualour ofthe king'sforces when
hß eye, and too little a'ccount tahen of
fi.ghiing
"tie¡ei und,er
Creelæ'wíll to resßt' The Persían commnn'd' di'd'
twt haue the strategical grasp to impose iæ oun pattern
on thcfi,ghting, an'd, Persian professiorm'lism in
mounting the exped'ition and dcLiaering mcn and ships
to the battlefronts llos not enough to ensure aictory'
J. M. cooK
,The Persian Empíre,pp'
/on Itng an d
/.6e sources
Q/n
s
s
lnn
lll-12
u s zng
Accord'ing to Cooh, what wa,s the m'ost successful
aspect of Xerxes' camPaign?
What d,oes he see øs wealtnesses in the Persian
higher cornrnand?
a
What specffic examples woald Cook haae had' in
mind' in rimarhing that the Persian cornmand
laclted "the strategicøl grasp to impose its own
p&ttern on' the fi'ghting'?
)
Do you agree with Coo]t"s assessment?
Øc/iui/ies
)
Cond,uct
a class forum
on the Persiart Wars' Form
a pønel comprising Xerxes, Mardonius, Artemisia,
Themistoclei arud Pausanias' Deaise a bank of
questions that cløss members will ash these fr'gures
ior""rning their role in the conflict' Remember to
Despite the failures at Salamis, Plataea and Mycale,
Persian involvement in Greek affairs did not come to
an end. Greater emphasis was now placed on diplomacy, as can be seen in Persian willingness to use
Gr"!k exiles, a policy that Xerxes had already
adopted in his use of Demaratuse and Ephialtes during
the Greek campaign. In the months after Plataea,
Xerxes entered ìnto negotiations with Pausanias, the
victorious Spartan leader. According to evidence
recorded by Thucydides, Pausanias promised to
deliver Greece to the Persian Empire in return for
marriage with one of Xenes' daughters'
Further benefit from this diplomacy was cut short
by Pausanias' subsequent recall to Sparta, followed
,áon uft", by his disgrace and death' Persia now lost
its former control of the lonian states, which took
join
advantage of Persian naval weakness to revolt and
the newly formed Delian League under the leadership
of Athens. Finally, at the battle of the Eurymedon
River in 469 BC, the last of the Ionian states that
remained loyal to Persia were defeated by the Delian
League, under the leadership of Cimon of Athens'
Control of the Aegean now lay with the Greeks'
Xerxes pr"."*"d the empire that he had inherited
from his father' Herodotus' roll-call of nations that
provided troops and ships for the p-1eek offensive
extent of Xerxes' empire'
iBook VII, 60-98) shows the
the Greek mainland'
from
retreat
Èoilowing Persia's
by imperial events:
taken
Xerxes found his attention
Masistes, folbrothel
his
he faced revolt in the east;
fled
with-Xerxes,
lowing a violent personal dispute
a
planning
Susa for his satrapy in Bactria, apparently
gory
The
revolt. Xerxes dealt swiftly with this threat'
details of the dispute, and the fate of Masistes, are
recorded in Herodotus,IX, 109-13'
Xerxes appears to have maintained an active foreign policy in the east. The Russian scholar M' A'
Dãr,dã*u"u suggests that Xerxes conquered the Saka
people, who lived east of the Caspian Sea' Further
Lurt, X"o". appears to have added to the empire a
region called Akaufaka, located north of Kabul in
modern Afghanistan.ro
appoint a mod,erator to chøir the proceedings'
:
Write an extended response to one of the following
exarnination-style questions. Remember to refer to
sources in your answer.
(i)
How
ffictiue
was Xerxes as a
military
lead'er?
What uJere the strengths ønd weøknesses
Xerxes' military lead'ership? (2 Un'it)
himself to the Persian court and accompanied Xerxes on
his Greek campaign, offering valuable advice on local
conditions.
(2 Uruit related)
(ä)
eDemaratus was an exiled Spartan king who attached
of
10M.
A. Dandamaev, A Polítical History of the Achaemenic
Empíre,E. J. Brill, Leiden, I9B9,p'232'
)