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XERXES The subject peoples XERXES' INVASION OF The core of the army consisted of myriads of Persians GREECE fighting as infantry. As the empire expanded the army -vas increased by the addition of other myriads of nfantry conscripted from the subject peoples. Each of these units was commanded by a Persian nobleman appointed by the king. Valuable archaeological evidence ofthese peoples can be found in the sculptured reliefs from the palace at Persepolis. Herodotus gives a detailed roll-call of the dress and weaponry of the Having dealt with the revolts of Egypt and Babylon, Xerxes was able to turn his attention to Greece. He had three main objectives for his Greek offensive: o to punish the Athenians for their involvement in the Ionian revolt during the time of Darius and for the Persian defeat at Marathon in 490 BC o to extend the Persian Empire into Europe by adding more than fifty different subject peoples who marched Greece in Xerxes'huge army. o The cavalry In studying Xerxes' Greek campaign, you need to be familiar with some important military terms. These The cavalry was the most important addition to the army in the early years of empire building. The Medes, who were regarded as the finest horsemen in Asia, formed the cream of the cavalry. After Cyrus conquered Croesus of Lydia in 546 BC, Lydian cavalry contingents were also added to the Persian army. Cyrus, esteeming the mobility of cavalry units, formed contingents of them from among the Persian nobility. By the time of Xerxes' campaign against Greece the cavalry included contingents of Bactrians, Sagartians, Cissians and Indians as well as Libyan chariotry and Arabian camel units. I 147 The navy I Because Persia was a land-locked nation, it possessed no navy of its own, but relied on the use of the navies h of the maritime nations that it conquered. The fleets of I t # þ the Phoencians, Egyptians and Ionians formed the core of the Persian navy to which were added smaller contingents from Eastern Mediter¡anean states such as Cyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia and Caria, among others. The crews of these ships were manned by the marines of the subject-states as well as a number of Persian sailors. Each state's navy was commanded by its own naval officers under the overall command of Persian admirals. 9"t fur/6et ìnttes /iqa/ìon Herod,otus' d,escription of the multi-nøtional force that accompønied, Xerxes on his Greek campøign is too lengthy to include h,ere. You a,re encourclged to read it for yourself in Boolt, VII, 60-98 and make a list of the followin g: infantry contingents, includ,ing their d.ress ønd weapons; cauølry units; naaøl units ancJ numbers f ships. to gain personal glory as his predecessors had done before him. are: . o o strategy logistics tactics. Persian strategy Strategy can be defined as the highlevel overall planning of a war or campaign. This involves making decisions about objectives-generally a prerogative of the king and his advisers. Herodotus tells us that 'Xerxes called a conference of the leading men in the country to find out their attitude towards the war and explain to them his own wishes.'6 Strategy also involves the methods by which the aims are to be achieved. This may often involve forming and maintaining alliances with other nations. In the case of Persia, foreign policy was based on conquest rather than a system of alliances. We know that Xerxes sent envoys to the Greek states demanding 'earth and water', the traditional tokens of submission. Athens and Sparta were excluded from this offer, because they were to be attacked and punished for previous offences. Many of the Greek states had little choice but to agree to Persian demands in view of their own defencelessness and the size of the Persian force ma¡ching against them. A vital component of Xerxes' stïategy was the decision to invade Greece by a combined land and sea attack. It was essential that the navy keep close contact with the army in order to provide it with supplies, protection and communication. This was a feature of Persian policy throughout the Greek campaign. Keep this in mind when we look at the Battle of Salamis, for the defeat of the Persian fleet at this time had a vital impact on Xerxes' subsequent strategy. óHerodotus, op. cit., -l VII, Ba, p,443. I4A PERSONALITIES AND GROUPS ìnt,es/ìqa/ìon account Herod'otus giues of Xerxes" meeting wíth his aduisers and the reasorts for his d,ecisiott' Read the full to irwade Greece (Flistories, Book VII, B). Persian logistics Logistics refers to the provision, movement and supply of armed forces. It includes the following: o mobilisation (recruitment) of forces o supply of weapons and ammunition o provision of communications o organisation of transport o provision and distribution of stores (food, clothing). Herodotus gives a very detailed account of the logistical preparations that Xerxes made in 484-81 BC in planning his Greek campaign. Frames 2 to 6 in the sequence chart in Figure 5.6 show the various preparations. Study the chart carefully and discuss the following questions. Persian battle tactics relied on the use of vast numbers of soldiers, who were thrown in wave after wave against the enemy front line. This tactic was more suitable for the open terrain of Persian lands than the mountains arld a What does the size of Xerxes' army and' nøuy suggest about the importance of the Greelt' campøign? a What arrangenlents did Xerxes møke to transport his ørmy across the Hellespon't? : Why were strategically located supply dumps important? What other method's would Xerxes høue used to proaisíon his troops? t Why did Xerxes order the build'ing of a cønal at Mt Athos? Whøt does Herod'ottts' remark indicate about his clttitude to Xerxes? Zclioi/V triecl to retreat. Xerxes and his commanders used these tactics with varying success throughout the campaigns of 480-79 BC. You will need to asses these tactics in the light of those employed by the Greeks in the defence of their homeland. The Greek response ffir your ou)n assessrnent of Xerxes' actions. (Consult the references to Herodotus giuen in Figure 5.6.) Persian tactics Tactics concern ìhe particular methods of fighting adopted in battle. They include: o choice of area in which to fight o decision about when to fight o o were the Greeks doing while Xerxes was prepar- ing his onslaught? They already knew of his plans through spies sent to Persia, but were too preoccupied with domestic concerns to respond. It was not until 481 BC, in the last months of Xerxes' preparations, that they began to prepare a strategy of their own. A conference was held at the Isthmus of Corinth' It was attended by thirty-one states, those that had not medised. Leadership of the newly formed Hellenic League was given to Sparta. It was decided that the best overall strategy to counter the invasion was to bottle up Persia's army and navy in narrow areas' This it impossible for them to deploy their huge numbers of troops and ships in traditional open formation. Another important strategy was to prevent the Persian fleet from carrying out its vital supporting role of maintaining the extended supply lines to the would make army, Study Figure 5.6. []sing eaclt' box as the basis for a paragrøph, construct your ou)n a,ccount of Xerxes' preparations for h'is ínaasion of Greece. Refer to Herod,otus, ønd, passes of Greece. Another feature of traditional Persian tactics was the use of archers in the initial attack. Kneeling archers would direct volleys of arrows at the enemy's front line. The purpose of this was to panic the opposing force and prepare the way for the advance of the infantry. The cavalry a vital contingent of the arm¡ would support the infantry and archers-its mobility enabled it to harass any section of the enemy line that .What Zot dìr"urrr'on tarro* deployment (positioning) of troops before battle troop manoeuvres during battle. The first line of defence the Greeks chose to implement this strategy was the narrow mountain pass at Tempe in Thessaþ This, however, proved impossible to defend. A viable alternative was the narrow pass between the mountains and the sea at a place called Thermopylae. Here, the Greek force of about 7000 men, under the command of King Leonidas of Sparta, made their stand. In the nearby straits of Artemisium the Greek navy assembled to support their land forces and to prevent the advance of the Persian fleet. The Persian advance Once Xerxes had completed his logistical preparatior and the Persian army had safely crossed tl t XERXES 149 tã . . stores of proaisions for the army and naay were established, at key locatiotu along the coast of Thrace and, Macecl,onia o for three years worlcmen dug a canal through the Mt Athos peninsula to allow the fleet to pass safely (Darius'preuious inuasion attem.pt hadfailed when the Persianfleet 'and prouision dumps were being formed for the troops lest either men or animals should, go hungry on the march to Greece' (Herod,otus, in a storm off the dangerous naters ofthe peninsula. Xerxes had, learnt was d,estroyed, VII,23). o ¡ . rememberecl by' (Herod,otus, the Strymon Riuer in Thrace was bridged' near its mouth, not .far.from the supply depot at Eion 'cal¡les, some of papyrus, some of white from preuíous mistakes ) 'it was mere osÍ,entcltíon that mad,e Xerxes haae the canal dug-he wanted to show his pouer and to leaue something to be flax, nere being VII, 23). FI preparedfor the brid,ges-a taslt uhich Xerxes entnuted to the Egyptians and the Phoenicia,ns' (Herod'otus, VII, 23). . ffi a briclge built of boats was on stn t cte. d acr o s s the. narrowest pa,rt of the Hellespont to enable a more fficient mouement of troops frorn Asia to Europe c. tl¡w . in 4Bl BC Xerxes sent enaoys o throughout Greece, with the exception of Athens and Sparta, d,emanding earth and, nater, the traditional tokens of submíssion . ¡r¡_l mo,ny nnrthern and, central skr'tes, . Black Sea and at right æt aware of their aulnerability, cornplied with his demands 'this . . . was d,ue to his confid,ent belief thøt the Greelts who hctd' preuiously refuseiL to comply with the d,emand, of Darius woukl now befríghtened into complying with angles to the Hellespont' (Herodotus, VII, 36). æ his own' (Herodotus, VII, 30). 'galleys and triremes were lashed together to support the bridges. They were moored, slantwise to the Hellespont * bæ Aegean Sea % æ Peloponnese % # æ FI . æ: æ æ# æ a Land t.oops .¡rr- 0 Fleet 50 # S "á 100 Sardis . . combinerl ínfantry and caaalryforce ofouer 200 000 assembleclfrom all satrapies a l0 ))]-strong elite corps of 'Irnmortals' afleet of 1200 triremes, comprising the nauies of Egypt, Phoenicía, Cyprus and, the lonian Greeks ê ææ r50 @ kilnm¿tres o nay)T includ,ed, warships, supply ships . 'the army uas ind,eedfar greater than any other in record,ed, history . . . Xerxes, in the process of assembling his armies, had' eaery corner of the continent rønsacked,' (Herod,otus, vII,18). :IGURE 5.6 Møp and sequence chart of Xerxes' logistical preparatíons and horse-transporï,s for tlrc Greelc campaign PERSONALITIES I5O GROUPS AND a ¡:¡TIõIÐU' /'/a/isn 6uút Pass It/a// /.,^6\ 4naVaeaî 'For 'í¡ I Çreek camp oo Fefíiûn c(thP aaaa four days Xerxes waited, in cottstønt expectation would make good theír escape' (Herod,ottu, VII, 2 I 0). thøt the Greelæ ET'EE w^íeit"d with rage and sentforutard the Medes an'd Cissiaru with ord¿rs to talæ the¡n aliae and bring them his presence. The Medcs charged, anil in the struggle which ensued, many fetl; but others took their places, and' in spite of terrible losses refnsed to be beaten off' They itþtotn enough to oryonr, and' not least to the king ^od" himself,'that he haã' ín hß army mo'ny men, ini.eed, but into tfs FFlÉE5¡ft¡(lt¡ti 'Onthefifth [day] when still they hadmade rw-mnae, ' . . he few sold,íers' (Herodntw, VII, 210). TiEÍETF¡:FGüTI¡ EEíETiET4 I tj í /qË¡q[J P @ IH -& . - '1-.--"&. :' 'Next d.ay thefi.ghting began again, but with tw better ,uccest jo, the Persians, who rencwed, theír omlaught in the hope that the Greeks, being so few in nwnber,-might be badly enough d'isabled. by wounds to preuentfurther resistance . . . But the Greelæ ræuer slaclcencd . , . So when the Persians found that things were no better for thern than on the preuious d,ay, they orrce m'ore withdrew' (Hero ìlottu, VI I, 2 I 2 ). FTGURE 5.7 Tlte battle of Thernt'opylae .ê 'but jwt then, a man namcd, Ephialtes, fro-m Malß þe9;rby Greeh statel camn in hope of a rich reward, to tell the leing øbout the lrack' which led ouer the hills to Thermnpylaeand, thus he was able to prùue the death of the Greeks who held the pass' (Herodottu, VII, 212). XERXES I5t rñ L:,I 'f/ 'la ffi trå 4 'At last the Pers_ians, f.nd,ing that their assauhs upon the .,. .were all tueless, brokc offthe engog"mcit ond wündreu. )(erxes was watching the battLe.from whcre he sat; and. it is said that in the lourse of the" a;¡;"k";ir"" "tirnes, in tenorfor his army, he leapí pT: 'All_d,ay the battle continued; the Med,es, . . . place uas talren by Hyd,arncs and his phked,'pur¡"n iioopr_fiËï".r,, I mmnrtals-who ad.uanre d, .,. *, (Herodotus, VII, 212). ø h;f;;; "fhåy," ur, o r" -. I t:o:nare,successful than the Med.es " "g"g"l,' had beeni a"tt o, oe¡ore, Lhe two arm,ies fi,ghling in a confined, space, the ylyrt.er spears than the Greehs'and høuing no aaaantage Jrom their numbers' (Herod,ottts, Vn, 2 I 0 iri, EE¡ÌF-'!FF mfri :i:::yyr:! ). zl EEtrFÍ¡TTã!Eì=I! ECEIEFE-{ÍIÏFIIñIIII I n:Tnæ¡!lFl?ß f: ( 'Xerxes . . . promptly sent off Hydarnes wírh ùe ffoops under . .., ßy earþ dawlt tþey were at the simm,it of :l^"-?y*"no spot where the phociam Greeh tr"ibel fiocat :::::"f:,:r:r,the srood,_on guard, wtth a thousand mcn . . . ffien the persians auøcked thernJ . . . the phociaru withdreåt io'iir"'äin"" point of the mnuntain, where they ;r;dr";o'î;r" destructnn. But the persiøru . . . paid ^"d*nofuiheränenion to them and. pas.sed on along the'drr;r"íi"s";;;T"*nn -'-"o vr*erv w' oU possible speed'(Herod,ot^,"W[ ZtB¡. qO éá\ When Inonid,as saw that he would soon be surrounded,, he ?way-mosj of the troops who were with him. In the flghtlng th:alfigllo-wed,, Iconid,as was killed.. The Spartans wno uere treJl,'wtthdrew into the nanow ncck of the up a position in a single f^j . . . and too,k they resßted to.the last, with "o,ipo", their swords if ?i!l ; _.rÍi:re thern, and d'nnt, with their hands and teeth, !*!.,n?o unkl the.Persians coming onfrom. the.front . . , antl ctroslng mfiom behind,finally ouerwhàlmed them with musúe weapons' ( Herod,otus, VI I, 22 T ). s:n! AND PERSONALITIES I52 GROUPS support the army which was advancing Hellespont over the ingenious bridge of boats built .p""iuily for the prrrpãt", he began the march on The states of northern Greece bowed before him, adding their men and ships to the Persian forces' The fleet, ãccording to plan, hugged the shore line' keeping close contact with the army' The first meeting iur at Therma in Macedonia, from where the ir"""". ftuå" waters of the Euripus Channel' When the storm finally combined forces headed south, meeting no resistance until they reached ThermoPYlae' The battle of Thermopylae The sequence chart in Figure 5'7 summarises the main deìelopments of the battle' Study the chart carefully and u.t.*", the questions which follow it' 7ot dt'scusston Immortals? a given Whøt tactics did the Persiøns use in th'eir opening mønoeuures? . : another summeÍ storm.T Over the next few days the Persian and Greek fleets fought three battles: . in th" first of these, the Persians with their superior What d,id' Xerxes hope to gain by sending in the Thermopylae? a abated, the Persian fleet took up its position at Aphetae, while the Greeks occupied a position off Artemisium. The Persians, in an attempt to encircle the Greek {leet, sent a squadron of 200 ships to sail south around Euboea but it was destroyed in yet numbers and lighter, more manoeuvrable ships' attempted to surround the Greek {leet in the open waters between Aphetae and Artemisium' However' the Greeks useù the defensive tactic called the 'kyklos', in which their smaller force formed a close circle with their rams pointing outwards, preventing the enemy ships from disrupting their formation' At What assumption does Xerxes appea'r to make about the eipected Greek' response to his rnalch on ç on ThLrmopylae. Off the rocky coast of Magnesia a vioIent storm raged for three days, destroying up to 200 Persian ships. The Greek navy, consisting of 271 triremes, .uil"d north to meet the Persian advance' With betier knowledge of local weather conditions, the Greeks were able to iide out the storm in the sheltered ,Líp, h"uã-on, stopping them from adopting either offãnsive or defensive manoeuvres' Herodotus (Book VIII, 9) tells us that the Persians lost thirty Why were the Persians unable to take the pøss by co nu entí on o] t actic s ? : What critical role d,id th'e Greek traitor, Ephialtes play in the Persiart' uictorY? a What d,o the tq'ctics ad,opted, by the Greeks øt Thermopylae ind,icate about the ffictiaeness of Xerxes' strategY and tactics? ships in this encounter. . O*ing the night, further storm damage to ihe the Persiaã ships anchored off Aphetae encouraged of part raid and Greeks to sail across the channel the Persian fleet engaged in repairing their ships' You sh'ould, req'd, Herod,otus'føscinating narrøtiae in íts entirety (Book VII, 176 loolroutfor the Greek bias Ác/itn/y: in ff)' of Be on the his account' enzP a/67 /as'6 Imagine that you are Xerxes' personal scribe responsithe Greeh cambte fo, læeping a record of the euents of of the bøttle &ccoutlt Persiøn poígn. Wr*"â" fficiat 'of øt Susa' court the to ih"r*opylae to be sent back' Naval engagement at Artemisium While the Persian and Greek forces were fighting at Thermopylae, inconclusive naval encounters took fh"" inï" Euboea. encounter, the Persian ships sailed across towards the Greek position at Artemisium and formed an offensive semicircle, which the Cr""k* attacked head-on' Both sides sustained o In the final 5o'þ./6e, inoes/ìVa/ion th.is battle *igttufth" Greek ships charged the Persian waters of Cape Artemisium to the north of The Persian {leet, comprising 1200 ships (accordto ing to Herodotus), had saiied south from Therma heavy casualties and the Persians, recognising that little was to be gained, withdrew' It was at this polnt that the Greeks received news of facthe disaster at Thermopylae; realising the danger ing southern Greece, they retreated down the Euripus to Athens, the Persian navy in pursuit' "Lånt"l While these naval encounters were indecisive' there were imPortanl outcomes: o The Greek navy was able, if oniy briefl¡ to prevent the Persians from assisting their land forces' Thus' careful in accepting Herodotus'figures without question. Historians argue that he may have the size of the Persian fleet and the numbers ?We need to be "rugg"rut"d of.tip, destroyed in storms in order to show the Greek effort to better advantage' XERXES *, * M Thermopylae I53 # & o æ /') EUBOEA \F/ ^¿J o Athens 0 25 Phalerum 50 hilometres X Battle site æ åv Persian shipwreck * Route of Persian fleet FIGURE 5.8 Key sites in the Battle of Artemisium the naval action at Artemisium interrupted the Persian strategy of combined naval and military operations. o o The Persian navy was now significantly reduced in numbers. This would affect the outcome of the battle of Salamis. Their lleet reduced, the Persians would be unable to send naval detachments to attack other parts of the Greek mainland. The fleer had to be kept together, as its destruction would mean the end of the Greek campaign as originally conceived. From Thermopylae to Salarnis \fter Thermopylae, the Greeks offered no further :sistance to the Persian forces, which pillaged and burnt villages and countryside as they headed southwards. Within a few days Xerxes reached Athens, which the majority of the citizens had evacuated shortly before his arrival. Those who remained were put to death. Temples and buildings were looted and burnt. A major objective had now been accomplished-Xerxes had taken revenge on Athens for its interference in Persia's affairs. The tide turns at Salamis The Persian fleet sailed south from Artemisium after the fall of Thermopylae and anchored in the Bay of Phalerum near Athens, meeting up with its army, which now occupied the city. The Greek fleet had withdrawn quickly to the waters of Salamis to help in PERSONALITIES I54 AND GROUPS The trireme many more marines than did Greek, for this The warship used by both the Greek and Persian navies at this time was the trireme, a ship with three banks of oars one above the other. We know that a Greek trireme was manned by about 200 purpose. men-170 rowers, marines, deckhands, the captain and a flautist who piped time for the rowers. Our knowledge of Persian ships is very limited, but we do know that Phoenician vessels were built with higher sterns and decks than their Greek equivalents, and that they carried more marines. Because of their higher decks, the Phoenician ships were faster than those of the Greeks, but were less stable and harder to manoeuvre in narrow waters and gusty weather conditions. Naval tactics of the Persian Wars Partly because of the different design of Greek and Persian ships, the naval tactics of the two sides varied. The Persian tactic was to maintain close formation and row alongside the enemy ship, before crashing into its side. In these close quarters the Persian marines would rain missiles upon the enemy crew, leaping aboard the disabled ship to intensify the combat. Persian ships usually carried the evacuation of Athenian citizens before the arrival of the Persian army and to plan a strategy in the face of the continuing Persian advance. Xerxes' next obvious objective was to mount a combined land and sea operation against the Peloponnese. Fearing an imminent attack, the Peloponnesians were building a wall across the Isthmus to prevent the passage of the Persian army. But in order to attack the Peloponnese, Xerxes would have to divide his fleet. He was unable to do this because a large number of ships had been lost in storms and the naval engagements at Artemisium. He was forced to concentrate his lleet at Salamis. We do not have reliable figures for the Persian fleet at this time but it has been estimated to have numbered perhaps 500 vessels. Herodotus says that 387 Greek vessels were stationed at Salamis.B u. Warry, in the Classical World,, Salamander Books, London, 1980, p. 32; P. Connolly, Greece ancl Rome at W ar, Macd,onald Phoebus, London, I9BL, p. 25; Herodotus, op. cit., VIII,45, p. 539. Vy'arfare Greek naval warfare relied more heavily on a tactic of ramming the enemy ship. The forward keel of each Greek trireme was equipped with a bronzeplated ram, situated below the water line. Bffective use of the ram required considerable skill and manoeuvrability; consequently, the Greek fleet kept a relatively open formation. A very effective manoeuvre-and-ram tactic employed by the Greek ships at Salamis was the periplus. In adopting the periplus the Greeks disabled their opponents by side-swiping them and shearing off their oars. The rest of the Greek fleet was then in a position to advance. At the battle of Salamis the Greek flanking ships were lying in ambush behind the Cynosura headland. The large Persian fleet was crowded into the narrow waters of the strait between Cynosura and the mainland. Because of this the leading ships, disabled by the ramming tactics of the Greeks, were forced back onto the ships following closely behind. The Persian ships ended by ramming each other and provided an easy target for the Greeks, who were able to ram them at will. At Salamis, in what is regarded as the major turning-point of the Persian W'ars, the Greek navy decisively defeated the Persian fleet. The Greek commanders were bitterly divided about the best tactics to adopt against the Persians. The overall com- mander of the Greek navy was the Spartan Eurybiades; the leader of the Athenian contingent was the brilliant Themistocles. The main events of the battle, which took place on 28 September 480, are set out in Figure 5.9. Study this figure and consider the following questions. Zot dtscussion : ; Why had the Persianfleet ctnchored, neør Salarnis? Whøt was the initíal C,reek response to the presence of the Persianfleet? : Whøt role d,id. Thernistocles pløy in the lead up to the battle? s What disaduantages d,id the Persianfleetface at Salamis? t XERXES : a What tectics did the Greeks ad,opt to ouercome the Persians? Xerxes has usually been rid,iculed,for h.is willingness to o,ccept the secret mirsage of Themistocles atføce aa,lue. How ,night hX d,ecision be explained, or justffied, c In whøt id,entifu some other factors to be consid,ered,. Write your speech, remernbering that you could, Iose your head, if Xerxes does not like you, âdrirr. E- on this occásion? respects d,o the accounts of Herod,ottu and, Aeschylu.s (page tST) support eøch other? Main sources Herodotus, The Hístoríes Our chief account of the events surrounding the battle of Salamis was recorded a generatio., aft"r'the battle by Herodotus. This, however, is not a flawless account: some of its detail has been questioned; Herodotus, moreover, lacked understanding of naval tactics. Tho additional consideratiorr, us to treat "rr"o,,.age Herodotus with caution: he wrote, i., hirrdsight, with with ø proposal. ,My you not to tøke receit euents too deeply to heart. What are afew planlcs and, thnbers? Th,e d.ecisiae struggle will rwt d.epend, upon them, but upon llardonitu . . . approo.ch,ed. Xerxes Lard''hc said,,'I beg men and, horses . . . I suggest, thcrefore, on im^.eiiate attoch upon the Peloponncse. Or wait ø while, if you prefer . . . ,f you haue ma.de up your mind. wt tå itay hcre, thcn go homc togethcr with the greater part of the army, and I will m,akc it m.y d,uty, 1Ðith J00 000 pickcd troops, to deliuer Creece to you HERoDorus, Th,e that he actually fought in the battle and therefore offers an eyewitness account. However, while the play does give useful detail ofthe battle itself, its chiefpu._ pose was to entertain, as well as to glorify the Athenian role in the victory. Moreover, u"".oL_.rrd_ ffle marine like Aeschylus would not have been party to the council meetings of the commanders nor would he have had any contact with persian sources. Most importantl¡ he describes the battle from a point of view with which he corrld not possibly have sympa_ thised-a Persian one! His depiction Lf X"o", u. u foolish and impetuous hothead is proba-bly pure dra_ matic invention. Xerxes' next move sÉlr¡rqounr, Artemisia giaes Xerxes thcfollowing ad,aice:,1 think that you should yourself quit thís country and leaae Mard,onitu behind, with thnforce hc aslt"sþr, if that is whøt h,e wants, and, if he høs reaily und.ernkån tu dn as h,e has sai.d, . . . who cares f Mard,onius comes to grieJ? He is only your slante, and th.e Creelæ will hm" bi,¡ o poor triumph i,f thny hill hím. Asfor yourself, you witt be going hgme uith the object of your carnpaign arcomplkh.ed-for you haue bumt Athens.) HERoDoTUs,?h.e. Historics, trans. by AuBREv DE rc p. 55g v With hisfleet routed,, Xerxes could, not supply hk large army sirrce ít dcpendcd on seaborne supplies whi.ch could. rww be intercepted. J. L. O'NEIL, dilemma. What should his next move be? Xerxes con_ Imagine th&t Xerxes has conferred, with Mard,onius tnd Arternisia, and that he has summoned, you to giae tim a_final opinion. Read the o"r, fro^ following "itthe aduice {erod,otus, Sources 5.5-6, which sui up 'ey haue just giuen hirn. The mod,ern sources will SÉl¡¡rqounr, _ sulted with his general, Mardonius, and his trusted /as^6 pp.556_Z td After the battle of Salamis Xerxes was faced with a adviser, Artemisia, Queen of Caria, regarding the best course ofaction. in chairu., Historics. trans, by AuBREy DE an Athenian bias; he viewed the battle as an illustra_ tion of Greek glory. Aeschylus, The Persùtns Another account of the battle was recorded bv the Athenian playwright Aeschylus in The persians, per_ formed in Athens in 472 BC, nine years after the bat_ tle. The value of Aeschylus, versitn lies in the fact 155 .The Life of Xerxes,, p. 12 ilIB The whole situationwas rww chønged,, ønd, Xerxes was in seriotn diffiruhics. Without afl.eet, the peloponræse could, rnt be conqucred,..Winter was only a rutith or two away: and, with thc prospects of unrest afier wth a reuerse, hc mtnt return to Sard,is to keep thc empire und,er surueillatwe. But to aband,on his new Greeh conquests would, be an admission of dcfeøt and, to equal hß predccessors in glory . . . J . M. cooK afailure , The persian Empire, pp. I2l_2 I56 GROUPS AND PERSONALITIES w trì¡lT¡füIÉ{iFr¡r @ pLace for 'seneiaL ThemisLocles persuades Eurybiades to caLl another conference, wih"r, h" makes thelolLowing speech: 'hí, now in you, po*", to saue Creece if you tak'e mv ad,uice and engage the enem'y's fleel here in SáLam¡s, instear| olwiLhdrawing to Lhe lst'hmus ' ' if you frght lat thã IsLhmusl, it wiLL haue Lo be in was hetd' . . . on the most suitable eigaging the enemyfleet ' The 'A council of uar Etrtrtf " feelíng of the counciL was inJauour oJ 'saíIing"Lo rheTsthmus lof CorinLhl andf'ghLing in rlefenle of the PeLoponnese, and a resolution was poura Lo¡glrr in åefence ol the lsthmus' ' (Herodotus, VIII, 49-57 ). ih" opri tro. and that wilL be greatly. t'o our . ilisad,uantage, uith our smaller numbers anrJ slower shipl . . . Fighting in a confi'ned space . the enemy' .fauours ui but Lhe open seafaaours (Herodotus, VIil, 58-60 ). EUBOEÄ. 4 (\,.æ Isthmus of Corinth a Phalerum Corinth E-E rflt æ --l:IFfl The Greek contmand,ers continued, to argue the íssu,e and' Thernistocles, anxious toforce the Greeks to stay andfi'ght at Salamis, secretly sent a messenger ti the Persian camp, who said' to Xerxesl[Themistocles] has told rne to report to.you that thi Greeks are aftaid and' planning to sliptLway. OnLy preaent lhomfront slLpping Lhrough un,ti linn"rt. and' vou lLaue aI Lhis momenl an ioooíLuãiL, of unparaLLeled, success. They are at no å.oggrrt d'íann with each olher, and wiLL the see will you contrary, the opf,ãsition-on ffir pio-Persians among Lhemrtghting Lhe rest' (Herodotus, VIII,76). FIGURE 5.9 Àthens The battle of Salamis 'The Persians belieued' what he had rold thetn and' ororeeded. to puL ashorc a large force on the islel 'of Psyttaleia, between SaLam'is and the coasL; ih"r,- obout midnight, Lhey moued Lheir wes;ern ninp in on encirc[ing mot)emenl upon Salamis, whie aL Lhe same Lime their ships ' ' ' adaonced anrJ blocked, the whole channel as far as Munychia . . . These tactical manoeur)res uere out in silence, to preaent the enemy from "arríed, b,eins aware of whar wai going on; they occupied the íahote night, so Lhat none of the men had time for sleep' (Herod'otus, VIII, 77). XERXES tr IE7 @ FFTTIII The Greelt.fleet, hauing learnt of the persian encírcling mouement, put to sea at dawn and prepared, to giue battle. Creek squad,rons uere lying in ambush behincl the promontory of Cynosura. When the Corinthian squodron hoisted, its sails and. began to sail north niLh Lhe obiect of delencling the Megarian ChanneL and. the êreek" realfom Egyptian attack, Xerxes ordered, his fleet to follow them by ad,aa,ncing inro the narrou) waters of the straits. '.The whole [Greek] fleet nou) got under wøy, and. in a moment the Persians were on them . . . The Athenian squadron found, itself facing the Phoenicians, who formed Llrc Persiai left wing, on lhe western, Eleusis, end of Lhe lineithe Lølæ_daemoníønsfaced the ships of lonia, which were stationed, on the Piraeui, o, "ost"rn end^. . . greater part of the Persian fleet _the sffirecl seaerely in the bo,ttle . . . the ireek fleet worJrcd together as a whole, while the persíaru had lost forrnation and, uere no longer fi,ghting " on any plan' (Herodotus, VIII, BS-BS): EÌeusis a Corinthian Bay of Eleusis squadron æ Meeara ATTICA tt ¡ ,r Athens Greek fleet oc> SALAMIS ll I æ t ,a ì I a t ìì" o)l t , 0 t I tl tt a Persian fleet Persian encircling movernent 71 $ I Greek ships Persian ships iirilTn¡ ',The g-reatest d,estruction took place uhen the ships which had beenfi,rst turned tailjfor those asternfåilfout of -engaged them in their attempt to press forward,, (Herodotusi V\il," g2). 'Then charge followed, charge on cuery side. ALfirsL by its huge ímpelus O^urfleet withstiod rhim. BuL"soon, in that n(nrow spoce, Our ships were jammed in hundreds; none could, heút a,nother. They rammerl each other with their prows of bronzej and, some Were stripped of euery oar. Meanwhile the enemy Camc round us in a ring and charged,' (Aeschylus, The Persians, II, 406:5 I S). tî-!Gl?n!clr.ll|!ltllã 'Xerxes, nhen he realisecl the extent of the dßaster, was afraid, that the Greehs, áither on their own initiatiue or at the suggestion ofthe Ionians, might sail to the Hellespont anci break Lhe bridges here. If this happened, he be cu: off in Europe and [n danger of ryouLd destruction' ( Herod,otus, VI I I, g 7). * PERSONALITIES I5A AND GROUPS cavalry-now strengthened by the Thessalian cavalry which used the best horses in Greece After Salamis: Mardonius in command After the defeat of the Persian navy at Salamis, Xerxes returned to Persia, leaving Mardonius to continue the campaign. The Persian arïny was still undefeated and, in tñe following spring, Mardonius led his troops against the combined Greek army at Plataea in central Greece. Mardonius skilfully dealt with the problems that the Persians faced after Salamis. Like Xerxes, he attempted to exploit weaknesses in the Greek resolve to resist Persia. He must have been well awa¡e of the Spartans' reluctance to venture beyond their fortifications at the Isthmus of Corinth' The Peloponnesian states had built a wall across this narrow land-bridge to prevent the Persian advance' Mardonius, therefore, offered attractive inducements to the Athenians and other Greek states if they would enter into an alliance with him. Athens refused these offers, but some chose alliance rather than costly defeat. The Athenians made several requests to the Spartans to join them in their defence of Greece' The Spartans delayed, however, while they completed their Isthmus wall. It was not until the Athenians had threatened to go over to the Persians that Sparta finally led a Peloponnesian force out from behind the Isthmus wall. Realising that all hope of an Athenian alliance was gone, Mardonius ordered his army to sack and burn Athens for a second time. He then withdrew from Attica to prepa-re for the battle to come' Zot dt'scussion a What would Mard,onius haue gain'edfrorn an alliance with Athens? ) How might Mardoníus interpret the Peloponnesiøn policy of reliance on th'e Isthmus wall? ; Wh.y might the Pelopon'nesians still be uulnerable to Persiøn atto,ck? : Consid'ering all of the aboue, how wise was Mørdonius' strategy? What went \{rong at Plataea? Herodotus gives an account of Persian strategy at this time when he says that Mardonius' plan 'was to retire on Thebes, where he could fight on good cavalry country and near a friendly town' (Book IX, 13). As at the battle of Marathon, the Persians enjoyed many intitial advantages: o o the army was as yet undefeated in this campaign Mardonius could rely on the Thebans for men and supplies o Mardonius had chosen to meet the Greeks on terrain that was well suited for the deployment of his o Mardonius himself was an experienced and capable general, by now very familiar with Greek conditions and tactics. Read the detailed account of Plataea in Chapter B. taking particular note of the significance of the following key developments. Stage I o the role ofthe Persian cavalry o the impact of the death of Masistius on the Persian forces. Stage 2 o Mardonius' o exploitation of the new Greek position across the Asopus ridge the poisoning of the Gargaphia spring. Stage 3 o Mardonius' order to engage the Greeks as they changed position o the impact of the Tegean and Spartan o o phalanx charge on the Persian front line the impact of the death of Mardonius the escape of Artabazus and his force. The aftermath of Plataea Once the Tegeans and Spartans had over"whelmed the Persian troops behind their barricade of wicker shields, they were joined by the rest of the Greek force. The combined Greek forces stormed the Persian stockade, slaughtering all within it. Herodotus tells us that the Greek losses were relatively light, whereas the bulk of the Persian army was destroyed (Book IX, 7I)' Mardonius' second in command, Artabazus, withdrew with approximately 40 000 cavalry and escaped back to Persia via the BosPhorus' The battle of Mycale Within a short time after the battle of Plataea the Persians and the Greeks engaged in battle at Mycale on the lonian coast. A combined Greek force, at the invitation of leading lonian states, attacked the remnants of the Persian navy, which had returned to Samos following the battle of Salamis. The Persians were reinforced by a contingent of 60 000 men, who had been sent by Xerxes to prevent revolt in lonia' Unable to lure the Persian {leet into a naval battle, the Greek forces beached their ships on the headland near Mycale and attacked the Persians, who had taken up e position on the beach behind a barricade of shields When the battle turned against the Persians, th Ionians and Milesians changed sides and joined the rout. XERXES Herodotus ends his account of the wars at this point, but the conflict soon moved to a new level through the initiative of the Athenians. They became '59 Zc/ìot/ìes : the leaders of a maritime league comprising a large number of Ionian cities and islands dådicated to tùe The Greek ffinsiue demonstrated. both positiae and. negatiue aspects of Xerxes, leødership. The followirug table contains some of the important actiuities q,nd euents of the campøign, Decid,e whiclr of the following of Xerxes, continued expulsion of the persians from their remain_ ing strongholds in Thrace and lonia. The Persian perspective lead,ership ^r"rr^irti ability bestfi,ts eøch one. Copy the tab_le ønd assign the a,ssessments to the àppropriate columns. Because our sources for the persian Wars are predom_ inantly Greek, the Greek view of the victory against the Persians has been emphasised at the expense of a (i) we of diplomøcy to neutralise opposition (ä) skill in logisticøl plønning (äi) lack ofreconnaissance oflocal weather balanced perspective. No doubt, a persian chronicle of the same period would have called the conflict ,the Greek Wars'! Students of history are all too familiar with traditional propaganda, which presents the vic_ tory of little Greece against the big, bad persians as a triumph of democracy and freedom over tyranny and oppression. This simplistic view ignores some impor_ tant facts. Certainly, the Greek victory against signfi_ cant odds,-including internal divisions, was a major accomplishment. However, it was not seen by the Persians as a serious humiliation, nor did it heraid the collapse of Xerxes' empire as the Greek sources liked to imply. M. A. Dandamaev sums up the persian per_ spective in Source 5.9. cond,itions (iu) skill in strategic planning (u) ability to exploit opportunities (ui) und,erestimating the opposition (uii) planning for future outcomes (aíä) skill in nøual tactics (ix) being outtnorLoeuared, by superior tactics (x) ouer-reliønce on superior numbers. Positive Actiyities/event Negative leadership leadership qualities What was the influence of the persian-Greeh wars on th.e Persians? Accord.ing to a classiral writerfrom the fi,rst century AD, Din Chrysostomos, the persinns utrote in relation to these wars that ,Xerxes, haaing undnrtalæn an expeditinn against the Greelæ, defeated thc lnked,acmnnians at Thcrmnpylae and, dcstroyed, the city of Athcns. All who could, ¡nt escape were ensiaued,. After hauing imposed tribute on the Greelts, Xerxes returned to Asia.'Thcre is no doubt that the persiarc (in any cose, in their offæial traditinn), did rwt regard, themselaes as being dcfeated,, because th,e preuinu.sly procløim.ed. objectiues had, been accomplished: Athens was talæn twice; the Eretriaw utere talæn culay in coptiuity. The real objectiae of the war was of course d.íffirenti undcr the pretext of a punitiue expedition against Athcrc, thc Persínn^s wanted to occupy all of Greece. On persian with dcpirtiotu of the war with the Greeks, who are armed with shicld"s and, speørs, the Helleræs [GreelæJ are usuølly dcpirted as hauing collapsetl to the ground,, or fallen onto their krces . . . To thc Achanmenid, empire, with iæ huge extent and, enormoræ resou,rces, the dnfeat seals in Greece had. the chara.cter of mirnr set-bork. along the perúphery of its realm. M. A. DANÞaMAEv, ApolitbalHi^storyof Achaeme nid, Empire, pp. the 2254 qualities o prepara,tions for Greelt 484481 BC ffinsiae o d,emands rnad,e.for . 'eørth and, uater' strategy of combined land and, sea ffinsiae o aictory at Thermopylae o loss of ships in storms off Greek coast o send,ing squad,ron of ships to blockad,e Megarian Channel before Salamis o being drawn into the battle at Salamis o defeat at Salamis . return to Persia after Sølamis a Study as thoroughly &s you can Xerxes, managem,ent of the Greek cømpøign. Can you thinlt of øny other aspects of the Greek campaign that d,etnonstrate positiue or negatiaefeotur", o¡ X e rx e s' military le a d,er ship ? GROUPS AND PERSONALITIES I6O LATER FOREIGN POLICY Erö On the nid'ence aboue all of Xerxes' [Greek] expedition' the Persian preparatiÐn at thís time was fi'rst class from the of an'd' warfare political of of uiew both poínt 'mouement of largeforces by land' an'd' sea' Th'e weakræss, if we mttst lookfor o/tß' lro's in the higher command'. The king ha'd little experien'ce of war' The lesson of Marathon hød rwt been learnt' Too greatfaith was placed' in the ualour ofthe king'sforces when hß eye, and too little a'ccount tahen of fi.ghiing "tie¡ei und,er Creelæ'wíll to resßt' The Persían commnn'd' di'd' twt haue the strategical grasp to impose iæ oun pattern on thcfi,ghting, an'd, Persian professiorm'lism in mounting the exped'ition and dcLiaering mcn and ships to the battlefronts llos not enough to ensure aictory' J. M. cooK ,The Persian Empíre,pp' /on Itng an d /.6e sources Q/n s s lnn lll-12 u s zng Accord'ing to Cooh, what wa,s the m'ost successful aspect of Xerxes' camPaign? What d,oes he see øs wealtnesses in the Persian higher cornrnand? a What specffic examples woald Cook haae had' in mind' in rimarhing that the Persian cornmand laclted "the strategicøl grasp to impose its own p&ttern on' the fi'ghting'? ) Do you agree with Coo]t"s assessment? Øc/iui/ies ) Cond,uct a class forum on the Persiart Wars' Form a pønel comprising Xerxes, Mardonius, Artemisia, Themistoclei arud Pausanias' Deaise a bank of questions that cløss members will ash these fr'gures ior""rning their role in the conflict' Remember to Despite the failures at Salamis, Plataea and Mycale, Persian involvement in Greek affairs did not come to an end. Greater emphasis was now placed on diplomacy, as can be seen in Persian willingness to use Gr"!k exiles, a policy that Xerxes had already adopted in his use of Demaratuse and Ephialtes during the Greek campaign. In the months after Plataea, Xerxes entered ìnto negotiations with Pausanias, the victorious Spartan leader. According to evidence recorded by Thucydides, Pausanias promised to deliver Greece to the Persian Empire in return for marriage with one of Xenes' daughters' Further benefit from this diplomacy was cut short by Pausanias' subsequent recall to Sparta, followed ,áon uft", by his disgrace and death' Persia now lost its former control of the lonian states, which took join advantage of Persian naval weakness to revolt and the newly formed Delian League under the leadership of Athens. Finally, at the battle of the Eurymedon River in 469 BC, the last of the Ionian states that remained loyal to Persia were defeated by the Delian League, under the leadership of Cimon of Athens' Control of the Aegean now lay with the Greeks' Xerxes pr"."*"d the empire that he had inherited from his father' Herodotus' roll-call of nations that provided troops and ships for the p-1eek offensive extent of Xerxes' empire' iBook VII, 60-98) shows the the Greek mainland' from retreat Èoilowing Persia's by imperial events: taken Xerxes found his attention Masistes, folbrothel his he faced revolt in the east; fled with-Xerxes, lowing a violent personal dispute a planning Susa for his satrapy in Bactria, apparently gory The revolt. Xerxes dealt swiftly with this threat' details of the dispute, and the fate of Masistes, are recorded in Herodotus,IX, 109-13' Xerxes appears to have maintained an active foreign policy in the east. The Russian scholar M' A' Dãr,dã*u"u suggests that Xerxes conquered the Saka people, who lived east of the Caspian Sea' Further Lurt, X"o". appears to have added to the empire a region called Akaufaka, located north of Kabul in modern Afghanistan.ro appoint a mod,erator to chøir the proceedings' : Write an extended response to one of the following exarnination-style questions. Remember to refer to sources in your answer. (i) How ffictiue was Xerxes as a military lead'er? What uJere the strengths ønd weøknesses Xerxes' military lead'ership? (2 Un'it) himself to the Persian court and accompanied Xerxes on his Greek campaign, offering valuable advice on local conditions. (2 Uruit related) (ä) eDemaratus was an exiled Spartan king who attached of 10M. A. Dandamaev, A Polítical History of the Achaemenic Empíre,E. J. Brill, Leiden, I9B9,p'232' )