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p THE SPARTAN NAVAL EMPIRE 412-394 B.C. by Ron Keeva Unz A thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts Harvard University C ambridge Massachusetts 23 March 1982 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED TheNatureoftheEvidence. / Table ofContents Prologue.. * . . . *. . . . . .11.1 *I.I...tSI. Chapter I: The Spartan Home Front...............3 Chapter II: The Persian Perspective... Chapter III The lonian War and the Rise of the Spartan N aval Einpix’e. 30 . and her New Chapter IV: Sparta Chapter V: 16 . * Slipping 55 Hegemony into a War with Persia 72 ChapterVl:.Agesilaos’War 88 Epilogue.... . . . . . . 99 . Appendix A: Appendix B: The Selection Appendix C: C hrono logy Notes to . . of . . . . Ephors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A14 . . ¶Pe,ct: Notes to . . . . * . . Al 8 nl-n27 Appendices. Bibliography . . LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ...*....... Anl-An4 Bi -B6 THE FIRST SPARTAN NAVAL EMPIRE AND THE SECOND Prologue: In the summer of 478 B.C., Sparta at naval empire. attempt land forces against and her place Persia prestige of Sparta’s at the head of the Greek alliance had insured that to lead the united Greek fleet Spartan were chosen admirals during the Persian and Salamis; blades had commanded at Arternision tychidas Eury King Leo War, Pausanias, at Plataiai and regent Greek fleet which won over Cyprus and Byzantion.2 Spartan domination of lonia, Pausanias’ Spartan design. the victor for one of the Spartan kings, the Hellespont, of the Aegean seemed possible, and this But Pausanias led the Lasting and the islands may well have been combined plans for increasing power in the Aegean with plans for increasing personal power at Sparta, and within at the hands of the Spartan his reputation by stories of his corruption, Such propaganda, makes it nearly a few years ephors as a traitor to Greece, blackened throughout arrogance, impossible to untangle his own he was dead to Sparta the Greek world to the absurd, the details of Paus intentions. Pausanias’ that Sparta’s fall. naval commitment did not By 478, and and medizing behavior.3 ranging from the plausible It is clear survive War. at Mykale.1 After the close of the Persian anias’ of had had no history Spartans but the overwhelming naval excellence, abandoned her first the year of Pausanias’ 1 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 2 first become disenchanted already leadership the Greek cities for misconduct, recall as experienced Dorkis arrived with the severity under Pausanias; replacement, as Pausanias’ at this Sparta had no great experience Sparta sea, and traditionally conservative Spartiates naval operations to the same political venture.5 oversight as land campaigns in the Peloponnese, Spartan admirals might dream of succeeding It is essentially at along the Asian coast control had failed. raised must have and risky viewed a naval hegemony as a foolish could not be subject refused the allies indeed, many of her leaders decision; probably welcomed It. More to the point, of Spartan when the Spartiate to follow him and turned to Athens instead.4 no objections of Asia had and and ambitious where Pausanias these reasons for rejection of naval empire which Thucydides ascribes to the Spartans of 478.6 Three-quarter war against Athens, Sparta on naval hegemony. been required Sparta varying effort the Aegean. of bitter decision fighting had the Athenian naval empire whose birth This time Sparta and for the next decade and success to maintain In analyzing the origin, "second Spartan naval empire," why it came into being, at the close of the again came to a watershed Twenty-seven years to destroy had allowed. thalassocrat, this of a century later, accepted the role of she attempted with her naval empire growth, in and decline of we must seek to understand and why the "first never existed. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Spartan naval empire" THE SPARTAN HOME FRONT Chapter I: Sparta Greek state is the commonly used modern name of the ancient from five the city of Sparta--formed small villages--and of Lakonia and the occupied the home territory controlling centered on of Lakedaimon in the Peloponnese, lands of Messenia. society At the top of Spartan scendants of the Dorian caste of the Spartan conquerors state. the crop. The Spartiates prohibited by law, lived and drill. as such, and living training held was slaves or serfs called helots, themselves They constituted a warrior meant to instill those toughness, lives in barracks caste, athletic necessary ability, themselves, agoge--was in a warrior: and mental discipline.2 there seems to have been an important distinction and various of hypomelones or "inferiors."3 types between the homoioi or "equals" term is widely used in describing citizen rights; and The rigorous youths underwent--the qualities Among the Spartiates referred military eating most of their meals in communal messes much of their tainly from were did no workthey but instead engaged in continual process Spartan physical and the ruling to produce a fixed annual contribution who were required training of Lakonia, The land Spartiates worked for them by state-owned de were the Spartiates, to Spartiates it probably Spartiates and almost cer in good standing, reflected their 3 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED The former possessing political full "equality." 4 tary command, or political the narrow social emphasizes the Spartan Consti ution his is quite virtue of he felt orders the city ment; brought them, violate evidence and Amompharetos, repeatedly to be much better than what he viewed In 421 the Peace of Nikias with Athens in control his direct he felt "equality" after it was sworn when the Spar of Amphipolis, to turn with the agree the Spartan ordersand that refused in compliance it was "impossible" was very closely he retreat, supreme commander, officials saying that for him to by obeying.7 indentified it represented retreating;8 implied political We know much less To the with "auto insist the pebble with in his mind, political independence. about the hypomeiones. term is used only once, seems to be a generic who he cast a stone down at the feet of his which he voted against equality des Pausanias; nomy." When Amompharetos became angered at Pausanias’ ence that to refused facing the Persians the wishes of the inhabitants homoioi, in the empirical of command. position over to the Athenians despite at length from his commander-in-chief was badly weakened shortly Klearidas, of obedience at Plataiai, unit disobedience as "cowardice."6 tiate Although Xenophon sense. when in positions withdraw his men from their direct in more than just homoioi were remarkably willful commanding a Spartan pite as "equals" theLakedaimonians,5 strong that independent-minded mili the franchise.4 and only they possessed Homoioi viewed themselves or normally office Only homoioi could hold political In fact the in Xenophon’s Hellenica term for all 3.3.6: those Spartiatewho LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED it for 5 one reason or another homoioi. rights citizen for an indefinite the loss of all A few Spartiates period.9 course probably But most "inferiors" under the Lykourgan system, who failed his contribution mess was disfranchised, became concentrated and greater ferior" usage,12 of food to the common into the hands of a few families, Henceforth, the term "Spartiate" fell some rough indications century, is of rourse According or lot.13 clined by 479, at which time there life-or-death struggle 2000-3000 full citizens at Mantineia, of military by the time of the conspiracy numbers age.14 down to Leuktra seem to have de were about 8000, By 418, at the age available,15* and of Kinadon in 399, Spartiates This trend of population in 371, re there were only some could be said to make up only one percent population.16 some and children ceived a kieros of whom over 5000 were of military unknown, but were redistributed and each of the 9000 male Spartiatesadults slightly to the homoioi. tradition, land holdings Spartiate greater with ancient will be restricted exist. land from homoios to "in in accordance The exact number of Spartia±s time in the eighth any Spartiate and as more and more of Sparta’s numbers of Spartiates status.11 of training became inferior from economic causes: to provide group or capture by the enemy, may have been unable to pass the strenuous of the agoge° probably from equality atimia--"dishonor"--and in formal resulting some fell Of these, on the battlefield through cowardice rights; disfranchised component of this the most important were fallen citizen lacked full of the adult male decline continued at which time there were fewer than LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 6 1000 Spartiates of military century onward, the fifth within the Lakedaimonian daimonian state Lakedaimonians part who lived spread across Lakonia; Although they lacked the full citizen integrated Argos, rights and Messene.1 of homoioi, into the Lakedaimonian and seem to have been very loyal there the descendants in small communities away of Sparta, According to tradition, around" own small towns they were probably from the large Dorian centers were fully of land.18 were "dwellers in their of those Dorians who had settled perioikoi of the Lake they were allocated foundation; the perioikoi but others- and helots. Lykourgan redistribution in the original As the name implies, Sparta, were not Spartiates, neodamodeis, from its of 98% of the people living had been an integral The perioikoi a share state perioikoi, "inferiors," perhaps quarter From the last age.17 to the Spartan army state.2° had been 30,000 male perioikoi at the time of the Lykourgan redistribution,21 and we have no reason to doubt this. The neodamodeis or "new citizens" been freed for military service. The first comes during the Peloponnesian class around 424 the Spartan who had done Sparta the Spartans the best service soon regretted killed after granting them all who had mention of this War, when some time promised freedom to the 2000 helots their such a large body of potential shortly were helots decision rebels, the helots on the battlefield; and came to fear for it seems that freedom, the Spartans in secret.22 Despite this inauspicious beginning, LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED but Spartan use of 7 as hoplite freed helots troops soon began in earnest. on his Thracian 424, 700 neodamodeis were sent with Brasidas expedition; to Thucydides, according the Spartan without risking helots Spartiate with a viable In any event, served so well and so faithfully in 421, Sparta that lives.23 leaders at Sparta at reducing the number of strong young helots much as they hoped to provide Brasidas that as a resident reluctance, initial and neodamodeis for military Sparta’s of 600 helots army upon their return garrison.24 frontier so that began to utilize Sparta campaigns: as the freed good behavior of these neodarnodeis set the pattern followed, force purposes, and over in the years which some neodamodeis in overseas especially in 413 consisted 300 neodamodeis were sent to served at Byzantion; took 1000 with him to Asia in 401/0, 2000 more a few years later.25 The large numbers of helots sent to Syracuse and neodamodeis Euboia in 413/2; and Agesilaos Thibron brought The reason for such widespread use of freedmen--at times neodamodeis must have far out numbered Spartiates and perioikoi in the army--is there were simply too few Spartiates, Spartan periods. allies were unwilling and both were widely used.26 were thoroughly and from home for long and mercenaries, as we can tell, neodamodeis loyal. also seem to have been freed or granted freedom in return state: to serve far As far obvious: while perioikoi The choice was between freed helots Helots aimed gave them land along the border with Elis so they could serve came Sparta’s In for performing other services desposionautai probably served as pety LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED partial to the Spartan officers over B oarsmen who rowed spartan the mass of helot performed obscure adespotal force; police may have been the Spartan and the as domestics or servants.27 state social At the bottom of the Spartan helots state-owned proper, crop to their tilled. master, slave/serfs the Spartiate possessed no rights Helots killed with impunity by any Spartiate helots were perhaps the descendants habitants of the Peloponnese;29 the Dorian Messenians, Spartan of each year’s who owned the land they whatsoever, and could be at will.28 Most Lakonian the helots of Messenia were and seventh centuries.30 masters,31 the enslaved Messenians on a number of occasions, populationLakonian up the great majority Sparta’s military whelming ratio of those living of slaves society, to full While to longed for including an century.32 probably made in Lakedaimonia. system was strongly of Spartan characteristics and Messenian after loyal of some years in the middle of the fifth The helot in of the pre-Dorian seem to have been surprisingly freedom and rebelled uprising bound to the land, enslaved by the kindred Spartans two long wars in the eighth the Lakonian helots pyramid were the a fixed portion and required to contribute their the aphetai perhaps roles, erukteres ships; influenced especially citizens. by the the over As mentioned above, Spartiates had the freedom from manual labor to be able to devote all their truly professional Greece.33 time and effort hoplite The outstanding to military troops unequaled performance training, anywhere else in of Spartiate LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED becoming contin 9 shows the value of this odds to win victory, numerical from this same cause, 5 fr. P U.- the me number of Spartiates enough for a few thousand Spartiate enslaved, designed around this completely -that the military same reason, the continual Fear of a helot factor in Sparta’s Kleomanes--a Sparta willingly reluctance relinquished Spartans them against multi Sparta under King caution or lack of leading decades did nothing subject allies, to support vague pro It was the united allies, backed by the threat if Sparta Athens, which finally to enter the Peloponnesi2n in the naval hegemony to they might not long remain allies to support rising. to enter into major mises to the Thasians notwithstanding.37 that began for this or to aid the lonian revolt of Athens’ rebellious call for war by Sparta’s it is likely a long--term commitment to protect Athens in 478,36 and for several the revolts seems seems to have been a major commitments. of Plataiai society were greatly difficulties revolt to undertake the independence and the to keep several task; of Spartiates man not noted for his great daring--refused 49935 and Spartan danger of a helot remarkable wars or lengthy military warriors one vital preoccupation In times of war, these plied. stemmed During peacetime it was difficult enormous number of helots. hundred thousand helots training. caution and conservatism extreme military Sparta’s overcoming extreme Mantineia--oftefl Tanagra, Plataiai, opylai, century--Therm of the fifth at all the major battles gents persuaded the War in 431; this juncture, just a few years of war, Spartan leaders did nothing and even at King Archidamos opposed the decision. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED After were already looking 10 to a negotiated settlement,39 major set-back, attempted Spartan to make peace.40 an extreme campaigning reflects Spartiate sacrifice and from the time of the first unless lives absolutely effort to never necessary. Lake to areas daimonian troops were very seldom sent on expeditions far the 300 Spartiates from the Peloponnese; is about the only major exception. captured with Brasidas Asia Minor expeditionary this force which in 421 was made up of freed helots Amphipolis mercenaries, Brasidas’ at Thermopylsi and himself the only Spartiate;1 forces the of Thibron and Agesilaos had same composition.42 Even during campaigns close to home, most Spartan manders of the fifth possible. outside century or later King Agis refused Argos in 418 despite strength; he retreated the same year; ceptional casualties was unwalled. among Spartan in 445, a battle after 403, King Pausanias Athenian democrats a few Spartiates in of Mantineis caution 43 in he returned despite ex When King Pleistoanax to the Peloponnese without advancing no further fighting to the next Nor was Agis’ caution commanders. after begun, by storming Elis, arranged a generous than Elis.44 In settlement with the a sharp skirmish in which were killed.4 It is important military with the Argives overwhelming superiority Elis which had barely to risk it invaded Attica risking whenever in 400 he used the excuse of an earthquake year he refused that to join battle before the battle end a campaign against the fact avoided battle com to realize adduced above, that in all the examples of it is the Spartan LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED commander 11 rather than the Spartan better part that these troops who judges to be the in fact we are told of valor and avoids battle; were generally to avoid battle decisions safety punished unpopular and we know of kings who were severely by an enraged citizen caution for their thought for fighting to eschew rational skill best interests might be served by minimizing price for their were thinking patriotic The logical of Spartiates. basis caution. caution was the small number for this This grim truth sheet of the battle balance men, and often paid a heavy number of her full century. strongest worth more to Sparta the interests total citizenry rounded, than captured of her major allies, and had instead aimed at saving their at Leuktra 1100 enemies half were perished. cities, killed fleets clearly of ships, or even the war effort themselves to the death after given them face-saving lives.50 yet even The 120 chip in the peace negotiations, to order them to fight refused in 418: Pylos became Athens’ the men had only surrendered itself;4 defeat even shows up in the of whornperhaps captured by Athens after bargaining by the end of was an overwhelming victory, Mntineia so over 5% of Sparta’s Spartiates cost Sparta citizens of Mantineis died and only 300 Lakedaimonians, Spartiates;48 that Sparta’s casuaities;4 A few score dead in a skirmish 5-10% of the total the fifth and the glories could not understand death--simply leaders from infancy raised of battlefield Sparta’s The truth body.46 ordinary Spartiates--men seems to be that very Years later only 400 Spartiates, LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED after Sparta being sur instructions in 371, the Spartan but this was close 12 total to half of Sparta’s body by that citizen Sparta’s power was broken forever.51 Sparta’s time, and earlier leaders had had good reason to avoid heavy casualties. As we have seen above, zens was small, oligarchy. Spartan so small that But within this by any standards ruling elite system was a peculiar political oligarchy, the number of full Spartan and democracy--the ideal citi Sparta was an of Spartistes, the blend of monarchy, blend according to Plato, Xenophon, and many other contemporary Greeks. The Spartan kingship from the Agiad house, the the kings possessed and peculiar was dual: one Spartan other from the Eurypontid. great social privileges--they prestige power was almost nil. auctoritas of his position, and his right tools Although and certain archaic were served double portions food at the communal mess--by classical political king came times, their of intrinsic A strong king might use the the continuity of his tenure, to supreme command of an army in the field to slowly build up his influence and power. as Some kings became de facto rulers of Sparta. who succeeded there were many other kings who failed, in this, or never attempted for real or perceived the five reigning befell to dominate Sparta politically. number of kings were severely prising regent, But for every Agesilaos offenses: Agiad kings, punished in the fifth And a sur by the ephors century, along with Pausanias, were deposed or executed for misconduct; two of the four Eurypontids of this LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED three of an Agiad the same fate period. Even 13 or death were made to pay severely kings escaping exile those for their mistakes: threatened house; after blunder, a military King Agis was of his with an enormous fine and the demolition he was assigned when he begged for a second chance, as military ten Spartiates without whose permission advisors he could take no action:;53 Aristotle hereditary styles kings as nothing more -than Sparta’s high priests and this and war leaders, of the Spartan concern ourselves retical constructs, state; with political but as historians, realities and the continuity rather Even in immediate matters, of his status cisions; and experience as king, a Spartan had an important ignorant who happened to be ephors that should not be over-estimated: King Archidamos failed from entering over long-term king by virtue say on all and unsophisticated who made up the Assembly or the five ignorant influence in his effort the Peloponnesian power they did was the peculiar state. year. In theory, Spartiates But a king’s powerful and popular to dissuade the Spartans War.4 the real nature of the Spartan govern the ephors were the rulers Chosen each year from the entire a king or any other magistrate to fine or im at will,6 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED of the body of Spartiates,55 the board of five ephors had the authority prison de and unsophisticated The main reason the Spartan kings possessed mental system. than theo he might often succeed in winning over to his side the thousand-odd Spartiates we must of a Spartan king’s power base gave him a good deal of influence policy. they showing the political would have appeared as on any paper chart organization is all and it was 13 or death were made to pay severely kings escaping exile those for their mistakes: threatened house; after blunder, a military King Agis was of his with an enormous fine and the demolition he was assigned when he begged for a second chance, as military ten Spartiates without whose permission advisors he could take no action:;53 Aristotle hereditary styles kings as nothing more -than Sparta’s high priests and this and war leaders, of the Spartan concern ourselves retical constructs, state; with political but as historians, realities and the continuity rather Even in immediate matters, of his status cisions; and experience as king, a Spartan had an important ignorant who happened to be ephors that should not be over-estimated: King Archidamos failed from entering over long-term king by virtue say on all and unsophisticated who made up the Assembly or the five ignorant influence in his effort the Peloponnesian power they did was the peculiar state. year. In theory, Spartiates But a king’s powerful and popular to dissuade the Spartans War.4 the real nature of the Spartan govern the ephors were the rulers Chosen each year from the entire a king or any other magistrate to fine or im at will,6 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED of the body of Spartiates,55 the board of five ephors had the authority prison de and unsophisticated The main reason the Spartan kings possessed mental system. than theo he might often succeed in winning over to his side the thousand-odd Spartiates we must of a Spartan king’s power base gave him a good deal of influence policy. they showing the political would have appeared as on any paper chart organization is all and it was 15 influence. their on the gerousia, Both kings held seats 28 other members were elected for life Assembly consisted from those Spartiates of the citizen over 60 years old by voice-vote king might lobby members of the gerousia policies, of much recent was multi-staged, the gerousia evidence, his discussion.66 and has been the sub It is clear that the process with the approval of both the Assembly and required: the gerousia seems to have framed the put it to the Assembly for approval issue, supporting of the law-making process is unclear because of the scant surviving ment, into or sway the men of the Assembly by his speech.65 The exact nature ject body;64 the A highly-regarded adult Spartiates. of all whose and possible amend then decided whether to approve the version which came out of the Assembly.6 handled by this same procedure;68 ratified in this gerousia also functioned cases,6 though in trials of war seems to have been Declaration same way. presumably treaties Besides its legislative as a high court, of a king, were role, judging all the capital the ephors were also in cluded as judges.7° LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED THE PERSIAN PERSPECTIVE Chapter II: In the second half of the sixth people, unified the next several led by their centuries, king, the Persian played a very significant course of Greek history titudes young Indo-European by a relatively the Persians, had created of individual Greeks. and at times, the tempting military to Greek cities Greek orators is true, is the consequence political that Greeks. Persian in the rhetoric of falling into the mental frame sources, behavior empire which he ruled of the Persian Much of this culture An idealized of Such a view of who naturally enough But to on the Greek a par with Athens or Elis--hides The political of kingship. prize but misleading. was not Greece and that the context at war with each other; empire to a stock character stage--on Persia the power at times, from the purely Greek perspective. reduce the Persian at and statesmen. work of our Greek historical viewed Persia in shaping the Persia was at times the ally Persia empire which Cyrus and in molding the political ful potential All of this For Cyrus II. role overwhelming menace to Greek freedom; panhellenic the major of the ancient Near East were conquered and civilizations politically century, the Persians the fact were not of the Great King and the can only be well understood culture in which it was rooted. becomes apparent Persian in ruler 16 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED in the Persian view was not a "hero-king" ror an Egyptian as in the Greek homeric tradition but had a royal nature a "judge-king"as closer of a "lawgiver-king" to that sense, in the Old Testacent upon a people of a similar cultur. some of the characteristics view "God-king," or based as it is This is seen if we consider as essential to a king:1 Saith Darius the King: By The favor of Ahuramazda I am of such a sort that I a:: a friend to right, I am not a friend to wrong. It is not my desire that the weak man should have wrcg done to him by the mighty; nor is that my desire, that the mighty man should have wrong done to h:rn by the weak. What is right, that is my desire. I am not a friend I am not hot-temp to the man who is a Lie-follower. ered. What things develop i my anger, I hold firmly under control by my thinkirg power. I am firmly rul ing over my own impulses. The man who cooperates, ]im according to his co operative action, him thu3 do I reward. Who does harm, him according to th damage thus I punish. It is not my desire that a ma should do harm; nor indeed is that my desire, if he should do harm, he should not be punished. What a man says against a man, that does not con vince me, until he satisfies the Ordinance of Good Regulations. The King does not embody the law or transcend good and evil, but is bound by the same stanards and truth the lowliest peasant, of justice as and is indeed charged with enforcing TWrs VAL/Ec The role of the King is one of divinely-appointed of men and champion of good and truth against judge "the Lie:"2 Saith Darius the King: Much which was ill-done, that I made good. Provinces were in commotion; one man was smiting the other. The following I brought about by the favor of Ahuramazda, that the one does not smite the other at all, each one is in his place. My law--of that they feel fear, so that the stronger does not smite nor detroy the weak. As we see above in these passages, Great King merely at the sufferance all-powerful the Great King is the of Ahuramazda, the nearly god who has made him King, bestowed wisdom upon him, and maintains and protects him, and through him, the LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 12 kingdom: A great god is Ahuramazda, who created this earth, who created yonder sky, who created man, who created happiness for man, who made Darius king, one king of many, one lord of many. A great god is Ahuramazda, who created this excellent rork which is seen, who created happiness for man, who estowed wisdom and activity upon Darius the King. HaurAtingly beautiful As we see, the Great King is King by grace of God, not Man: we do not find Darius claiming the kingship or achievements, his abilities secular nature essentially is evident other Persian except insofar This is directly to the favor of Ahuramazda. contrast in Herodotus’ kings. Herodotus before the horses of the other This is a typically history by virtue stories Greek tale, contrary to the and the of Darius and the says that Darius received the the aid of a stratagem conspirators and fits as an empire-wide of as they are due of the Greek weltanschauung, throne because his horse neighedwith political of ofPsalms in the Old Testament. Book the of Ahuraxnazda, akin to that praise against the Magus4 as well into Persian election based on universal suffrage The difficulty seems to be that there was an unbridgable gap between Greek and Persian the Greeks unsuccessfully in terms of their a different, sentially decision. attempting "practical of religion, to describe Greeks were devout, more "secular" metaphysics." well that own. notions attitude. superstition" which left alien ideas but were filled Greek religion with was es rather than "transcendent A Greek kept his oaths because he knew perfectly the gods punished oath-breakers;5 The idea that lies or deceit"the LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED it was a practical Lie" constituted 19 he treats to the truth; eating this and Herodotus in their being peculiar comments on the Persians customlike was alien,6 in and of themselves evil absolute as merely another rigid strange adherence foreign and never even connects it to Persian ants religion acts sprang from very mundane motives: Most Greek ritual an oracle one visited future; better one expiated in a battle; they could not be understood men that views on ethics and morality philosophy religion than with practical no deep more seems very much1 concerned with"absolutes" matters, us. In Greece, and considering Socrates by asking such questions good because it is good, Gods do it?"10The disturbed as: its modern distant this should not the minds of many "Do the Gods do what is or is it considered good because the in terms of Ahuramazda would have been as meaningless dark because it is dark, because it is found in darkness?" Jew or Moslem would probably say with absolute religions, same questionrephrased asked of Darius likely darkness a good man and punished his enemies; among the Judeo-Christian Athenians Even popular involved.9 Persian surprise or dealt with. were practical-minded: was one who helped his friends cousins a curse in order to get a Gods were not so far above or to end a plague.8 harvest or find out about the an animal to learn whether or not victory one sacrificed was likely a dispute to settle certainty as: or is the dark considered An unthinkingly have the same reaction. that Darius’ dark devout modern We can Ahuramazda was not a god of the type which seduced Greek maidens or quarrelled his wife while relaxing "Is in his home on Mount Olympus. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED with we have quoted above probably give us The inscriptions of the essence of Persian impression an accurate toward "Ithe Lie" and love of abhorrence mighty god Ahuramazda, religion--the and justice- -but they are all taken from only one period truth and the reign of only one man, Darius I; over the two centuries considerably religious but one fact is clear: the Persian component peoples. freedom among its and diversity rule.11 of -the Near East our general the other religions rather meager, of Persian between Persian With regard to the relation of the empire made this they represent which seems to have evolved in time of a system of beliefs a slice as such, religion and evidence is empire allowed The great local priestswho apparently took this the Babylonian lesson to heart: with the proper awe and reverence.14 Jews5 ruler,12 as we can tell, complete religious tolerance winning over the important avoided the endemic local doom an over-extended pre the Babylonian gods Cyrus adopted this with regard to the gods of the Elamites, As far of and he although he himself sumably worshipped Ahuramazda,13 he treated policy support had been angered by the contrary views of Nabu-Naid, religious Cyrus L almost inevitable. seems to have captured Babylon aided by the passive discontented size same Assyrians, and he seems to have established for the various priestly unrest political classes national by this; and hostility empire. gods, hence he which would This policy was generally continued by his successors. From the political feature of the Persian Ephesos on the Ionian perspective, the single empire was its truly coast, it stretched most significant enormous size: from over 1700 miles by LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED to Susa, and from there provinces in the east, a somewhat greater making it one of the largest which ever existed in the world prior of comnrinications construction linking land empires to the development of and one of their and transport The Persians empire cannot be overemphasized. cognized this, to the Indian and t::ansport. modern communications The importance distance greatest to a large re clearly achievements was the of "royal roads" and messenger networks of a series the heart of the empire with the outlying provinces. Our Greek sources speak with awe of the road from Sardis close to 1700 miles long, Susa: route--a three months’ top speed; courier royal messengers were stationed equal to the distance they could ride in a day at by having a message relayed along the road from to courier, the Persians land communication possible vast distances several along the journey for a traveier.16 Along each of these roads, at intervals with 111 way stations to achieved the fastest in ancient rate of times.17 Even so, the to be crossed meant that it would have taken weeks for any word of what was happening at the frontiers of the empire to reach the Great King at Susa or Persepolis, and an equal time for even the most hasty and urgent of royal replies to be returned;18 courts have multiplied Transporting the leisurely this pace of oriental time considerably a major military tightly-run for ordinary messages. force the length of the empire would have taken most of a full Under such physical campaigning season.19 constraints, a highly-centralized empire was simply an impossibility. Persia was not a national sense; instead, state the Persian would or Moreover, in the Macedonian or Egyptian Great King was quite LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED literally a totally its subject dissimilar own customs, as he did over a vast number of ruling "King of countries," and its own traditions. empire was not the single the Persian Even politically, own language, each with its peoples, as on solid patch of bright green or red which it appears modern maps. kings made no attempt to subjugate Persian and impoverished fierce hill and the Uxians in the hills Mesopotamian lands, road, looking the Susa-Persepolis of the empire’s territory which did recognize The empire was composed of a varying number of kingdom- sized political units, most centered on a particular and each ruled by a vassal Greek sources, of the Great King. some of these PaphlagOnia--were kings, every time of the Great King were ruled indirectly. the authority Persian demanding tribute over between his capitals.2° the Great King wished to travel Those portions we find a few days’ march of Persia’s the unconquered Carduchi within richest of the interior; tribes the while the rest kingdoms and their were more closely being ruled by a royal governor called rapavan or "Protector may be an artificial According to our as Gilicia provinces--such independent nationality rulers bound to Persia, a satrapPersian of the Kingdom";21 but this and vassal each Khshath distinction and it was anyway more theoretical construct, than real.22 From our literary trol sources the Great King exercised erably from region to region he employed to rnaintainthis Xenophon tells systemwhich us that it seems that the degree of con varied consid but and from era to era, -the methods over his satrapies control did not. from the establishment he anachronistically ascribes LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED In the Cyropsedia of the satrapal to Cyrus rather than 23 in all key garrisons half of the 4th century-- first had remained under the direct the satrapies as a check upon of the Great King in order to serve authority satrapal own day--the down to his to Darius independence;23 this.24 the evidence we have supports all Herodotus and Xenophon also speak of the "King’s Ears" and "Eye" of some sort, royal spies or inspectors charged with the task of monitoring the activities or "Eyes", apparently It is virtually independence for us to learn the degree of impossible exercised evidence based entirely upon our Greek sources, satraps, concerning principally those and Hellespontine Aside from glimpses, we know absolutely of Persian be generalized Communication distance this of the empire rule. the Asia Minor satrapies to the Persian should not empire as a whole. alone would ensure that the King’s hold in region would be weaker than his grip on the heartland empire; and there are other factors Minor satrapies were easily their of Asia Minor of LydiaSardis Our evidence concerning necessarily is yet with few exceptions of what went on in the Eastern provinces for the two centuries and of satraps the position touch only upon the activities PhrygiaDaskyleion. nothing Our only detailed by most satraps. circumstantial these sources of satraps.25 somewhat anomalous. available which tended to make the Asia Excellent in the Aegean area; Greek mercenaries we have evidence use going back to the middle of the 5th century.26 were also the powerful states could and often did support of Greece itself, a rebellious Asia Minor may be a special relations case, of There some of which satrap.2? but in analyzing with Greece it happens to be the special most interested of his Persia’s case we are in, and the evidence based upon our Greek sources LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG is very useful. The impression our evidence generates ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED of satrapal 24 is quite independence the satrap century, against As early as the middle of the 5t remarkable. the Athenian empire, supporting the Samian revolt hostage;28 he appears to be acting holding Athenians though it may be that vblition, a blind eye to his activities. operated with invading apparently tirned By the end of the century, satraps armies against When reins The reins are loose, importance Hellespontine Persians-.-was northern third at Daskyleion, was a satrap, did so long as they of the driver, abutted satrapy just south he struck as a very honorable of the "People by the Sea" by the covering in a man whose great-grandfather we know Pharnabazos’ that and at this the Greek world. of the Hellespont. Pharnakes indeed. of the horses becomes of theory most of the Artabazosof royal in succession the European Greeks.31 personality the Greeksor capital By 412 Pharnabazos had ruled the satrapy before him from the time of the against can state and did not threaten of western Asia Minor, with its satrapal and father say that the Great King did to say something of those portions Phrygia--called a large All of this and Xenophonwho must that tribute the nature empire which directly and of the Great King seem loose than the nature it is worthwhile blood satraps sent him the appropriate his own position.3° openly, to know believed not much care what his outlying Persian satraps, neighboring at times even went to war with each other.29 have been in a position point on his own the Great King deliberately seems to have been done more or less regularly and of the Great King in Asia Minor commonly co and other officials greater seems to wage a "cold war of Sardis Pissouthnes is foolish, at least but we our Greek sources and courageous man; he was a rather LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED To hellenized 25 which should not surprise Persian, ruled a province containing us since Greek cities his family had and in close prox imity to Greece for four generations.32 Sardis, mre the other major satrapy of the west, comprised Its or less the area of the vanished kingdom of Lydia. satrap seems often to have ruled the smaller of Carla as well,33 satrapy coastal controlled the fifth of whose cities by Athens for most of the fifth century, the satrap most of the southern of Sardis two-thirds had once been a rich kingdom, the satrapy of Sardis independence. leion, In contrast satrap, century;4 and it seems that pattern succesion at Sardis: led a rebellion of the two western satraps Pisidians, Thracians--were extent, Many tribal Lykaonians, independent and quieting at Dasky independence-minded around 418; the next command in 396. examples. was in firm control peoples Paphlagonians, Bithynian or lesser them often occupied much of a satrap’-s During most of the fifth the Greek cities of the Aegean coast--those spontine Phrygia and those attached to Sardis--were rule; century, part making up the "satrapy" many of of Helle of lonia, members of the Athenian empire and however the Great King never theoret LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED of of the interior- or autonomous to a greater time and effort. free from Persian of by Darius I in the late was murdered at royal all his nominal holdings. Mysians, Lydia the strength The long gaps in our knowledge may hide further Neither during thus held claim to with the orderly Pissouthnes Tissaphernes, were de facto of western Asia Minor. was murdered through stealth sixth century; the often tempted its holder with dreams of we find a checkered Oroites satrapy to have held in title and generally of ioniainany southern 26 ically tribute their loss acknowledged their and merely ceased to request money from his western satraps; this presumably being the arrangement worked out in the Peace of Kallias sworn with Athens.37 The likely of the Persian monarchs toward Greece attitude and the Greeks is rather In contrast to the ancient defenders of civilization, barbarian protecting barbarians image East.38 To a fifth-century have seemed a distant culture significanceexcept of Greece as the themselves civilizations for miserable peoples and no political unity, stage of organization of their more in for the amount of trouble lives border regions. to fighting in contrast of Mesopotamia; Greek Greeks one another to the peaceful Greece had no wealth being merely a step above the tribal in the mind of a King of Kings.39 long as it is not taken to extremes; of the early first of the Near of little land, comparison with Rome and the German tribes as perspective and hence unattractive; patches of poor soil, and "civilized" the Great King at Susa, Greece must perhaps alien part against of an empire which than any of the other outlying devoted the greater common popular the Persian and peculiar was completely philhellenes. it is the Greeks who are the the ancient and protects it caused its hammering at the gates embces trinsic city-states hordes of Asia, produces an inverse warlike to unthinking Greek viewand which sees the free ization "savage" sobering century A.D.admittedly A is very illuminating a German Herodotus an impossibility would have given the impression that the main ambition of the subjugation despotic rulers of Rome was theAof the free Germanic peoples. Just as in the the main impact of Greece upon RomanTOparadigm, LICENSED UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Persia and the attention of a Persian Great King was in the a? nonetheless military sphere; regard. The Persian Greece was very important empire had been founded from the saddles of the superb Persian and Median cavalry, the world during this period. esteem in Persia, Infantry the Royal Guard--the was the only well-trained soldiers; the remainder likely seems to have held low system.4 nature It is likely Ten Thousand Immortals described dotus--41 levy, probably the best in as might be expected from the "feudal’ of the economy and the land tenure peasant in this and -equipped that by Hero body of foot of the infantry undoubtedly was probably Asiatic without training or armor, 42 and to melt away in the heat of battle if it were used at all. Like the Persian navy, the grand army of the Persian was merely the sum of the various making up the empire, contingents nomadic peopleswho relied entirely satrap. of Asia seem to have had military similar to that organization of neighboring system or for the domination it was hard put to hold its and poor soil large personal Except for the systems the various essentially had been admirably of nomadic tribes upon long spears opylai proved that unsuited or for heavy reliance tactics, armored and well-trained relied of horsemen, own against Greek armies. of Greece was estates and contact disciplined adapted kingdoms based upon the same armies were bu< around hoplite of heavily and serving of the persians.4 Persian military terrain or king, upon cavalry, nations to the conquest of the nationalities each led by its chieftain under the command of the appropriate empire but The rugged for the growth of upon cavalry; Greek the use of dense formations yeoman citizen-soldiers, fighting hoplite troops LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED for victory. who Therm in close raanks on favorable or Asiatic attacking cavalry victories of Plataisi Persian much larger Persian The subsequent infantry.4 and Mykale signaled supremacy, military any number of frontally- could defeat terrain armies on open terrain.4 fighting that policy was to hire Greeks to do much of their for them, either as "bought" collectively wealth, they had little soon came to the conclusion and Great Kings and satraps wisest of armies destroyed as Greek hoplite But though the Greeks fought well, their the passing individually or allied we again note the resemblance or as mercenaries and subsidized city-states; to Rome’s German policy during the Empire. evidence There is substantial contingents by western satraps 5th century,46 and this dreams of rebellion. the support likely as early as the middle of the played a crucial endence-minded for despite role divided Oroites to them alone rather between satrap and Great King; position, a personal the Great King convinced the men of his Persian Tissaphernes, When a later his agent first Great King tried militarily and cavalry less so, the Iranian trump, LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED away from stratagem.48 became more important cavalry and the success came to depend upon which side message from to do away with by a clever as Greek hoplites the Great King’s irresistible of a revolt indep bodyguard to had to lure the satrap his bodyguard of 300 Greek mercenaries Even more significantly, than could have used such men in the 6th century, his strong military execute him.4 in satrapal A Greek mercenary bodyguard gave satraps of men who were loyal men with loyalties for the use of Greek mercenary ceased to be or failure could obt in the larger number of Greek mercenaries. that The Great King seems to have realized gold was his ‘ strongest credit Greeh arms as early asA46O if we weapon against our sources: we are told -that he sent Megabazos to Greece around this time to "buy" a Spartan Athens, hoping that this would force the Athenians their massive intervention 10,000 golden "archers" Spartan politicians their part the Spartans in Egypt.4 were distributed of several in stirring attack to end In the early 4th century, to the leading large Greek cities; up an anti-Spartan against coalition out of Asia.5° LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED these anti did and driving Chapter III: THE IONIAN WAR AND THE RISE OF THE SPARTAN NAVAL EMPIRE When Sparta and her allies went to war with Athens in L1.31,1 the expected stalemate of land power against sea power quickly developed. 500 shipsU Despite foolish Spartan dreams of obtaining. from friendly Greek cities in the West or of hiring away Athens’ experienced mercenary seamen by offering better pay, the truth was that Sparta had few ships and almost no money.2 While Spartan hoplite troops were the best in the world-the nucleus of the unmatched land army of the Peloponriesianssuccess in naval warfare was largely resources: a function of financial a trireme cost about one talent to build, and pay for the 200 sailors on a ship ranged from three to six obols per man per day, or one-half to one talent per ship per month.3 Only a state with a huge financial a fleet base could hope to maintain of 100 or more triremes for any length of time, and while Athens could draw on the yearly tribute of over 100 sub-’ jects and had a large reserve fund,I Sparta had no significant financial resources whatsoever.5 Sparta’s Peloponnesian allies ition. were in much the same pos Only Korinth had a fine naval tradition resources, and adequate but she was no match for the Athenian empire in either category furthermore, she suffered a precipitous decline in strength during the early years of the war as the Athenian naval blockade apparently took its toll on her commercial re lations.6 30 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED p 31 recognized their The Peloponnesians only a handful of rather cautious naval weakness, and limited and naval efforts were made during the early years of the war against Athens.7 When in 425 the entire Peloponnesian fleet of 60 hipswithout their crews was seized by the Athenians following a truce,8 it seems not to have been rebuilt: between 425 and 414 we find not a single reference to Peloponnesian naval forces.9 The sea had been wholly abandoned to Athens. It was the Athenians themselves who caused the end of Athens’ absolute naval supremacy. In 415, Athens took ad vantage of the Peace of Nikias made with Sparta a few years earlier to dispatch an enormous military expedition to Syracuse in an astonishingly boldand foolish Sicily. attempt to subjugate all The result was utter disaster, and as the entire total of the Athenian expeditionary force together with major re inforcements--over 200 ships and crews plus 3400 Athenian hoplites--1° was annihilated in Sicily, the Spartans re-entered the war against Athens1 The sheer magnitude of the Athenian losses--perhaps two- thirds of Athens’ naval strength and a third of her land army--12 created a widespread feeling throughout the Aegean that Athens was doomed,13 and this encouraged additional parties to enter the field against her. Many major Athenian subject allies such as Chios, Mitylene, Erythrai, revolted or moved toward revolt.14 and Euboia either Even more significantly, Pharnabazos, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and Tissaphernes, satrap of Lydia, independently sent representatives LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED to the 32 Spartans to promise cooperation against Athens, along with generous subsidies The intervention of Persia must be placed in context. Throughout the first phase of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans had made some effort to gain Persian support, since only Persia sould supply the cash which Sparta desperately required in order to wage effective naval warfare. We find a joint Peloponnesian embassy dispatched to Persia in 430, and many other diplomatic missions had been sent by 425.16 results of these efforts were nil. The The Persians had far too much respect for the strength of Athens to risk a war, and in any event the political scruples of the Spartans--men raised on the mythos of Thermopylai and Plataiai--toward the notion of Greek liberty seem to have kept the Spartan offers to the Great King so ambiguous and ungeneráous that the Persians saw little to gain from Spartan victory.17 There is substantial evidence that Darius II renewed Persia’s standing peace treaty with Athens, perhaps in 2+24/3, shortly after he had come to the throne.18 The aftermath of Sicily changed all this, and we are told that it was the Great King himself who took the initiative in pressuring Athens9 letter; his satraps to actively By this time, support Sparta against the peace treaty had become a dead Athens had broken it some time around 414 by supporting the revolt of Amorges, who hadcontinuedor rekindled? the earlier revolt of his natural father Pissouthnes, late satrap of Sardis.2° With the entrance of Persia into the war, a very complex LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 314. and multipartite struggle began along the waters and coastal areas of the eastern Aegean--the "lonian" nesian War--lasting from 2+12 until Aigospotami in 405. Athens’ Several distinct pase of the Pelopon final defeat at parties were involved: the Athenians, attempting to maintain their surviving imperial control over th4reek cities of Asia Minor and the Aegean islands, and to safeguard Athens’ lifeline of grain from the Black Sea area; the Spartans and their allies, doing their best to destroy the remaining Athenian navy and force Athens into surrender; the Persians, supporting the Spartans against the Athenians in hopes of recovering the Asian Greek cities, once part of the Persian empire, but since 2+78 under Athenian sway; and the Greek cities of the region themselves, some such as Miletos or Chios under governments strongly anti-Athenian, others such as Samos under governments staunchly loyal to Athens, but most--as far as we can tell from the evidence--mere onlookers, seeking to avoid being trampled by the giants struggling all about them.21 Even this muddled picture of three major participants a host of more or less and neutrals is far more straightforward than the true state of affairs; neither Athens nor Sparta nor Persia had a unified policy or leadership. At Athens., the disaster in Sicily and the beginnings of Persian intervention had led to a general loss of faith in the efficacy of democracy, and oligarchic elements used this opportunity to seize power in the winter of 412/11; for much of the following year, the pro-oligarchic forces based at Athens were more or less in a state of war with the main fleet, remained loyal to democracy.22 based at Samoa, which had Even after popular govern at Athens in 411, there seems to remain a ment was restored LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 35 severe lack of coordination and trust between the home city and her commanders in the field; we commonly find generals replaced for political reasons, or even executed.23 Sparta’s difficulties were of a slightly different nature. From 413 to the end of the war, King Agis remained summer and winter at Dekeleia, a fortified base he had established Attica, in from which he continuously ravaged Athenian holdings and encouraged slaves to desert. Dekeleia wasa great success-- decisive in the decline of Athenian strength__24 but to a certain extent it cut both ways, for it allowed Agis to set up what amounted to a second Spartan government, one entirely under his personal control.25 of the Spartan war effort, The result was fragmentation especially during the first few years of the lonian War, as Agis and his political rivals back home at Sparta independently prepared military thrusts against Athens, each hoping to gain sole credit for the expected victory in the war.26 Persian rivalries mirrored those within Sparta: Pharna bazos and Tissaphernes each hoped that he would be the won to win the lion’s share of the Great King’s gratitude for regaining the Greek cities of Asia; hence ntther supported the other, and each tried to convince the Spartans to make his satrapy the primary area of operations against the Athe nians 27 Given this image of fragmentation on all sides, it is often stated that it was only the disorganization of Athens’ enemies which allowed her to survive the year 412. To a certain extent this is true, but if we focus our attention on LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 36 the simple question of raw naval power, we find that Athens’ strength was not at all incommensurate with that of her foes. In Sicily she had suffered a loss unmatched by that of any other Greek city-state in history, but even the remnant of Athenian might was very powerful indeed; in 2+12 she had perhaps more than 100 ships available in need,28 and rather more than 1000 talents in cash.29 Against this, Sparta and her allies seem to have had only sixteen ships available before winter 2+13/12--those had fought in the Syracusan campaign and were still in Sicily--30 ordering her allies and while during the winter we find Sparta to construct 100 ships,31 this is remini scent of that earlier directive demanding 500 ships, and from the external evidence it seems that at most only 40 or 50 triremes were completed and crewed by the end of suninier 412.32 Chios added 30-40 ships to this total,33 and 20-35 Sicilian triremes arrived in late summer 2+12. The veteran crews Athens possessed remained far superior to the inexperienced Peloponriesian sailors for several years.35 The pattern of Athenian weakness masked by even greater Peloponnesian weakness was doubtless repeated in finances; the military calamities of Athens would not have put cash into bankrupt Peloponnesian treasuries, and for the first few years of the lonian War, the subsidies of Persian satraps were prob ably measured not in hundreds but in scores of talents.6 The precise details of the lonian War need not concern us, except insofar as they touch upon the two matters most crucial to an understanding of the Spartan naval empire: Sparta’s relations with Persia and Sparta’s policy with regard to the LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 37 Asian Greeks. The course of the lonian war had much influence on the evolution of both these political issues, and they in turn determined the nature of the Spartan naval hegemony which emerged I.j 4o4. The first hard decision the Spartan government was forced to make came in 2+13/12, when it was faced with the choice of either sending its newly-built ships to assist the revolt of Chios and the other cities of the lonian region as Tissaphernes requested, or to the Hellespont to support Pharnabazos.37 The strength and importance of Chios seems to have decided the issue, and in spring 2+12, the first tentative naval forces were sent out: 21 ships under the Spartiate Alkamenes were detected by the Athenians and bottled up in Korinthian ter ritory,38 but five Lakedaimonian ships under Chalkideus suc ceeded in making their way to lonia, where they supported the revolt of the Chians; revolts of the nearby Erythraians and Klazomenaians soon followed.39 In all of these cities, the revolts which occurred were most strongly supported by the oligarchic elements of the population, the wealthier and more powerful of the citizens; the exact attitude of the popular elements is unclear, though at Chios, Thucydides implies that they were somewhat hostile to the notion of revolt. Support for whichever outside power seemed stronger at the moment was also a major factor.40 Soon after bringing about the revolt of Miletos, Chalkideus negotiated the first of what proved to be several treaties between the Spartans and the Great King, as represented by Tissaphernes.41 alliance, This first treaty formalized a Persian-Spartan and conceded the Greeks of Asia to the Great King. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 38 These terms may seem significant tentions, as evidence for Spartan in but this impression is rather misleading; a close inspection makes it seem likely that the treaty is nothing more than the on-the-spot creation of Chalkideus, and hence gives us little insight into the policy of the Spartan gov eminent concerning Persia and the freedom Of the Asian Greeks. The very haphazard nature of the pact is shown by its other features: the treaty grants the Great King most of European Greece along with the Asian cities2+2 itmakes no reference to Persian financial support for sparta;4 it binds only the current Great King, Darius II any successor to violate the agreement freely.44 , and allowing These miserable terms for Sparta make it clear that no Spartan diplomat had been present at the negotiations, and quite likely that Chal kideus had been the sole Spartan author. Chalkideus obviously knew nothing of diplomacy, and as a Spartiate commander he would have been too proud to devolve any of his negotiating respon sibility upon any of the other Greeks under his command; it may also be that he was trying to hide the fact that he was promising to return all the Greek cities of Asia to Persian rule--how would the Chians have reacted to this? This seems the only way to explain the treaty’s terms. Not long after these events, the Spartan nauarch Astyochos crossed the Aegean with four ships and arrived at Chios! This episode serves to illustrate the lack of Peloponnesian confidence in the sea and in naval matters at this point in time, for Astyochos left 16 of his ships behind in Korinthian territory;46 Chalkideus’ earlier crossing of the Aegean LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED :- 39 with five ships had been made only at the continual urgings of his friend Alkibiades, the daring Athenian exile, who knew perfectly well that Spartan caution was one of the chief ob stacles to victory.4 initial Only near the end of summer, after these probes have proven strikingly successful, Spartans consider sending their main fleet--55 and Sicilian ships--to Ionia.48 do the Peloponnesian At this same time, the Spartans sent out their first harmost of the lonian War, Ped aritos, who was given charge of the Peloponnesian forces at This last institution deserves some mention. number of Spartiates--probably The small fewer than 2000 at this time--5° made it impracticaland far too risky to be sent overseas for any reason. for any sizable number Despite this, Sparta’s position at the head of the anti-Athenian alliance along with the high military prestige of Spartiate warriors allowed Sparta to make the presence of her citizens felt: only a handful of Spartiates might be sent out, but each was sent as a com mander or a potential commander. A single Spartiate, Brasidas, leading a force of mercenaries and neodamodeis had nearly ended Athenian control of the Thraceward region a decade earlier; the single Spartiate Gylippos with a similar force had turned the tide at Syracuse, leading to the destruction of fully half of Athens’ total military strength.51 Now in the lonian War, the Spartans hoped to repeat the success of this system, and Pedaritos is the first in a long series of hammosts sent to Asia by the Spartans, Lakedaimoniansusually Spartiates as far as we can tell appointed as military governors in coin- LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 40 mand of cities controlled by the Peloponnesians. The Spartan use of nauarchs--of whom Asyochos seems to have been the first same system. appointed for a decade--was based on the Although Lakedaimonian triremes composed only a tiny fraction of the total Peloponnesian fleet facing Athens-10 ships out of 120 at Arginousai--52 once again Sparta’s position and her prestige insured that the commanding admiral was always a Spartiate; monians the Lakedai would have balked at serving under say or a Syracusan. ition, the various alliesand a Chian Since the Spartans had no strong naval trad and no man could hold the nauarchy twice,53 the, system usually meant that the Peloponnesian fleet was commanded by a man with little or no naval experience; this naturally proved to be a severe handicap during the course of the lonian War. During winter 2+12/11, the nauarch Astyochos and the Spartiate Therimenes arranged a new treaty with Tissaphemnes and the Great King aimed at removing some of the inequities the earlier treaty.2+ This time Persia is explicitly of required to provide pay, and the treaty is made binding upon King Darius and all his sons--potential phemnes. heirs each one--as well as Tissa However, by implication this new treaty still grants most of European Greece to Persia. This may simply be once again an oversight- -two ignorant Spartiates not realizing the full legal meaning of the words--but since the other obvious blunders of the first treaty have been caught, we should perhaps look for an alternate explanation. One is easily available. The world-view of the Great King--his religion and culture-LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 2+1 would have made it difficult, perhaps nearly impossible, for him to formally acknowledge the loss of any territory which he or his ancestors before him had once claimed. Being a party to a treaty which implied the independence of those parts of mainland Greece which had once sent earth and water to Darius I or which had fallen to Xerxes’ army was simply unacceptable at this point; Tissaphernes would have known this and it is possible that he succeeded in convincing Astyochos55 and Therimenes to humor the theoretical claims of the Persian monarch. It is possible that when the terms of the treaty sworn by Astyochos became known at Sparta, they caused a furor, for soon after the swearing we find twelve Spartiates being sent out as "advisors" to Astyochos--with the authority to replace him if they choose--56 and one of these, Lichas,was an exper ienced diplomat.57 Lichas reacted with horror at the terms of the two treaties with Tissaphernes and the Great King.58 The agreements were declared null and void; they had never been ratified by the Spartan gerousia and Ass3lyand knew that they could never be ratified, was more or less legitimateat view. Lichas well so their nullification least from the Spartan point-of Tissaphemnes reacted very angrily to this: to his mind, the Spartans had proven themselves to be completely untrust worthy, making and then nullifying two separate treaties within a short space of time. After having forwarded to the Great King two consecutive treaties which respected his formal claim to Greece, Tissaphernes did not dare to ask the King to be a party to a treaty which did not; he left the Spartans in disgust. At this point, Tissaphemnes is alleged to have come under LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 2+2 the influence of Alkibiades, that brilliant Athenian exile. but unscrupulous After the death of his patron Chalkideus in battle outside Miletos, Alkibiades had become distrusted by the Spartans, and some time toward the beginning of winter, he had fled for protection to the satrap, offering excellent political advice about the Greeks in return for safety.59 According to him, the Great King’sand Tissaphernes’ wisest course of action was to pay the Peloponnesians as little as possible and hence keep them money weak as the Athenians; the result of such a policy would be that the two Greek alliances would wear each other out, and leave the Persian satrap to pick up the pieces, without having to contend with a strong and victorious Sparta. Alkibiades is clearly Thucydides’ chief informant for much of book eight,60 and he very likely exaggerated his own influence with the Persians; but as Thucydides himself points out, Tissaphernes certainly seemed to act as if he were fol lowing Alkibiades’ suggestions, though à:.key motive perhaps was his resentment as what he viewed as Spartan treachery with regard to the treaties. The facts are that pay for the Pelopon nesian sailors was reduced from six to three obols per day, and the money was given infrequently at that.61 This may also be partly due to the limited nature of Tissaphernes’ resources; a satrap did not have the wealth of the Great King, and Tissa phemnes was spending his own money at this point.62 After a lengthy period of dispute with the Peloponnesians brought on by the disagreements over Persian sovereignty and subsidies discussed above, Tissaphernes decided to end the LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 4.3 hostility and negotiate a new treaty with Sparta. We are told that Tissaphernes was beginning to fear that the Pelopon nesian fleet--which had relocated to Rhodes in anger--would completely disintegrate due to lack of funds or might even begin pillaging the mainland for suppiies6 been on starvation rations for almost three months.64 The treaty which followed did difficulties the sailors had not contain any of the of the earlier agreements, and its form shows that it had been negotiated by an experienced diplomat.6 The Great King’s sovereigntywas explicitly limited to Asia and pay was guaranteed for the Peloponnesian fleet while it served in support of Persia. As part of the agreement, Tissaphernes promised to bring a powerful Persian fleet up from Phoenicia to support the Peloponnesians and help sweep Athens from the sea. In return for all this, the Great King was granted all the Greek cities of Asia. The Persian concession over so vereignty. in Greece made it impossible for the Great King himself to be a party to the treaty, but the oaths of Tissa phernes, Pharnabazosalong with his brothers, the Great King’s brother-in-law the participation and Hieramenes 66 were sufficent for the Spartans; of the last of these men makes it clear that the treaty had Darius’ de facto approval. The promise concerning the status of the Asian Greeks is very significant. Although both the earlier treaties had contined similar provisions, we have seen that they also contained provisions which were clearly not acceptable to Sparta, and had been negotiated by Spartiate military commanders who possibly did not even realize the enormity of the concession LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 44 they were making with regard to the Greeks of Asia. By contrast, the third treaty was sworn by a full team of Spartiate envoys, headed by Lichas, an experienced diplomat, .who may well have been sent out from Sparta for this very purpose. Sparta had entered the Peloponnesian War vowing to liberate the Asian Greeks from Athenian rule, but now she had apparently sold their freedom to Persia in exchange for Persian financial and military support. This much is clear. What is not clear is how long this arrangement remained in effect. That the third treaty was a model of diplomatic correctness--proper opening formula and date--has blinded many scholars into failing to consider the question of whether the treaty long remained in effect, indeed whether it was ever even ratified or at Sparta; it is widely assumed that this third treaty governed Sparta’s re lations with Persia and her policy toward the Asian Greeks down to 405, and even beyond.6 In considering this extremely crucial issue, we must bear in mind that some time during summer 2+11 the Spartan gerousia and Assembly must have been considering whether to ratify or reject the proposed treaty; presumably, under ordin ary circumstances, the requirements of diplomatic honor and the trust in the judgments of the men on the scene would make the ratification certainty; of a properly . negotiated treaty almost a but rejection was always a possibility. The death of Lichas in early summer 2+1168 would have removed the most powerful voice for ratification. In fact, the empirical evidence we shall examine below proves that the treaty as ratified, given in ThucydidesLICENSED was never TO UNZ.ORG or at least did not ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED remain in force for more than a few months; in practice, was a dead letter it by late summer 2+11, and’ Spartan commanders no longer officially recognized the right of the Great King or his representatives tO do as they wished with the cities of the Asian Greeks. Several factors combined to doom the treaty, notably the perceived betrayals of Tissaphernes and the violent reaction of many Asian Greeks to their new status as Persian subjects. Some time after the end of winter 412/11, Tissaphernes had established a fortified garrison at Miletos--now his to do with as he wished under the agreement--and in early summer 411, the Milesians stormed the fort and drove out the Persian garrison.6 This incident brought home to Sparta the difficulties position, for while most of Sparta’s alliesand other lonians of her obviously the were wholeheartedly in support of the Milesians’ action, seeing it as a blow for Greek liberation bar*barian, if Sparta herself approved it, from the she would be in violation of her recent treaty with Persia. The decision was difficult, Spartiate present, but Lichas was the senior and he had a personal stake in the success of his treaty; also, as a diplomat, he was very likely more sophisticated than most Spartiates, ent Sparta was upon Persian support. and realized how depend He came down firmly on the side of the treaty, telling the Milesiansand any other lonians who wished to hear that they and all the citizens the Greek cities of Asia would have to subjugate themselves to some extent to Tissaphernes, at least until the war with Athens was over and Persian support was no longer needed.7° LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED of 2+6 This greatly angered the Milesians--they refused Lichas burial when he died soon afterwards of an illness--71 but his words would hardly have assured Tissaphernes when his agents at Miletos reported them; they implied a future betrayal by the Spartans after the war with Athens was concluded. Further more, Thucydides does not say that the Milesians were forced to reaccept Tissaphernes’ been difficult garrison, which likely would have for the Spartans to manage; if the garrison was not reinstalled, into certainties. Tissaphernes’ suspicions would have grown It is reported that Tissaphemnes became very dilatory in his financial and the Persian fleet--whose support as the summer moved on; entrance into the war the treaty had assumed--never arrived.72 Sparta’s allies words as final, and the Milesians had not taken Lichas’ but instead had sent representatives to Sparta, hoping that the home government would annul the agreement or at least demand its modification with respect to the status of the Asian Greek cities.73 Then as the summer wore on and the failure of Tissaphernes’ promises became more and more manifest, the Peloponnesians decided to sail north and support the efforts of the satrap Pharnabazos instead, as the latter had apparently been trying to persuade them to do for some time.4. afterward, Soon we find the Peloponnesians giving support to the Antandrians after they drOve one of Tissaphemnes’ garrisons out of their city;75 Tissaphernes’ out of Knidosa Spartan coiony6 garrison was also driven around this same time.77 It is apparent by now that the treaty is no’ longer oper ational, at least in the minds of Spartan field their hostility toward Tissaphernes seems plain. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED commanders; and 2+7 The military events of the next few years of the lonian War are important for our purposes only in outline. Pharnabazos proved to be a much better ally than Tissaphernes had been, and the Spartans were not in serious financail want again for several years Despite this improvement in condition, . Peloponnesian naval incompetenceor more precisely the in competence of Spartan nauarchs victorious in battle allowed the Athenians to be after battle. In summer 411, Mindaros was defeated at Kynossema, the first major battle of the lonian War;79 later that same summer, he was badly beaten at Abydos;8° and in spring annihilated shore.81 4io, he was killed and the ships of his fleet at Kyzikos, though most of his men escaped to Although Pharnabazos supplied enough money to allow the Peloporinesians to rebuild most of their fleet, it was still several years until they had regained the strength and deter mination to risk a major sea battle, and during this period the Athenians went on the offensive, recapturing a number of their subject cities. This same period is very badly attested politically, arthe only evidence we have concerning the sort of arrangement Sparta had with Pharnabazos is empirical; cities we know what Sparta didor in a limited number of did not do with the satrap’s blessing or at least his acquiescence. These examples permit some cautious generalization. In 2+08, we find a Spartan harmost, Hippokrates, in charge at Chalkedon, rather than the agents of Phamnabazos; yet when Hippokrates was defeated and killed by the Athenians, it was Pharnabazos LICENSED who took responsibility TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED for the city, nego 2+8 tiating for the safety of its citizens.82 The same pattern is repeated at Byzantion. the Spartan harmost, ruled the city, composed of Peloponnesians, Klearchos, and the garrison was but Phamnabazos seemed to be content with this arrangement and willingly supplied money to the Greek forces.83 About this same time there was a revolUtion at Iasos,84 and the Spartan harinost Eteonikos along with his garrison were driven out; a party supported by Tissaphernes power.85 seized Whether or not the satrap had actively aided the overthrow is unclear; but it is apparent that Sparta did not feel herself to be under any sort of treaty obligation to surrender the city to direct Persian control. In fact we find not a single iinstance in the years 410-408 of a Persian garrison of either satrap present in any Asian Greek city. This may possibly be due to the pro-Spartan bias of our chief source, Xenophon, who might find Spartan willingness garrisons simply too embarrassing to mention; but surely we would still sources, to hand over ‘!Liberated" Greek cities to Persian find some mention in passing in one of our other say Diodorus-Ephorus, probably based for these years on the excellent Hellenica Oxyrhynchia.86 The total of the evidence makes a rather good prima facie case that Sparta had completely reversed her apparent earlier policy of allowing Persian satraps to assume direct control over Greek cities freed from Athens--the policy begun after the treaty with Tissaphemnes. What was Sparta’s new policy? From the limited and scattered evidence LICENSED discussed above, a pattern emerges. TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Greek 49 cities were not to be occupied by Persian garrisons or dir ectly reincorporated into the empire; Miletos, Antandros, and Knidos had shown this to be unworkable. the cities were to be under titular onnesian garrisons control. Instead, though all Persian authority, Pelop and Spartan harmosts were to be in direct Phamnabazos was clearly willing to accept this new arrangement; it is likely that Tissaphernes was not. It seems extremely doubtful whether any provisions of this new agreement were rigidly set down in the form of a permanent treaty; established more probably, it was a working arrangement after t} failure of the earlier apparent to all parties. treaty had become Given the difficulties experiencing with Tissaphernes, Sparta was and the Spartan belief that he had broken hiscOrnmitments under the third treaty, been the chief cause of its failurea and had belief he reciprocated, we would expect that the Spartans were attempting to negotiate a treaty with the Great King himself during these years. In fact, in early spring 2+07, we hear of the return of a Spartan diplomatic mission froth the Great King’s court.87 We are not told when the mission had been sent out, but the vast distances to be travelled and the ponderous workings court make summer 4.09 a reasonable possibility; of an oriental this would hve been perhaps had tried--and the disaster failed--to five or six months after Sparta make peace with Athens following at Kyzikos.88 Apparently the long negotiations led by Boiotios had been successful, and a treaty of some sort with the Great King had been worked out, presumably more or less along the lines of the third treaty; it may even be possible that the treaty LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 50 was formally resurrected. Under other circumstances the new arrangement worked out with Darius might have received more attention sourcesthough terms, in our not in Xenophon, who would have deplored its but in this case its importance was overshadowed by the appearance of Cyrus, the younger son of the reigning Great King; he had been sent down to the coast with the returning ambassadors by his father to act as overlord of the local satraps.89 The intent was to provide centralized to Persia’s efforts ambassadors must very much. coordination against Athens, which--as the Spartan have pointed out--had so far failed to achieve It is likely that the Great King had become con vinced that unless a personal representative of his, such as his own son, were in charge, the local satrapsespecially Tissaphernes might continue to pursue their own policies and the war might continue to drag on for some time. It is also very likely that he feared to entrust royal funds to a potentially rebellious significant satrap. The arrival of Cyrus marks a watershed in the pattern of Persian support for Sparta. On the purely finanôial level, the subsidies granted Sparta until the appearance of Cyrus seem to have been very meager, probably no more than a few hundred talents rapal stinginess from 2+12 to 408.90 This may be due to sat or satrapal poverty. arrived with 500 talents In any event, Cyrus of royal silver, and he made it clear that he intended to spend it all and as much more as was necessary to bring the war to a successful For the first conclusion.91 time, money ceased to be a limiting LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED factor. 51 Another actor of exceptional importance to the history of the Spartan naval empire also entered time. the stage at this In spring 2+07, the term of the Spartan nauarch Krates ippidas expired, and a new and unusually capable nauarch, Lysandros, arrived in.Ionia.92 Within a matter of weeks, shrewdly charming Lysandros had met with Cyrus at Sardis, and laid the foundation of a close personal friendship with the Persian prince, an impressionable youth of about 17; Cyrus went so far as to directly modify his father’s by raising the pay for Peloponnesian sailors instructions as a personal favor to Lysandros.93 With full Persian cooperation assured, Lysandros was able to turn his attention to military matters, 4.07 at Notion, he succeeded in inflicting and in late a stinging defeat upon the main Athenian fleet under the temporary command of Antiochos, Alkibiades’ first officer.2+ from decisive militarily--only lost--but The battle was far some 20 Athenian ships were it was decisive politically: Notion represented the first major Spartan victory at sea in the six years of the lonian War, and in the political the battle, Alkibiades’ political repercussions enemies at Athens used the defeat to drive him once more into exile, of her most brilliant which followed thus depriving Athens general and diplomat.95 Soon after Notion, probably during winter 407/6, Lysandros began to capitalize on his victory by attempting to create a personal power base in the Asian Greek cities. many of the leading men of these cities He invited to his headquarters at Ephesos, and distributed honors and favors to those who pledged him their loyalty; he encouraged these men to form LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 52 "political clubs" loyal to him and to Spartain in their respective cities.6 Lysandros may have hoped that a network of supporters in the Greek cities, the personal friendship influence that order together with of Cyrus, would allow him to retain in lonia after his nauarchy expired; he certainly attempted to make matters difficult for his successor, in the hope that he would fail.97 Lysandros’ hopes were realized. successor Kallikratidas arrived, In spring 406, his a young man seemingly cast in the mold of an ideal Spartiate--brave, scrupulously honest, and too proud to charm a Persian barbarian for financial outs.98 Xenophon admired these characteristics, portrayed Kallikratidas’ deeds in as favorable but he could not cover up the basic facts, show us that Kallikratidas’ experienceand ability In quick succession, hand and accordingly a light as possible, and these easily Lakonian virtues and lack of military left him rather a tactless he succeeded in alienating blunderer. his paymaster Cyruswho expected the proper deference due a son of the Great King and Lysandros’ clients in the Greek citieswho a continuation summer of Lysandros’ political favoritism; expected and in 2+o6, after a few bold naval strokes, Kallikratidas while losing 77 Peloponnesian ships at Arginousai, died a disastrous defeat brought on by his own stupidity.99 Cyrus seems to have become very annoyed with the Spartan government for replacing his friend the victorious Lysandros with the blunderer Kallikratidas; the peculiar Spartan political system which forbade a single man from holding the nauarchy twice would have been alien .and incomprehensible prince. to a Persian TO UNZ.ORG very plain after Arginousai, Cyrus madeLICENSED his displeasure ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 53 for he seems to have cut off all Persian subsidies. We find the surviving Peloponnesian sailors hiring themselves out as agricultural laborers at Chios in order to eat, and facing starvationduring winter 2+06/5; these terrible conditions led to a widespread conspiracy among the men which was discovered by the commanding Spartiate just in time, and the Peloponnesian fleet narrowly escaped mutiny and dis integration *b00 This final incident badly frightened the Spartan gov ernment, causing it to finally bow to the demands of Cyrus’ envoys and those from the lonian cities, and Lysandros was returned to command; since he was prohibited from serving as nauarch a second time, he was appointed assistant a nonentity, actually nauarch under with the understanding that it would be he who commanded the fleet.101 Returning to Asia in spring tored good relations 4o5, Lysandros quickly res with Cyrus and with the men he had established in power in the Greek cities. More Persian money was obtained and the Peloponnesian fleet was restored to strength within a few months. Then, some time, during summer a great stroke of fortune: to be at his father’s 4o5, Lysandros had Cyrus was sommoned home to Persia deathbed, and the young man decided to leave his remaining war funds, together with his official thority over the Greek cities and their tribute, of his Spartan friend Lysandros02 au in the hands Tissaphernes traveled to the Persian court in company with Cyrus.103 Hence, for the crucial year or two which followed, Lysandros had almost un checked authority over the coast of Asia Minor, . Lysandros was not one to waste such an opportunity, LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED he immedite1v oroceeded to use his militrv . and strength nd Cyrus’ 54 writ to install cities his own supporters as rulers controlled by the Peloponnesians. in those Greek In Miletos, he seems to have arranged a massacre of the popular elements and those among the wealthy whom he suspected of opposition; power was placed in the hands of Lysandros’ all cronies.104 This same process was probably repeated in less bloody fashion in many of the other Greek cities at this time.105 In late 405, Lysandros finally felt his strength was sufficient for a decisive engagement, and he brought the Athenian grand fleet to battle in the Hellespont at Aigos potami; through clever strategy, Although the details the outcome is he was completely victorious. of the battle are confused and unclear, not: the Athenians lost all but a handful of their 180’ ships, and the Peloponnesians led by Lysandros gained absolute control of the sea.°6 Following up his decisive victory, the Greek cities fleet, Lysandros swept through of the Aegean and coastal Asia Minor with his allowing the demoralized Athenian garrisons in each to return home under truce and installing harmosts and native dekarchiesboards composed of influential citizens in their places Spartan of ten, the latter chosen for their loyalty to Lysandros and placed in charge of day-to-day administration.107 Aside from democratic Samos, which remained loyal to the cause of Athens and continued to resist, Sparta now controlled most of the eastern portion of the old Athenian empire. naval empire had come into being. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED A Spartan Chapter IV: SPARTA AND HER NEW HEGEMONY During the winter of 405/4, Sparta’s was one of near absolute been won militarily power. The war against Long Walls, inued to resist 200 ships Minor, and elsewhere Athens had into surrender only democratic the Peloponnesians. controlled the islands, Samos cont Lysandros’ and the Hellespont at Susa awaiting the behind fleet the Aegean, and the Greek cities domination or her direct still in Greece and would soon be won politically: Athenians were slowly being starved their position were all of of Asia under Sparta’s Cyrus and Tissaphernes control. were the Great King’s death in March 404,1 and Cyrus’ writ given to Lysandros still held; for now, Sparta could do as she wished with the Asian Greeks without Persian interference. Sparta and Sparta’s policies ahd come to a crossroads. The mission which she had undertaken Athenian imperialism twenty-seven eration fraction was dead. long years of Spartan of Sparta’s But that in the past, leaders had raised mission citizenry had been begun and an entirely now ruled the state; naval character only a small The unprecedented nature and the alliance with Persia- up new leaders whose power and position upon characteristics nant to a Spartiate new gen was now made up of men who had voted for war in the assembly of 432. of the war--its in 4.32 had been fulfilled; were based which would have seemed alien and repug Lysandros had never fought a land of 432. 55 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 56 battle, but his naval experience charm Persian aristocratscontrast him an importance approaching of other Spartiates harmosts, and his ability that had similarly or subordinate gave of a Spartan Dozens officers; men raised under total in sole and absolute command of wealthy Ionian fraction poverty had been placed thought, and instilled ability; by 402+ a sizable the outside in discipline Peloponnesian degree. to close herself up once more. ritories, was intimately funds and hostile time in their base to support it. had a state of had possessing of coined money. her domination of overseas and a navy required to Lakedaimonian society; ter a financial Sparta had no revenue or state alien to of whether connected with the issue to the very notion The society income, of a tax levied upon wealthy Spartiates have been utterly imposition lives As a land power, Sparta wished to retain she needed a navy, and the notion had "discovered Sparta now faced the choice the naval hegemony. But if Sparta than in original than with reasoning been able to remain closed and conservative, no public citizens War had opened up the closed Spartan The question century, to give orders as well as to obey them. an unprecedented retaining rather of Spartiates world" and for the first had an opportunity with all with courage rather fraction or corrupt. of the eighth had been run as a closed society, save for the kings trained cities--small became power-hungry From the time of the Lykourgan reforms Sparta king. served abroad as nauarchs, and scrupulous a sizable and dead Kallikratidas Lykourgan discipline wonder that to flatter would only a re of the hated peacetime phoros in one form or another could provide sufficient revenue for a fleet. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED In essence, Sparta 57 was faced with only two options: empire Lysandros Athenians had created she could retain the naval in the process of defeating the or she could give it up, and accept the power vacuum which would result. There were many Spartiates two policies. Lysandros who advocated each of these and others who had benefited from the naval hegemony obviously wished to maintain other Spartiates may have remembered the terrible the regent Pausanias the more recent cases of corruption a "cosmopolitan" "political Sparta But to talk era.3 a closed society of perhaps members of a warrior political parties, and to Spartiates. caste official factions" most accurate less supported the notion less opposed it, thought of "political 1500 ignorant, is misleading; platforms, tribution ephors--underlies sentiment--and Spartan policy in the in unsophisticated it evokes ticket.4 some Spartiates of a "naval empire," The thread of this of Spartiate The first to say that "imperialist" factions" and candidates and many were undecided at all. three which existed campaigning on the pro- or anti-imperialist safestand of naval empire would often speaks of the twoor or "anti-imperialist" of this lesson Many and misdeeds by Spartiates bring moral decay to Sparta Modern scholarship it. in the 470s and would have pointed to in Asia2 as proof that necessarily greatly images of for office It is more or some more or or gave it no consistent shifting and evolving the chance selection dis of of the next decade. direct decision Sparta faced came in early 2+04 when Athens surrendered.5 and facing mass starvation, The Athenians, blockaded for months had sent an embassy to Sparta LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED in 58 order to sue for peace on any terms. Thebes, and many of Sparta’s any Athenian surrender the city Melos, ful leaders so notable must have realized allies, that Athens lost a docile Less happily, ally Athens is somewhat unclear; ingly brief and imprecise who actually imposed the Thirty; many events into a few sentences, the formal surrender he was an eye But if we credit then it was Lysandros Plutarch’s account compresses but the other say that is so annoy-. two accounts, Lysandros and acting did this sOme on his own initiative, is supported by the sequence of events which our sources describe.9 This would have been in character, noted above, Lysandros succeeded to him as rulers similar came to power at it seems unlikely arxl Pseudo-Aristotle, which are much more detailed, She was also Xenophon, an Athenian, that and time.7 or bothered to learn the details.8 Plutarch, her existence Thirty Tyrants. at this symbols she gained an imposed The exact manner in which the Thirty and this who were already with Spartan highhandedness.6 the so-called as a Spartan time after to some of Sparta’s notably the Thebans, fortifications. Diodorus, her more thought and dependent of her power, but she retained extreme oligarchy, witness Sparta her navy and her Long Walls to the Peiraieus, and substance enrolled further, counterweight showing signs of discontentment destroy deal of hatred. a great a city; Athens would make an exbellent more independent opposed accepting and Skione had been destroyed; years of war had left balked at destroying her city allies and instead wished to totally the way Histiaia, twenty-seven other We are told that Korinth, influence in installing in most of the Spartan-occupied over Athens, the largest LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED city for as we have men favorable cities; having in Greece, would 59 have been very tempting. In the early summer of 4.04, the entity as the Spartan we have described naval empire might have seemed more a Lysandrine naval empire to the Greeks of the cities which composed it. Lysandros was the man who commanded the fleet the Aegean, his clients personally captured ruled in the subject held nearly loot which controlled all of Sparta’s and the remaining and he cities, made up of warchest, money of Cyrus;1° when his friend Cyrus returned from Susa, Lysandros was likely still All of these more powerful. power than any Spartan factors this, honor.11 this erected in his name, and created sacrifices Plutarch power at this had ever had, and flattering posing songs in his honor; whole cities offered gave Lysandros more commoner in history the Greeks of his day recognized believed that to become him by com altars to him, festivals in his Lysandros wielded more personal time than any single Greek before him had, and may well be true.12 But if Lysandros’ firm political power was enormous, foundation. Lysandros it was without was not a Spartan he was too young to become a member of the gerousia were selected randomly, His achievements and the office gave him great only official position--the him under extraordinary Athens was over, it was likely of Greece a private Spartan citizen party" loyal and since but it is to him; been granted ,f single to make the erstwhile once more, with no authority ships or troops. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED and his the naval war with not to be renewed. of the ephors would be sufficient ephors at Sparta, de facto nauarchy--had conditions, king; could only be held once. influence nonsense to speak of a "political any vote ruler over 60 Essentially, Lysandros had two choices: within the Spartan constitutional to subvert great it. His prestige at this point him to secure further in Lakedaimon. serve Lysandros’ his reputation But while this What Lysandros a permanent politicalAbase, sources, constitution. oracles kingship reputation to direct election; was of our this when Lysandros spoils of Aigospotami6 involving his choice at the next vacancy, time, to be illegitiinate.-5 traveled with his Lysandros of Apollo at Delphoi, to Deiphol to dedicate His next attempt, of Zeus at Dodona possibly A third to occur in the future, to open but had presumably taken place during winter 405/U, it too failed.’ he hoped ‘sure that an old man by this sought to bribe the oracle Lysandros the Spartans he felt would make him an obvious was unsuccessful; simple; Using bribery, which would persuade only "son" widely believed plots required to several was fundamentally and King Agis was already first desperately one by changing the Spartan schemed to become a Spartan &ing. their it was obviously no 14. The goal they allege to obtain and hence his course of action might and according he sought to obtain for commands; and new victories needs for a few years, long-term solution. at Sparta--very might make it possible military would allow him to maintain power framework or he could attempt and influence in time-- he could work came during this attempt the made at the oracle same winter, and at Zeus Aminon in Libya was as were various forged sacred tablets other more complicated and a spurious Apollo. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED son of 61 How much we can credit to judge. oracles all The fact that these stories is difficult Lysandros visited the three prinicipal in the Greek world within a short span of time cannot be disputed, and does seem to imply some extraordinary on his part; but whether his plans our sources describe be called they if of Lysandros’ is so ill-established guesswork; few and fragmented of events dreams of kingship The chronology reputation. movements in this period sources, these did not blind Lysandros to his need to main tain his military frankly to the ones is unclear. What is clear is that can be credited corresponded motive but if we stick as they are, that it must closely to the a consistent sequence does emerge.18 It seems that soon after Athens, Lysandros succeeded send him to Thrace-9 length against side Sparta’s the leaders those establishing in persuading cities He captured elements, probably operations a city near Poteidaia.2° Lysandros moved to the Hellespont dispatched complaints to Sparta, the ephors officially recalled they may have also overturned region, who resented within his sphere made in the Hellespont.22 slaughtering and spent some in late 404, there he’ clashed with Pharnabazos, made on territory Thasos, siege of Aphytis, time in an unsuccessful the focus of his the ephors to of the north which remained out of the pro-Athenian this, at We find him waging a campaign of some hegemony. Some time after the Thirty the attacks of influence. and after Lysandros;21 a few of his The latter some consultation, at this same time, local decisions Lysandros suffered LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED and some disgrace 62 and obtained the ephors’ permission Zeus Ammon in Libya in fulfillment the temple of to visit of a vow made during the Thracian campaign;23 he obviously hoped to return after storm had died down and perhaps with a the political helpful oracle. There does seem to have been a political this time, as the full implications began to make themselves warrior caste. had dispatched felt to the blunt minds of Sparta’s Samoa for Athens, Before leaving one of his subordinates, and when the man embezzled part was detected, a major debate naval empire broke out.24 the incident as further of Sicily, had fallen of the money and the theft Spartiates policy: before a sack of silver. "purifying" silver in Thrace by this views ‘carried while private was made a capital its offense, a fleet Ephorus and considered Lysandros was newly-created but still retain public the public and the naval hegemony. the day and a com possession of gold or the Lakedaimonian state Sparta hoped to remove the opportunity dizement, the hero time and could not add his voice to the men of Lysandros’ would retain o’f whether publicly But in the end, although promise was worked out: silver and gold, used effects Gylippos, the ephors seriously held.25 of the on the whole question Theopompus both agree that or privately to Sparta which had accumulated, proof of the corrosive Lakonia of all Lysandros Gylippos, Traditionalist new naval and fiscal Sparta’s storm around of a naval hegemony with the bulk of the cash and valuables debate, to Sparta treasury.26 By this for personal aggran funds she needed for It is doubtful LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED that any firm 63 or final decision Sparta’s to retain control of Lysandros, of private harmost of Samos--in doubtless survived many other cases upon all those Spartiates incorruptibility a worse fate since overseas representatives complex cities to Trachinian immediately of the Spartiates often resulted Herakleia putting harmost at Athens, unmatched noting did so by an enormous number As Lysandros is a brutality of the did not know how to govern men.31 Far worse from Sparta’s Lakonian toughness" cases unrest to death 500 citizens, many Spartiates placed in charge A Spartan harmost sent to put down civil to have observed after The brutality in atrocities for a Greek city of about 10,000 men.3° free were showing to be far worse than merely corrupt. the time of the Persian Wars: alleged for scrupulous reputation and poverty which saved him from and lack of sophistication of large, who had served abroad; than mere disgrace.29 Many of Sparta’s themselves which have not of peculation and it was probably only Lysandros’ personal and would have put a permanent stain in the sources, of suspicion of Kallibios,28 the bribery crime, possession illegal Such an incident money and had executed him.27 coupled with Gylippos’ the of Lysandros and the had caught Thorax- -a friend man he had appointed of whether of her naval empire. over the cities About the same time as the recall Spartans question was made on the overall of personal by far the worst. own perspective than some "good on the part of a harniost or two were the abuse of power. Of these, Klearchos’ Some time in 4.04 or 403 this LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Spartiate was 64 had been sent out as a harmost to the Byzantines, troubled by civil strife and warfare with the Thracians. No sooner had Klearchos arrived and secured his power than he hired a large body of mercenaries, magistrates, murdered the civic and set himself up as a tyrant terrorizing the Byzantine population neighboring Salyinbria; needless of the Spartan ambassadors ment. and local to say he ignored the orders sent to recall having to send out a sizable him home for punish Lakedaimonian throw the man she herself had placed f ought battle, army was defeated, Klearchos’ in power; after but whatever the date, the degree to which Klearchos’ position of army to over a hard and he himself We cannot date the career with any precision, potentate, and even conquering Sparta was forced into the humiliating fled to Cyrus.32 who were of Klearchos we can well imagine deeds soured the Spartans on their naval empire. Some time in late still away f,rom Sparta coast from Susa.33 of execution 4.04--very likely while Lysandros was in Libya--Tissaphernes Cyrus was still for plotting against at court, Parysatis plot and only the intervention who favored to the under threat his elder brother Artaxerxes who now reigned as Great King; Tissaphernes alleged returned her younger son had uncovered the of the Queen Mother had been sufficient to save Cyrus’ life.34 The arrival of Tissaphernes work under which the Spartan In her treaties War, Sparta changed the’ political frame empire in Asia had been created. sworn with Persia during the Peloponnesian had promised the Asian Greeks to the Great King LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED II, 65 and his successors, and upon his return would have demanded that Tissaphernes legitimate, of those was no friend to Sparta, such Spartans who feared the inordinate included drawing the Spartans cities brutal with the wishes influence ruling in the lonian cities; stationed in lonia coming as it did after at Sparta, Spartan several harmosts With would have certainly and the Greek might not have been too displeased and corrupt of King Agis and King Pausanias.35 to the "anti-imperialists" themselves change, but his demand was and his wishes would have coincided Spartans obviously Sparta honor her commitment. Lysandros and his dekarchies appealed Tissaphernes by the years of rule by and Lysandros’ tyrannical dekarchies. Obviously, the ephorate the ordinary Spartiates would never have approved Greeks of Asia to the barbarian; of the Assembly or "abandoning" but Sarta’s leaders would never have presented terms. Instead, "free the lonians more sophisticated the decision in these the ephors would have been persuaded from Lysandros’ the harmosts and garrisons tyrannies" which kept the dekarchies but merely left them free to by withdrawing Sparta would not have turned any of the lonian to Tissaphernes, the in power. cities over and independent just as she had promised to do in 4.32; if Tissaphernes happened to take them over, This was precisely it was none of Sparta’s concern. what Sparta had done in a similar situation at Amphipolis,following the Peace of Nikias with Athens during the Peloponnesian War.36 The preceding three paragraphs are admittedly LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED conjectural 66 and poorly documented; of our sources that is there a statement Sparta returned phernes the sad truth control upon his return of Tissaphernes’ our other sources during these all Tissaphernes stain Zenophon obviously would on Sparta’s of our sources, upon Cyrus’ return while the external is very strong. the Asian Greek cities had revolted from and gone over to him; nowhere is there to depose all or harmostsrpresent.38 of the dekarchies the Asian Greek cities, a mention When we are convinced the ephors Lysandros had installed and "return of the people,"39 evidence to Asia Minor around King Agis and King Pausanias garrisons record,37 of control took place of any Spartan garrisons control of the Asian Greeks to Tissa itself. the silence Xenophon says that told that implication are very sketchy at best concerning Asia such a transfer early 403, or a direct years. Despite that nowhere in any to Asia Minor--we are not even told arrival not have mentioned this is that the governments the Spartan harmosts must have been withdrawn at this in to the and Peloponnesian same time. In early 4.03, a major new development took place as the civil war at Athens reached a critical appointed by Lysandros, politically At first they had been content popular leaders; which probably blamed these not to have opposed this The Thirty, had grown more and more violent extreme in the months following and her radical to kill point.40 their to execute Athens’ and appointment. demagogues arid the Athenian citizenry-- groups for defeat very much. in the war--seems But soon the Thirty large numbers of Athenians without LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED cause, began including 67 those members of the upper classes and a regular reign of terror broad support they had once held, whose wealth they coveted, began. the Thirty requested Spartan harmost and a Peloponnesian protect them "from the rebellious was granted along with various With 700 foreign troops the Thirty further menes, depicted the Thirty, garrison their by some sources to their During this many of these greater their hold over the city, killings, exiles and greater an exiled fortress of 404/3 this sufficient strength with their foreign garrison Peiraieus, killing their remaining extreme of the Thirty, popular and liberation leader, had formed force had accumulated troops in a battle near the Critias in the process; dispirited and discredited, the while their place was taken by a new group of ten oligarchs, slightly among citizens As the popular forces to the city, numbers of Athenians of Phyle which he had seized. exile leader oligarchs, support for his to defeat the army of the Thirty along withdrew to Eleusis, more moderate and apparently of the cavalry based at the Piraieus the Ten and possibly of the Thirty as well the democrats. oligarchs began to join the "national and based at the Attic with strong and soon Thera as the leading moderate among the city and the terror army" which Thrasyboulos, By the winter them.41 extreme policies. time, had been fleeing and this request other measures to support to strengthen increased a from Sparta to democrats" was executed by the other opposition siege Losing what little prepared to lay the surviving sent for Lakedaimonian By now it was spring class.42 support members against 403, and Lysandros LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED saw 68 an excellent influence; opportunity to regain he persuaded some of his old power and the Spartan government to send him out as harinost of Athens, and with his brother been appointed nauarch for 403/2--in blockading Lysandros the democratic forces gegan to raise regain contol Libys--who had command of a fleet inside the Peiraieus, a mercenary army with which to of Athenian territory. Lysandros’ ambitions Spartan kings acting were once more frustrated in unison.43 by the We are told that they feared Lysandros would again become too powerful if he were allowed to take Athens, the greatest city in Greece, time, and install his three of the five ephors to send King Pausanias Peloponnesian own men as rulers. a second The kings persuaded with a large army to Athens in order to arrange a settle ment there. After a sharp skirmish the Athenian democrats, was worked out; generous political it met with the approval who had accompanied man negotiating a fairly near the Peiraleus Pausanias’ team later with settlement of the two ephors army and a special fifteen- sent out by the Assembly and ephors at Sparta.44 The terms of the agreement were designed Lysandros’ ambition democrats--the yet stillserve overwhelming majority Athens and presumably arrangement same time, Sparta’s most of Attic a politically-independent territory; the Ten, and those around Eleusis rump-state of their oligarchic interests. of Athenians--were would have meant a resumed civil the territory to frustrate war. The granted any other At the was detached to form granted to the Thirty’, supporters LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED who feared 69 punishment by the victorious Athens would not be able to pose a threat it lasted, hostile Athens’ power and ambition. Eleusis were Both Athens and Eleusis as Spartan allies.45 As we have noted, of the ephors present this seemed a brilliant permanently home government; solution not wasting Spartiate lives virtually Pausanias’ triumphant condemned.46 pro-imperialist in continually putting Only Lysandros, personal all modern scholars return, who had lost in Greece’s had let the democrats Yet it believe he was tried that upon by the Spartans escape--and nearly The grim hand of vengeful Lysandros and his "political faction" is seen in this. As we have discussed above, Lysandros had no "politicalparty" at Sparta sense of the word, and such personal and "fellow travellers" him politically down as rulers clients This idea is obvious nonsense. meaningful problem of would have been dissatisfied, seems that for malfeasance--he indeed it must have power while at the same time Athenian popular rebellions. his chance at installing support negotiators special to the difficult checking Athens’ most populous city, had the full settlement and of the fifteen sent out by the Spartan Athens; to would serve as a strong check on Sparta; enrolled war, and so long as Athenian civil would end the troubling This arrangement democrats. after his plans as he did possess his supporters would have abandoned complete humiliation in front had been thwarted by the united both kings,’ and the settlement, made by Pausanias work of the ephors and Assembly as well. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED in any effort of of had been the Lysandros would have 70 appeared to be anything But Pausanias but a rising political was tried for his settlement we even know the distribution condemnation.4 that this show that in 403. the trial In fact the Athenians their state At this time, which must have seemed so brilliant to be nothing more than a recipe were clearly policy; tells even elderly time, 4.03 had been correct For several political convincing of authority and annexed it, Pausanias’: unifyirg solution in 403 had shown itself for allowing the restoration since all with the it was felt that in his policy in along.48 Pausanias’ about his activities, evidence that to raise settlement and this at Athens, Out silence is Lysandros was given no position command. He plays no, role in Cyrus’ a Greek mercenary army and secure Spartan military assistance; it probable Lysandros never even had personal that Plutarch weakness is very much apparent. nor military growing efforts the man identified regained much of his influence years after sources are silent rather shortly King Agis voted for conviction. us that Lysandros Lysandros’ conclusively and powerful Athens, and the Spartiates enraged against Sparta at this our sources had seized Eleusis once more. his we have no reason to believe took place around 401 or 400, after of a democratic at Athens; of votes ‘for and against The point is that occurred star. with the ‘Persian prince after the silence 405. of our sources makes contact When Sparta sent a fleet to support Cyrus in spring 401, Lysandros would have been an obvious choice as admiral, but Samios was appointed LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED instead.4 71 Thibron was appointed Tissaphernes Lysandros in 400, and Derkyllidas would have given anything Lysandros personal obviouly supporters much became clear policy. to conduct the war in Asia against retained in 397--but as a private frustration significant lonians We must remember that warrior for those in the lonian cities nothing more than anordinary itarian replaced state, citizen him in 399; commands. numbers of and elsewhere--that had no say over Spartan officially Spartiate, Lysandros was a cog in a total and he could not even leave for Asia without Lysandros felt the ephors’ permission.5’ The must have been enormous; he who might have carved out a personal empire in Asia Minor was trapped at Sparta by the archaic Lykourgan code, drink black broth in the communal messes as a Spartiate moner. Lysandros, who a little erful man in Greece, forced to com before ‘had been the most pow was reduced to this. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Chapter V: SLIPPING INTO A WAR WITH PERSIA By the winter of 402/1, believe close that relations between Sparta for the indefinite bear a grudge against most Greeks must have come to future. and Persia Many Spartans Tissaphernesand would remain might still vice-versa for what had happened during the lonian War, while others might dream of being able to return to lonia as harmosts over rich lonian cities, but in Asia Minor "Persia" brother of the Great King and chief among the western satraps; meant Cyrus, he had seemingly healed his differences had returned II and power restored soon had returned.1 Sparta’s relations Spartans with Artaxerxes to the coast with his original after Tissaphernes the younger with Cyrus were excellent. must have continued to feel gratitude Many for the generous support which he had provided them during the lonian War, and soon Sparta providing as a whole was to show her collective him with substantial been significantly hellenized had ‘spent in Ionia,2 mercenary troops.3 transfer by Cyrus had years which he and he employed large numbers of Greek in lonia he had taken which Tissaphernes the departure had gained control of the Spartans, had not been free of violence;4 bore Tissaphernes support. by the formative Upon his arrival over the Greek cities following military feelings a grudgeto Artaxerxes in the succession Darius II, and apparently and apparently this no doubt Cyrus still put it mildly stuggle of for upporting following the death of doing his best to have Cyrus executed.5 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG 72 ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 73 Xenophon’s account of Cyrus’ great popularity is obviously Asia6 nonetheless; biased, as mentioned at least.7 It seemed that some thirty 4o1, Cyrus began his attempt from his brother. stable His earlier mercenaries, which he intended tingents his preparations were all In all, 3000 cavalry.9 probably be able to’ field Spartan support perhaps 70,000 Asiatic The Great King, would but Cyrus believed with many that the and heavy armor of his Greek hoplites--who in a broad, and the throne. shallow front--1° For her part, of about 700 hoplites, Lakedaimonians, Sparta contributed including were to would win him victory a substantial and commanded by Cheirisophos, she also sent 35 ships support By and the Greek con an army twice as large, times the number of cavalry, fight the Great King. same time.8 of them hoplites--and including training to use as the cutting Cyrus’ army comprised about 13,000 Greek merce naries--11,000 troops empire large numbers of Greek were complete, at this as had been pretence: ordered to assemble at Sardis; requested was formally of the Persian reconciliation edge of the army he would lead against early 401, come to the Aegean framework came apart years he had been gathering for several and Cyrus open warfare. control to seize would of Greek mercenaries peace had finally this true and dekarchies seem good by comparison, years of more or less Then in spring hoplite harmosts knew how to win the friendship certainly after but probably more or less earlier, have made most other rulers among the Greeks of a contingent number of a Spartiate;U under the nauarch Pythagoras Cyrus’ march along the coast to of Asia Minor.12 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 74 The reasons behind Sparta’s easily apparent. Sparta on the throne of Persia that The advantages Cyrus was entitled the support support of having a friend are obvious; of and the argument to Spartan assistance in return for he had given Sparta during the war against Athens would have swayed a Spartiate precisely for Cyrus are the reasons our sources assembly. cite, and apparently were good enough for the vast majority of Spartiates, we do not hear a whisper of any disagreement or any recriminations These are they for over the policy when Cyrus’ scheme failed.13 For Cyrus did fail, dying in battle against Artaxerxes II in summer 401 at Kunaxa, and in the months which followed, Sparta began to learn the risks pretender to the Persian the Spartans Persian by supporting a In the mind of Artaxerxes, they had been given a few years a Persian Greek King. of all throne. in supporting and the other Greeks had repaid the generous assistance Artaxerxes involved rebel and waging war against We are told that considered men.14 the Spartans provocation; the to the end of his life, to be the most shameless The Greeks had attacked of Persia without earlier the legitimate ruler the Gree.ks would have to be punished. The suitable phernes, agent.for a personal punishment was at hand. enemy of Cyrus, had remained loyal to Artaxerxes, and had given valuable for loyalty went hand in hand with punishment and accordingly, service by summer 400 Tissaphernes Asia Minor as satrap of Karia, Tissa Lydia, lonia, LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED at Kunaxa. Reward for betrayal, had returned and other to 75 holdings; he was also given authority who had apparently over Pharnazcs, remained at his own establishment the struggle between Cyrus and Artaxerxes.16 Tissaphernes intended but their loyalty hostility to treat the cities Spartans How severely the lonian Greeks is unclear, toward him combined with their to Cyrus certainly dispatched led them to suspect embassies to Sparta, war with Persia in the context were faced with a dilemma. had been the last But now friendly doubtful that Tissaphernes old arraement, and grant lonian would consider the lonians assembly that Tissaphernes poor past relations Spartiates returning a sizable meant to install destroy these their against other than Tissaphernes’ to Asia or allowing very harshly treated An earlier and taxes. tyrants in their would have led most A Spartan embassy warning him not to commit the Greeks of Asia; was faced with the choice degree of freedom, and Sparta’s charges. was sent to the ‘Persian satrap, aggression to the would have told the Spartan with Tissaphernes to believe was Cyrus was dead, and it seemed very ambassadors and completely Cyrus, who perspective, autonomy in exchange for submission Frightened A thing Sparta had intended of Asia Minor and Sparta’s Persia. no reply the worst; begging the when she had sent her men and ships to support cities past for protection.17 Sparta and the Spartans internal during it apparently attack of either on Kyme.18 sending a military received Sparta force the Asian Greeks to be conquered and bythe hated Tissaphernes. Sparta might have sent a second embassy, LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ‘ 76 then washed its of late hands of the whole business; 400 contained a substantial number of Spartiates who longed to leave the narrow confines to Asia Minor: aiding of Greece and return these men would not have let the lonian struggle. cities The specific incidents memory being as transient probably lost much of their had annexed Eleusis, sting. earlier years in the past, By this date, of the lonians, to Asia. We must not neglect is--had the Athenians to regain a measure he would have vigorously arguments partial as it usually causing Lysandros of his old influence; endorsed the hoping to be sent out as a commander emotional considerations: Spartan assembly might have been swayed by the pleas lonian representatives to protect the hubris Tissaphernes. arrival of detested of the Ten Thousand--the have come to hold an exaggerated barbarian We know nothing a of fellow Greeks against If rumors of the remnant of Cyrus’ mercenaries-- at the Euxine had reached Sparta by this Greek arms against of of power abuse and corruption from naval empire were several and--public the issue fade away without a political which had helped to bring about Sparta’s retreat but the Sparta time, impression Spartans might of the power of numbers. of the arguments made at Sparta, or how narrow the vote turned out to be, but some time probably in lat+00, against Thibron was sent out to defend the Asian Greeks Tissaphernes and Persia. The chronology ensuing war in Asia over the next half-decade presented in the surviving sources that of Sparta’s is so poorly it is generally LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 77 difficult to firmly establish hence our treatment although a precise impossible, pattern Sparta’s history and generate Tisaphernes importance into a consistent of the nature of empire. of Sparta’s commitment to the war against question for us to decide. it might seem that upon the war, for the army Thibron took with him 1000 neodamodeis 4000 Peloponnesians cities.2° from the allied is somewhat deceiving, were obviously worth nearly actually Also, have negative Diodorus’ allies" mercenaries;21 since be paying for them, Sparta was uninterested shows that the would presumably None of this in the war; there was no great interest. seeking an empire in Asia, she seeking an "empire on the cheap." her imperial of Thibron in Asia, Sparta began to presence we have argued earlier, an infrastructure tell, themselves presence. to were actually they cost Sparta nothing. With the arrival recreate and might us that informs which Xenophon refers If Sparta was consciously was definitely of neodamodeis value if Sparta feared their the lonians proves that but it certainly for the lives account and But this nothing to Spartiates more detailed "Peloponnesian directly At Sparta placed great was very large by Greek standards: appearance But is virtually do fall a good impression is a crucial inspection of these years themselves overseas The strength first must take the form of an outline.19 the events revived any date to within a year; along the lonian Sparta’s As naval empire had never had or administrative it merely consisted coast. base; of individual as far as we can harmosts ruling by LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 78 fiat, scattered military with its nauarch. require little garrisons, garrisons, and the Spartan fleet Re-establishing such an "empire" more than sending out new harmosts and and persuading or coercing the Greek cities into accepting them; widespread fear of Tissaphernes have made this last task rather easy. Matters were different There, Pharnabazos certainly ruled, we have, and the Hellespontine Anaxibios, at his hands. it seems that ended her presence would in the north of Asia Minor. would not have turned their in fear of destruction evidence would in that cities Greeks over to Sparta But from the limited Sparta had never completely area. In early 400, we find the Spartan nauarch for 401/0, making his presence known in the Euxine,22 and some time later we come across a Spartan harmost in charge of Byzantion.23 A Spartan garrison is also in control includes vague statements of Chalkedon,24 to the effect of the region had Spartan harmosts.25 the Spartan presence Pharnabazos blessing appears had recently Hellespontine Chalkedon continuously importance and since arrangement his terms with the Spartan that Sparta had controlled such as Byzantion and from 4.05,26 probably because of the of Euxine grain to Greece.27 If the nature from this cities cities There is no hint that to have given the entire it seems very likely some important various been restored, and to have been on amicable authorities, that and Xenophon of Spartan area and time--and control may be generalized we have no reason to doubt this-- then the ‘Spartan naval empire was an extraordinarily LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED loose 79 and undirected entity. Since the recall 404., there had been no single harmosts pretty the Spartiates whether contrary or chain of command. account makes this strikingly After the Ten Thousand led by Xenophon had made and nearly a dispute with the local Anaxibios made a proclamation caught within Spartan directive he Pharnabazos expired, that any of the mercenaries disagreed while the man was nauarch, to completely commander.31 Spartiates recognized The evidence were sold as had done his best to secure Anaxibios’ but after this personal reverse he did his best to frustrate individual the the sick and dis 400 Greek soldiers harmost of Byzantion instead; new Spartan Kleandros, and simply ignored ignored him, and made arrangements Anaxibios the nauarch but when his successor Aristarchos some time later, cooperation officials, seems even to have invited abled to come in, slaves.30 sacked the city following the city would be sold as slaves.29 the harmost of Byzan-tion, clearly like, of any official way to Byzantion arrived it and the wishes of the local Greeks We see no signs clear.28 as a result, sent out to Asia as commanders Xenophon’s eyewitness their of policy; much did whatever they felt to "Spartan policy" not. leader to dominate the various and set the broadlines seems that of Lysandros in his earlier his term with the new insult led behavior, the aims of Pharnabazos Sparta had no policy, sometimes did; and and the though and Pharnabazos this. of Xenophon also supports Spartan commanders in these years essentially LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED the notion that ruled by fiat. ‘ 80 He says this outright in the Anabasis: are not far away, and the Spartans They have the power, yes, Greek cities He repeats this each individual same description of Greece. Spartan in the there. ‘"32 of Spartan authority in Since we come across no mention of any system of taxation Spar-tans during this financial are masters has the power, to do what the3.like the Hellenica.33 organized ‘The Greek cities " period, contributions or tribute-gathering by the it is quite that possible local to Spartan commanders were raised in the same manner, by fiat. During winter 400/399, among his lonian allies Thibron quartered and raised Ephesos and other neighboring a further Greek cities; his troops 2000 men from by late spring, he had also gained the service of most of the 5000 remaining troops of the Ten Thousand.34 Although the 12,000 or so troops he now had may seem a small force when measured against army. the manpower of Asia, We must remember that Greek mercenaries it was actually a very formidable Cyrus had expected his to win him victory against the grand army of the Great King in the heart of the Persian force 14,000 empire. is more than twice the size of the original Thibron’s land army which Athens had sent to Syracuse.35 The presence of this is without precedent. enormous Greek army in Asia Minor In her day, Athens had been a naval power, and her empire had confined or coastal strips. By contrast, accustomed to land warfare, its expansion to islands the Spartans we’re most and with increasing LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED numbers of’ 81 Greek mercenaries rather than of citizen hoplites allowed Sparta’s commanders in Asia to take military Perikles or even a K,on had never dared to consider. risks that a The Athenian naval empire had done no more than send out small tribute-collecting forces a few miles inland;36 under Sparta, large armies were to march all through the interior of western Asia Minor. The first tentative Spartan probes into the interior and cautious. army on Ephesos, In early spring Thibron captured towns, but withdrew to the coast cavalry.3.7 nearly After the arrival doubled the strength confident Greek in the face of Tissaphernes’ of Cyrus’ mercenaries of lonia, including remained inland had of his army, Thibron felt marched into the hinterland had apparently 399, basing his several enough to face Tissaphernes number of inland towns were very in open country, and winning over a large some Greek ones under Persian control which since the 6th century.39 Following this short from the ephors ordering concentrate in Caria.3 his attack him to leave lonia upon Tissaphernes’ his successor him; Thibron returned condemned for misconduct--he allies--and a message and instead home territory As he was at Ephesos in summei/399 preparing for his march into aria, to replace campaign, Thibron received Derkyllidas to Sparta, had let arrived where he was his troops’ plunder exiled.0 Derkyllidas into the details was now in command, and we need not go of his campaigns at all. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Over the next his 82 two years, it is unlikely months actually fighting that he spends more thana Tissaphernes of the remaining time is spent to help build a wall against few Chian exiles lidas’ great willingness with the Persian "Sisyphos"__42 or besieging the truces he does is as obvious as his nickname- which happens to be the name of an ancient for his shrewdness seems almost certain Derkyllidas that and greed. was turning commission in Asia to very profitable lining his pockets with Persian causing the Persian satraps It his advantage, gold and in return not any trouble; empire in Asia was very likely Naturally a The reasons behind Derkyl king of Korinth legendary military most the Chersonese the Thracians to make all satraps or Pharnabazos; visiting in Atarneus.41 few under him Sparta’s a glorified Xenophon--who very clearly liked protection racket. Derkyllidas--43 makes no mention of this. how Derkyllidas It is also obvious with his activities: almost nil. Thibron, phernes Spartan Just before the latter interest Derkyllidas had received managed to get away in Asia was clearly had arrived to replace an order to attack in Caria and had been preparing to do so; Derkyllidas simply ignored the order and marched north instead The ephors apparently forgot all Tissa about him. of south.44 Two years later, after Derkyllidas marched to most parts of coastal Asia Minor except Caria probably Tissaphernes paid him well, once again send him an order to invade Caria; ignorance of geography, had invaded Carla, until it is possible that given Spartiate they thought some Ionian Greeks pointed error. 45 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED the ephors he out their 83 While Derkyllidas Chian exiles, had been sasting the Persian the situation. satraps The Spartans his time against had been taking stock had shown themselves more dangerous than the Athenians levies, and they had succeeded the Spartans time marching aimlessly might not be permanent. Tissaphernes have begun to fear that step of attempting ability, this indecision and Pharnabazos may to extend her power into the non-Greek overthrow a Great King, defeating supported to wast their Sparta would soon take the logical areas of Lydia or Phrygia; trouble by Athens. were content along the coast, to face with in capturing inland towns which had never been controlled Although at present to be much had ever been, for their powerful land army made them simply too strong mere satrapal of at least would have no if they were properly cavalry. led and It was well within Sparta’s’ from the purely military point to detach the western satrapies from Persia, in the hands of friendly rulers. been able to call could nearly 8000 or 9000 hoplites a satrap by adequate if 12,000 hoplites native upon thousands of view, and place them If Pissouthnes of allied had Greek hoplites, his revolt would have been successful. It is obvious from Sparta’s government never even remotely but the Persiaris considered army remained on their the Spartan any of these could not have known this, would have grown increasingly paring to depart. behavior that options, and the satraps nervous as the large "barbarian" territory arid showed no sign of pre In early summer 398, Phanabazos set off for Susa to confer with the Great King about the situation.46 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 84 By the time Pharnabazos reached King, messengers from Evagoras, had already been there and placing and were attempting land power with Evagoras proposed building a large fleet it under the command of Konon, the experienced in exile added his support 500 talents of the Great king of Cyprus, to counter Spartan Athenian admiral living apparently a subject for some time, to persuade Artaxerxes Persian naval power; the court to initiate at his court. to this plan, the construction Pharnabazos and was granted of a fleet at Cyprus; Konon was put in charge of the Great King’s ships. Returning to the coast bazos met with Tissaphernes; army from the territories 20,000 infantry truces dangerously levies, account, lites Persia low in numbers, during the long had allowed his army and now, even with attack he claims Pharnabazos Tissaphernes.--who From Xenophon’s might very well have urged suc’h an attack, remembered what a few Greek hop had done at Kunaxa--decided A truce was arranged, terms: Derkyllidas a Persian to avoid battle would be left independent and in exchange the Spartan harinosts be withdrawn from Asia, to seek approval instead. and the commanders negotiated the Greek cities Ephesos. with the army he had he had only 7000 troops.4 been successful; but that marched against to defend his base; it seems that a large satrapies--allegedly Derkyllidas with the Persians, lonian they raised and 10,000 cavalry--and put together to fall together of their There, they encountered hastily some time in early 397, Pharna Both parties for the treaty LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED from and army would dispatched from their treaty messengers respective home 85 governments. It is very likely this as a device to stall "treaty" were waiting until sail; Derkyllidas significant of these events a strong had finally terms were harsh: would be ready to the Spar-tans had been unfolding Peloponnesian side, which had long state and after communities, and power. several Korinthians both refused. of growing Boiotian allies, in that resentment in Korinth. willing overt Athens.5- mirrored Later that to overthrow to contribute is a pattern of the Spartan hegemony over to a lesser with the year and the next and covert assistance puppets;5° and of the loot from Dekeleia and of Athens.49 fighting as pro-Spartan there In 404 Thebes had quarreled over the division democrats The the Athenians while the Boiotians Greece, and we find Thebes’ attitude she had provided 397. and hence lose much of her From the end of the war against Athens, over the fate years of in spring The war is notable as Spartan Spartans in main Elis was forced to grant independence to participated extent in Asia, Sparta had gone to , forced a surrender many of her outlying territory the Persians had also been taking place been a thorn in Sparta’s fighting were using support. 40048 probably In late war with Elis, for time: may have been hoping that developments land Greece. both sides the Great King’s fleet would send him additional While all that the Thirty, neither troops to the Athenian whom she viewed Thebes nor Korinth had been to Pausariias’ Some time in these years--very LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED expedition likely against before the 86 overthrow slice of the Thirty--the Thebans had annexed a small of Attic territory around Oropos, led to further political conflict Internal Boiotlan much of Bolotia’s discusses politics pro- and anti-Spartan that may have with Sparta.52 played a role foreign policy; it seems most likely and this in shaping the Oxyrhychian historian factions at length.53 the mere fact of Spartan But hegemony over Greece was the main factor which pushed Korinth and Thebes into opposition; Greece against Athens three While relatively and Boiotia overwhelming Athenian power had united strong could afford known, Athens could not. and a year of terror in the physical her annexation dutifully such as Elis, to make their Thirty anti-Spartan years under the Thirty of Eleusis sending contingents as requested..5 they learn that Greece had drained her, both sense. Aside from seems to have than a true military 403, to Thibron and to the war as 397, we find Even as late all Athenians--upper-class demagogues alike--desperately sentiments of war against in 401/0--which putsch rather Korinth, she remained a model Spartan ally after against Elis nearly states and in the psychological been a near-bloodless action--S4 decades earlier. politicians frightened a few citizens and popular and submissive when had arranged a provocation against sparta.56 As to Sparta’s two or three own internal years after Cyrus’ expedition, a near impenetrable darkness. Lysandros’ star had risen politics in the crucial we are faced with When Athens annexed Eleusis, while King Pausanias LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED had narrowly 87 escaped condemnation--this know in this period, is impossible supported and even it is poorly established. the Elean War or Dkyllidas’ following or the Athenian annexation have attempted into the interaction factions, slate, but this leaders inactivity of Eleusis. of several Certain well-defined any in Asia of Oropos modern political is the more accurate of Sparta are a mystery, which is not solved by the construction digms which have no historical It Spartan policy-making amounts to drawing a cartoon workings if the Theban annexation to dissect and the blank slate The internal the only fact we to guess which of Sparta’s or non-intervention scholars is virtually on a blank picture. a mystery of artificial reality. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED para Al A: Appendix THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE In the period of Greek history on, virtually all important evidence is very marginal inscriptions which -this thesis evidence is literary. Athens and not to Sparta. few of major importance Epigraphical and will not be discussed are few and those which survive Of our literary to this thesis focuses below: are relevant sources, to only the will be singled out for analysis. Thucydides:1 The history for malfeasance detailed of Thucydides, an Athenian general in 4234.104_107,5.26,2 account ot the Peloponnesian and Sparta; the narrative and covers the war to 411. the finest of our ancient the most rigorous discusses is a continuos standards and War fought between Athens the rise Thucydides sources, exiled of Athenian power is rightly approaching of factual recognized as in his writing accuracy and depth of analysis. We need not concern ourselves of the man or his method; Thucydides carefully logically, a general cross-examines of his informants1.22, vention2.54., refuses statement he was able to.gather to credit information to suit fickle be enough. supernatural inter to use evidence, hypotheses1.2-6. from the men of both sides5.26. story will discussion and compares the statements and shows a keen ability and form plausible as a romantic with a detailed reason As an exile, on the course of the war He intends his history public tastes, LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED but as a not A :;. sober record of the events of his time, of the future beings a solid knowledge of the ways in which human and city-states As such, his writing or apologetic; with regard rather aimed at giving men react under varying conditions1.22. is meant to be true rather such little bias as manages to creep ine.g. to Kleon:4.27-39 than the rule than moralistic seems very much the exception in comparison with most other ancient historians. Unfortunately for our purposes, to complete his history eighth rough and unfinished to this state. none of the polished show the apparent furthermore, War; even his of the Peloponnesian covers the beginning of the lonian War and book--which hence is most pertinent tains Thucydides never lived motives thesis--is unmistakably Unlike the others, this in a book con speeches which Thucydides used to and views of the major belligerents; the narrative breaks off abruptly at the end, in the middle of a narrative. Besides these requires extensive porting the revolt obvious signs, editing and revision. of Amorges against Minor8.5,19,28,54., the revolt appears at Athens: dides in Persia’s the Great King in Asia decision version.3 several that the The same need for minor inaccuracies probably would have caught in a later also likely to back Sparta in the a,ccount of the oligarchic it contains revolution which Thucy check.4 It is Thucydides might have reworked the form of LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED of Athenian collusion so Thucydides would have discussed at length in his final revision clearly We find Athens sup or why Athens decided to intervene; Andocides 3.29, revolt itself but we are never told of the beginning with Amorges was crucial cf. the account the three treaties period, between Sparta and Persia though this is not certain; the treaties in form and seem to have been directly documents, rather actual in the eight authors. vantage--Thucydides’ to those treaties, is concerning relating to the war in lonia; the political informants we get goodthough at Sparta of the which is a great is Thucydides’ and that chief inclusion surviving ad far sources. account sadly lacking, decisions Alkibiades made at Sparta is obviously for book eight, undoubtedly one of and while he is biased but when he leaves for Asia with Chalkideus more about Sparta’s as apparent account of the lonian War is still Only in one regard Thucydides’ own style, Even with these of our subsequent greatly based on the original book--and the apparent forms of the Persian superior differ than reworked into Thucydides was usual with ancient defects made during this information, we learn nothing view of the events which develope. Xenophon: No other source of Sparta’s personal as important to our understanding naval empire as Xenophon, both because of his great knowledge of Sparta is the only extant history; is nearly continuous hence it is vital and Persia narrative and because his Hellenica of this period of Greek to gain a good understanding of the man and his works. Xenophon himself was apparently cavalry class--note Art born into the Athenian his essays on ofHorsemanship and the attention cavalry classHell.2.4.26-27. cavalryThe Cavalry Commander, paid to theThe Athenian This made him a member of the LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED richest one or two although percent it is clear that service he performed anything skirmishes seem based on personal described concerning proves that their reign and heartily e.g. Hell.2.3.15,17,50-56; the rise despised their have made him somewhat suspect cruelty and violence rather But he than join and his social class would under the restored a year he had left the city, to join Cyrus’ army in AsiaAnab.3.1.4-1O. the death of his friend of the and fall he was no extremist. army of liberation, 403, so within The he was in Athens during most of had remained in Athens under the Thirty Thrasyboulos’ in the Hellenica experienceHell.1.2.2-5,15-18. which he includes Thirty Tyrants but loyal during the years of the Peloponnesian War: a few of the cavalry details but population,6 his sympathes were mildly oligarchic, there is no evidence that military of the citizen democracy of invited by a friend After Kunaxa, and along with the other Greek generals, Xenophon helped lead the remnant of the Ten Thousand back to Asia Minor; these events he recorded in his Anabasis, memoirs with apologia.7 years, serving King Agesilaos. Agesilaos Derkyllidas, He seems to have become a close friend important Pharnabazos: He remained in Asia for several under the Spar-tans Thibron, during this at several period, for he is obviously conferencesmost Hell.4.1.30-40, noticably and after or eight years Xenophon spent a strong leavening and of an eyewitness Agesilaos’ death in The seven in Asia under Cyrus and under gave him a considerable and some years later more the one with 360/59, he wrote a lengthy encomium, the Agesilaos. the Spartans combining he distilled of historical knowledge of Persian this knowledge--together romance and moralism--into LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED affairs, with f1c his Cyropaedia, the education When Agesilaos in 394., part marched back to Greece with his army back with him, clearly Xenophon travelled in the battle fought of Koroneia on the other side, to his native to return controlled together acquire city, settling territory with Agesilaos with his close Ages.2.lO-l5; and henceforth Peloponnesian His friendship of Cyrus the Great. Athens had Xenophon was unable at Skillos instead and other proximity taking in Spartan- Anab.5.3.7-13. leading Spartans to Sparta allowed him to a knowledge of Lakedaimon which was unprecedented for a non-Lakedaimonian. customs of the Spartans Lacedaimonians, Besides describing the social at length in his in his Hellenica specialized Spartan terms--the Assembly," the "Spartan-trained" Consti ution of he routinely "inferiors," usesthe the "Little Hell.3.3.6;3.3.8;5.3.9-- whose meaning we can only guess at, proving the depth of his knowledge and the depth of our ignorance. likely that thousand Xenophon had personally Spartiates of this Xenophon’s Hellenica or institutional rather poor. and purports as a source but as straight Thucydides’ history work is not unitary. between the first to the surrender narrative of Mantineia it is breaks off, years, in 362; however, the There is a very obvious stylistic portion--which break deals with the Ionian War of Athens and the establishment Hell.2.3.ll--and of social begins with the loniari to cover the events of the next fifty closing with the battle Thirty period. His "Greek History" War in 411 soon after is very met most of the few is invaluable knowledge; It the remainder of the of the work, which LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED may or may not have been composed as a single late unit in the 350s.8 The portion War contrasts of the Hellenica sharply with the account The events little for its clumsiness and lack of detail of Thucydides which it attempts of seven years--411 to 404--are more space than Thucydides and wheat not chaff is lost. effort dealing with the lonian devotes compressed Xenophon apparently significant defeat war in Korkyra Diodorus seizure 13.52-53; in 410 Diodorus of the Athenian-held 52-53;9 fortifications 13.65.1-2. He mentions departure of Boiotios’ embassy to Susa Hell. devotes one ambiguous sentence Hell. 1.2.18; of his chronology first magnified cf. the very the return but not the to the Spartan 1.4.1-3; capture and of The accuracy to much doubt-° of historiography which Xenophon displays segment of the Hellenica in his account the or the Iviegarian Diodorus 13.64.5-7. is subject All the errors in this he of Nisaia Diodorus ceases made little Spartan peace mission to Athens following at Kyzikos into to the year 412; to gain firm knowledge of the war as a whole: omits the civil Pylos to continue. are repeated and of events after to even mention the passage 404., for now he of most winters, leaving us often unable to date an event within a year or two.11 His factual coverage clearly ominissions are equally striking. of the Asian campaigns of Agesilaos participated His in which he is often vague and spotty. The decisive naval war along the Asia Minor coast between 397? Knidos is almost totally ignored, and afterwards LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED and naval matters ‘p are treated is attempted, with the land war no integration very briefly; while the chronology Hell.4.8.1-5.1.29. is turbid of the Xenophon makes no mention anywhere of the foundation Second Athenian Confederacy in 378 or the refoundation Messene in 370, both events of the greatest of devoting Instead importance. his space to significant trivial spends four full giving a vivid description Agesilaos’ training Hell.3.4..16-19, in Phrygia 12, following A little later, is closer Apologia especially the Hellenica, carries silences. for Sparta and King Agesilaos, between the lines to.guess times no doubt making it one word about Sparta’s of Asia Minor to Persian Agesilaos’ daughterHell.4..1.4-15. its title, no weight at all.13 often in the form of often forcing us to read impossible. rule of matters, and some The Hellènica says not of most of the Greek cities at the conclusion of the Pelop onnesian War;-’ not one word of the many atrocities by Spartan of Greece," Xenophon bore a deep admiration the truth return instead role as matchmaker despite also plays a large role, suspicious Oxyrhynchia as much as memoirs than "A History on any matter of Oxyrhynchia 21, of Otys to Spithridates’ to being personal and its silence Hellenica Xenophon ignores at great length about Agesilaos’ As Cawkwell aptly notes, He campaign of 396 may be due to apologia campaign in Mysia Hellenica in the marriage details. word on Agesilaos’campaign of Sardis the battle weighting incompetence.12 writing to the Sardis but not a single though this difficult camp prior but colorful matters, Xenophon often emphasizes sections of committed commanders in Asia;15 not one word about Agesilaos’ LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED story Lysandros that had secretly it is as often in defense of When Xenophon does speak, as in defense he defends Agesilaos impropriety youth, at great length against the Hellenica Agesilaos father, political the boy."l? Agesilaos Similarly, seizure Oxyrhynchia 21 briefly raid against Diodorus 15.20.2; it is very difficult that in Phoibidas’ to suit co-believer, Agesilaos in 378 Hell. the truth sentiments long, noble speeches valorHell.1.6.1-34, his 23 or 5.4.20-34; of these affairs. also cause him to own conceptions. He into the mouth of Kallikratidas, and emphasizes his ability and though a close reading shows the man to have been rather a blunderer.18 Agesilaos’ as much more ambitious campaigns in Asia and successful than they were.19 Besides these moralizing ponsible Plutarch to disengage cut and trim the facts Assembly, states in the son than in the the Peiraieus Xenophon’s panhellenic actually about of the Theban Kadmeia in 382 Hell. Sphodrias’ are portrayed interest knowledge and keeps silent from any complicity cf. as his Agesilaos’ Xenophon does his best to exonerate 5.2.25-36; depicted a handsome "he was said to have a mighty passion for and Sparta treacherous inserts he emphasizes was much more interested saying that charges of son Megabates, while in the Hellenica Negabates; In the Agesilaos5.4.-7 of the truth. with Spithridates’ in Spithridates’ to make himself means.16 king by extra-legal his friends plotted biases, Xenophon at times shows a rather and superstitious "seemingly impelled for the disaster streak. The hubris of the Spartan by some divine power," is res at Leuktra; the battle LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED is lost at /39 the place where some Boiotian themselves had long ago killed after having been raped by some SpartansHell.6.4.2-8. After lason treasures virgins of Pherai of Delphoi, appears to be planning the God says that own, and lason is slaughtered 20 6.4.30-31 Despite allthese remain our principal him of inaccuracy statements his with Xenophon, he does for this everywhere, against he will protect in the very next sentenceHell. difficulties source to seize the period. We can suspect but we Can directly a more credible source check his only rarelysee next item Hel enica Oxyrhynchia, Xenophon’s devaluation in this accellorated papyri. lished --are Ephorus, as a historical in 190,8 by Grenfell parently fragments beginning Papyri--the and Hunt, of several new first others fragments pub in 1949 by Bartoletti of an anonymous Greek history, where the history papyrus in 386.22 The authorgenerally is unknown and speculation surviving fragments is little more than a name ot us, historian.23 and great seem totally ap of Thucydides leaves off and ending perhaps at Knidos in 394, or more likely of Antalkidas The source has been century by the discovery In these Oxyrhynchus contained andDiodorus:21 at the Peace denoted "P." for includes Theopomposwhose dissimilar, Cratipposwho or some totally unknown But whoever the man was, the serious analysis detail of the portions of his writing which survive show him to have been far superior to Xenophon in historiography. One surviving chapter of the political of P.’s history structure of Bolotia gives us more knowledge than all Xenophon’s works LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED give us about the Spartan constitution. Unlike Xenophon, P. devotes the proper space to the naval war up to Knidos, and gives winters, us complete information the appointment concerning the passage of and the domestic politics of nauarchs, of the Greek states. The detailed it virtually nature certain that of the information the author relied and first-hand accounts whenever possible; lowed directly the historical of, Thucydides. The history method, nor passages and there against is little overt political the anti-Spartan factions and here it may be due to P.’s baldly charges that bribes to anti-Spartan view, discounting to political merit--but bias, politicians, but at least accurate; except perhaps in Thebes and in Athens, Where Xenophon War was caused by Persian P. takes the impact of the Persian fighting instead; a. more moderate gold and pointing his view may not be it is much more balanced. Although Xenophon served in Asia with Agesilaos, his accounts of the campaigns do not begin to compare with-those Oxyrhynchus historian, dull-- far as we can as informant.24 the Korinthian faction wholly correct, he probably fol though not the style, speeches of much literary makes upon eyewitness he wrote was relatively there were none of Thucydides’ tell, P. presents whether in clarity, accuracy, of the or completeness. 25 Despite the substantial of the Hellenica limited intrinsic value of those fragments Oxyrhynchia which have been found, they are in size and number and come from only a few years of the history. Their greatest value comes from the strong LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED /11/ evidence they provide Athenian, a bit of battles fragments, Diodorus, is our conduit for Ephorus unfortunately a poor one. world history, including upon P. and poor.26 were rather in the age of Caesar, other historians Setting Greek, and out to write Sicilian, a complete and Roman affairs and set within a chronological on an equal footing work of Archonships, a serious and a man whose descriptions Greek writing a Sicilian Consulships, difficulty: Ephorus, and Olympiads, frame he encountered his chief source for much of the 5th and 4th centuries ,wrote not chronologically topically. This--together makes his history with Diodorus’ virtually useless repeatedly the fall led Peloponnesian of the Thirty invasions before before a continuous e.g. of’ Attica Diod. 12.35.4;27 the activities Diod. of the Ten’ 14.30.4-14.33.6; complete "years" -are devoted to Sicilian sometimes several Greek narrative Diod. 14.40-78. is quite poor--he sources--and three years the at Athens is dated to 4.01/0 rather Thousand during winter 400/399 vice-versa dating: of the war which took his name and in which he than 4.03/2, and is placed after affairs but own incompetence-- for precise death of King Archidamos II is recorded the outbreak we but he is known as a pro- of a moralizer, when not relying for way into Of Ephorus himself, work, which survives. have rew surviving were the basis and hence found their much of Ephorus’history, Diodorus’ P.’s writings that there Diodorus’ general accuracy sometimes blunders is substantial chose which historian is resumed and in summarizing his evidence that he occasionally to follow based upon his own predisposition LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED for moralizing, seeking to show the success and the failure of the wicked.28 Despite all us with a great Diodorus provides of these numerous faults, deal of valuable of the good information about Greek between 411 and 386, years when it seems that history summaries of Ephorus retain Oxyrhynchia. Hellenica In all activities at Rhodes, it is clear that perhaps the outbreak Justin Because of this, assume that reasonable contains of Polyaenus, Pausanias, and based upon P. it is probably safe to period which of Diodorus in this and detailed War-- is the ultimate be ultimately with some caution any passage Konon’s of the Korinthian the Oxyrhynchus historian may likewise history fragments to surviving of Notion and .Sardis, A few portions source.29 of Diodorus’ portions during these years which correspond of P.’s work-- the battles of the a bit of the facts quite his information is ultimately trustworthy. derived from P., and hence essentially Plutarch: 30 A well-educated lived Greek from Chaironeia in the era of the Roman Empire, writing the late first with facts for their but biography, is intended to illustrate chronological and Plutarch often speaking, and the factual the personal than simply recount the life’s A strictly Although ‘Plut Lives were not overly concerned own sake; strictly not history Plutarch his works during and early second centuries ‘A.D. arch disdainedrhetoric,31his rather in Boiotia, they were material character history each contains of the subject of the manAlex.1. development of events is not the goal, digresses sharply from the main flow of his LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 13 narrative in order to illustrate 2.4.-5;24.1-26.4 world was obviously no better Ephorusy.17.2, wrote a continuation Knidos. Plutarch Plutarch’s provides some modern scholars versions difficult major historians clear sources for the more obscure himself, Plutarch consulted upon condensed The question authors, routinely disagreement he also attempts is but for such reasonably an intermediate compares his between theme.g. to use sources with direct knowledge of historical it does seem at least upon himas has led read them in the original.32 knowledge of the, events they describe Plutarch’s The very as Ephorus or Theopompus the evidence seems and often cites 17.1-2,20.6; sources. of for by Plutarch merely relied in intermediate that Plutarch As an writer the personal and passim. to boubt whether he actually to resolve down to much of the material sources cited works themselves,or contained the last who wrote a long history ofArtaxerxesArta.1 large number of historical the original II, but he uses XenophonAges. the works of Ctesias, of Artaxerxes Life of his sources, of Thucydides history also cites which apparently Persia century B.C. Greek and Theopompus.17.2; of these court physician than that Among others, are many and good. 18.1, traite.g. cf.20.6. knowledge of the fourth Plutarch’s these a particular whenever this is possible.33 method may be informal, good. We can generally source. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED but rely Alt L1 Appendix : THE SELECTION OF EPHORS In recent its years, the nature impact upon Spartan policy scrutiny;1 yet several of the Spartan puzzling problems remain. the chief power in the Spartan 4th century, of money during their lives of ease.2 The author any criteria state. they had In addition, emoluments to the office: by the late and have come under increasing ity of the ephors was enormous--by were other ephorate Aristotle ephors routinely terms of office, there says that made vast sums and in general lived The ephorate would seem a very attractive position. Yet there is no known case in these Spartiate seeking the ephorate, for any positivepersonal contrasts the excessive with the relatively according of of any ephor being elected or political to him it is the gerousia ate is that Aristotle power of the ephorate of the gerousia which attracts but power- while the main problem of the ephor it is routinely Aristotle’s reason. and dictatorial modest authority hungry men of ambition, of any centuries filled by "any chance men"O statements are borne out by such’ external evidence as exists. We have the names of some 64. Spartan ephors down to 330/29, yet of these all but eight are apparent nonentities, who receive no mention in our sources except during their term of office;and of the eight which do appear, only three--Brasidas, Endios, and Antalkidas--appear of major importance. Five ephors were appointed LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED as men each year, and by law or by custom reappointment was forbidden; the small number of Spartiates would have allowed many un men to serve as ephor.4 distinguished this and But the evidence of our sources is that this was the overwhelming rule than the exception; the number of distinguished rather men serving as ephor is about what we would expect random chance to produce.5 Perhaps this whose results is because ephors were selected approached those of random chance. Greece, most democratic highest civilian identified officials election by lot, as the "democratic" by lot--Aristotle In classical elected and the ephorate their is always component of the mixed Spartan It is clear that constitution.6 as Athens statessuch by a process the process was not simply 4.7.5 Politics rules this out--7 but the evidence totle is that whatever the actual system--Aris it very childish- _8 the result was that ephors calls were chosen essentially that no Spartiate at random. Aristotle there was no danger of ambitious contrast to the gerousia;9 instead system for allowing to become ephors, he repeatedly criticizes riixoes "any chance men"o condemns Sparta for choosing her ephors in a random manner, Plato praises same reason: your government still the Spartan "Then your third fretting and fuming, one might say; by the power of the ephors, nearly Plato itin and hence hold so much power and make so While Aristotle this men gaining decisions0 many important exactly implies could announce his candidacy for the office and that the Spartan strongly to and Aristotle power ephorate savior, seeing curbed it, leading as thegov ernment bylot."11 disagree for about the efficacy LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED of the system, the same facts, but both men recognize ephors were chosen in an essentially The word "essentially" were blindfolded interpreting point procedure Spartiates fluence point the result of politics From this be elected or policy, fact on the basis purposes;12 rather board, it follows than to any shift the chance selection change in Sparta’s Thucydides that of any "policy" this from the stand randomly. could not they espoused. If from those of possibly in Spartiate could in due to chance "public opinion;" and of ephors might very often cause a dramatic foreign 5.36 or domestic policy. contains an excellent the impact of chance upon ‘Spartan foreign how Xenares and Kleoboulos, two Spartan the Peace of Nikias negotiated year and did their the important ephors on an issue was quite some honestly ephors were selected the ephors of one board differed the preceding or priests or group of Spartiates for political crucial that But whether the of sacred chickens, is that no Spartiate process was, makes it clear took place. the entrails of the issue. what the actual and as mentioned above, Aristotle electors random manner. goes to the heart We have no way of ever guessing sort of elective that Sparta’s . example demonstrating policy; he describes ephors for 4.20, opposed by the ephors of the preceding best to thwart it:13 The following winterfor there chanced to be dif ferent ephors from those under whom the treaty had been made, and some of them actually opposed the treaty.., Thucydides’ words do not in the least change in the views of most Spartiates, by electing ephors who favored describe a general which they demonstrated an end to the treaty LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED with Athens; A17 instead, he is describing Athenian ephors, the chance selection a purely fortuitous impact on Spartan-Athenian of two anti event which had a decisive relations. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED AI C: Suggested pChronologies endix Notes on Xenophon describes Chronol gical the two invasions The first Hell.3.2.21-31. Elean War: of Elis began the war and was quickly terminated following diplomatic maneuvering followed, then "as the year was coming the ephors called out ‘the ban again and Agis led all the alliesexcept the Boiotians invasion the rest the Korinthians lengthyHell.3.2.26, and after behind the harmost Lysippos to ravage Elis of the summer and the following time contraints Thucy.1.20.3 took place and the phrase make it virtually during different exchanges that toieniautoiCf. Agis’ two invasions The description described ultimately In Diodorus’ by Xenophon, so Diodorus’ account with the name of the king changed. account, but found it too difficult walls. derives bears no resemblence In Xenophon’s account we are told that Elis had strong with the dip The account is filled with numerous so it very likely details cannot be a duplication Elis "during describes only one invasion of Elis, from P. and is accurate. invasions de campaigning seasons, and that by King Pausanias. and very precise it ended, winter"Hell.2.3.29-3O; peri onti certain The occupying the winter. Diodorus14.17.4.-12 3.2.27. and in a second invasion of ElisHell.3.2.25. seems rather Agis left to’the Some an earthquakeHell.3.2.23-24. round" lomatic by King Agis Pausanias laid siege to Elis to capture14.17.1O-11; Therefore, if we believe LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED is unwalledHell. clearly both these A19 details, invasion must come after Agis’ second Pausanias’ invasion, in the next campaigning season. probably tells XenophonHell.3.2.30-31 in the summer following us that Elis sought peace but that Sparta Agis’ second invasion, found the Elean terms unacceptable and "compelled" make peace on Sparta’s "compulsion" to Pausanias’ campaigning invasion. seasons, this Therefore Elis second invasion probably dedicating two surrendered during The Spartans Games at Elis been refused main Spartan pretexts an interruption summer 400. that this invasion. and this to attend the Olympic provided for the warHell.3.2.21. on of the Therefore our sources would have failed 401 lasted from summer 4.00 to winter , to winter 397NB: winter had already either it to mention of the war by the Olympic games which fell Thus, the war probably 403 to winter Hell.3.3.1; permission for over a decade, seems unlikely the booty from his to the God at DelphoiXen. is the reason he does not lead the third 399 in the first three winter. King Agis died soon after summer probably refers the Elean War lasted with Agis’ invasions in the third. and Pausanias’ the third terms; Elis to in from summer 398, or from the war ended after the third The death of King Agis occurred in begun. the middle year of the war. The possibility Xenophon that 4.03-401 is ruled out by the statement the Elean War occurred while Derkyllidas campaigning in .AsiaHell.3.2.1; in 399See following item. took place in 400-398or Derkyllidas Therefore later, was in Asia the Eleari War probably with Agis’ LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 399or later. arrived of death occurring in 4.c who succeeded Agis, died in winter 361/0 But Agesilaos, or more likely Plutarch 360/59Cf. Agesilsos for 41 yearsor 40 years. 40,2 tells at the least Spartan political Ages.4.0; Xen. Ages.2.31, Plut. years, i.e. he had been king of Sparta us that his reign that that extended into 41 it had lasted than that. If the Olympic games did not interrupt the war must be dated to 4.00-398; otherwise sibility, the Elean War, 401-399 is a pos though the overlap with Derkyllidas’ Asia would be so slight 3.2.21. for about Hence, Agis’ death might come in 399, but it could not come later So: while This, as to nearly conflict campaigns in with Xen. Hell. combined with the implausibility Olympic festival of an unnoticed in the middle of the war, suggests should be excluded that 401-399 and leaves 4.00-398 as the only plausible date. Notes on As our starting occurred first the point, Campaigns we know that in summer 4.01Anab.1.8.lff; winter after of the Battle the Ten ThousandAnab.7.5.6; in Asia, short 3.1.5; 399, weather for ships of 399, Thibron contacted but by Hell.3.2.1, so he must have arrived In early spring The The winter of 4.00/399 was explicitly In the spring mentionedAnab.7.3.13. wintered Diod.14.28. when there was good sailing Diod.14.30.4-5. The marked by the Ten Thousand’s march through heavy snowAnab.4.5; Anab.5.3; of Kunaxa Diod.14.22.lff. the battle--4O1/O--was summer of 400 came andDerkyllidas: ChronoThil gicabl ron Thibron had in very late 400. Thibron campaignednearEphesos time before the Ten Thousand joined himDiod.14.36; once Cyrus’ mercenaries arrived, LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED for a Hell. he campaigned in north- - em Lydia for a timeHell.3.1.6-7. After this, the ephors ordered Thibron to invade Caria, and while he was at Ephesos preparing his expedition, Hell.3.1.7-8; Diod.14.38.2. with Tissaphernes captured Derkyllidas Derkyllidas made an eight Derkyllidas him then made a truce and led his army to Aiolia, a number of townsHell.3.1.9-28; After this, to replace arrived where he quickly Diod.14.38.2-3. month truce with Pharna bazos and marched into Bithynian Thrace for the winterHell.3.2. 1-5; Diod.14.38.3. At the beginning of spring 398, Derkyllidas Europe and had his term of office missioners1-lell.3.2.6-9. a wall against had gone to Cyprus, before the time of the harvest had left for Susa, probably returning and form there to Asia Minor some time 397Diod.14.39.1-4.. After completing for eight where he built as soon as the second truce with Derkyllidas had been sworn, Pharnabazos returned com Diod.14..38.6-7. Meanwhile, in early until to renewed his truce with to the Chersonese the Thracians Hell.3.2.9-10; renewed by some Spartan Derkyllidas then traveled Pharnabazos, returned the work in the Chersonese, to Asia and then besieged Atarneusheld monthsHell.3.2.11; to Asia not long before Since Derkyllidas the time of the harvest, Derkyllidas by Chian exiles had returned Atarneus’ fall must be dated to summer 397. After this, the ephors ordered Derkyllidas as he was preparing to do this, Tissaphernes marched toward Ephesos, encountered a tmuceHell.3.2.12-20; Diod.14.39.4-6, came at this and Pharnabazos Derkyllidas’ time1-Iell.3.2.21. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED to invade Caria; army ,and swore The nauarchy of Pharax Notes on the Asian The chronology of Agesilaos’ straightforward. ology differs campaigns in Asia is relatively The sequence of events is clear from the orthodox chronology I argue for the existerce Xen. Hell.3.k.28-29 Chron logical ofAgesilaos: Campaigns in only one respect: of a "missing winter"396/5 A In Hell. Hel enica are: Q.9, the nauarch Pollis the nauarch Archelaidas; kmates arrives passed, around and in the badly fragmented book 14 of the Oxyrhynchia, My arguments and my chron in Hell. to replace Q.19, Pollis. but the only place comes out to replace the nauarch Cheiri Prima facie a winter has where a winter might have been mentioned is in book 14. B Xenophon claimed that money sent out by Tithraustes the Korinthian remained at Ephesos until from Sparta, sells War to beginHell.3.5.1. all the thirty hardly before late captured prisoners he won the battle of Sardis, news of the defeat new Spartiates spring, raustes least, scarcely of events C to travel is the cause-and-effect presents. ‘ By the time tith it would have been well into the summer at giving him time enough for starting Tithraustes is able to tell then after to reach Susa and for Tithraustes in Greece which led to the Korinthian arguing that since he it would have taken some time for which Hell.3.4..21-25 arrived, especially had had arrived nakedHell.3.k.16-20; to Lydia and execute Tissaphernesthis relationship But Agesilaos caused us that did start the chain War. I am not the war; only that Xenophon he did. If there is a missing winter in Hell. Qç.14, then Hell. the events of 396 and the "eighth year" Qy.9 would deal with LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED referred to is the eighth year after War in 404which use rather is a very plausible than the eighth as important the end of the Peloponnesian reference-point year after 403which a year and hence a much less point. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED for P. to is not nearly plausible reference- ni 9 to chapter IV: 1. Xen. Anab.1.1.1-3; Olmstead, History of Notes Plut. the Arta.2-3. For the date, cf. A.T. Persian EmpireChicago,1948371. 2. For example, Astyochos, the Spartan nauarch, was thought to have been bribed by Tissaphernes in 411Thucy.8.5O.3,8.83-84. 3. C.D.Hamilton is the leading current advocate of this view. Cf. C.D.Hamilton, "Spartan Politics and Policy, 405-401 B.C.," Journal ofPhilology 911970294-314 American and Sparta’sBitter VictoriesIthaca,1979. 4. This grotesque caricature is almost identical to Hamilton’s impression of Spartan government and society; cf. Hamilton1970 295,303 and Hamilton197975,81-87 for a few examples. Hence forth I will not bother to refute Hamilton in detail. 5. For what follows, cf. Xen. Hell.2.2.9-23; Plut. Alc.38; Plut. y.l5; Ath. Const.34.2-3; 13 . 5ff , 13. 33ff Diod.13.1O7,14.3; Lysias.12.4.8ff, 6. The Thebans had demanded a share of the loot Xen. Hell.3.5.5. at Dekeleia 7. Xen. Hell.2.20. 8. It is also exactly at this point that the break between the first and second parts of the Hellenica comes; this may have added to Xenophon’s compression of events. See Appendix A. 9. At the time of Athens’ surrender, we are told that she was forced to allow all political exiles to return, and that it was these exiles who helped to call in Lysandros and establish the Thirty. Obviously, it would have taken a week or two at least before these exiles would have returned to Athens; hence the Thirty probably were set up some time after Athens’ surrender. 10. Allegedly 1500 talents of silver at the time of the esta blishment of the Thirty at AthensDiod.13.106.8. 11. Plut. 12. Plut. j.18.2. 13. Diod.14.6.1. 14. Plut. y.20.6,24.-26,30.2-4; Ephorus seems to be the ultimate 15. Xen Hell.3.3.1-4.. Diod.14..13.2-8; Nepos source of these stories. Agis was an "old man" when he died in 399. 16. Plut. 17. There is no real way to precisely date the attempt at Dodona. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG us that it came after the one at Delphoi and All our sources tell ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED n20 before the one at the oracle of Zeus Arnmon; the first likely came during winter 405/4 while the second directly followed Lysandros’ recall from the north in summer 404. This means that Lysandros either visited Dodona during winter 4.05/4 or between the establishment of the Thirty and the beginning of his Thracian campaign which seems to contradict Plutarch. For a different reconstruction of Lysandros’ movements, 18. cf. R.E. Smith, "Lysander and the Spartan Empire," Classical Philology 431948, 145-156. 19. Plut. 20. Nepos y.2.1-3 21. Plut. and Polyaenus 1.4.5.4; Plut. !. 20.5. 19-20. 22. Plut. 14.2; it may be at this point in time that the ephors overturned his expulsion of the Sestians from their city. 23. Plut. 20.4-21.1. 24. Plut. 16-17; 25. Plut. 17.1-2. 26. Plut. 17.4.. 27. Diod. 28. Plut. 29. For Lysandros’ Plut. Diod. 106.8-10. 14.4.4.. 19.4. reputation for incorruptibility cf. 2.30. 30. Da.od. 12.59.5, 13.38.4. The severity of Spartan harmosts been at Herakiela had noted by Thucydides 3.93, but although Herakleia was not a typical city in the Spartan naval empire-the Spar-tans themselves had founded It in the late 5th century-it is likely the brutality of Sparta’s harmosts there was not atypical. The 500 citizens summarily executed by Herippidas may have represented a much larger fraction of the population than the 1500 Athenians killed during the year-long "reign of terror" of the Thirty Ath. Pol. 35.4. 31. Plut. 15.5. 32. Diod. 14.12. The parallel with Pausanias’ career as tyrant of Byzantion in the 470’s would not have been ignored Thucy. 1.128-131. 33. As we noted above, Darius II died in March 404, and Tissaphernes would have presumably left for home soon after ward. 34. Xen. Anab.1.1; Plut. Arta.2-4.. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED n21 35. Plut. 36. Thucy.5.35. 37. See Appendix A. 38. Xen. Anab.1.1.6-8. 39. Plut. Lysandros’ dekarchies were clearly so unpopular that simply withdrawing Spartan support from them would have been sufficient to cause their overthrow the governments to the control of the people." 4.0. For most of what follows, cf. Xen. Hell.2.3-4; Ath. Const.35-40. 32-33; Plut. y.21; and "return Diod.14. 41. The Spartans ordered all the other Greek states to return any Athenian exiles to the Thirty; only Thebesand Argos re fused to allow thisDiod.11+.6. 42. This is asserted in Xenophon’s versionHell.2.4.24-27. 43. Xenophon and Diodorus only mention King Pausanias’ in volvement, but since it was he who was actually sent out, it is understandable that they ignored King Agis. 4.4.. Xen. Hell.2.4..38. 45. Xen. Hell.2.4.35-36. There is a surviving decree from the state of Eleusis concerning the right of an Athenian army to travel through Eleusinian territory when summoned by the Spartans. See J. Wickersham and G.Verbrugghe, Gre k Historical of the Documents Fourth CenturyToronto,1973#2. 46. So Lewis1977; Hamilton1979; Jones196796. 47. Paus.3.5.1-2. Fourteen gerontes and King Agis voted for conviction; fourteen gerontes and the five ephors voted for acquittal. Although King Agis had supported the original plan to stop Lysandros, he clearly did not support the settlement Pausanias had arranged. 4.8. Plutarch y.21.3-4 makes it very clear that King Paus anias was brought to trial"some time after" his settlement at Athens when "the Athenians had revolted again;" this, is clearly a reference to Athens’ annexation of Eleusis contrary to the terms of Pausanias’ agreement. According to Ath. Pol.40.4, this annexation took place two years after the settlement at Athens, in the Archonship of Xenainetos, hence in 401/0. 49. Diod.14.19.4.-5; he was probably the nauarch for 402/1 since Xenophon’s account of a later stage of the campaign describes the Spartan nauarch as being Pythagoras, who was apparently the nauarch for 401/0Xen. Anab.1.4.1-2. 50. Xen. Hell.3.1.4.,8. 51. Cf. Plut. 20.4-21.1. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED n22 to chapter V: 1. Plut. Arta.3.5. See chapter4, ni., Cyrus it is unlikely month or two. Notes Artaxerxes came to the throne in March 4.04 and after he was persuaded not to kill that he kept him at Susa for more than a 2. For his hellenization, of. the eulogy in Xen.Anab.1.9 which emphasizes his personal traits; these allegedly were very Greek and very commendable. He also had several Greek mistressesXen. Anab.1.10.1-3 3. Xen. Anab.1.2.1-3. 4. Xen. Anab.i.i. 5. Xen. Anab.1.i; Plut. Arta.3. Tissaphernes either Cyrus’ plot to assassinate the Great King or invented either way, Cyrus would be a great enemy of his. 6. revealed the story; Xen. Anab.i.i.6-8,1.2.2. 7. Only such loyalty, plus a great deal of gold, could have enabled Cyrus to persuade his mercenaries to march 1500 miles into the heart of Asia. 8. Xen. Hell.3.1.i. 9. Xen. Hell,i.2.9; Diod.14.19.7-8. 10. Xen. Hell.1.2.15. The Greeks were to fight in ranks four deep rather than the usual eight to allow them to extend over much of the front of the Great King’s army. Cf. G.L.Cawkwell, notes and introduction to Xenophon’s HellenicaNew York,1972 37-4.1. 11. Xen. Anab.1.4..2-3; Diod.i4.21.1-2. For proof that Cheiri sophos was a Spartiate and not merely a perioikos cf. Xen. Anab. 4.6.13-15. There. was definately a large sprinkling of Lakedaim onians in Cyrus’ army; of. J.Roy, Historia 161967303-306. 12. Xen. Anab.1i4.2; .two references seems difficult 13.Xen. list Diod.i4..19.3-4; of Cyrus," Xen. Hell.3.1.1. Samios as the Spartan nauarch, The last and the matter to resolve. Hell.3.1.1-2; 14.. Demon p. "The Mercenaries Diod.14.19.2-5; Plut. Arta.6.2-3. Plut.. Arta.22.1. 16. Xen. Hell.3.1 .3,3.2.13; 17. Xen. Hell.3.1.3; Diod.14.27.k,14.35.2-3, Diod.14..35.6-7. 18. Diod.14.35.6-7. 19. A suggested chronology of these years of the war in Asia TO UNZ.ORG will be presented LICENSED in Appendix C. ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED n23 20. Xen. Hell.3.1.4 21. Diod.14..36.1. 22. Xen. Anab.5.1.4.. - 23. Xen. Anab.6.2.13. 24. Xen. Anab.7.1.20. 25. Xen. Anab.6.6.13. 26. With the exception of the period of Klearchos’ of course; revolt of. chapter 4, pp.63-64. 27. The importation of Euxine grain into Greece--especially Athens--was probably considerable in this period. Cf. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Pelop n esian WarLondon, 1972; E.F.Bloedow, "Corn Supply and Athenian Imperialism," Classigue 4.4197520-29. L’Antiguite 28. Much of what follows is discussed in Cawkwell19794.4-4.5; but Cawkwell seems unable to believe the evidence which he himself has gathered. 29. Xen. Anab.7.i.36. 30. Xen. Anab.7.2.5-6. 31. Xen. Anab.7.2.7-13. 32. Xen. Anab.6.6.12. 33. Xen. Hell.3.1.5. 34. Xen. Hell.3.1.5-6 Diod.14.36.2-37.4. 35. Thucy.6.43. 36. Thucy.2.69,3.19. 37. Diod.36.2-3; Xen. Hell.3.1.5. 38. Xen. Hell.3.1.6-7. 39. Xen. Hell.3.i.7. 4.0, Xen. Hell.3.1.8,3.2.1; Diod.1k.38.2. 41. Xen. Hell.3.i.8-3.2.11; Diod.14.38.2-7. and a suggested chronology, see Appendix C. 4.2. Xen. Hell.3.1.8. . 43. Xen. Hell.3.i.21. 44.. Xen. Hell.3.i.8-9. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED For the details . n 24 45. Xen. Hell.3.2.12-13. 46. For what follows, cf. Diod.14.39.1-4 and Plut. Arta. 21.1-3 with a good discussion and analysis in C.D.Hamilton, Sparta’s VictoriesIthaca,197911k-117though onlyBit er insofar as he concerns himself with Persianmatters. 47. Xen. Hell.3.2.12-20; Diod.14.39.4-6. 4.8. For a detailed discussion of the Elean War and its sug gested chronology, see Appendix C. 49. Xen. Hell.2.2.19-2O; 5G. Xen. Hell.2.4.1-2; 3.5.5. Diod.14.6.3,14..32.1. 51. Xen. Hell..2.4.30. 52. Diod.14.17.1-3. 53. Hell. Bruce1960. p .17-18; 54. Xen. Hell.2.4.4.3; 55. for a full Ath. discussion and analysis, of. Const.4O. Xen. Hell.3.1.4,3.2.25. 56. Hell. 6-7. A few citizens with the collusion of members of the Athenian Boule had dispatched an Athenian trireme to Konon; this was probably intended as an anti-Spartan provocation, but the very negative public reaction--which cut across party lines --forced the act to be disavowed. It had perhaps also been in tended as a show of support for Konon and to give him some idea of Athens’ potential assistance. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 24. Cf. R.J. Seager, "Agesilaus in Asiafl Propaganda and Clas ical Monthly 21977, Objectives," Liverpo l 184; H.J. Kelly, "Agesilaus’ Strategy in Asia Minor," Liverpool Monthly 31978 97-98. Clas ical 25. It is the issue of whether Agesilaos did or did not successfully exploit his opportunity on which Xenoon’s Cf. Cawkwell 1979 account appears highly questionable. 16-17. 26. Hell. Q. 27. Xen. Hell. 21. 4.1.3-4.; Hell. 20-25; 28. Xen., Hell. 4.1.1-2, 29. Xen., Hell. 4.1.20-28. 22; Q. Plut., Plut., Ages. 11. Ages. 11-12. Agesilaos’ reluctance or inability 30. Xen., Hell. 4.1.26-28. to force Herippidas into agreeing to an equitable division of and the Paphlagonians is remarkable. spoils with Spithridates 31. Xen. Hell 3.5.3-16; Hell. 32. Xen. Hell. 3.5.17-25; 33. Xen. Hell. 4.2.1-4; 34. Hell. Plut., Plut., 19-20; Diod. 35. Xen. Hell. 16-18; Diod. Q. 28-30; 14.81.1. Diod. Ages. 15; Diod. 81.1-3, 89. 14.83. 81.4-6. 4.3.10. 36. Peisandros had been appointed by Agesilaos to the naval of his command through the persuasion sister, Agesilaos’ wife; Xenophon himself criticizes Peisandros’ complete lack of naval 3.4.27; experience Xen.Hell. 37. Xen. Hell. 4.3.10-12; Plut., Ages. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 16; Diod. 83.4-7. r11 to Appendix A: Notes 1. Cf. M.I.Finley, notes and introduction to ThucydidesPenguin, 1972, including a brief analysis of the eighth book. 2. For this and subsequent notes in this appendix, the source unless otherwise noted will be the author under discussion. 3. See chapter 3, p.32. 4.. The number of syngrapheis appointed to revise the con stitution was probably 3OAth. Const.29-33 rather than the 10 as Thucydides reports8T67; see Finley1972618-619 for a discussion of this and various other minor inaccuracies. 5. For an excellent discussion of Xenophon’s life and his Hellenica from which many of the following arguments are borrowed, see G.L.Cawkwell notes and introduction to Xenophon’s HellenicaPenguin,1979 6. Thucy.2.13. In 4.13 there were 1200 Athenian citizens in the cavalry class, 29,000 in the hoplite class, and uncounted additional masses who served as rowers or light troops. apologetic 7. For an excellent discussion of the essentially nature of the Anabasis, see G.L.Cawkwell, notes and introduction to Xenophon’s AnabasisPenguin,1972l7ff. 8. See Cawkwell1979l7ff. 9. See chapter 3, p.49. 10. Besides being very muddled, XenophonHell.1.1.35-36 dir ectly contradicts both Thucydides8 .80 and Diodorus13.51 in dating when Klearchos was sent to Byzantion; numerous other errors may simply be undetectable due to the absence of parallel accounts. . 11. See chapters 4 and 5 passim. 12. The campaign didn’t accomplish anything; 13. So Cawkwell197928. 14.. See chapter 4, pp.64-66. 15. See chapter 4, pp.63-64. 16. See chapter 4, pp.60-61. 17. See chapter 6. 18. See chapter 3, p.52. 19. See chapter 6. 20. So Cawkwell197934-35. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED see chapter 6. 21. For an excellent discussion of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, see I.A.F.Bruce, An Historical Com entary on theHellenica Q rhynchiaCarnbridge,19671-27 and passim for a brief account of Ephorus, see R.Meiggs, The Athenian EmpireOxford,197210 Diodorus is discussed in R.Drews, "Diodorus and his Sources," Journal ofPhilology831962, American 383-392. 22. Cf. Bruce19673-5 for the evidence and reasoning. 23. Cf. Bruce196722-27. 24. Cf. I.A.F.Bruce, "Internal Politics and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War," Emerita 28196075-86 and "The Pol itical Terminology of the Oxyrhynchus Historian," Emerita 30 1962,63-69. 25. Discussed - in Cawkwell1979 passim. 26. Cf. Meiggs19721O. It should be noted that Polybius 12. 2Sf highly praises Ephorus’ accounts of the naval battles of Cyprus and Knidoswhich would have been based on P., while he finds a great deal of fault with his accounts of Leuktra and Mantineiawhich could not have been based on P.. 27. So Meiggs197211. 28. So Drews1962. At 1.2.2 of his history, Diodorus says that he aims at: .preserving the nobility of distinguished men, pro claiming the wickedness of the base, and serving the good of mankind in general. For if the myths about those in Hades, despite the fact that their content is fictitious, do much to turn men toward piety and jus tice, certainly History, the voice of truth ‘and the "mother country" of all philosophy, must be regarded as a most effective means of endowing men’s character with noble integrity. 29. Cf. Bruce196720-22. 30. An excel1t J.R.Hamilton, discussion of Plutarch is contained in introduction. Plutarch:AlexanderLondon,1969, 31. Evidence collected 32. The matter in Hamilton1969xxxvi-xxxvii. is discussed in Hamilton1969xliii-xlix. 33. Cf. HamiI%on1969xlvii. LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED ‘ to Appendix C: Notes 1. See A.Andrewes, "The Government of Classical Sparta," in SoAncietniets andInstitutionsOxford,1976, E.Badian, ed., pp.1-20; A.H.1VI.Jones, "The Lycurgan Rhetra," in AncientSocieties InstitutionsOxford,1976, E.Badian, ed., pp.165-175; and H.D. Westlake, "Reelection to the Ephorate?," Greek, Roman,and Studies197634.3-352 P.J.Rhodes, "The Selection Byzantine of Ephors at Sparta," Historia1981498-5O2. 2. Arist. P01.2.6.14-16. In the latter reference, Aristotle 3. Arist. Pol.2.6.16,2.7.5. says that the kosmoi of Krete are similar to the ephors of Sparta in that they are hol tychontes, but differ in that they are selected only from certain families rather than from the citizens as a whole; this proves that hoi yhontes is not being used in the sense of "anybody" but in the sense of "any chance persons." 4. So Rhodes1981499. 1913, Pros pogràphie derLakedaimonierBreslau, 5. P.Poralla, lists references to some 800 Spartiates who are mentioned by our sources down to the era of Alexander the Great; he also lists the 64 ephors known to us. If we restrict our examination to the hundred-odd years from 433/2 to 330/29--which contains the bulk of these references--these numbers are reduced to perhaps and 57 ephors. There were probably fewer than 600 Spartiates 3000 adult Spartiates alive in 433/2, the number had declined to about 1000 by 371, and that year 400 of these died at Leuktra See p. ; it is likely that there were fewer than 6ooo adult Spartiates alive between 433/2 and 330/29. About 10% of these attracted the notice of our sources, and roughly the same fraction of Sparta’s ephors were deemed worthy of mention outside the term of their ephorate; all but a small handful are simply names on an ephorate list to us. Rhodes1981498 makes the valid point -that importance in the eyes of our sources and importance in the minds of most Spartiates are not necessarily equivalent; but it seems rather presumptuous to argue that all of our sources-including Xenophon, who knew Sparta intimately--simply ignored the overwhelming majority of Sparta’s leading political figures. 6. Arist. 7. Pol.2.6.15-16. Cf. Rhodes1981 for a good discussion. - 8. Arist. Pol.2.6.16. Aristotle Politics 2.6.18 also describes the manner oelecting the gerousia as "childish;" but there is no reason to believe that the two processes were necessarily similar in any significant way. 9. Arist. Pol.2.6.16-19. ‘ 10. See n.3 above. 11. Plato Laws 692a, emphasis mine. Rhodes1981499 points out that after Leuktra, the Spartiate population was so severely LICENSED three or four Spartiates eventually reduced that perhaps one TO in UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED served as ephor; this he cites of words. Rhodes’ figures as the reason are questionable--he for Plato’s choice is assuming an equilibrium model, which was not the case--but even if they are correct, Plato’s passage is clearly referring to Sparta of the 8th or 7th century, when there were perhaps 6000 or 7000 Spartiates, making it highly unlikely that any particular in dividual would serve as ephor. 12. Admittedly Agis IV arranged for his supporter Lysandros to be elected ephor in 243Plut. 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