Download Martha Nussbaum*s *Non-Relative Virtues: An

Martha Nussbaum’s “Non-Relative
Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach”
Introduction to Ethical theory, Benjamin Visscher Hole IV
240W8L1
1.
2.
3.
Clicker Quiz
Where we are
Transition from Aristotle to Nussbaum
AGENDA
Clicker Quiz
Nussbaum claims that to many current ethical theorists, turning to an ethical
approach based on the virtues is connected with a turn toward:
82%
9%
9%
0%
0%
0%
0%
em
na
l
ism
.
pi
ric
ism
re
.
la
tiv
ab ism
.
so
lu
de tism
on
.
to
lo
gy
te
.
le
al
o
lo
lo
ft
gy
no
he
.
ne
ab
of
ov
th
e.
e
ab
ov
e.
0%
tio
rationalism.
empiricism.
relativism.
absolutism.
deontology.
teleology.
all of the above.
none of the above.
ra
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
According to Nussbaum, the first step in Aristotle’s account of each virtue is:
A. to isolate a sphere of
human experience that is
more or less universally
shared.
B. to give an analysis of the
notion of “goodness.”
C. to survey the opinions of
previous thinkers on the
matter.
D. to list different possible
accounts of that virtue.
E. all of the above.
F. none of the above.
91%
9%
al
0%
of
th
e
ab
o
ve
.
ve
.
ab
o
no
ne
ft
he
le
...
0%
lo
os
sib
of
...
0%
en
tp
io
ns
lis
td
iff
er
op
in
of
t
to
su
rv
e
yt
he
ys
is
of
re
e
giv
to
to
an
an
al
ph
e
as
te
la
iso
to
he
.
h.
..
..
0%
Nussbaum claims that for Aristotle the reference of each virtue term is fixed
by:
64%
27%
9%
0%
0%
0%
0%
co
n
gr
ou ve n
a
t io
n
th
na
ick din
g
lu
de
ex
se
sc
pe
.
r ip
r ie
t io
nc
es
n
of
.
th
e
...
tra
di
tio
n.
‘e
al
nd
lo
o
ft
no
he xa’
ne
ab
of
ov
th
e.
e
ab
ov
e.
A. conventional use.
B. grounding
experiences.
C. a thick description
of the virtue.
D. tradition.
E. ‘endoxa’
F. all of the above.
G. none of the above.
DATES
REQUIRED READINGS
RECOMMENDED READINGS
Week One: June 24-28
Why be moral? Moral Theory Primer





Syllabus
Plato, 65-78
Timmons (electronic)
Hobbes, 236-247
Hardin (electronic)




Week Three: July 8-12
Utilitarianism


Week Four: July 15-19
Utilitarianism

Shafer-Landau, 1-17
Shafer-Landau, 289-305
Concepción (electronic)
Vaughn, “How to Read an
Argument” (electronic)
Shafer-Landau, 201-213
Nozick (electronic)
Bentham, 353-361


Shafer-Landau, 117-132
Shafer-Landau, 21-58


Singer, 873-880
Mill, 362-383


Shafer-Landau, 117-132
Shafer-Landau, 133-153
Week Five: July 22-26
Kantian Ethics

Kant, 313-352



O’Neil (electronic)
Velleman (electronic)
Shafer-Landau, 168-186
Week Six: July 29 - August 2
Assessing Utilitarianism & Kantian Ethics


Anscombe, 527-539
Williams, 657-673



Wolf, 790-802
Stocker (electronic)
Baker (electronic)
Week Seven: August 5-8
Virtue Ethics

Aristotle, 124-140; 146-147


Shafer-Landau, 252-271
Aristotle, 152-157
Week Eight: August 12-16
Virtue Ethics & Assessing Ethical Theory


Nussbaum, 755-774
Wolf, 790-802


Shafer-Landau, 252-271
Note: Final Paper due August 12
Week Nine: August 19-23
Contemporary Moral Issues: Abortion


Thomson, 817-827
Hursthouse, 849-862


Review for the final
Note: Final Exam August 23
Week Two: July 1-5
Social Contract Theory and Collective
Action Problems
I could use a short extension
on my paper.
A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
36%
18%
18%
18%
9%
0%
Ag
re
e
ha
tA
gr
ee
So
Ne
m
ew
ut
ra
ha
l
tD
isa
gr
ee
D
St
isa
ro
gr
ng
ee
ly
Di
sa
gr
ee
ew
So
m
St
ro
ng
ly
Ag
r
ee
0%
My preferred paper due date:
A. Monday at 11:59pm
(no change)
B. Tuesday at 11:59pm
C. Wednesday at
11:59pm
D. Thursday at
11:59pm
E. Friday at 11:59pm
45%
27%
18%
9%
M
on
da
ya
t1
1:
59
pm
(n
Tu
o
es
...
da
y
at
W
ed
11
ne
:5
9p
sd
m
ay
at
11
Th
:5
ur
9p
sd
m
ay
at
11
:5
Fr
9p
id
m
ay
at
11
:5
9p
m
0%
Main Takeaways from Friday’s lecture
•
•
•
•
•
Practical Wisdom (phronesis)
The Practical Syllogism
Practical (Moral) Perception
Top-down and bottom-up methodologies
The Reciprocity of the Virtues
Aristotle’s Virtues
Virtue
Virtues of feelings
• Courage
• Temperance
Virtues of external goods
• Generosity
• Magnificence
• Magnanimity
• Proper Pride
Virtues concerned
with social life
• Mildness
• Truthfulness
• Wit
• Friendliness
Sphere of Life
Fear/confidence
(Bodily) pleasure
Money
Honor
Anger
Truth-telling
Amusements
Pleasure in daily life
The Reciprocity of the Virtues
A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
36%
18%
18%
9%
9%
9%
Ag
re
e
ha
tA
gr
ee
So
Ne
m
ew
ut
ra
ha
l
tD
isa
gr
ee
Di
St
sa
ro
gr
ng
ee
ly
Di
sa
gr
ee
ew
So
m
St
ro
ng
ly
Ag
r
ee
0%
Aristotle’s Theory
Eudaimonia
The function
argument
Excellence in intellectual
virtues
Excellence in phronesis
Excellence in the moral virtues
The doctrine of the mean
All of the relevant parameters
Moral particulars; objects of moral perception
Structured by a series of practical syllogisms …
Top-down and bottom-up
As Sarah Broadie puts it, Aristotle
simultaneously offers two kinds of
answers to “what should I do?”
questions: there is a unified,
exhaustive answer from the
“architectonic perspective,” but
there are only particular answers
on the “ground level.”
Tragic dilemmas



Moral Perception
Practical Guidance
Moral Residue / Remainder
The virtues in moral philosophy
•
•
Many recent philosophers
have expressed renewed
interest in the virtues.
This interest has often
been accompanied by a
turn to relativism.
(VE) “An action is right if and only
if (and because) it is what the
virtuous person would not avoid
doing in the circumstances under
consideration.” (Timmons, 23)
The Relativism Worry
(ER) “An act (performed by
members of group G) is right if
and only if the moral norms
that are accepted by G permit
the performance of the action.”
(Timmons, 32)
(VE) “An action is right if and only
if (and because) it is what the
virtuous person would not avoid
doing in the circumstances under
consideration.” (Timmons, 23)
The Relativism Worry
(CS) “The rightness or wrongness of an action
may depend in part on facts about
the agent and her circumstances,
(ER) “An act (performed by
where her circumstances may include
members of group G) is right if
facts about the norms for what
and only if the moral norms
counts as constituting insults, a
that are accepted by G permit
person’s privacy, proper respect for
others, and so forth” (Timmons, 33).
the performance of the action.”
(Timmons, 32)
(VE) “An action is right if and only
if (and because) it is what the
virtuous person would not avoid
doing in the circumstances under
consideration.” (Timmons, 23)
The Relativism Worry
“[Any] virtue ethics which is ‘Aristotelian’
as described inevitably aims to stick close
to the author’s interpretation of
Aristotle, and interpretations of Aristotle,
in many of which relevant issues vary.”
• We can reject Aristotle’s views, e.g., on
women and slavery.
• We can also revise the list of virtues.
Hursthouse ON VIRTUE ETHICS, (1999), 9.
(VE) “An action is right if and only
if (and because) it is what the
virtuous person would not avoid
doing in the circumstances under
consideration.” (Timmons, 23)
Martha Nussbaum
(VE) “An action is right if and only
if (and because) it is what the
virtuous person would not avoid
doing in the circumstances under
consideration.” (Timmons, 23)
An Aristotelian Program
This is Nussbaum’s virtue ethical response to the relativism worry.
A two-stage inquiry
1.
Isolate a sphere of human experience that
figures in more or less any human life, in which
nearly everyone will have to make some
choices about how to act.
2.
Find a correct fuller specification of what it is to
act well in that sphere.
Nussbaum’s Spheres of Virtue
VIRTUE
SPHERE
1. Courage
Fear of important damages, esp. death.
2. Moderation
Bodily appetites and their pleasures.
3. Justice
Distribution of limited resources.
4. Generosity
Management of one’s personal property where others are concerned.
5. Expansive hospitality
Management of one’s personal property where hospitality is
concerned.
6. Greatness of soul
Attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth.
7. Mildness of temper
Attitude to slights and damages
8.a. Truthfulness
8.b. Easy grace (contrasted with coarseness, rudeness,
insensitivity)
8.c. Nameless , but a kind of friendliness (contrasted with
irritability and grumpiness)
“Association and living together and the fellowship of words and
actions.”
a. Truthfulness in speech
b. Social association of a playful kind
c. Social association more generally
9. Proper judgment (contrasted with enviousness,
spitefulness, etc.)
Attitude to the good and ill fortune of others.
10. The various intellectual virtues, such as perceptiveness,
knowledge, etc.
Intellectual life.
11. Practical Wisdom
The planning of one’s life.
The Relativism Worry
• Greatness of soul (megalopsuchia) is
Aristotle’s virtue concerned with
deservedly claiming great external
goods, such as honor (ENIV.3).
• Medial with respect to the vain
person (chaunos) who claims much but
deserves little, and the small souled
person (mikropsuchos) who claims little
but deserves much (EN1123b12-13).
• While Aristotle’s specific description
is reminiscent of “a certain sort of
Greek gentleman,” Nussbaum
argues that the account is objective
in the “features of humanness that
lie beneath all local traditions.”
Nussbaum (1993), 705-6.
Various Criticism
• J.O. Urmson : “[it] reveals what must be a view
of the ideal gentleman as visualized by
Aristotle and, presumably, by many other
upper- and middle-class Greeks of the fourth
century BC.”
• J. Burnet: “parody” of Greek ideals.
• W. Hardie accepts and apologizes for Aristotle’s
alleged relativism: “His moral ideals are the
product of his time and cannot be expected to
be adequate in the world of today.”
• W.K.C. Guthrie: “a few such characters (there
would never be many) might be no bad thing in
a city of excitable Greeks.”
• Bertrand Russell: “One shudders to think what
a vain man [chaunos] would be like.”
Greatness of soul: “features of humanness
that lie beneath all local traditions.”?
• Greek megalopsuchia
• Christian humility
Sphere: Attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth.
We can revise Aristotle’s theory and maintain an objective NeoAristotelian approach to ethical theory.
A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
ew
Ag
re
e
ha
tA
gr
ee
So
Ne
m
ew
ut
ra
ha
l
tD
isa
gr
ee
D
St
isa
ro
gr
ng
ee
ly
Di
sa
gr
ee
0%
So
m
St
ro
ng
ly
Ag
r
ee
0%