Download 3.45 Lefteris Kretsos, University of Greenwich. Governing Greece

GOVERNING GREECE.
THE EXPERIENCE OF SYRIZA
Dr LEFTERIS KRETSOS
UNIVERSITY OF GREENWICH
SECRETARY GENERAL OF MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS
@
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[email protected]
W
in
www.media.gov.gr
t
@MediaGovGr
CRISIS AND THE AUSTERITY
POLICIES IN GREECE (1) OBJECTIVES

First MoU signed in 2010; second in 2012

Common objectives:
a) internal devaluation.
b) primitive accumulation, i.e. violent
proletarisation of middle class/petit bourgeoisie.
c) a focus on increased competitiveness, rather
than increased productivity – i.e. wage reductions –
both in the public and the private sector.
d) fiscal adjustment
2
CRISIS AND THE AUSTERITY
POLICIES IN GREECE (2) OUTCOMES
400
30
40
200
180
35
350
25
160
30
300
140
20
25
120
250
20
100
15
200
80
150
15
60
10
10
40
100
5
20
5
50
0
0
Debt to GDP
0
0
GDP
2008
2014
Unemployment
2008
2008
2014
Gini Index
2008
2012
2014
3
REPRESENTATION CRISIS (1)

2010: First MoU signed by strong, newly elected social-democrat
government

2011: After losing several MPs, PASOK is forced to hand over to technocrat
government under PM Papademos

2012: Second MoU, snap elections called

May - June 2012: Tripartite coalition led by right-wing New Democracy –
SYRIZA main opposition party.

2014: SYRIZA wins Euroelections

December 2014: New Democracy unable to elect PoR, snap elections called

January 2015: SYRIZA wins national elections, forms government with ANEL

July – August 2015: SYRIZA reaches agreement with creditors, snap
elections called

September 2015: SYRIZA wins national elections, forms government
with ANEL
4
REPRESENTATION CRISIS (2)
Political parties’ electoral performance
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
PASOK
New Democracy
2009
May 2012
June 2012
SYRIZA
2015
5
GOVERNING GREECE: SYRIZA’S
UNDERSTANDING OF STATE AND POWER

Theoretically informed by the Eurocommunist
strand of political thought.

State and supra-national entities (e.g. EU), aim to
ensure smooth operation of capitalism.

Yet, they do not merely represent ruling class
interests: Their structures reflect the “material
and specific concentration of the power balance
between classes and class fractions” [Poulantzas,
1978].

A relational and dynamic understanding of power.
6
GOVERNING GREECE: POULANTZAS’
RELATIONAL AND DYNAMIC UNDERSTANDING
OF POWER

The State has “relative autonomy” from class interests

Neo-liberalism is a sign of “class imbalance”:
Bourgeoisie’s full-scale assault against the working class

Through the control of State apparatuses, the working
class may reverse, to some extent, this process

Same goes for supra-national state-like entities: the
extent to which working class gains access to its
apparatuses, reflects but also alters the balance of
power at the supra-national level (e.g. EU)

Important note: Poulantzas considers that, ultimately,
the battle is transferred at nation-state level; the EU
institutions, though, were very different in the ’70s.
7
GOVERNING GREECE:
SYRIZA’S OBJECTIVES

Undertake government, in order to radically alter
the balance of power in State apparatuses and the
Greek society.

Gradually put an end to the austerity dogma,
focusing on productivity increase and positive
stimuli to the economy

Implement major institutional reforms, in order to
move beyond the post-dictatorship Greek political
system (clientelism, corruption, state-tycoons
complex)

Develop in practice a new, successful paradigm for
the post-crisis Europe.
8
GOVERNING GREECE:
SYRIZA’S MAIN POLICY AXES

Arrive to a positive deal with creditors,
shifting focus from competitiveness to
productivity

Secure debt relief
“Parallel Program”:

Redistribute wealth towards the
weakest population strata

Anti-corruption, anti-clientelist reforms

Expand social and political rights
9
THE NEW BAIL-OUT AGREEMENT

Reduction of forecasted state budget
primary surplus from 4,5% to 1,5% for
2016 (the target has already been
achieved)

Recapitalization of Greek banks w/o
increase of public debt

Privatization fund will finance public
investment and welfare provisions for the
weak

Secures 35 billion euro public
investment, financed by EU up to 100%
10
THE NEW BAIL-OUT AGREEMENT (2)
Previous governments had agreed to
abolish eviction protection for
mortgage holders
Creditors requested the protection to
cover only 16% of households

SYRIZA expanded the protection to 60%
of mortgage-holding households.

Practically, only the richest 5% of
households risk their house being
auctioned, in case they are unwilling to
refinance their loans
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THE NEW BAIL-OUT AGREEMENT (3)
Creditors had requested a 23% VAT tax to
be imposed on education services.

SYRIZA dismissed the idea, taxing instead
gambling and alcohol. No VAT for
education.

Prior to the agreement, the SYRIZA
government had implemented a 100instalment repayment scheme for
citizens’ and companies’ debts to the
State/pension funds.
Creditors requested its abolition.

SYRIZA retained the scheme, assisting
indebted households and increasing state
and pension funds’ monthly revenues.
12
GREEK PUBLIC DEBT RELIEF
Although the 2012 agreement included
reference to it, discussion had never
been launched.

Today, stakeholders agree debt relief
“inevitable” – although different
responses on how to do it are noted.
Important to avoid the 2012 (PSI)
disaster.

The issue is expected to top the
agenda in early 2016.
13
WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION –
SOCIAL POLICIES

Humanitarian crisis program: Free electricity,
food and rent assistance for 300.000 families

No cuts in state-guaranteed main pensions

Protection of weak households under threat of
eviction

Increased financing of the public health
system – guarantee of free-of-charge,
universal access to it

Improved state finance will allow income tax
reduction from 2016
14
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

Increased tax-evasion controls (bank deposits
above 300.000 euros are being controlled for
tax evasion)

Incentives towards the use of “plastic
money”

Change in electoral system in a more
proportional direction

Dismantling the media-political economic
elites complex (regulation and licensing of
private TV stations, re-opening of public
radio and TV broadcaster)

A new culture in public affairs management
15
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Progressive penal system reform

Migration policy change: no “push-backs”, no
militarized detainment camps

Same-sex couples’ civil union, equal rights

Protest policing reform, less repression,
accountability of police officers
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PRESENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

Counter the recessive 3rd bail-out agreement measures

Fierce opposition to anti-corruption reforms by media
tycoons

Efficient management of public investment funds
required to boost economy

Migration issue: up to now, strengthened the hand of
Greek side – if internal EU borders close, risk of
“trapping” tens of thousands in Greece
17
Greece: Refugee Crisis in numbers
 Total arrivals (Jan – 02
Dec 2015): 746,714
 Top nationalities of
arrivals during November:
Syria: 45%,
 Afghanistan: 28%, Iraq:
11%, Iran: 6%
 More than 90.000 people
have been
rescued at sea.
 204 dead – 110 missing
Source UNHCR
18
INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ARTICLES ON MIGRATION WITH DIRECT
REFERENCES ON GREECE
Timespan: 1/9/2015 - 4/12/2015
No.ofArticles(reportage, analysis, opinionarticlesetc.)
USAMEDIAANDNEWSAGENCIES 404
BRITISHMEDIA
267
GERMANMEDIA
517
FRENCHANDEUMEDIA
210
SUM
1398
19
INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ARTICLES ON POLITICAL /
FINANCIAL ISSUES vs MIGRATION
WITH DIRECT REFERENCES ON GREECE
SUM 1/9/2015-4/12/2015: POLITICAL/FINANCIAL vs MIGRATION
%
1/9/2015 – 4/12/2015
%
1/9/2015 – 26/10/2015
SUM 1/9/2015 – 4/12/2015
%
26/10/2015 – 4/12/2015
20
TOURISM: THE SAFE ROAD TO RECOVERY
MORE POTENTIAL
EAST MEETS WEST - CROSSROAD OF THE ENERGY
PATHWAYS OF
EURASIA & CAUCASUS
AT THE GATES OF MIDDLE EAST
AT THE SEA CHANNELS TOWARD SUEZ, INDIA & CHINA