Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
MORE UPWARD AND ALSO MORE DOWNWARD MOBILITY? COMPULSORY SCHOOLING IN THE NETHERLANDS DURING THE 20TH CENTURY Wout Ultee - Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen Presentation in the Department of Sociology, Tel Aviv University February 24, 2005 1 In the 1990s it was found that only in Sweden and the Netherlands inequalities in education had decreased Some doubted the quality of the Dutch data leading to this conclusion New findings indicate that with sufficient statistical power, a trend towards smaller inequalities in education is present in other (post)industrial countries too 2 Previous Research on the Netherlands Loglinear models with educational distributions for fathers and children (sons and daughters) fitted with trend constraints on relative chances Educational inequality decreased according to: uniform association and diagonal densities 3 Present research: data Stacked file from 31 surveys 21,899 men/20,903 women; age over 25 Fifteen 5-year birth cohorts (1900-1974) Father’s education 4 categories (low – high) Daughter’s/Son’s education 4 categories (low – high) 4 Are questions about diagonal densities and uniform associations, or even questions about odds ratio’s, pertinent research questions given the theories at issue? A lower odds ratio may result from a higher odds to climb and from a higher odds to fall. What are current theories about? 5 Present research: hypotheses Four hypotheses from the field of stratification One from each generation of stratification studies 6 Zero-generation non-hypothesis There is a linear downward trend in uniform association and diagonal density This hypothesis at best is about some unspecified macro force 7 First-generation hypothesis A rising standard of living makes for lower uniform association and lower diagonal density This hypothesis is about the effect of a country characteristic, that is, about a macro force or factor 8 Second-generation hypothesis State intervention makes for lower uniform association and diagonal density This hypothesis is about effects of states 9 Third-generation hypothesis State intervention does not alter the density in the diagonal cell for the highest level of education This hypothesis is about the fate of elites in the hands of states 10 Embedding the four hypotheses in general sociology: How to derive macro hypotheses from micro hypotheses? 11 Zero generation hypothesis derived (post)industrialization requires more and more mobility, and this functional prerequisite is met Or: the increasing demand of employers for highly educated employees makes it worthwhile for employees to educate themselves and they therefore do so 12 First-generation hypothesis derived Persons differ in financial resources; and the relation between a country’s average income and its educational inequalities is an aggregate result of a general rise in income 13 Second-generation hypothesis derived Apart from individual actors there is an all powerful corporate actor: the state (Coleman about corporate actors) 14 Two possible derivations from the assumption of an intervening state: The implicit old one and The explicit new one 15 The implicit old one: States provide stipends etc. for children of low backgrounds and with outstanding intelligence to attend university 16 My explicit new one: States gradually raise the age until which schooling is compulsory for everyone: first only primary school, now also a long period in secondary school 17 Third-generation hypothesis derived Highly educated parents deploy strategies compensating for state policies raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends States are not all-powerful: (Elias about a spiraling process as a competitive outcome) (Bourdieu about compensatory strategies) (Hout & Raftery about maximally maintained inequality) 18 All in all, the odds to move up for persons at the lower end of the social scale increase, While at the time these odds increase, the odds for persons at the upper end of the social scale do not fall, but increase too. 19 Theoretical lesson Deriving macro hypotheses from micro hypotheses, makes clear that worthwhile alternatives are around 20 The age until which schooling was compulsory in the Netherlands changed as follows Since 1900 until the age of 12 years After 1948 until the age of 14 years After 1969 until the age of 16 years After the mid 1970s until the age of 18 years 21 Graph 1 Changes in Cohort Specific Association-Men Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling 1 2 3 4 intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 birth cohort cohort specific association GDP per Capita 1950 1960 1970 linear trend Age Compulsory Schooling Model includes one general diagonal effect for each cohort Homogeneous equal scalings for education 22 Graph 2 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal Effects-Men Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 birth cohort cohort specific association GDP per Capita 1950 1960 1970 linear trend Age Compulsory Schooling Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohort Homogeneous equal scalings for education 23 Graph 3 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonals 1 2 3-Men Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 birth cohort cohort specific association GDP per Capita 1950 1960 1970 linear trend Age Compulsory Schooling Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohort Homogeneous equal scalings for education 24 Graph 4 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal 4-Men Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 birth cohort cohort specific association GDP per Capita 1950 1960 1970 linear trend Age Compulsory Schooling Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohort Homogeneous equal scalings for education 25 Graph 5 Changes in Cohort Specific Association-Women Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling 1 2 3 4 intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 birth cohort cohort specific association GDP per Capita 1950 1960 1970 linear trend Age Compulsory Schooling Model includes one general diagonal effect for each cohort Homogeneous equal scalings for education 26 Graph 6 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal Effects-Women Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 birth cohort cohort specific association GDP per Capita 1950 1960 1970 linear trend Age Compulsory Schooling Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohort Homogeneous equal scalings for education 27 Graph 7 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonals 1 2 3-Women Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 birth cohort cohort specific association GDP per Capita 1950 1960 1970 linear trend Age Compulsory Schooling Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohort Homogeneous equal scalings for education 28 Graph 8 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal 4-Women Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 birth cohort cohort specific association GDP per Capita 1950 1960 1970 linear trend Age Compulsory Schooling Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohort Homogeneous equal scalings for education 29 Stipends etc. in the Netherlands Not only for keen working class boys Also for upper class girls, They are for everyone 30 Testing the third-generation hypothesis more severely How do macro variables influence uniform association and diagonal densities? Few states ever sought to increase the odds for moving down. Uniform association and diagonal densities derived from odds ratios Odds ratios made up from an odds for moving up and an odds for moving down 31 Hypotheses about odds Raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends, increases the odds for moving up. But what does it do to the odds for moving down? 32 Observed Odds: Upward Move from Level 1 to Level 4 intergenerational educational mobility 8 10 Men in the Netherlands 1900-1974 upward trend 0 2 4 6 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 birth cohort 1950 1960 1970 dots proportional to sample size 33 Observed Odds: Downward Move from Level 4 to Level 1 intergenerational educational mobility .8 1 Men in the Netherlands 1900-1974 no trend or a downward trend 0 .2 .4 .6 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 birth cohort 1950 1960 1970 dots proportional to sample size 34 Dutch questions, Dutch theories, Dutch data collection 35 Dutch questions Two large questions about societies; – Various inequalities – Several aspects of cohesion 36 Dutch questions: serach for wrong ones, enrich existing ones Questions should not be about odds ratio’s Questions should be about separate odds 37 Dutch theories Not factor sociology Versus Actor sociology 38 Dutch theories Not factor sociology Versus Actor sociology: There is a third alternative 39 Dutch theories * Factor or macro forces sociology - Industrialization - Technology - Ideology - Average income - General rise in education * Actor or individual sociology – Individuals – One goal – One shot decisions – (all powerful) state * ActorS sociology – Egos and their networks – Several goals – Sequential decision processes – (intermediate) collective actors 40 Dutch data collection Family Survey Dutch Population – 1993 – 1998 – 2000 – 2003 41 Dutch data collection Harry Ganzeboom Nan Dirk de Graaf Paul de Graaf Gerbert Kraaykamp Marcel Lubbers Ariana Need Wout Ultee 42 Dutch data collection Multi-Moment data Multi-Actor data Multi-Context data 43 Dutch data collection Multi-Moment data Multi-Actor data Multi-Context data 3 MAC data 44 Dutch data collection Series moments primary respondents – Job history – Educational history – Income history – Housing history – Religious history – Smoking history – Sport club history 45 Dutch data collection Point moments primary respondents – Parental, material, and cultural resources – Leisure activities at age 18 – Weight at age 25 and now – Relation with boss at every job spell – Relation with co-workers at every job spell 46 Dutch data collection Past and present attitudes of the primary respondent – Abortion – Foreigners – Homosexuals 47 Dutch data collection Actors – Primary respondent – Partner – Parent – Child – Sibling 48 Dutch data collection Actors – Partner same questionnaire as respondents to answer questions about the extent to which partner similarity is more than a byproduct of educational homogamy, and whether spouse effects are present 49 Dutch data collection Actors – Parental questionnaire as a check upon retrospective answers of the primary respondent – Additional questions about upbringing of primary respondent 50 Dutch data collection Actors – Child Questionnaire attuned to the issue of first generation upon third generation effects 51 Dutch data collection Actors – Sibling Questionnaire in main aspects the same as questionnaire for primary respondents, so that family effects can be estimated and the statistical power of models can be increased 52 Dutch data collection Contexts – Municipalities – Neighborhoods – Schools – Employers – Economic sectors – Sport clubs 53 Dutch data results Wim Bernasco Koen van Eijck Tamar Fischer Maurice Gesthuizen Christiaan Monden Hester Moerbeek Inge Sieben Wilfred Uunk Herman van der Werfhorst Maarten Wolbers 54