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Choosing Peace: Jimmy Carter and the Iran Hostage Crisis
From 1939 to 1975, a period of time spanning seven United States presidencies, there
were only 11 years during which the United States was not involved in a major military
conflict. When Jimmy Carter became president in 1977, the Vietnam War had just ended
two years prior. And two years later, on November 4, 1979, Iranian militants stormed the
United States Embassy in Tehran and took approximately seventy Americans captive.
This terrorist act triggered the most profound crisis of the Carter presidency and began a
personal ordeal for Jimmy Carter and the American people that lasted 444 days. Over the
next forty minutes-or-so, we will look at the origins and resolution of the Iran hostage
crises, and attempt to understand why President Carter, a military man who knew the
importance of a strong defense, chose not to wage a war against Iran.
Like other presidents before him, Jimmy Carter search for the delicate balance between a
strong military and an eagerness to work for peace. “As long as I am in the White
House,” he was once quoted as saying, “I will keep a strong defense. We build weapons
for peace to let the world know our nation is strong.” While that sounds like something
that all presidents should say, Carter was true to those words: since the Vietnam War, the
U. S. defense budget had decreased steadily but he INCREASED it every year of his
presidency.
In fact, the American military was in transition during Jimmy Carter’s presidency –
moving toward new weapons and tactics. A nuclear engineer by trade, Carter served
under Admiral Hyman Rickover, the father of America’s nuclear submarine program,
who placed Carter in command of one our country’s first two nuclear submarines, the
USS K-1. As a result, Carter was knowledgeable about modern weaponry and intensely
interested in the nation’s defense. He canceled expensive weapons systems like the B-1
Bomber and continued development of more practical and advanced weapons, including
stealth fighters and other bombers. They were closely guarded secrets during his
administration that are now indispensable tools of today’s armed forces. With that said…
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why did President Carter not respond more forcefully or effectively with regard to the
Iran Hostage Crisis? Let’s take a look at that . . .
The origins of the Iran Hostage Crisis began more than 25 years before President Carter
took office, in 1953, when the U. S. helped force out a democratically elected leader in
Iran and replaced him with Shah Reza Pahlavi. The Shah was a loyal ally in the Middle
East but led a brutal regime. Fleeing revolution, he left Iran in January, 1979. Gravely ill
by the fall, the Shah was admitted to the U. S. for medical treatment. Only a few days
later, on November 4, 1979, Iranian militants overran the U. S. Embassy in Tehran.
“For nearly a year the crisis handcuffed the administration, which tried everything it
could think of to end the standoff: suspending oil imports, freezing Iranian assets,
expelling Iranian diplomats, imposing economic sanctions, even conducting clandestine
negotiations.” (Brinkley, 10). Unfortunately for the hostages, their families, the United
States, and for President Carter, the hostages were not released until 444 days later, on
the day that Ronald Reagan was inaugurated the 40th president of the United States.
That’s the short version of the origins of the crisis. Here is the longer version . . .
On November 15, 1977, the Shah and Shahbanou of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and
Empress Farah, visited the White House. Before that evening’s state dinner, they
presented President and Mrs. Carter with a beautiful tapestry: the Gilbert Stuart likeness
of George Washington, which appears on the front of the U. S. dollar bill. In fact, that gift
is still on display to this very day in the newly renovated Jimmy Carter Presidential
Library& Museum, in Atlanta, GA. Although it was a first for the Carters, the Shah had
had a long, somewhat sordid relationship with the U. S. that predated the Carter
administration by many, many years.
Speaking of the Shah’s relationship to the U. S. Carter said “I continued, as other
Presidents had before me, to consider the Shah a strong ally. I appreciated his ability to
maintain good relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and his willingness to provide
Israel with oil in spite of the Arab boycott. At the time of his visit to Washington in
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November 1977, I was especially eager to secure his influence in support of Sadat’s
dramatic visit to Jerusalem, which had just been announced.” (Carter, 435)
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, began his reign in 1941, succeeding his
father, Reza Khan, to the throne. In a 1953 power struggle with his prime minister, the
Shah gained American support to prevent nationalization of Iran’s oil industry. In return
for assuring the U. S. a steady supply of oil, the Shah received economic and military aid
from the eight American presidents who held the office before Carter. This pre-existing
relationship is one of the reasons that Carter would later feel obliged to accommodate the
Shah when he fled Iran and sought cancer treatment here in the U. S.
Early in the 1960s, the Shah announced social and economic reforms but refused to grant
broad political freedom. Iranian nationalists condemned his U. S. supported regime and
his “westernizing” of Iran. During rioting in 1963, the Shah cracked down, suppressing
his opposition via his brutal police force, known as SAVAK. Among those arrested and
exiled was a popular religious nationalist and bitter foe of the U. S., the Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini.
Between 1963 and 1979, the Shah spent billions of oil dollars on military weapons. The
real price of military strength was his loss of popular support. On September 7, 1978, the
Shah declared martial law throughout Iran, following which there was a bloody
confrontation between police and protesting Muslims. Several hundred people were
killed. From that point forward, the strength of the demonstrator’s grew as they
demanded the Shah’s abdication. (Carter, 438)
Even after the Shah’s bloody crackdown Carter said, “Still, there was no question in my
mind that the deserved our unequivocal support. Not only had the Shah been a staunch
and dependable ally to the United States for many years, but he remained the leader
around whom we hoped to see a stable and reformed government organized and
maintained in Iran.” (Carter, 440)
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On January 16, 1979, the Shah fled Iran in exile, and on February 1, 1979, the exiled
Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Tehran from Paris and whipped upped popular
discontent into rabid Anti-Americanism.
On October 20, 1979, sixteen days BEFORE the U. S. Embassy in Iran would be overrun,
the Carter administration made the decision to admit the Shah to the U. S. for medical
treatment. “Zbig felt that it was better for us if the Shah would come to the United States,
so that we could demonstrate to the world our continuing support for an old ally.”
(Carter, 448) The Shah arrived in New York two days later and was admitted to New
York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, to be treated for cancer and gallstones. (Brinkley,
10)
According to Carter, “Cy reported to me on October 22: ‘The Iranian Government
reacted with moderation when informed by us that the Shah will visit the United States
for medical reasons. We have told them that neither the Shah nor the Shahbanou
[Empress Farah]… will engage in political activity.” (Carter, 456)
On October 31, 1979, Carter receives a memo from David Aaron, his Deputy National
Security Advisor. Written just 5 days before the embassy is overrun, the memo reflected
concern for an upcoming religious holiday/political demonstration in Iran to protest U. S.
policy and the Shah’s presence in New York City. While noting that a rally and march
were supposed to end at some distance from the embassy, Aaron also wrote “but the
chances of demonstrations or an attack there are considerable.”
Aaron noted too that contingency plans were in place for this, and that “The security of
the building has been greatly reinforced since February and is nearly impregnable short
of a heavy weapons attack. The Iranian police have promised to provide security for the
compound.” All of this came to a head on November 4.
On November 4, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Iran was overrun by 3,000 militants. They
took 66 Americans captive (3 of them 66 from the Iranian Foreign Ministry). Six more
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Americans escaped. Of the 66 taken hostage, 13 were released on Nov. 19th and 20th; one
was released on July 11, 1980, and the remaining 52 were released on Jan 20, 1981. The
hostages ranged in age from 21 to 65 years old, came from 26 states, and varied in
occupation from Marine guards, to a Private businessman, to an embassy cultural officer.
“Sunday, November 4, 1979, is a date I will never forget,” Carter would later write in his
memoir, Keeping Faith, “Early in the morning I received a call from Brezinski, who
reported that our embassy in Tehran had been overrun by about 3,000 militants, and that
50 or 60 of our American staff had been captured… We were deeply disturbed but
reasonably confident that the Iranians would soon remove the attackers from the embassy
compound and release our people” (Carter, 457)
At this early stage in the siege Carter says “It is not at all clear what the militants
wanted… As kidnappers, they seemed to have no clear ideas about ransom, except to
repeat the cry we had been hearing over since January 16 of the previous year – return the
Shah and his money to Iran.” (Carter, 458)
On November 5, day two of the crisis, Carter received a letter from Kenneth Bleakely,
President of the American Foreign Service Association. Blaeakely wrote Carter noting
that the AFSA “wished to emphasize that the protection of the lives and safety of the
individual Americans involved must remain the paramount concern of the United States
Government.” Carter’s approach to the crisis suggests that he either adopted, or already
wholeheartedly agreed with the AFSA about the primacy of hostage safety from the very
beginning of the crisis.
While many people agreed with the sentiment that the lives of the hostages should be put
first, according to at least one historian, “Carter had made a fatal error to state at the
outset that his primary concern was bringing the hostages home alive. The Iranians used
this to blackmail the Carter Administration.” (Brinkley, 10)
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On day three of the crisis, Carter makes a diplomatic attempt at ending the crisis via a
personal letter written to Khomeini. Delivered by Ramsey Clark and William G. Miller,
the letter asks that the Ayatollah “release unharmed all Americans presently detained in
Iran and those held with them…” Carter states “I ask you to recognize the compelling
humanitarian reasons, firmly based in international law, for doing so.” It is worth noting
that Carter also assembled a team and commenced plans for a possible rescue mission on
this day. (Carter, 459)
On November 8, Carter’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bob Beckel, drafted a
memo to White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, about congressional reaction to U.
S. Iranian students’ protests. After having briefed 200 members of the House on the
Iranian situation Jordan brought several observations to Beckel’s attention, two of which
were that:
1. “There is an extraordinary amount of hostility running through the Congress
toward the Iranian students in the United States – from left to right, Democrat to
Republican.” Also, “we are encouraged almost unanimously to stop all
demonstrations by Iranian students and to use our influence with local
governments to refuse permits across the country.”
2.
“Tom Harkin on the left and Bob Dornan on the right have joined forces to call
for the ouster of the Shah.”
The Carter administration decided against returning the Shah to Iran, but Carter began to
take more forceful measures, such as embargoing Iranian oil in November 11, now day
eight of the crisis.
By day 11, Carter issued an Executive Order Blocking Iranian Government Property, and
blocked delivery of $300 million dollars in military items to Iran.
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On November 17, 1979, day 14 of this crisis, Khomeini announced that the Iranians
would release 13 women and blacks “who were not spies” because women and minorities
already suffered “the oppression of American society.” With that said, two women and
one African-American did remain among the 53 hostages left. The Carter administration
reaction to this? “Mixed emotions.”
According to PresidentCarter, “We had sent strong warnings that the trial or punishment
of any hostage would bring serious consequences, involving military action, so we
viewed this release of thirteen of the hostages with mixed emotions.”
As the winter of 1979 turned to the spring of 1980, and negotiations failed to produce a
deal, frustrated Americans demanded stronger action. “No one can know how much
pressure there was on Jimmy to do something,” Rosalynn Carter recalled. “I would go out
and campaign and come back and say, ‘Why don’t you do something?’ And he said,
‘What would you want me to do?’ I said, ‘Mine the harbors.’ He said, ‘Okay, suppose I
mine the harbors, and they decide to take one hostage out every day and kill him. What
am I going to do then?” As interesting as it is to hear me relay this conversation, you can
hear it for yourself if you visit the newly renovated Jimmy Carter Library & Museum, in
Atlanta, GA, because Rosalynn’s comments are part of our new introductory film.
On April 7, 1980, day 157 of the crisis, President Carter makes an announcement about
Iran, addresses Congress, and issues an executive order. He announces punitive measures
against Iran such as breaking diplomatic relations with their government, closing down
the Iranian embassy and consulate, issuing sanctions against U. S. imports to Iran, and
using the already-frozen Iranian assets being held in U. S. banks to pay out damage
claims to the hostages’ family members. Deportation proceedings were started on Iranian
students illegally in the U. S. Iran, in response, decided to withdraw billions in U. S.
banks. Carter countered by freezing ALL Iranian assets held in U. S. banks.
So it was that 4 days later, on April 11, the decision was made to proceed with Operation
Eagle Claw, the hostage rescue mission. Interestingly, Cyrus Vance, Carter’s Secretary of
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State, tendered his letter of resignation on April 21, over his disagreement with the
soundness of the decision to attempt a rescue. Vance would seem to be vindicated 3 days
later, on April 24, when Operation Eagle Claw failed and 8 U. S. servicemen from the allvolunteer Joint Special Operations Group were killed in the Great Salt Desert near Tabas,
Iran.
On April 25, Carter addresses the nation via TV and takes responsibility for the mission’s
failure. Footage of this can be found easily on the World Wide Web. Speaking to the
timing of the rescue attempt, President Carter said “This rescue attempt had to await my
judgment that the Iranian authorities could not or would not resolve this crisis on their
own initiative.”
For those of you who are interested, Secretary Brown held a news conference during
which he went into great detail about the logistics of the failed rescue attempt, and we
have transcriptions of that conference.
Relatively little happened during the summer of 1980, as Iranian internal politics took its
course. In the states, constant media coverage – yellow ribbons, footage of chanting
Iranian mobs, even a whole new television news program, ABC’s Nightline, which had
been created on November 8 of 1979 – provided a dispiriting backdrop to the presidential
election season. For those of you who have seen the show Countdown with Keith
Olberman – the way that he ends each show, by mentioning the number of days since
President Bush declared ‘mission accomplished’ in Iraq – that little closing flourish was
stolen from Nightline’s countdown of the number of days Americans had been held
hostage in Iran.
In July of 1980, the Shah died, opening the door for a negotiated settlement between the
U. S. and Iran for release of the hostages that wouldn’t come until mid January of 1981.
On July 11, one hostage, Richard Queen of NY, NY, was freed because of an illness later
diagnosed as multiple sclerosis.
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On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran and Khomeini, realizing his nation couldn’t
take on 2 powerful enemies at once, became more open to negotiations that might result
in releasing the hostages. In January of 1981, Iran offers to release the hostages in return
for $2.5 billion in Iranian assets held by the Federal Reserve, along with $5.5 billion in
Iranian assets held in U. S. banks in Europe. Carter rejected that deal as blackmail.
On November 4, 1980, the one-year anniversary of the Americans’ captivity, and
Election Day, Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter in a landslide.
The crisis finally began to come to a close when Carter negotiated final terms for the
release of the hostages on January 16th.
On January 20, 1981, just after Ronal Reagan was sworn in as the 40th President of the
United States, the hostages were released. President Carter flew over to Weisbaden,
Germany, to welcome the Americans to freedom, on Jan 21, 1981.
In Unfinished Presidency, David Brinkley noted that “Fifteen years after the fact, Carter
said he still believed he could have been reelected if he had bombed Tehran until the
hostages were released or incinerated along with the entire Iranian government.”
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