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Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War and Spartan Supremacy Final Defeat of Athens Aegospotami in the Hellespont: Athenians lose 160 of 180 ships (405 BCE) Lysander, victorious Spartan commander: recall Athenians abroad; siege; capitulation after eight months (May, 404 BCE) Spartan Terms: Athenian fleet restricted to twelve ships Long Walls to Piraeus to be destroyed The Rule of the Thirty (pro-Spartan Athenians) Overthrow of the Oligarchic Regime Restoration of Democracy (October, 403 BCE) Aegospotami 405 BCE Athens: Destruction of the Long Walls (404 BCE) Lysias, Against Eratosthenes (12.5-7) Speech written for the Athenian citizen Manistheus under the restored democracy, between 394 and 389 BCE “When the Thirty, by the evil arts of slander-mongers, were established in the government, and declared that the city must be purged of unjust men and the rest of the citizens inclined to virtue and justice, despite these professions they had the effrontery to discard them in practice, as I shall try to remind you by speaking first of my own concerns, then of yours. Theognis and Peison stated before the Thirty that among the resident aliens there might be some who were embittered against their administration, and that therefore they had an excellent pretext for appearing to punish while in reality making money; in any case, the State was impoverished, and the government needed funds. They had no difficulty in persuading their hearers, for those men thought nothing of putting people to death, but a great deal of getting money. So they resolved to seize ten, of whom two should be poor men, that they might face the rest with the excuse that the thing had not been done for the sake of money, but had been brought about in the interests of the State, just as if they had taken some ordinary reasonable action.” Sparta in Control and Irresponsible Spartan Foreign Policy Imperial Sparta: Administrative Choices in Asia Minor and the Aegean: Harmosts (Spartan overseers). Decarchies (pro-Spartan councils of 10); ephors dissolve them by 396 BCE (Xenophon, Hellenica, 3.4.2) Agesilaus and the Eclipse of Lysander Agesilaus “Trojan Expedition” of 396 BCE (Xenophon, Hellenica, 3.4): Athenian Conon defeats Spartans at Cnidus with Persian fleet (August, 394 BCE) Asia Minor Greeks prefer Persia! Agesilaus’ “Trojan Expedition” 396 BCE (Xen. Hell. 3.4.3) “When Agesilaus offered to undertake the campaign, the Spartans gave him everything he asked for and provisions for six months. And when he marched forth from the country after offering all of the sacrifices which were required, including that at the frontier, he dispatched messengers to the various cities and announced how many men were to be sent from each city, and where they were to report; while as for himself, he desired to go and offer sacrifice at Aulis, the place where Agamemnon had sacrificed before he sailed to Troy.” Corinthian War (395-387/6 BCE) Pharnabazus, the Persian fleet, and Conon’s leadership (Athens refortified with Persian subsidies) Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos align against Sparta The King’s Peace (“Peace of Antialkidas”), spring, 386 BCE (Xen. Hell. 5.1.31; cf. Thuc. 8.43.3-4, 58.2): Leagues of Greek poleis prohibited Asia Minor Greeks to the Persians Site of the Battle at Cnidos: Athenian Commander Conon defeats Spartan fleet with Persian subsidy August, 394 BCE King’s Peace of 386 BCE Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.31 “King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace, upon them I shall make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money.” Spartan Abuses and Growing Greek Resistance Spartan Occupation of Kadmeia, Thebes (382 BCE) Sphodrias’ attack on the Piraeus of Athens (378 BCE) The Formation of the Second Athenian League in 377 BCE “so that the Spartans may allow the Greeks to live in peace, free and autonomous, with all their territory secure.” (decree of Aristoteles) Decree of Aristoteles 377 BCE: Constituting Second Athenian League Rise of Thebes and End of Spartan Hegemony Epaminondas and Pelopidas’ Military Reforms depth of left flank of phalanx oblique advance of right flank of phalanx coordination of hoplites and cavalry light-armed shock troops commander directs reserve force throughout battle Spartan force of 10,000 hoplites crushed at Leuctra in Boeotia (371 BCE) Theban Liberation of Messenia Spartan Failure: Historical Factors Parochial Preoccupations The Helots (Messenia) The Perioikoi Inadequacies of Spartan agoge (educational system) for foreign service Restrictions on Individuals; Failure to Exploit Individual Talent (Brasidas, Lysander) Polybius (ca. 150 BCE) on the Spartans Histories, 6.48 “Lycurgus secured the absolute safety of the whole territory of Laconia, and left to the Spartans themselves a lasting heritage of freedom. But as regards the annexation of neighboring territories, supremacy in Greece, and, generally speaking, an ambitious policy, he seems to me to have made absolutely no provision for such contingencies, either in particular enactments or in the general constitution of the state. What he left undone, therefore, was to bring to bear on the citizens some force or principle, by which, just as he had made them simple and contented in their private lives, he might make the spirit of the city as a whole likewise contented and moderate. But now, while he made them most unambitious and sensible people as regards their private lives and the institutions of their city, he left them most ambitious, domineering, and aggressive towards the rest of the Greeks.”