Download Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War and Spartan Supremacy

Survey
yes no Was this document useful for you?
   Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Document related concepts

Thebes, Greece wikipedia , lookup

Brauron wikipedia , lookup

First Persian invasion of Greece wikipedia , lookup

Sacred Band of Thebes wikipedia , lookup

Sparta wikipedia , lookup

300 (film) wikipedia , lookup

Epikleros wikipedia , lookup

Theban–Spartan War wikipedia , lookup

Theorica wikipedia , lookup

Peloponnesian War wikipedia , lookup

Ancient Greek warfare wikipedia , lookup

Spartan army wikipedia , lookup

Transcript
Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War
and Spartan Supremacy
Final Defeat of Athens
 Aegospotami in the Hellespont:
 Athenians lose 160 of 180 ships (405 BCE)
 Lysander, victorious Spartan commander:
 recall Athenians abroad; siege; capitulation after
eight months (May, 404 BCE)
 Spartan Terms:
 Athenian fleet restricted to twelve ships
 Long Walls to Piraeus to be destroyed
 The Rule of the Thirty (pro-Spartan Athenians)
 Overthrow of the Oligarchic Regime
 Restoration of Democracy (October, 403 BCE)
Aegospotami
405 BCE
Athens: Destruction of the Long Walls (404 BCE)
Lysias, Against Eratosthenes (12.5-7)
Speech written for the Athenian citizen Manistheus under the
restored democracy, between 394 and 389 BCE
“When the Thirty, by the evil arts of slander-mongers, were established in the
government, and declared that the city must be purged of unjust men and the
rest of the citizens inclined to virtue and justice, despite these professions they
had the effrontery to discard them in practice, as I shall try to remind you by
speaking first of my own concerns, then of yours. Theognis and Peison stated
before the Thirty that among the resident aliens there might be some who were
embittered against their administration, and that therefore they had an
excellent pretext for appearing to punish while in reality making money; in any
case, the State was impoverished, and the government needed funds. They had
no difficulty in persuading their hearers, for those men thought nothing of
putting people to death, but a great deal of getting money. So they resolved to
seize ten, of whom two should be poor men, that they might face the rest with
the excuse that the thing had not been done for the sake of money, but had been
brought about in the interests of the State, just as if they had taken some
ordinary reasonable action.”
Sparta in Control and Irresponsible Spartan
Foreign Policy
 Imperial Sparta: Administrative Choices in Asia Minor
and the Aegean:
 Harmosts (Spartan overseers).
 Decarchies (pro-Spartan councils of 10); ephors
dissolve them by 396 BCE (Xenophon, Hellenica, 3.4.2)
 Agesilaus and the Eclipse of Lysander
 Agesilaus “Trojan Expedition” of 396 BCE (Xenophon,
Hellenica, 3.4):


Athenian Conon defeats Spartans at Cnidus with Persian fleet
(August, 394 BCE)
Asia Minor Greeks prefer Persia!
Agesilaus’ “Trojan Expedition”
396 BCE (Xen. Hell. 3.4.3)
“When Agesilaus offered to undertake the campaign, the
Spartans gave him everything he asked for and provisions
for six months. And when he marched forth from the
country after offering all of the sacrifices which were
required, including that at the frontier, he dispatched
messengers to the various cities and announced how many
men were to be sent from each city, and where they were
to report; while as for himself, he desired to go and offer
sacrifice at Aulis, the place where Agamemnon had
sacrificed before he sailed to Troy.”
Corinthian War (395-387/6 BCE)
 Pharnabazus, the Persian fleet, and Conon’s
leadership (Athens refortified with Persian subsidies)
 Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos align against
Sparta
 The King’s Peace (“Peace of Antialkidas”), spring, 386
BCE (Xen. Hell. 5.1.31; cf. Thuc. 8.43.3-4, 58.2):
 Leagues of Greek poleis prohibited
 Asia Minor Greeks to the Persians
Site of the Battle at
Cnidos: Athenian
Commander Conon
defeats Spartan fleet
with Persian subsidy
August, 394 BCE
King’s Peace of 386 BCE
Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.31
“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should
belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the
islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great,
should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros;
and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But
whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace, upon
them I shall make war, in company with those who desire this
arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with
money.”
Spartan Abuses and Growing Greek Resistance
 Spartan Occupation of Kadmeia, Thebes (382
BCE)
 Sphodrias’ attack on the Piraeus of Athens (378
BCE)
 The Formation of the Second Athenian League
in 377 BCE
 “so that the Spartans may allow the Greeks to
live in peace, free and autonomous, with all
their territory secure.” (decree of Aristoteles)
Decree of Aristoteles
377 BCE: Constituting
Second Athenian League
Rise of Thebes and End of Spartan Hegemony
 Epaminondas and Pelopidas’ Military Reforms
 depth of left flank of phalanx
 oblique advance of right flank of phalanx
 coordination of hoplites and cavalry
 light-armed shock troops
 commander directs reserve force throughout battle
 Spartan force of 10,000 hoplites crushed at Leuctra in
Boeotia (371 BCE)
 Theban Liberation of Messenia
Spartan Failure:
Historical Factors
 Parochial Preoccupations
 The Helots (Messenia)
 The Perioikoi
 Inadequacies of Spartan agoge (educational system)
for foreign service
 Restrictions on Individuals; Failure to Exploit
Individual Talent (Brasidas, Lysander)
Polybius (ca. 150 BCE) on the Spartans
Histories, 6.48
“Lycurgus secured the absolute safety of the whole territory of
Laconia, and left to the Spartans themselves a lasting heritage of
freedom. But as regards the annexation of neighboring territories,
supremacy in Greece, and, generally speaking, an ambitious policy, he
seems to me to have made absolutely no provision for such
contingencies, either in particular enactments or in the general
constitution of the state. What he left undone, therefore, was to bring
to bear on the citizens some force or principle, by which, just as he had
made them simple and contented in their private lives, he might make
the spirit of the city as a whole likewise contented and moderate. But
now, while he made them most unambitious and sensible people as
regards their private lives and the institutions of their city, he left them
most ambitious, domineering, and aggressive towards the rest of the
Greeks.”