Download Jen Kissoore Thesis Synopsis

Jen Kissoore
Thesis Synopsis
Did Stalin win the Battle of Stalingrad or did Hitler lose it?
Josef Stalin’s leadership during the Battle of Stalingrad resulted in the Battle of
Stalingrad as seen from the implementation of a scorched earth policy, strategic use of the Stavka,
and counteroffensive campaigns of 1942 to 1943.
THESIS:
Argument 1: Stalin’s application of a scorched earth policy allowed the Soviets time to
regroup and reassess their military strategies while denying the German forces much
needed supplies.
Scorched Earth Policy- destroying and burning any supplies or anything that may be
useful to an enemy while retreating from an area.1
1. By implementing a scorched earth policy, and ordering the Red Army to retreat Stalin
bought Soviet forces time to adjust ineffective strategies. Stalin was able to recognize the
weaknesses and lack of preparation in the Red Army’s defences and implement a strategy
that was best suited for the Soviets.
“In case of a forced retreat of Red Army units, all rolling stock must be evacuated, the enemy
must not be left a single engine, a single railway truck, not a single pound of grain or gallon of
fuel…valuable property that cannot be withdrawn, must be destroyed without fail…”2
2. Through recognizing that the Soviet forces were not adequately prepared to fight, Stalin’s
implementation of a scorched earth pokicy proved extremely wise. German forces were
left to attck with no way of communicating and receiving supplies.
“While the Axis forces were advancing toward Stalingrad, Stalin deliberately ordered the red
Army to withdraw eastward, delay the advancing Germans, and buy time to assemble fresh
strategic reserves capable of mounting a counteroffensive.”3
-Sixth Army suffered more than 240, 00 losses in men due to the lack of supplies and
communication4
3. Strong leaders make the nest with the power and capabilities of their forces and Stalin did
exactly this in introducing scorched earth tactics. The Red Army was not sufficiently
prepared to combat the Sixth Army during the first year of battle. In utilizing a scorched
earth policy, Stalin ensured that the Soviets would have enough manpower and supplies
to continue to combat the Germans.This decision was the first step in securing the Soviet
victory.
“After more than a year of bitter defeats, the Soviet army was exhausted and demoralized but it
started to employ a new tactic-the fighting retreat- which put a strain on German supply lines.” 5
Counter-Argument 1: Hitler severly underestimated the capabilities of Soviet forces, and
did not send the Sixth Army with enough supplies to last through the winter making the
Germans susceptible to scorched earth tactics.
Argument 2: Premeditated Soviet military planning and execution by the Stavka resulted in
stronger Soviet campaigns.
1. Stalin’s Stalin’s use of the Stavka to assign strong generals to the Red Army led to the
Soviet victory because this ensured that Soviet forces were under competent control at all
times, in all areas. The strategic operations formed by the Stavka built on the scorched
earth policy of the previous year and further exposed the weakened state of the Sixth
Army.
“…the Red Army could not hope to defeat the Wehrmacht on the battlefield unless and until
Stalin, and the Stavka…were able to identify competent command cadre and assign them to
command its forces.”6
1
David Glantz. Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943. (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005.) 49
Michael, Gibson, Russia Under Stalin. (East Sussex: Wayland (Publishers) Ltd, 1972.) 93
3 David, Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943. (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005.) 29
4 Michael, Gibson, Russia Under Stalin. (East Sussex: Wayland (Publishers) Ltd, 1972.) 93
5 Bill, Barry, Stopped Cold at Stalingrad. (Weider History Group.) 99
6 David Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943. (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005.) 617
2
2. The operations planned by the Stavka allowed the Soviets to gain control of the strategic
initiative.
-counteroffensive launched in fall of 1942 (operation Uranus=> November 19) Red Army
surrounded German forces trapping them in Stalingrad
“Those offensives…quickly and violently shifted the strategic initiative into Red Army hands and
signalled the beginning of a distinctly new period of war.”7
-Stavka’s strategic operations “produced significant strategic gains but more importantly, paved
the way for even larger-scale operations in the future.”8 giving the Soviets the upper hand in the
battle both on the battleground and strategically.
“…the Red Army that the Stavka employed in the spring and summer of 1942 was far more
capable than its threadbare predecessors.” 9.
3. The Stavka were able to effectively exploit the weaknesses in the Sixth Army. This made
Soviet campaigns very successful.
“By playing that strength against German weaknesses, the Soviets were able to maintain a
reasonable correlation of forces and, ultimately, achieve their pre-eminent strategic aim of
conducting a viable strategic defence.”10
-Stalin was able to use a “seemingly inexhaustible supply of manpower”11 to the Soviets
advantage as two campaigns could be launched without over extending the Red Army.
Counter-Argument 2: It was the commanders of the Stavka, not Stalin who were
responsible for planning Soviet military strategies.
Argument 3: The Soviet counteroffensives throughout the winter of 1942 to 1943 overtook
the Germans, leading Stalin and the Soviet Union to victory.
1. September 4-December 29, 1942-Red Army launches a series of counterattacks that
decimates and isolates the Sixth Army in Stalingrad. These operations were co-ordinated
so that the first offensive encircled the Germans in the Northeast of Stalingrad (Sept.21)
and then in the Southeast (Oct.1). 12 By Dec. 19 the Sixth Army was isolated in
Stalingrad. 13
2. Soviet counteroffensives constantly forced the Sixth Army to react quickly to the Red
Army’s campaigns, resulting in weaker defences. As a result, the Red Army was able to
3.
wear down the Sixth Army.
The year 1943 “…marked the beginning of the end for the Germans. Never again could they launch a major
offensive…the Germans could only defend and delay, relying on scorched earth tactics, overtaxed Soviet
logistics and a tenuous defense to erode Soviet combat capability and impede the Soviet advance.” 14
Counter-Argument 3: Hitler’s poor military decisions and leadership made the Soviet
campaigns look more successful
Your thesis isn’t clear.
16/20
7
Ibid.
David Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History. (London: Frank and Cass & Co Ltd, 1992.) 125
9 David Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943. (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005.) 31
10 Constantine Pleshakov. Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War II on the Eastern Front. (Boston: Haughton Mifflin
Company, 2005.) 89
11
Constantine Pleshakov. Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War II on the Eastern Front. (Boston: Haughton Mifflin
Company, 2005.) 89
12 Richard Overy. The Soviet-German War. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/soviet_german_war_01.shtml. (November 16,
2007)
13 Ibid.
8
14
David, Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History. (London: Frank and Cass & Co Ltd, 1992.) 146.