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Managing Knowledge in the Public Sector: An Intergovernmental Response to the West Nile Virus Epidemic By John Zanetich * Department of Health Orange County, New York and Department of Public Administration and Policy The University at Albany – SUNY [email protected] Introduction The need to respond to a variety of environmental threats, such as natural, technological and terrorist disasters, is becoming a recurrent problem for government at all levels. To prepare for these catastrophic events, federal, state and some local governments have formed emergency management organizations, especially in those geographical areas where natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, etc.) and technological disasters (e.g., electrical blackouts, nuclear reactor malfunctions, etc.) are possible, if not predictable. Foresight and knowledge about the nature and course of a disaster permits emergency management organizations to plan and develop processes and procedures that can be used to ameliorate the disaster’s effects on individuals and groups. However, a sudden, unanticipated, catastrophic event, about which there is no scientific or experiential knowledge, is both bewildering and challenging. These events require government managers to quickly create and manage the necessary knowledge under conditions of extreme uncertainty. Since preparedness and response programs generally do not fall within the unique domain of any one particular agency or organization, intergovernmental collaboration and coordination are required. This is especially true for public health threats that have the potential to affect a large number of individuals across county and state borders. *The views expressed in this paper represent those of the author and not the organizations. In these circumstances, the knowledge and expertise of all levels of government are required to coordinate and integrate planning, preparedness and response initiatives. The management of necessary knowledge is essential for a quick, effective and coherent response to an environmental threat. The private sector has led the way in recognizing the value of knowledge management in dealing with sudden, potentially devastating unanticipated events. In that sector, environmental threats result from competitive forces, which threaten firm survival or profit. Attempts of competitors to win buyers over to their products, buyers’ and/or suppliers’ ability to exercise bargaining power and leverage, entry of new rivals into the market, and rivalry among competing sellers create turbulent environments which require a response from managers. Managers have looked to internal resources to help them in their task and have identified knowledge management as a core competency necessary for strategic action. A significant literature about knowledge management in the private, for profit sector exists and can be culled from the professional and applied journals in management, economics and the organizational sciences. However, the literature is silent on knowledge management in the public sector. This paper applies the private, for profit sector’s understanding of knowledge management within a firm to a public sector organizational response to an unanticipated public health threat – the West Nile Virus (WNV). First, I will present an overview of the onset of the West Nile Epidemic in New York State and the information gathering process used. Next, I will define ‘knowledge’ and knowledge management as it has emerged in the private sector and identify three important processes at work in the knowledge management process – storage, conversion and transfer. Then I will discuss these three processes in the context of the WNV. Finally, I will discuss the public sector’s use of knowledge management principles in the intergovernmental response to an epidemic. The New York Response to the West Nile Virus Epidemic Until August 1999, the West Nile Virus had never been identified in the Western Hemisphere. Some virus experts think that the leap of the WNV into North America from Eastern Europe and Africa is one of the most important biological events to occur in the world of viruses in the 20th century. Notably, until its occurrence in New York, the virus had not been fatal to its avian hosts. Moreover, the outbreak revealed the mobility of viruses and their propensity to move across continents. The experts do not know how the virus got to New York City and currently have little idea about its ultimate course. The ecosystem in New York is substantially different from the Upper Nile Valley in Africa where the virus originated and the middle European nations where a previous WNV epidemic infected thousands of people, and killed hundreds. Consequently, the presence of WNV in the United States was, and still is, shrouded in mystery and its course is unknown. Until 1999, there was no scientific, medical, epidemiological or public health knowledge about the emergence, transmission, or prevention of the WNV in the United States. Currently, public health officials know that in the summer and fall of 1999, the WNV killed 7 people and infected 62 people in New York State. Its existence has been confirmed in humans, mosquitoes, birds, cats, horses, bats and raccoons. Most importantly, the presence of this virus created a public health crisis that required an immediate response from federal, state and local officials. The absence of scientific, medical, epidemiological and public health knowledge about the emergence, manifestation, transmission, and prevention of the WNV in the United States posed a crisis to the public health community at al levels of government. The urgent creation of knowledge about the WNV in the United States was imperative to the development of preventative actions. New York City had been conducting an acute epidemiological investigation and mosquito control for what they thought was St. Louis encephalitis (SLE) from the midsummer of 1999 until September 3, 1999. Since the SLE has existed in the United States for decades, the “outbreak” remained a city problem caused by a known virus. On September 3rd, the Federal Center for Disease Control confirmed the presence of the WNV in the brain samples of two New York City residents who had died. The WNV was confirmed in the first human case in an adjacent county in New York State on September 24, 1999. With the confirmation of the unprecedented existence of the WNV in New York State and the spread of the virus to counties outside of New York City, Commissioner Antonia Novello of the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) immediately formed an organization composed of federal, state and local public health officials to set policies and direct the processes necessary to control the WNV epidemic. The organization was composed of Commissioners and Public Health Directors of the seven counties in the New York City Metropolitan Region, directors of other New York State departments with expertise in wild life and the environmental aspects of pesticides, as well as experts in vector borne diseases at the Federal Center for Disease Control. At the Governor’s request, the State Emergency Management Organization (SEMO) initiated a command center at the NYSDOH to assist in the effort. The organization formed by the Commissioner was unique in that (1) it would evolve over a two year period of time and have a limited “life span”; (2) it would be responsible for the creation and management of knowledge to control the virus; and (3) it would exist in essence or ‘virtually,’ though not in actual name or in a physical location. The organization’s learning and decision making occurred during telephone conferencing and regular use of other telecommunications technology (i.e., e-mail, secure discussion groups and specialized software). Meetings were conducted at a pre-specified time, accessible only through restricted codes and typically lasted an hour and a half. Due to the cold weather induced hibernation-like state for mosquitoes and the suspension of the transmission cycle of the virus, the virtual organization temporarily disbanded on November 12, 1999. Over the following winter months, over 150 people, including federal, state and local health agency staff, state environmental agency staff, university academic members and members of local environmental advocacy groups, participated in numerous learning and planning groups to prepare for the possible reemergence of the virus in Spring 2000. Once existence of the virus was confirmed in March 2000, the virtual organization was reformed. The initial response to the West Nile virus during the late summer, early fall of 1999, provided a unique opportunity to document the emergence of knowledge management in a public sector organization. As Deputy Health Commissioner of Orange County New York, I was a participant-observer of the emergent, virtual organization formed by state officials in 1999. During this time period, I collected information from the telephone proceedings of the organization (over 100 hours of meetings), kept detailed field notes, and collected complementary data from newspapers, magazines, e-mails, electronic discussion groups and websites, as well as memoranda and reports. I participated in work groups and had numerous discussions with co-workers outside of these groups about the etiology and medical implications of the virus and the means to prevent spread of the epidemic. Although policy-level meetings are generally characterized by secrecy and ‘insideroutsider’ distinctions, my position afforded me the opportunity to participate in the ‘birth,’ emergence and operation of a knowledge-intensive organization. My immediate colleagues in the local heath department knew of my role as participant-observer and I informed and received acceptance of my role by the leadership at the state level. Knowledge and Knowledge Management Data, information and knowledge are often used loosely to describe the same phenomena. To avoid semantic confusion and achieve consistency, this discussion begins with definitions proposed by Burton-Jones (1999) that will be used throughout this paper. Data are defined as any signals that can be sent to a recipient – human or otherwise. Data are context free in that they are the smallest differences that can be picked up by the senses. Data can always be shared among people because the receiver does not or cannot interpret them. Information is represented by verbal and written communications and involves the actions of sensing, collecting, organizing, processing, communicating and using the expressions of our own or others’ knowledge. Information, like knowledge, always encompasses an act of transfer or sharing among people. Knowledge involves personal understanding and interpreting. Knowledge can be defined as the cumulative stock of information and skills derived from the use of information by the recipient (Marchand, 1998). In turn, the value of new information depends upon the recipient’s prior knowledge. Without prior knowledge of an area, it is difficult to make sense of new data and information. The more knowledge we have about an area, the better we are able to use and evaluate new data and information about it. A two category, parsimonious, classification of knowledge has been proposed by Polanyi (1972), Popper (1972) and Nonaka (1994). Knowledge is either tacit (informal, uncodified and subjective) or explicit (formal, codified and objective). Explicit knowledge is transmittable in formal language and is easily communicated in the form of hard data procedures and practices. Tacit knowledge is not easy to express, is highly personal and hard to formalize and is rooted in the individual’s experience, attitude, values and behavior patterns (Gore and Gore, 1999). Explicit knowledge can be stored in different forms such as registers, libraries, databases and documentation. Alternatively, tacit knowledge is possessed solely by the individual in a direct and absolute manner and she is the sole arbiter of its use by others. Knowledge resides in people, and it is always personal. Individuals make choices about what and to whom they communicate knowledge. Knowledge can also be based on whether it can be made explicit or whether it remains tacit. Besides the inherent complexity of the subject matter, the critical difference between these two aspects centers on the ease or difficulty in codifying the knowledge in terms that is understandable by a broad audience. If it cannot be codified, knowledge remains tacit and difficult, if not impossible, to transfer. This characteristic of knowledge is known as ‘stickiness.’ Stickiness refers to the difficulty often associated with the conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit transmittable information. Some tacit knowledge is extremely difficult to communicate and, as a result, the transfer of the knowledge is complicated and, in some circumstances, impossible. For example, "socially embedded" knowledge sticks to the owner because it is deeply rooted in practice. Trying to move knowledge without its application in practice involves moving the knowledge (know-what) without the know-how. Hierarchy helps overcome the stickiness of knowledge to a unit or individual caused by the indivisibility of know how and practice (Brown and Druguid, 1998). In other words, superiors can require and make necessary resources available to convert tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. Since the conversion of knowledge is a context-dependent mix of tacit and explicit knowledge, conversion of knowledge involves managed interaction in context (Millar, Demaid, and Quintas., 1997). While stickiness slows down the conversion and transfer of knowledge, absorptive capacity refers to the ability of the recipient to assimilate and use new knowledge. The ease with which the recipient assimilates new knowledge is affected by the degree to which an innovation is related to the pre-existing knowledge base of the prospective user (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The absorption of new knowledge depends on the pre-existence of related knowledge. It is necessary to have some knowledge about an area to absorb new knowledge about it. And finally, for knowledge to be converted, transferred, absorbed and used, the recipient must (1) have time and space to self-organize and integrate the new knowledge with the existing knowledge; (2) engage in some form of interaction about the new knowledge; and (3) experience some fluctuation or change in their environment that necessitates the incorporation of the new knowledge (Nonaka, 1994). Tacit knowledge can exist solely in the minds of employees, in the “collective mind” of groups or divisions of an organization or it can be embedded in the structure of an organization (Argyris and Schon, 1996). Organizational knowledge will depend upon the knowledge of its individual members and will, like knowledge in individuals, develop incrementally. Organizational knowledge is not, however, simply the sum of the knowledge of individuals, it includes the knowledge across and within the organizational structure. Organizational knowledge at any single point in the organization is supplemented by the organization’s ability to exploit it (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In summary, knowledge can be either tacit or explicit and it resides in individuals, groups, and /or in the organizational structure. It can be sticky and difficult to communicate or encapsulated through codification and easy to communicate. In order for knowledge to be shared, the recipient must have some prior knowledge before new knowledge can be absorbed. Definition of Knowledge Management The definitions of knowledge management assume that knowledge (a) resides within individuals, groups and the organization; (b) is a discrete, discernable entity that can be captured in some form – behavior, language, processes and/or structure; (c) is subject to manipulation; and (d) supports strategic management intent. The components of knowledge management have been identified by both practitioners (Hackett, 2000) and various theorists (Pfeffer and Sutton, 1999; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Gore & Gore, 1999) and include: (1) generating new knowledge; (2) accessing valuable knowledge from external sources; (3) using accessible knowledge in decision making; (4) embedding knowledge in processes, products or services; (5) representing knowledge in documents, databases and software; (6) facilitating knowledge growth through culture and incentives; (7) transferring existing knowledge from one part of the organization to another; and, finally, (8) measuring the value of knowledge assets and/or the impact of knowledge management. As such, the management of knowledge can be used in the development and use of a strategy, as a means of defining expectations and influencing behavior, and to accumulate ‘value’ by treating knowledge as an asset. Definitions of knowledge management vary according to underlying assumptions. Argyris and Schon (1978) suggest that an organization is a 'cognitive enterprise’ that is made up of multiple structures including a knowledge structure. The characteristics of a knowledge structure are: (1) it is narrower than culture and climate; (2) it deals with goals, cause and beliefs; (3) it posses distinctive cognitive elements and (4) it is linked to an organization' s strategy for survival. Knowledge is closely linked to information and the definition of knowledge management stresses the importance of features and functions, such as data repositories, intranet and information technology, as well as the people who create and operate them. In this cognitive approach, knowledge management becomes akin to information management and focuses on the management of people and finding ways for filling in the data, information and knowledge gaps within the organization. Connectionists, such as Scarborough (1999), also view knowledge management in terms of employment and control, but suggest that the social and institutional conditions of the work process are shaped by endemic, multi-level conflicts and contradictions. Therefore knowledge management becomes a process of conflict resolution. Conflict at the institutional level derives primarily from the problematic relationship between the values of the economic institutions of firms and markets and the values of the knowledge producing institutions of science, education, and the professions. Conflict in and between organizations is created by the demands that occupational specialization and external networking place on the firm's division of labor (Scarborough, 1999). The specialization that is required to foster communities of practice in certain fields tends to create internal boundaries and rigidities among individuals and groups that can be interpreted in terms of autonomy versus control or maintaining organic social relationships versus complying with the requirements of a hierarchy. As a result, there is a clash between the corporate culture that captures the commitment of managers and the professional culture that socializes professionals. Knowledge managers are expected to mange this conflict. Finally, autopoietic theorists (Nonanka, 1994; Nonaka, Umemoto and Sasaki, 1998; Schuppel, Muller-Stewens and Gomez, 1998; and, Venzin, Von Krogh, and Roos, 1998) assume the world is not represented in knowledge but rather knowledge of the world is brought forth, created and shared by individuals. Knowledge is not something abstract and distant but it is embodied and personalized. Knowledge resides in mind, body and the social system. It is observer and history dependent, context sensitive and not directly shared. It is only shared indirectly through discussions. Since knowledge is not directly observable, the resource allocation decisions inherent in knowledge management cannot always be made explicit and, at times, they are hard to communicate. Knowledge management, from this perspective, is defined in terms of overcoming barriers to knowledge development and viewing the manager as a knowledge enabler (Ichijo, Von Krogh, and Nonaka, 1998). The potential impediments to knowledge development are mindset, communication, structure, relationship, and human resource management. Managing the dynamic, interactive and spiraling sets of processes (Nonaka, 1994) involved in the development, access and movement of knowledge is particularly evident in a knowledge intensive firm (KIF) (Bonora and Revang , 1993). In a KIF, employees undergo continual educational processes using teams as a means of socializing members into a ‘professional corps’ (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). This professional corps (a) engages in activities which internalizes a set of norms, values, models, knowledge and a professional language; and (b) trains its members to turn information and experience into knowledge (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). This knowledge, in turn, accrues to the organization, which manages it as an “intangible asset” (Mouritsen, 1997). In summary, organizations store knowledge everywhere – in people, in written documents, in operations and in organizational culture. Managers are faced with accessing, storing, creating and transferring the knowledge of an organization to achieve strategic objectives. Knowledge can either be embedded in the form of mental models, beliefs or perceptions that are so ingrained they are taken for granted and become difficult to separate from the individual (tacit) or knowledge is easily transmittable in the form of symbols (explicit). Knowledge about something can also be a combination of tacit and explicit knowledge that varies along a continuum between the polar extremes of tacit and explicit. Knowledge managers adopt strategies intended to develop a system that shares the tacit knowledge inherent in an on-going practice, and they create explicit organizational knowledge for future events (Zack, 1999). Chart 1 identifies the individual, group and organizational components of knowledge management. The knowledge management process is depicted in Chart 2. Chart 1. The individual, group and organizational components of knowledge management according to the knowledge continuum between tacit and explicit knowledge. * -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tacit Knowledge Explicit Knowledge HUMAN CAPITAL (Individual) SOCIAL CAPITAL (Team) CORPORATE CAPITAL (Organization) - Expertise - Networks - Intellectual Property (i.e.- patents and human resources) - Experience - Capability - Creativity - Capacity Adaptability - Relationships - Interactions - Language - Patterning - Processes - Databases - Flexibility Chart 2 The Knowledge Management Process *Adapted from Alex Bennet Department of the Navy 11/29/00 Presentation The Intergovernmental Response to the West Nile Epidemic The Existing Knowledge Base in the United States In September of 1999 when the confirmed diagnosis of WNV, only the Federal Centers for Disease control and some of the public health community had access to the explicit knowledge about WNV. Tacit knowledge in this area did not exist. The explicit knowledge was contained in foreign and domestic professional journals such as - The Romania Journal of Virology, The Indian Journal of Medical Research, The Lancet, Canada Communicable Disease Report, Journal of Vector Ecology, Journal of Infectious Diseases, and the Journal of Emerging Infectious Diseases. These publications dealt exclusively with the diagnosis, emergence and spread of the WNV in Romania, the Ebordelta region of Spain and the Middle East. This literature identified the mosquito as the vector for transmission and birds as the reservoir of the disease. The cycle of transmission was as follows – mosquitoes bite birds and either become infected with WNV or transmit the virus to uninfected birds. Infected mosquitoes then bite humans and transmit the disease. Infected birds develop antibodies to WNV and, over time, become immune to the disease. Infected birds in other countries did not die. Infected humans developed encephalitis-like symptoms and either recovered or died from the infection. Both explicit and tacit knowledge pre-existed on the generic collection of mosquitoes as a result of early experiences with other mosquito-transmitted diseases, such as malaria and the nuisance control of mosquitoes in residential and wetland areas of the United States. The control of bothersome mosquitoes also resulted in knowledge about larviciding (inhibiting the larval development) and adulticiding (spraying of pesticides to kill adult mosquitoes) for the control and elimination of these mosquitoes. The medical community had preexisting explicit and tacit knowledge on the diagnosis and course of treatment for other forms of encephalitis in humans. Other forms of encephalitis such as the SLE have been present in the United States for decades. Animal biologists were knowledgeable about laboratory diagnostic procedures for identifying diseases in insects, birds and other mammals. When the WNV was first diagnosed in New York in September of 1999, no knowledge about the etiology, course and prevention of the WNV in the United States existed. In the United States, explicit knowledge of the WNV on other continents existed, as did tacit and explicit knowledge about other encephalitic diseases, diagnostic procedures for humans, insects and mammals and methods and procedures for the control of insects. Thus, there was an existing knowledge base upon which new knowledge about the WNV in the United States could be developed and absorbed. The Storage of Knowledge Pre-existing knowledge about the epidemiological investigation, prevention, treatment and control of vector borne diseases, such as WNV, existed in certain individuals, groups and organizations in the United States in general and in New York State specifically. Since this paper focuses on the intergovernmental aspects of knowledge management only organizations and units of those organizations will be identified and used in the discussion. Chart 3 contains the organizations and units involved in the New York State response to WNV and indicate what was their stored preexisting knowledge. The Conversion of Knowledge Building on existing knowledge, new knowledge about the diagnosis, prevention and control of the spread of WNV was obtained by a combination of expertise and experience in respective specialty areas. That is, this new knowledge was tacit and required conversion. First, the new knowledge was shared among colleagues within a specialty area through conversations and the exchange of information. Although initial attempts at Chart 3. Members of the West Nile Response Organization and Stored knowledge Jurisdiction Federal Department Health and Human Services Department of Defense State Local Government Units Other New York State Department of Health Unit Center for Disease Control U.S. Military Academy at West Point Commissioner’s Office Metropolitan Regional Office Office of Public Health Information Systems and Health Statistics Center for Environmental Health Highly Infectious Unit, Wadsworth Laboratory Center for Community Health, Bureau of Communicable Disease Control Stored Knowledge Arbo-viruses, specialized pathological testing, epidemiological investigations Local conditions (located in Orange County, NY) Strategic planning, policy development, statewide coordination Policy implementation Local health programs and funding Information technology and data management Environmental health hazards Pathological testing of specimens Arthropod diseases, human diseases, epidemiological investigation New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets New York State Department of Fish, Game and Wildlife New York State Emergency Management Office New York State Department of Environmental Conservation New York City Department of Health Privately owned farms and stock Dutchess County Department of Health Nassau County Department of Health Orange County Department of Health Putnam County Department of Health Rockland County Department of Health Suffolk Department of Health Ulster County Department of Health Sullivan County Department of Health Westchester County Department of Health Wildlife Conservation Society Rutgers University Local conditions Birds and mammal pathological testing and surveillance Crisis and consequence management Pesticides Local conditions Local conditions Local conditions Local conditions Local conditions Local conditions Local conditions Local conditions Local conditions Community concerns Mosquito collection and abatement knowledge conversion used some pre-existing, shared scientific explicit knowledge, this explicit knowledge did not contain all information necessary for action. Since so much knowledge had to be converted under conditions of extreme urgency, the ‘shorthand’ implicit in tacit to tacit knowledge conversion was essential. This required the tacit knowledge of one individual to be converted to the tacit knowledge of another individual. As the knowledge was refined and validated it was converted into explicit knowledge. The explicit knowledge was codified in many forms including written procedures, explanatory memoranda, reports, comparative charts, maps and news releases. The new explicit knowledge was communicated to participants in written and electronic form. Subsequently, the explicit knowledge was combined to produce summary documents that were used to facilitate the internalization of this explicit knowledge into the tacit knowledge of individuals responsible for decision-making at every level of the organization. This knowledge conversion process is exemplified by the laboratory testing procedure used to confirm the presence of WNV in mosquitoes. Laboratory investigation into the likely geographic source of the WNV indicated 99% homology with a strain found in Israel in 1998 (existing knowledge base). The initial testing and verification was done by the CDC in consultation with professionals knowledgeable about the Israel strain of WNV. Through shared scientific language in both written and spoken forms, interaction between professionals created new knowledge (tacit to tacit). The staff of the CDC, then, developed a set of guidelines for laboratory testing of mosquitoes for WNV (tacit to explicit). After the guidelines were legitimized through internal processes, the CDC forwarded these guidelines to the NYSDOH executive staff, who in turn, forwarded them to the NYSDOH, Wadsworth Laboratory where they were integrated into existing procedures (explicit to explicit). Individuals at the Wadsworth Laboratory followed the new procedures and learned from their experience (explicit to tacit), and then communicated their findings to managers (explicit /tacit to explicit/tacit). Managers at the Wadsworth Laboratories communicated the meaning of the laboratory results to other managers (tacit to tacit) who produced memoranda and reports (tacit to explicit). These reports were forwarded upward in the organization for policy direction (explicit to tacit). This cycle is reflected in Chart 4. Chart 4. Summary of knowledge conversion process for laboratory procedures for identification of WNV in American mosquitoes Israeli mosquitoes with WNV (existing knowledge base) Policy makers set direction (explicit to tacit) Professional Consultation between scientists (tacit to tacit) Develop Guidelines for Testing (tacit to explicit) Managers produce reports for policy makers (explicit/tacit to explicit) Managers communicate to other managers (explicit/tacit to explicit/tacit) Adapted by Wadsworth Laboratory (explicit to explicit) Laboratory learns about WNV in US (explicit to tacit) The Transfer of Knowledge The transfer of knowledge within an agency is constant. Interaction between employees is necessary for action to occur and action toward strategic objectives is an expectation of the organization. During this interaction, tacit and explicit knowledge is being transferred between employees. Interorganizational knowledge transfer occurs in the same manner, but not with the same intensity or frequency as between employees. Representatives of organizations interact with the representatives of other organizations so that action toward their respective organization’s strategic objectives is taken. During this interaction, tacit and explicit knowledge is being transferred between organizations. An example of interorganizational knowledge transfer is the intergovernmental transfer of knowledge about mosquito testing procedures for the presence of WNV. The Guidelines for Laboratory Procedures developed at the federal level were transferred (sent) to the state. The NYSDOH executive staff received the guidelines and transferred (sent) them internally to the Wadsworth Laboratory. The laboratory applied them to specimens provided by the county and testing results were transferred (sent) to the county. Explicit and tacit knowledge is transferred through the two-way activity of interaction. Chart 5 depicts the intergovernmental transfer of knowledge about the laboratory testing of mosquitoes for WNV. Chart 5. Intergovernmental transfer of knowledge about the laboratory testing of mosquitoes for WNV Federal CDC Guidelines NYSDOH Guidelines and Directives Wadsworth Laboratory Results Local Government Unit Accepts Results and Submits Specimens The Knowledge Management Process within the NYSDOH Response to WNV The organization formed in response to the WNV in New York was not united by a hierarchical structure and unity of command, but rather by shared values, beliefs, responsibilities and commitment to a common cause, i.e. the prevention and control of an epidemic. No single organization, group, or individual was in charge. However, all members of the organization were committed to the same outcome. The absence of a unifying command structure which assumes authority over all members is a result of the intergovernmental nature of the group, and excludes the use of typical access and control activities commonly found in the private sector knowledge management process. Knowledge management in the WNV organization was multilayered, multifaceted, and comprised of cognition, actions, and resources. Knowledge management occurred within the context of a socially constructed and embedded social network and community of practice. All agencies involved in the WNV response organization had pre-existing relationships. These relationships were formed over an extended period of time as a result of a diverse set of funding mechanisms (i.e., grants, deficit funding formulas, as well as complementary and jointly funded program initiatives), and overlapping governmental jurisdictions (federal, state and local), as well as membership in professional and intergovernmental organizations (such as the intergovernmental task forces, the National Academy of Medicine, and various societies for epidemiologists, public health practitioners, and public health researchers). Embedded in these relationships was a basic understanding of the differences among members’ area of responsibility, resource availability and expertise. In such circumstances, where there is no unifying command structure, the practice of knowledge management is not directive and exploitative. Rather knowledge management focuses on the elimination of barriers to the storage, conversion and transfer of knowledge. In the WNV Response organization, barriers to the exercise of knowledge management resulted from (a) the bureaucratic determination of job duties and reporting relationships within each agency, (b) the different language customs between agencies, (c) the incompatibility of communication systems both within and between agencies, and (d) the storage of relevant knowledge in diverse locations within and between organizations. Management of the knowledge-intensive organization required the empowerment of knowledge workers at all levels in all locations, as well as legitimating the role of knowledge enablers in resolving conflict between components and in facilitating the exchange of knowledge that is communicated through information systems, programs, routines and managerial interchanges. The varying levels of participating agencies and the lack of directives defining required actions in the WNV Response organization attests to (1) the “team” nature of the WNV Response organization and (2) the enabling function (rather than the directive function) of knowledge management within this organization. Discussion Research in the private sector indicates that managers of organizations adopt strategies intended to efficiently and effectively (1) share an individual’s unique knowledge (tacit) from an ongoing practice to create written (explicit) knowledge for use by the organization in future events; (2) transfer written (explicit) knowledge among and between individuals, units, departments and agencies; (3) create space for the interpersonal transfer of know-how (tacit knowledge); and (4) design work practices which permit individuals to self–organize and thereby create know-how (tacit knowledge) from written materials (explicit knowledge). The case of knowledge management in the response to the West Nile Virus suggests that the purpose of knowledge management in intergovernmental organizations closely resembles the purpose of knowledge management in the private, for profit sector. However, the process and activities involved in knowledge management different substantially between intergovernmental public sector organizations and the network or alliances of the private sector. One might assume that the nature and significance of public-sector work as well as the pre-existence of communities of practice in the public sector contribute to sector differences. Knowledge creation in intergovernmental organizations can be supported and nurtured but it cannot be managed or constructed according to a formula. The WNV Response Organization emerged from the existing public health community of practice. This new organization was faced with 4 key challenges: (1) the technical challenge- to design human and information systems that not only make information available, but also help community members think together; (2) the social challenge - to develop communities that share knowledge and still maintain diversity of thought to encourage thinking rather than sophisticated copying; (3) the management challenge - to create an environment that truly values sharing knowledge; and (4) the personal challenge- to be open to the ideas of others, willingness to share ideas, and maintenance of a thirst for new knowledge. By linking diverse agencies with different belief systems and different practices into a cohesive, hybrid organization, the limits of each agency’s knowledge are challenged. This challenge generates new knowledge through what Hirschhorn (1997) calls the "productive tension" and what Leonard-Barton (1995) call "creative abrasion". The conflict caused by the interaction pushes particular agencies and local communities of practice beyond their own limits. The productive side of organizational tension draws from experience from throughout the organization, and produces knowledge that requires systematic, not individual explanation. The distribution of knowledge within an organization reflects the social division of labor. As Adam Smith explained, the division of labor is a source of dynamism and efficiency. Consequently, specialized groups produce specialized knowledge. The tasks undertaken by communities of practice develop particular, localized and highly specialized knowledge within the community. This knowledge is as divided as the labor that produces it. If the division of labor produces the division of knowledge, then it would seem reasonable that the same method used to coordinate the division of labor (either markets or hierarchies) could be used to coordinate the knowledge. But markets work best with commodities and hierarchies, which rely on authority and control. In the absence of markets and hierarchies, knowledge management is best understood in terms of conflict resolution. Knowledge management in intergovernmental organizations can be viewed as conflict resolution. When different agencies must interact to produce knowledge, a natural by-product of this interaction is conflict. Organizational conflicts created by knowledge work are associated with the demands that occupational specialization and external networking place on the division of labor. Knowledge creation and transfer occurs at the interface of two or more agencies within the same community of practice. These agencies may be composed of functional divisions, professional affiliations, and networked organizations. These differences produce a misalignment in processes and gaps in knowledge, which must be resolved for knowledge conversion and transfer to occur. The impetus for conflict resolution comes from the nature and significance of the work performed and the commitment to a shared vision. The introduction of a new virus that was unknown and unanticipated by the public health community of practice in the New York State created a shared vision. All agencies that were members of the virtual WNV Response Organization shared the same vision, were members of the same community of practice and were familiar with the ways to work cooperatively to achieve the desired outcome. Conclusions The case of the intergovernmental response to the WNV in New York State indicates that knowledge management does occur in the public sector. This paper presented examples of how knowledge is stored and created at various levels of government, and how knowledge is converted and transferred through the interactions among different agencies united by a common objective. However, the way in which knowledge is managed in the public and private sectors differ. Intergovernmental knowledge management lacks the unity of command and management control present in the public sector. The public sector has established, long standing communities of practice that are formed by the accountability of government for the health and welfare of its constituents. For communities of practice, shared values become the anchor for generating commitment and cooperation. When values are created together and truly shared, order is achieved and decisions are made without position power and excessive rules. Knowledge management within communities of practice requires the recognition and use of knowledge workers and knowledge enablers as critical components in the process. In the absence of unity of command and management control, knowledge managers rely on the organizational dynamics and the activities of knowledge workers and enablers in communities of practice to store, convert and transfer knowledge. 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