Download An Intergovernmental Response to the West Nile Virus Epidemic

Managing Knowledge in the Public Sector:
An Intergovernmental Response to the West Nile Virus Epidemic
By
John Zanetich *
Department of Health
Orange County, New York
and
Department of Public Administration and Policy
The University at Albany – SUNY
[email protected]
Introduction
The need to respond to a variety of environmental threats, such as natural,
technological and terrorist disasters, is becoming a recurrent problem for government at
all levels. To prepare for these catastrophic events, federal, state and some local
governments have formed emergency management organizations, especially in those
geographical areas where natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, etc.)
and technological disasters (e.g., electrical blackouts, nuclear reactor malfunctions, etc.)
are possible, if not predictable. Foresight and knowledge about the nature and course of a
disaster permits emergency management organizations to plan and develop processes and
procedures that can be used to ameliorate the disaster’s effects on individuals and groups.
However, a sudden, unanticipated, catastrophic event, about which there is no scientific
or experiential knowledge, is both bewildering and challenging. These events require
government managers to quickly create and manage the necessary knowledge under
conditions of extreme uncertainty.
Since preparedness and response programs generally do not fall within the unique
domain of any one particular agency or organization, intergovernmental collaboration
and coordination are required. This is especially true for public health threats that have
the potential to affect a large number of individuals across county and state borders.
*The views expressed in this paper represent those of the author and not the organizations.
In these circumstances, the knowledge and expertise of all levels of government are
required to coordinate and integrate planning, preparedness and response initiatives. The
management of necessary knowledge is essential for a quick, effective and coherent
response to an environmental threat.
The private sector has led the way in recognizing the value of knowledge
management in dealing with sudden, potentially devastating unanticipated events. In that
sector, environmental threats result from competitive forces, which threaten firm survival
or profit. Attempts of competitors to win buyers over to their products, buyers’ and/or
suppliers’ ability to exercise bargaining power and leverage, entry of new rivals into the
market, and rivalry among competing sellers create turbulent environments which require
a response from managers. Managers have looked to internal resources to help them in
their task and have identified knowledge management as a core competency necessary for
strategic action. A significant literature about knowledge management in the private, for
profit sector exists and can be culled from the professional and applied journals in
management, economics and the organizational sciences. However, the literature is silent
on knowledge management in the public sector.
This paper applies the private, for profit sector’s understanding of knowledge
management within a firm to a public sector organizational response to an unanticipated
public health threat – the West Nile Virus (WNV). First, I will present an overview of the
onset of the West Nile Epidemic in New York State and the information gathering
process used. Next, I will define ‘knowledge’ and knowledge management as it has
emerged in the private sector and identify three important processes at work in the
knowledge management process – storage, conversion and transfer. Then I will discuss
these three processes in the context of the WNV. Finally, I will discuss the public sector’s
use of knowledge management principles in the intergovernmental response to an
epidemic.
The New York Response to the West Nile Virus Epidemic
Until August 1999, the West Nile Virus had never been identified in the Western
Hemisphere. Some virus experts think that the leap of the WNV into North America
from Eastern Europe and Africa is one of the most important biological events to occur in
the world of viruses in the 20th century. Notably, until its occurrence in New York, the
virus had not been fatal to its avian hosts. Moreover, the outbreak revealed the mobility
of viruses and their propensity to move across continents.
The experts do not know how the virus got to New York City and currently have
little idea about its ultimate course. The ecosystem in New York is substantially different
from the Upper Nile Valley in Africa where the virus originated and the middle European
nations where a previous WNV epidemic infected thousands of people, and killed
hundreds. Consequently, the presence of WNV in the United States was, and still is,
shrouded in mystery and its course is unknown. Until 1999, there was no scientific,
medical, epidemiological or public health knowledge about the emergence, transmission,
or prevention of the WNV in the United States.
Currently, public health officials know that in the summer and fall of 1999, the
WNV killed 7 people and infected 62 people in New York State. Its existence has been
confirmed in humans, mosquitoes, birds, cats, horses, bats and raccoons. Most
importantly, the presence of this virus created a public health crisis that required an
immediate response from federal, state and local officials.
The absence of scientific, medical, epidemiological and public health knowledge
about the emergence, manifestation, transmission, and prevention of the WNV in the
United States posed a crisis to the public health community at al levels of government.
The urgent creation of knowledge about the WNV in the United States was imperative to
the development of preventative actions.
New York City had been conducting an acute epidemiological investigation and
mosquito control for what they thought was St. Louis encephalitis (SLE) from the midsummer of 1999 until September 3, 1999. Since the SLE has existed in the United States
for decades, the “outbreak” remained a city problem caused by a known virus. On
September 3rd, the Federal Center for Disease Control confirmed the presence of the
WNV in the brain samples of two New York City residents who had died. The WNV was
confirmed in the first human case in an adjacent county in New York State on September
24, 1999.
With the confirmation of the unprecedented existence of the WNV in New York
State and the spread of the virus to counties outside of New York City, Commissioner
Antonia Novello of the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) immediately
formed an organization composed of federal, state and local public health officials to set
policies and direct the processes necessary to control the WNV epidemic. The
organization was composed of Commissioners and Public Health Directors of the seven
counties in the New York City Metropolitan Region, directors of other New York State
departments with expertise in wild life and the environmental aspects of pesticides, as
well as experts in vector borne diseases at the Federal Center for Disease Control. At the
Governor’s request, the State Emergency Management Organization (SEMO) initiated a
command center at the NYSDOH to assist in the effort.
The organization formed by the Commissioner was unique in that (1) it would
evolve over a two year period of time and have a limited “life span”; (2) it would be
responsible for the creation and management of knowledge to control the virus; and (3) it
would exist in essence or ‘virtually,’ though not in actual name or in a physical location.
The organization’s learning and decision making occurred during telephone conferencing
and regular use of other telecommunications technology (i.e., e-mail, secure discussion
groups and specialized software). Meetings were conducted at a pre-specified time,
accessible only through restricted codes and typically lasted an hour and a half.
Due to the cold weather induced hibernation-like state for mosquitoes and the
suspension of the transmission cycle of the virus, the virtual organization temporarily
disbanded on November 12, 1999. Over the following winter months, over 150 people,
including federal, state and local health agency staff, state environmental agency staff,
university academic members and members of local environmental advocacy groups,
participated in numerous learning and planning groups to prepare for the possible
reemergence of the virus in Spring 2000. Once existence of the virus was confirmed in
March 2000, the virtual organization was reformed. The initial response to the West Nile
virus during the late summer, early fall of 1999, provided a unique opportunity to
document the emergence of knowledge management in a public sector organization.
As Deputy Health Commissioner of Orange County New York, I was a
participant-observer of the emergent, virtual organization formed by state officials in
1999. During this time period, I collected information from the telephone proceedings of
the organization (over 100 hours of meetings), kept detailed field notes, and collected
complementary data from newspapers, magazines, e-mails, electronic discussion groups
and websites, as well as memoranda and reports. I participated in work groups and had
numerous discussions with co-workers outside of these groups about the etiology and
medical implications of the virus and the means to prevent spread of the epidemic.
Although policy-level meetings are generally characterized by secrecy and ‘insideroutsider’ distinctions, my position afforded me the opportunity to participate in the
‘birth,’ emergence and operation of a knowledge-intensive organization. My immediate
colleagues in the local heath department knew of my role as participant-observer and I
informed and received acceptance of my role by the leadership at the state level.
Knowledge and Knowledge Management
Data, information and knowledge are often used loosely to describe the same
phenomena. To avoid semantic confusion and achieve consistency, this discussion begins
with definitions proposed by Burton-Jones (1999) that will be used throughout this paper.
Data are defined as any signals that can be sent to a recipient – human or otherwise. Data
are context free in that they are the smallest differences that can be picked up by the
senses. Data can always be shared among people because the receiver does not or cannot
interpret them.
Information is represented by verbal and written communications and involves the
actions of sensing, collecting, organizing, processing, communicating and using the
expressions of our own or others’ knowledge. Information, like knowledge, always
encompasses an act of transfer or sharing among people.
Knowledge involves personal understanding and interpreting. Knowledge can be
defined as the cumulative stock of information and skills derived from the use of
information by the recipient (Marchand, 1998).
In turn, the value of new information depends upon the recipient’s prior
knowledge. Without prior knowledge of an area, it is difficult to make sense of new data
and information. The more knowledge we have about an area, the better we are able to
use and evaluate new data and information about it.
A two category, parsimonious, classification of knowledge has been proposed by
Polanyi (1972), Popper (1972) and Nonaka (1994). Knowledge is either tacit (informal,
uncodified and subjective) or explicit (formal, codified and objective). Explicit
knowledge is transmittable in formal language and is easily communicated in the form of
hard data procedures and practices. Tacit knowledge is not easy to express, is highly
personal and hard to formalize and is rooted in the individual’s experience, attitude,
values and behavior patterns (Gore and Gore, 1999). Explicit knowledge can be stored in
different forms such as registers, libraries, databases and documentation. Alternatively,
tacit knowledge is possessed solely by the individual in a direct and absolute manner and
she is the sole arbiter of its use by others. Knowledge resides in people, and it is always
personal. Individuals make choices about what and to whom they communicate
knowledge.
Knowledge can also be based on whether it can be made explicit or whether it
remains tacit. Besides the inherent complexity of the subject matter, the critical difference
between these two aspects centers on the ease or difficulty in codifying the knowledge in
terms that is understandable by a broad audience. If it cannot be codified, knowledge
remains tacit and difficult, if not impossible, to transfer. This characteristic of knowledge
is known as ‘stickiness.’
Stickiness refers to the difficulty often associated with the conversion of tacit
knowledge into explicit transmittable information. Some tacit knowledge is extremely
difficult to communicate and, as a result, the transfer of the knowledge is complicated
and, in some circumstances, impossible. For example, "socially embedded" knowledge
sticks to the owner because it is deeply rooted in practice. Trying to move knowledge
without its application in practice involves moving the knowledge (know-what) without
the know-how. Hierarchy helps overcome the stickiness of knowledge to a unit or
individual caused by the indivisibility of know how and practice (Brown and Druguid,
1998). In other words, superiors can require and make necessary resources available to
convert tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. Since the conversion of knowledge is a
context-dependent mix of tacit and explicit knowledge, conversion of knowledge
involves managed interaction in context (Millar, Demaid, and Quintas., 1997).
While stickiness slows down the conversion and transfer of knowledge,
absorptive capacity refers to the ability of the recipient to assimilate and use new
knowledge. The ease with which the recipient assimilates new knowledge is affected by
the degree to which an innovation is related to the pre-existing knowledge base of the
prospective user (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The absorption of new knowledge
depends on the pre-existence of related knowledge. It is necessary to have some
knowledge about an area to absorb new knowledge about it. And finally, for knowledge
to be converted, transferred, absorbed and used, the recipient must (1) have time and
space to self-organize and integrate the new knowledge with the existing knowledge; (2)
engage in some form of interaction about the new knowledge; and (3) experience some
fluctuation or change in their environment that necessitates the incorporation of the new
knowledge (Nonaka, 1994).
Tacit knowledge can exist solely in the minds of employees, in the “collective
mind” of groups or divisions of an organization or it can be embedded in the structure of
an organization (Argyris and Schon, 1996). Organizational knowledge will depend upon
the knowledge of its individual members and will, like knowledge in individuals, develop
incrementally. Organizational knowledge is not, however, simply the sum of the
knowledge of individuals, it includes the knowledge across and within the organizational
structure. Organizational knowledge at any single point in the organization is
supplemented by the organization’s ability to exploit it (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
In summary, knowledge can be either tacit or explicit and it resides in individuals,
groups, and /or in the organizational structure. It can be sticky and difficult to
communicate or encapsulated through codification and easy to communicate. In order for
knowledge to be shared, the recipient must have some prior knowledge before new
knowledge can be absorbed.
Definition of Knowledge Management
The definitions of knowledge management assume that knowledge (a) resides
within individuals, groups and the organization; (b) is a discrete, discernable entity that
can be captured in some form – behavior, language, processes and/or structure; (c) is
subject to manipulation; and (d) supports strategic management intent. The components
of knowledge management have been identified by both practitioners (Hackett, 2000) and
various theorists (Pfeffer and Sutton, 1999; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Gore & Gore, 1999)
and include: (1) generating new knowledge; (2) accessing valuable knowledge from
external sources; (3) using accessible knowledge in decision making; (4) embedding
knowledge in processes, products or services; (5) representing knowledge in documents,
databases and software; (6) facilitating knowledge growth through culture and incentives;
(7) transferring existing knowledge from one part of the organization to another; and,
finally, (8) measuring the value of knowledge assets and/or the impact of knowledge
management. As such, the management of knowledge can be used in the development
and use of a strategy, as a means of defining expectations and influencing behavior, and
to accumulate ‘value’ by treating knowledge as an asset.
Definitions of knowledge management vary according to underlying assumptions.
Argyris and Schon (1978) suggest that an organization is a 'cognitive enterprise’ that is
made up of multiple structures including a knowledge structure. The characteristics of a
knowledge structure are: (1) it is narrower than culture and climate; (2) it deals with
goals, cause and beliefs; (3) it posses distinctive cognitive elements and (4) it is linked to
an organization' s strategy for survival. Knowledge is closely linked to information and
the definition of knowledge management stresses the importance of features and
functions, such as data repositories, intranet and information technology, as well as the
people who create and operate them. In this cognitive approach, knowledge management
becomes akin to information management and focuses on the management of people and
finding ways for filling in the data, information and knowledge gaps within the
organization.
Connectionists, such as Scarborough (1999), also view knowledge management in
terms of employment and control, but suggest that the social and institutional conditions
of the work process are shaped by endemic, multi-level conflicts and contradictions.
Therefore knowledge management becomes a process of conflict resolution. Conflict at
the institutional level derives primarily from the problematic relationship between the
values of the economic institutions of firms and markets and the values of the
knowledge producing institutions of science, education, and the professions. Conflict in
and between organizations is created by the demands that occupational specialization and
external networking place on the firm's division of labor (Scarborough, 1999). The
specialization that is required to foster communities of practice in certain fields tends to
create internal boundaries and rigidities among individuals and groups that can be
interpreted in terms of autonomy versus control or maintaining organic social
relationships versus complying with the requirements of a hierarchy. As a result, there is
a clash between the corporate culture that captures the commitment of managers and the
professional culture that socializes professionals. Knowledge managers are expected to
mange this conflict.
Finally, autopoietic theorists (Nonanka, 1994; Nonaka, Umemoto and Sasaki,
1998; Schuppel, Muller-Stewens and Gomez, 1998; and, Venzin, Von Krogh, and Roos,
1998) assume the world is not represented in knowledge but rather knowledge of the
world is brought forth, created and shared by individuals. Knowledge is not something
abstract and distant but it is embodied and personalized. Knowledge resides in mind,
body and the social system. It is observer and history dependent, context sensitive and
not directly shared. It is only shared indirectly through discussions. Since knowledge is
not directly observable, the resource allocation decisions inherent in knowledge
management cannot always be made explicit and, at times, they are hard to communicate.
Knowledge management, from this perspective, is defined in terms of overcoming
barriers to knowledge development and viewing the manager as a knowledge enabler
(Ichijo, Von Krogh, and Nonaka, 1998). The potential impediments to knowledge
development are mindset, communication, structure, relationship, and human resource
management.
Managing the dynamic, interactive and spiraling sets of processes (Nonaka,
1994) involved in the development, access and movement of knowledge is particularly
evident in a knowledge intensive firm (KIF) (Bonora and Revang , 1993). In a KIF,
employees undergo continual educational processes using teams as a means of socializing
members into a ‘professional corps’ (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). This professional corps
(a) engages in activities which internalizes a set of norms, values, models, knowledge and
a professional language; and (b) trains its members to turn information and experience
into knowledge (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). This knowledge, in turn, accrues to the
organization, which manages it as an “intangible asset” (Mouritsen, 1997).
In summary, organizations store knowledge everywhere – in people, in written
documents, in operations and in organizational culture. Managers are faced with
accessing, storing, creating and transferring the knowledge of an organization to achieve
strategic objectives. Knowledge can either be embedded in the form of mental models,
beliefs or perceptions that are so ingrained they are taken for granted and become
difficult to separate from the individual (tacit) or knowledge is easily transmittable in the
form of symbols (explicit). Knowledge about something can also be a combination of
tacit and explicit knowledge that varies along a continuum between the polar extremes of
tacit and explicit. Knowledge managers adopt strategies intended to develop a system
that shares the tacit knowledge inherent in an on-going practice, and they create explicit
organizational knowledge for future events (Zack, 1999). Chart 1 identifies the
individual, group and organizational components of knowledge management. The
knowledge management process is depicted in Chart 2.
Chart 1. The individual, group and organizational components of knowledge
management according to the knowledge continuum between tacit and explicit
knowledge. *
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tacit Knowledge
Explicit Knowledge
HUMAN CAPITAL
(Individual)
SOCIAL CAPITAL
(Team)
CORPORATE CAPITAL
(Organization)
- Expertise
- Networks
- Intellectual Property
(i.e.- patents and human resources)
- Experience
- Capability
- Creativity
- Capacity
Adaptability
- Relationships
- Interactions
- Language
- Patterning
- Processes
- Databases
- Flexibility
Chart 2 The Knowledge Management Process
*Adapted from Alex Bennet
Department of the Navy
11/29/00 Presentation
The Intergovernmental Response to the West Nile Epidemic
The Existing Knowledge Base in the United States
In September of 1999 when the confirmed diagnosis of WNV, only the Federal
Centers for Disease control and some of the public health community had access to the
explicit knowledge about WNV. Tacit knowledge in this area did not exist. The explicit
knowledge was contained in foreign and domestic professional journals such as - The
Romania Journal of Virology, The Indian Journal of Medical Research, The Lancet,
Canada Communicable Disease Report, Journal of Vector Ecology, Journal of Infectious
Diseases, and the Journal of Emerging Infectious Diseases. These publications dealt
exclusively with the diagnosis, emergence and spread of the WNV in Romania, the Ebordelta region of Spain and the Middle East. This literature identified the mosquito as the
vector for transmission and birds as the reservoir of the disease. The cycle of
transmission was as follows – mosquitoes bite birds and either become infected with
WNV or transmit the virus to uninfected birds. Infected mosquitoes then bite humans and
transmit the disease. Infected birds develop antibodies to WNV and, over time, become
immune to the disease. Infected birds in other countries did not die. Infected humans
developed encephalitis-like symptoms and either recovered or died from the infection.
Both explicit and tacit knowledge pre-existed on the generic collection of
mosquitoes as a result of early experiences with other mosquito-transmitted diseases,
such as malaria and the nuisance control of mosquitoes in residential and wetland areas of
the United States. The control of bothersome mosquitoes also resulted in knowledge
about larviciding (inhibiting the larval development) and adulticiding (spraying of
pesticides to kill adult mosquitoes) for the control and elimination of these mosquitoes.
The medical community had preexisting explicit and tacit knowledge on the
diagnosis and course of treatment for other forms of encephalitis in humans. Other forms
of encephalitis such as the SLE have been present in the United States for decades.
Animal biologists were knowledgeable about laboratory diagnostic procedures for
identifying diseases in insects, birds and other mammals.
When the WNV was first diagnosed in New York in September of 1999, no
knowledge about the etiology, course and prevention of the WNV in the United States
existed. In the United States, explicit knowledge of the WNV on other continents existed,
as did tacit and explicit knowledge about other encephalitic diseases, diagnostic
procedures for humans, insects and mammals and methods and procedures for the control
of insects. Thus, there was an existing knowledge base upon which new knowledge about
the WNV in the United States could be developed and absorbed.
The Storage of Knowledge
Pre-existing knowledge about the epidemiological investigation, prevention,
treatment and control of vector borne diseases, such as WNV, existed in certain
individuals, groups and organizations in the United States in general and in New York
State specifically. Since this paper focuses on the intergovernmental aspects of
knowledge management only organizations and units of those organizations will be
identified and used in the discussion. Chart 3 contains the organizations and units
involved in the New York State response to WNV and indicate what was their stored preexisting knowledge.
The Conversion of Knowledge
Building on existing knowledge, new knowledge about the diagnosis, prevention
and control of the spread of WNV was obtained by a combination of expertise and
experience in respective specialty areas. That is, this new knowledge was tacit and
required conversion. First, the new knowledge was shared among colleagues within a
specialty area through conversations and the exchange of information. Although initial
attempts at
Chart 3. Members of the West Nile Response Organization and Stored knowledge
Jurisdiction
Federal
Department
Health and Human Services
Department of Defense
State
Local
Government
Units
Other
New York State Department of
Health
Unit
Center for Disease
Control
U.S. Military
Academy at West
Point
Commissioner’s
Office
Metropolitan
Regional Office
Office of Public
Health
Information Systems
and Health Statistics
Center for
Environmental
Health
Highly Infectious
Unit, Wadsworth
Laboratory
Center for
Community Health,
Bureau of
Communicable
Disease Control
Stored Knowledge
Arbo-viruses, specialized pathological testing,
epidemiological investigations
Local conditions (located in Orange County, NY)
Strategic planning, policy development, statewide
coordination
Policy implementation
Local health programs and funding
Information technology and data management
Environmental health hazards
Pathological testing of specimens
Arthropod diseases, human diseases, epidemiological
investigation
New York State Department of
Agriculture and Markets
New York State Department of
Fish, Game and Wildlife
New York State Emergency
Management Office
New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation
New York City Department of
Health
Privately owned farms and stock
Dutchess County Department of
Health
Nassau County Department of
Health
Orange County Department of
Health
Putnam County Department of
Health
Rockland County Department of
Health
Suffolk Department of Health
Ulster County Department of
Health
Sullivan County Department of
Health
Westchester County Department
of Health
Wildlife Conservation Society
Rutgers University
Local conditions
Birds and mammal pathological testing and surveillance
Crisis and consequence management
Pesticides
Local conditions
Local conditions
Local conditions
Local conditions
Local conditions
Local conditions
Local conditions
Local conditions
Local conditions
Community concerns
Mosquito collection and abatement
knowledge conversion used some pre-existing, shared scientific explicit knowledge, this
explicit knowledge did not contain all information necessary for action. Since so much
knowledge had to be converted under conditions of extreme urgency, the ‘shorthand’
implicit in tacit to tacit knowledge conversion was essential. This required the tacit
knowledge of one individual to be converted to the tacit knowledge of another individual.
As the knowledge was refined and validated it was converted into explicit knowledge.
The explicit knowledge was codified in many forms including written procedures,
explanatory memoranda, reports, comparative charts, maps and news releases. The new
explicit knowledge was communicated to participants in written and electronic form.
Subsequently, the explicit knowledge was combined to produce summary documents that
were used to facilitate the internalization of this explicit knowledge into the tacit
knowledge of individuals responsible for decision-making at every level of the
organization.
This knowledge conversion process is exemplified by the laboratory testing
procedure used to confirm the presence of WNV in mosquitoes. Laboratory investigation
into the likely geographic source of the WNV indicated 99% homology with a strain
found in Israel in 1998 (existing knowledge base). The initial testing and verification was
done by the CDC in consultation with professionals knowledgeable about the Israel strain
of WNV. Through shared scientific language in both written and spoken forms,
interaction between professionals created new knowledge (tacit to tacit). The staff of the
CDC, then, developed a set of guidelines for laboratory testing of mosquitoes for WNV
(tacit to explicit). After the guidelines were legitimized through internal processes, the
CDC forwarded these guidelines to the NYSDOH executive staff, who in turn, forwarded
them to the NYSDOH, Wadsworth Laboratory where they were integrated into existing
procedures (explicit to explicit). Individuals at the Wadsworth Laboratory followed the
new procedures and learned from their experience (explicit to tacit), and then
communicated their findings to managers (explicit /tacit to explicit/tacit). Managers at the
Wadsworth Laboratories communicated the meaning of the laboratory results to other
managers (tacit to tacit) who produced memoranda and reports (tacit to explicit). These
reports were forwarded upward in the organization for policy direction (explicit to tacit).
This cycle is reflected in Chart 4.
Chart 4. Summary of knowledge conversion process for laboratory procedures for
identification of WNV in American mosquitoes
Israeli mosquitoes
with WNV
(existing
knowledge base)
Policy
makers set
direction
(explicit to
tacit)
Professional
Consultation
between
scientists
(tacit to tacit)
Develop
Guidelines for
Testing
(tacit to explicit)
Managers produce
reports for policy
makers
(explicit/tacit to
explicit)
Managers
communicate to
other managers
(explicit/tacit to
explicit/tacit)
Adapted by
Wadsworth
Laboratory
(explicit to
explicit)
Laboratory
learns about
WNV in US
(explicit to
tacit)
The Transfer of Knowledge
The transfer of knowledge within an agency is constant. Interaction between
employees is necessary for action to occur and action toward strategic objectives is an
expectation of the organization. During this interaction, tacit and explicit knowledge is
being transferred between employees. Interorganizational knowledge transfer occurs in
the same manner, but not with the same intensity or frequency as between employees.
Representatives of organizations interact with the representatives of other organizations
so that action toward their respective organization’s strategic objectives is taken. During
this interaction, tacit and explicit knowledge is being transferred between organizations.
An example of interorganizational knowledge transfer is the intergovernmental
transfer of knowledge about mosquito testing procedures for the presence of WNV. The
Guidelines for Laboratory Procedures developed at the federal level were transferred
(sent) to the state. The NYSDOH executive staff received the guidelines and transferred
(sent) them internally to the Wadsworth Laboratory. The laboratory applied them to
specimens provided by the county and testing results were transferred (sent) to the
county. Explicit and tacit knowledge is transferred through the two-way activity of
interaction. Chart 5 depicts the intergovernmental transfer of knowledge about the
laboratory testing of mosquitoes for WNV.
Chart 5. Intergovernmental transfer of knowledge about the laboratory testing of
mosquitoes for WNV
Federal
CDC
Guidelines
NYSDOH
Guidelines
and
Directives
Wadsworth
Laboratory
Results
Local
Government
Unit
Accepts
Results and
Submits
Specimens
The Knowledge Management Process within the NYSDOH Response to WNV
The organization formed in response to the WNV in New York was not united by
a hierarchical structure and unity of command, but rather by shared values, beliefs,
responsibilities and commitment to a common cause, i.e. the prevention and control of an
epidemic. No single organization, group, or individual was in charge. However, all
members of the organization were committed to the same outcome. The absence of a
unifying command structure which assumes authority over all members is a result of the
intergovernmental nature of the group, and excludes the use of typical access and control
activities commonly found in the private sector knowledge management process.
Knowledge management in the WNV organization was multilayered, multifaceted, and
comprised of cognition, actions, and resources. Knowledge management occurred within
the context of a socially constructed and embedded social network and community of
practice.
All agencies involved in the WNV response organization had pre-existing
relationships. These relationships were formed over an extended period of time as a
result of a diverse set of funding mechanisms (i.e., grants, deficit funding formulas, as
well as complementary and jointly funded program initiatives), and overlapping
governmental jurisdictions (federal, state and local), as well as membership in
professional and intergovernmental organizations (such as the intergovernmental task
forces, the National Academy of Medicine, and various societies for epidemiologists,
public health practitioners, and public health researchers). Embedded in these
relationships was a basic understanding of the differences among members’ area of
responsibility, resource availability and expertise. In such circumstances, where there is
no unifying command structure, the practice of knowledge management is not directive
and exploitative. Rather knowledge management focuses on the elimination of barriers to
the storage, conversion and transfer of knowledge.
In the WNV Response organization, barriers to the exercise of knowledge
management resulted from (a) the bureaucratic determination of job duties and reporting
relationships within each agency, (b) the different language customs between agencies,
(c) the incompatibility of communication systems both within and between agencies, and
(d) the storage of relevant knowledge in diverse locations within and between
organizations. Management of the knowledge-intensive organization required the
empowerment of knowledge workers at all levels in all locations, as well as legitimating
the role of knowledge enablers in resolving conflict between components and in
facilitating the exchange of knowledge that is communicated through information
systems, programs, routines and managerial interchanges. The varying levels of
participating agencies and the lack of directives defining required actions in the WNV
Response organization attests to (1) the “team” nature of the WNV Response
organization and (2) the enabling function (rather than the directive function) of
knowledge management within this organization.
Discussion
Research in the private sector indicates that managers of organizations adopt
strategies intended to efficiently and effectively (1) share an individual’s unique
knowledge (tacit) from an ongoing practice to create written (explicit) knowledge for use
by the organization in future events; (2) transfer written (explicit) knowledge among and
between individuals, units, departments and agencies; (3) create space for the
interpersonal transfer of know-how (tacit knowledge); and (4) design work practices
which permit individuals to self–organize and thereby create know-how (tacit
knowledge) from written materials (explicit knowledge). The case of knowledge
management in the response to the West Nile Virus suggests that the purpose of
knowledge management in intergovernmental organizations closely resembles the
purpose of knowledge management in the private, for profit sector. However, the process
and activities involved in knowledge management different substantially between
intergovernmental public sector organizations and the network or alliances of the private
sector. One might assume that the nature and significance of public-sector work as well
as the pre-existence of communities of practice in the public sector contribute to sector
differences. Knowledge creation in intergovernmental organizations can be supported and
nurtured but it cannot be managed or constructed according to a formula.
The WNV Response Organization emerged from the existing public health
community of practice. This new organization was faced with 4 key challenges: (1) the
technical challenge- to design human and information systems that not only make
information available, but also help community members think together; (2) the social
challenge - to develop communities that share knowledge and still maintain diversity of
thought to encourage thinking rather than sophisticated copying; (3) the management
challenge - to create an environment that truly values sharing knowledge; and (4) the
personal challenge- to be open to the ideas of others, willingness to share ideas, and
maintenance of a thirst for new knowledge.
By linking diverse agencies with different belief systems and different practices
into a cohesive, hybrid organization, the limits of each agency’s knowledge are
challenged. This challenge generates new knowledge through what Hirschhorn (1997)
calls the "productive tension" and what Leonard-Barton (1995) call "creative abrasion".
The conflict caused by the interaction pushes particular agencies and local communities
of practice beyond their own limits. The productive side of organizational tension draws
from experience from throughout the organization, and produces knowledge that requires
systematic, not individual explanation.
The distribution of knowledge within an organization reflects the social division
of labor. As Adam Smith explained, the division of labor is a source of dynamism and
efficiency. Consequently, specialized groups produce specialized knowledge. The tasks
undertaken by communities of practice develop particular, localized and highly
specialized knowledge within the community. This knowledge is as divided as the labor
that produces it. If the division of labor produces the division of knowledge, then it would
seem reasonable that the same method used to coordinate the division of labor (either
markets or hierarchies) could be used to coordinate the knowledge. But markets work
best with commodities and hierarchies, which rely on authority and control. In the
absence of markets and hierarchies, knowledge management is best understood in terms
of conflict resolution.
Knowledge management in intergovernmental organizations can be viewed as
conflict resolution. When different agencies must interact to produce knowledge, a
natural by-product of this interaction is conflict. Organizational conflicts created by
knowledge work are associated with the demands that occupational specialization and
external networking place on the division of labor. Knowledge creation and transfer
occurs at the interface of two or more agencies within the same community of practice.
These agencies may be composed of functional divisions, professional affiliations, and
networked organizations. These differences produce a misalignment in processes and
gaps in knowledge, which must be resolved for knowledge conversion and transfer to
occur. The impetus for conflict resolution comes from the nature and significance of the
work performed and the commitment to a shared vision. The introduction of a new virus
that was unknown and unanticipated by the public health community of practice in the
New York State created a shared vision. All agencies that were members of the virtual
WNV Response Organization shared the same vision, were members of the same
community of practice and were familiar with the ways to work cooperatively to achieve
the desired outcome.
Conclusions
The case of the intergovernmental response to the WNV in New York State
indicates that knowledge management does occur in the public sector. This paper
presented examples of how knowledge is stored and created at various levels of
government, and how knowledge is converted and transferred through the interactions
among different agencies united by a common objective. However, the way in which
knowledge is managed in the public and private sectors differ. Intergovernmental
knowledge management lacks the unity of command and management control present in
the public sector. The public sector has established, long standing communities of
practice that are formed by the accountability of government for the health and welfare of
its constituents. For communities of practice, shared values become the anchor for
generating commitment and cooperation. When values are created together and truly
shared, order is achieved and decisions are made without position power and excessive
rules. Knowledge management within communities of practice requires the recognition
and use of knowledge workers and knowledge enablers as critical components in the
process. In the absence of unity of command and management control, knowledge
managers rely on the organizational dynamics and the activities of knowledge workers
and enablers in communities of practice to store, convert and transfer knowledge. This
paper identifies the need for investigation into the differences between the public and
private sectors understanding of knowledge management, in general, and knowledge
management in communities of practice, specifically.
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